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more than is animal or vegetable oil, and it can in- an unqualified recognition in this State. In the case deed only be so classified in the most general or of Ellicott v. Peterson's Ex'rs, 4 Md. 488, it is said : scientific sense. Dunham v. Kirkpatrick. Opinion by “These principles have been recognized by innumeraGordon, J.
ble decisions both in England and in this country. [Decided Oct. 2, 1882.]
And in pursuance of the principles which they sustain, especially that of the case of Peter v. Compton, Skin
ner, 353, it has been held both in England and in these MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS AB
States, the statute will not apply where the contract STRACT.
can by any possibility be fulfilled or completed in the JUNE, 20 1883. *
space of a year, although the parties may have intended its operations should extend through a much
longer period." Cole v. Singerly. PENALTY - TURNPIKE CHARTER IGNORANCE
Opinion by Yel
lot, J. LAW-ILLEGAL TOLL.-(1) Ignorance of the law will not excuse the offender, and consequently evidence of such ignorance is inadmissible. (2) If the stockholders
VERMONT SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. of a turnpike company accept a charter, coupled with
MAY TERM, 1883. * the condition and privilege to increase the tolls, provided they complied with certain pre-requisites, and HIGHWAY-LIABILITY OF TOWN FOR DEFECT CAUSat a certain time the company has no right to increase ING INJURY-DEFECT NEED NOT BE IN WAY.-In order the tolls without first complying with such pre-re- to render a town liable for injury to a traveler on the quisites, and at the time designated. Grumbine v. highway from a defect, it is not necessary that the deState of Maryland. Opinion by Stone, J.
fect be in the way, if it is in such close proximity as to PARENT AND CHILD-MOTHERS RIGHT TO RECOVER
render travelling along the way dangerous. In Hay.
den v. Attlebore, 7 Gray, 338, the injury arose from FOR NEGLIGENT INJURY TO SON-DAMAGES-- HIGHWAY -CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. — (1) A mother sued
being precipitated into a cellar that was either within the county commissioners of Hartford county to re
the limits of the way or in such close proximity
thereto as to render travelling along the way dangercover for injury done to her minor son, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants
ous. The defect complained of was the want of a railin not keeping a publie road in repair, over which the
ing. The court said that the want of a railing necesson was riding at the time he was injured. The father
sary to the safety of travellers was a defect in the way
itself, for which the town was liable. In Coggswell v. had died before the injury occurred. Held, that the
Lexington, 4 Cush. 307, the injury was occasioned by a mother, the father being dead, was entitled to recover for the services of her minor son, provided he was at
post outside the way as located. The court not decidthe time of the iujury actually living with and sup
ing whether the town had the right as against the
owner of the land on which the post stood to enter and ported by her. That if the son were thus living with
remove it, said "it clearly had the right, and it was its aud supported by his mother, she was clearly entitled to recover for the care and labor of nursing him, and
duty, if it could not lawfully remove the post, to place
such a fence or other barrier between it and the road the expense and cost of medicines and medical attendance to which she was subjected on account of his in
as would bare rendered the road safe.” The law of
Massachusetts on this subject is tersely stated by jury, and which she procured for him. That the
Gray, C. J., in the recent case of Puffer v. Orange, 122 plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the pain and suffering of her son, nor for her own anxiety and
Mass. 389. “A town is bound to erect barriers or railsuffering on his account. (2) The care and caution re
ings, where a dangerous place is in such close quired of one travelling on a public road is simply such
proximity to the highway as to make travelling on the as persons of common prudence ordinarily exercise.
highway unsafe. But it is not bound to do so, to preCommissioners of Hartford County v. Hamilton.
vent travellers from straying from the highway, Opinion by Miller, J.
although there is a dangerous place at some distance
from the highway which they may reach by so straySTATUTE OF FRAUDS-AGREEMENT NOT TO BE PER- ing.” In Warner v. Holyoke, 112 Mass. 362, the court FORMED WITHIN YEAR.-. .-The defendant on the 8th of
says: “The law has nowhere undertaken to define at March, 1880, while negotiating for the purchase of a what distance in feet and inches a dangerous place mill, found the plaintiff in charge of the same, and said must be from the highway in order to cease to be in to him: "If I buy this mill from M. P., I will employ close proximity to it. It must necessarily be a practic you to take charge of it for a year, and will pay you cable question, to be decided by the good sense and $1000 a year.” The plaintiff accepted the offer, and experience of the jury.” It seems to us that this is was afterward notified by the defendant that he had
the only practical rule that can be adopted; and that made the purchase. The plaintiff, on the day he was as a general rule, it is for the jury to say, in the concrete 80 notified, entered the service of the defendant, and case, whether the place is sufliciently near the highwas soon afterward discharged. In an action by him
way to render travelling upon it unsafe unless guarded for a breach of the contract, it was held, that conceding against, and that, as said in Adams v. Natick, 13 Allen, there was a perfect contract entered into by the 432, this “must be determined by the character of the parties on the 8th day of March, 1880, the remedy upon place or object between which and the travelled road it was not barred by the Statute of Frauds as being for it is claimed that the barrier should be interposed.'' services not to be completed within a year. When As said by Hoar, J., in Alger v. Lowell, 3 Allen, 405 : there is a possibility that the services may be per- “The true test is not whether the dangerous place is formed within a year. the remedy for a breach of the outside of the way, or whether some small strip of contract is not barred by the statute. In Fen
ground not included in the way must be traversed in ton v. Emblers, 3 Burrows, 1281, it is said: “The reaching the danger, but whether there is such a risk Statute of Frauds plainly means an agreement not to of a traveller, using ordinary care in passing along the be performed within the space of a year, and expressly the street, being thrown or falling into the dangerous and specifically so agreed. A contingency is not place that a railing is requisite to make the way itself within it; por any case that depends upon contin- safe and convenient." Drew v. Town of Sutton. Opingency.” This construction of the statute has received ion by Rowell, J. *To appear in 60 Maryland Reports.
* Appearing in 55 Vermont Reports.
LIBEL-AMBIGUOUS CHARGE — EVIDENCE - OTHER Court, to be that a common carrier of goods cannot by STATEMENTS TO SHOW ANIMUS.-(1) In an action for contract relieve himself from liability for his own ueg. a libel, where the language used is ambiguous or iron- ligence. Christenson v. American Express Co., 15 ical, the plaiutiff's acquaintances may state their un. Minn. 270; Shriver v. Sioux City & St. P.R. Co., 24 id. derstanding as to whom the libellous charge refers, and 506; Railroad Co. v Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Bank of what it imputes. As Abbott, C. J., in Bourke v. War- Kentucky v. Adams Ex. Co., 93 U, S. 174. Nor is there ren, 2C. & P. 307, says: “It is not necessary that all any reason why a different rule should prevail in rethe world should understand the libel; it is sufficient spect to the transportation of live-stock, or of property if those wbo know the plaintiff can make out that he under the care of the owner. The rule itself rests is the person meant." The doctrine that in such upon considerations of public policy, and upon the cases the witness may state his understanding of the fact that to allow the carrier to absolve himself language used is recognized in 2 Greenl. Ev., $ 417; from the duty of exercising care and fidelity is inLeonard v. Allen, 11 Cush. 241; Stacy v. Port. Pub. consistent with the very nature of his undertaking. Co., 68 Me. 279; Smith v. Miles, 15 Vt. 245; Odgers Moulton v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba R. Co. Libel and Slander, 539. (2) The defendant, after suit Opinion by Dickinson, J. was brought, published another article referring to the [Decided Aug. 2, 1883.] plaintiff by name. It was admissible to show the animus, the intention, in publishing the first article.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. Also what one of the defendants said, a few days after the first publication, manifesting a hostile feeling THE following decisions were handed down Fritoward the plaintiff, was admissible. “Any words
day, February 8, 1884. written or spoken of the plaintiff before or after those
Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide sued on, or even after the commencement of the
event. The appeal from the order denying the motion action, are admissible to show the animus of the de
to vacate the order of arrest dismissed, with costs fendant.” Odgers, 271. “The second paragraph was admissible to show what the intention of the defend
against the appellant, Edwin L. Hayes-Agnes Y.
Humphrey, respondent, v. Mary E. Hayes and another, ant was in publishing the first.” Bosanquet, J., in
appellants. — Judgment affirmed, with costs against Barwell v. Adkins, 1 Man. & Gra. 807. Knapp v. FulOpinion by Powers, J.
the appellant-In re Estate of John C. Zabrt.-Judg
ment affirmed with costs-Henry C. Simms, respond. SALE-CONDITIONAL SALE OF CHATTEL — FORFEI- ent, v. George Vogt and another, appellants; Michael TURE-DEMAND-WAIVER. - By the conditional sale if
Hynes, respondent,v. Thomas E.Patterson and another, the vendee failed to pay the note according to its
appellants; Louis De V. Wilder, appellant, v. Lafay.
ette Ranney and another, respondents; George W. tenor, he forfeited what he had paid, and the vendor
Mead, respondent, v. Mary C. Jenkins and others, apcould take the wagon. There was a failure to fully pellants: George Godfrey, administrator, etc., respondpay; but the vendor allowed the wagon to remain with ent, v. Ogden P. Pell, appellant.-Judgment of Genthe vendee; and he accepted payments after the last eral Term reversed; that of Special Term affirmed installment was due. Without making a demand he
with costs--Susan M. Murray and another, executors, brought suit to recover the balance of the note, attach
respondents, V. Phebe Marshall, appellant.-Judge
ment of General Term reversed; that of Special Term ing the wagon and holding it by virtue of the attach
modified according to opinion, costs of both parties to ment until the trial commenced, when he entered a be paid out of the estate of testator-Jeanie De F. K. non-suit, and claimed to hold it under the written Barbour, an infant, appellant, v. Robert W. De Forest contract. Held if a demand were necessary the bring
and another, executors, respondents.-Judgment reing of the suit was sufficient. By making the attach
versed, new tria granted, costs to abide the event-. ment the defendant did not waive his right to the
John J. Townsend, respondent, v. New York Life h
surance and Trust Co., appellant.-Judgment afwagon under the conditional sale; nor was he estopped firmed with costs to the respondent, and appellants to from asserting his right. Nor did he waire the causes be paid out of the estate-Walter P. Tillman, in his of forfeiture arising from default of payment by ac- own right and as executor, v. Eliza Augusta Davis, cepting payments after the note was due. Hutchings
and the executors of William N. Davis, appellants, and Munger, 41 N. Y. 155; Manufacturing Co. v. Teetzlaff,
Isaac E. Bird, impleaded, etc., respondent. Judg.
ment affirmed with costs to the respondent, payable 13 Rep. 511; Taylor v. Finley, 48 Vt. 78. Matthews v.
out of the fund-- Ann Reese, respondent, v. William Lucia. Opinion by Rowell, J.
Smythe, superintendent, etc., appellant.- -Order af. firmed with costs-In re Application of the New York,
West Shore & Buffalo R. Co., to acquire lands, respond MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. ent, of Johanna Par and others, appellants. — Appeal
dismissed with costs-Bolton Hall and others, appel
lants, v. United States Reflector Co., respondent. CARRIER-CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY DOES NOT The cases argued were: Appeal from judgment of afEXCUSE NEGLIGENCE.- A contract contained in a firmance by General Term of a conviction of misdeshipping bill given by a railroad company, and agreed
meanor and sentence to pay a fine of $25. Argued by to by the shipper relieving the company from liability
William F. Kintzing for appellant; Johu Vincent, asfor loss in transporting horses. Held not to relieve the
sistant district-attorney for respondent-People, re
spoudent, V. John M. Myres, appellaut.—Appeal company from liability for loss through its own negli- from judgment of General Term, first department, afgence. A railroad company which undertakes to firming judgment rendered upon the verdict of a jury, transport live-stock for hire for such persons as choose Argued by A. J. Vanderpoel for appellants; S. P. to employ it, assumes the relation of a common car
Nash for respondents-John L. Sutherland and another, rier, and becomes chargeable with the duties and obli.
executors, respondents, v. Lauren C. Woodruff, ap
pellant. -Appeal from judgment of General Term, gations which are incident to that relation. Kimball
reversing the order and decree of the Surrogate's v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 26 Vt. 247; Rixford v. Smith, Court of Chautauqua county. Submitted - Nancy 52 N. H. 355; Clarke v. Rochester & S. R. Co., 14 N. Watts and others, respondents, 5. James Ronald, executY. 570; Evans v. Fitchburg R. Co., 111 Mass. 142; St. tor, etc., appellant. — Appeal from judgment of af. Louis & S. E. R. Co. v. Dorman, 72 Ill. 504; Powell v.
firmance by General Term of the decree of the SurroPennsylvania R. Co., 32 Penn. St. 414; Great Western
gate's Court of Queens county in admitting a codicil of
the last will and testament of Margaret Woolley to R. Co. v. Hawkins, 18 Mich. 427, 433. The law has
probate-Benjamin Woolley, executor, appellant, v. been determined in this State, and in most of the Sarah E. Woolley and Minor Onderdonk, respondents. United States, as well as in the Federal Supreme The court took a recess to Feb. 25.
our western contemporary confesses that he is. But The Albany Law Journal.
we still suspect that lynching prevails in the west
because of a public disbelief in the ability and inALBANY, FEBRUARY 23, 1884. dependence of judges as well of as prosecuting at
torneys. We do not have any lynching in this
State, whatever may be the reason for it in the CURRENT TOPICS.
west. TOME recent citations in this journal from 31st Hun were by misprint attributed to 30th Hun.
The Central Law Journal gets more excited over the matter than is necessary, and talks of our
“grotesque humor," "abuse,” “taking offense,” It is amusing to see how earnest our western con
We hope that our brother does not carry any temporaries, the Chicago Legal News, the Central weapon more deadly than a “pocket pistol," else Law Journal, and the Denver Law Journal are in this temper of his may prove dangerous to his near opposition to the judges' gowns. We stirred up a neighbors. But he continues: “If the judges of hornet's nest by saying "it would not hurt our New York must be dressed in silk before the peowestern communities if their courts were held in ple will treat them with respect, then we think our higher respect.
Better have judges in Albany contemporary would be more in place in gowns than lynchers in masks.” Upon this the confining its attention to home necessities, rather Dencer Law Journal remarks: “We agree with our than in casting slurs at our western courts. The contemporary in these sentiments expressed by him. western courts of last resort are held in as high reBut would judges in gowns prevent lynchers in spect by the people as that of New York, and the masks? Would the presence of a judge in his ability of the western bench will compare with that gown repel a party of lynchers about to inflict the of the court whose members our contemporary penalty of death upon a red handed murderer, of would robe. If there is a marked lack of respect whose guilt there is no doubt? We believe that in western communities for the administration of the true remedy is to have a more honest adminis-justice, it is for the verdicts of juries, and not for tration of the law, to make the prosecuting officer the opinions of the courts of last resort. Occasionan appointive instead of an elective officer, depend-ally the latter make mistakes, and we have freely ing for his position on the votes of the very class criticised them, but we have never conceived the of people who are most frequently amenable to the idea of concealing their lack of ability, if there be law. We would give the State the benefit of the any such lack, by covering them with robes, whereablest counsel experienced in law, instead ef select- with to inspire the people with awe. We have no ing for prosecutor some beardless youth just out of hesitation in saying that we would give more for a law school, or as is more frequently the case, some the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan than frequenter of the corner grocery or pot-house poli-| for that of New York's pet court, even if its judges tician, ignorant often of the very elements of were in gowns. Yet this is one of the courts criminal law. It is the want of ability in the which deals with the interests of our western comprosecutor, while the defendant has the ablest and munities.” So it seems that the objectors do not most astute counsel, and the tendency of the courts agree among themselves. According to the Central to give every advantage to the defendant, which lynching springs from lack of confidence in the so often results in a miscarriage of justice, and cre- verdicts of juries, and not from the inefficiency of ates a want of confidence in our courts. Out of the public prosecutors, as the Denver writer puts this arises lynch law. Can a gown restore confi- it. In many of the western States the public have dence in the integrity of a court, in which a man so little confidence in their judges that they forbid of whose guilt there can be no question, is set at them to comment on the facts to the jury. The liberty through a mere technicality ? Confidence books are full of new trials for disregard of this in the honesty of the judge begets respect for the injunction. We are not so much afraid of our court, and such respect is far more desirable, and judges as that. But a public that cannot trust its tends more to elevate the popular ideas of law and own juries may well muzzle its judges, and ought of the courts than all the gowns with which the to, to be consistent. There certainly is no better judges could be robed. Prompt, swift and impar-court than the Supreme Court of Michigan, as we tial justice administered by the courts is the true have more than once before remarked, but would mode of elevating the popular idea of law and of the Central Law Journal think any less of it if its the court. We suggest that our contemporary join judges should put on gowns? After all, our west with us in laboring to elevate the popular idea of ern brethren may be right about the dress of their the law and the courts by insisting on the prompt, judges. We do not assume to dictate. Has it speedy and impartial administration of justice by ever occurred to them that our judges and our bar the courts, and dispense with gowns for the judges." may be the better fitted to pronounce upon the This of course goes mainly to the matter of the ineffi- question in our own State? When our judges put ciency of the prosecuting attorneys, and yet we do on the gowns, as we suppose they will, the reports not see how having the judge wear a gown could ren of the Court of Appeals of this state, we predict, der the prosecuting attorney any less efficient than will not fall off in circulation in the west.
VOL. 29 – No. 8.
A correspondent of the Delhi Republican also op- us, that it leaves no room for a reply. Some adposes the gowns, and says we are “cool if not mod-mirer of Mr. Carter has come out in The Nation with est.” We hope we are both. The gowns are both. a pronunciamento against codification, in which The correspondent quotes De Tocqueville's approba- there is an amusing attempt to conceal favoritism tory comment on the absence of “ceremo- under the guise of impartiality. We have the nial costumes," and dwells the custom greatest respect for The Nation's literary ability and of our judges to sit without gowns, and authority; none at all for its politics or its law. We distinguishes the case of military uniforms be- never knew it to be right on a legal matter yet. cause they are prescribed by law, but he has not a Even The Nation concedes the usefulness of "temword to say about the gowns of the Supreme Court porary statutes,” but it prefers that the judges shall judges. He also speaks of the superior simplicity make them. All these theorists will find themselves of the early times of the republic, forgetful of defeated one of these days – perhaps not this year Washington's four- (or six-) horse State carriage, nor next — by the success of what they deny. The and of the insuperable etiquette of the old White man will get up and walk in spite of their denial House. The correspondent of course quotes the of the power of motion. Meantime we turn and somewhat familiar expression about crooking the point from Mr. Carter and The Nation to Story, pregnant hinges of the knee, but he winds up with Metcalf and Greenleaf, and we ask our readers to an entirely unique and telling metaphor of “our peruse their opinion of codification given in our democratic pyramid of liberty, fraternity and last issue, and the opinions of the current working equality.” We have not proposed to go back to of the system in California. There is just one point the pyramids, but only to the fathers who put in which The Nation is right. The Code of Civil gowns on their judges, and whose degenerate off- Procedure, as it now stands, is an argument against spring left them off through carelessness.
codification. Mr. Throop spoiled Mr. Field's Code.
Let us be careful to avoid another voluminous and Speaking of robes, we betook ourself to Wash- obscuring glossary of this kind. ington the last week to behold a sight which we had never seen — the Supreme Court in session, and to see if there is really any thing so objectiona- The Tribune is circulating postal cards, with a reble about their robes. To our disappointment we quest for answers to these questions. “1. Are you found the court taking a vacation for the month, in favor of Codification of the Common Law in this which it seems is their uniform custom. " Vaca- State ? 2. Are you in favor of the proposed • Field tion" means a time for consultation and writing Civil Code ?' 3. Why?” The Tribune ought to opinions. We were enabled, however, to see the have added: “4. Have you read the proposed court in detail, and to hear from them individually, 'Field Civil Code?'” We have a strong suspicion which was much pleasanter than to hear some that the answers to questions one and two from the tedious lawyer lecturing them on elementary princi-class to whom the Tribune will send will be unaniples, and to undergo the possible shock of the monsly in the negative, and that the answers to robes. We also visited the chambers of our Na- question four would be nine-tenths in the negative. tional legislators, and although perhaps it is a little outside our jurisdiction we will venture to suggest that it would be better manners if the Senate Sir John Mellor does not believe in oaths, and would not compel the chaplain to pray for empty declares that he is “profoundly convinced by a seats at noon, and if the leading members of the long judicial experience of the general worthlessHouse would not smoke in public session. Also ness of oaths, especially in cases in which their that the atmosphere of both chambers is perfectly falsity cannot be tested by cross-examination, or be abominable— literally as bad as that of an Irish tene- criminally punished,” and that therefore he “has meut house. Our own capitol has cost a good deal | become an advocate for the abolition of oaths as a of money, and one of the rooms is deficient in test of truth.” Bentham and Pothier were of the acoustic properties, but all are well ventilated. like opinion. The latter said: “A man of integ.
rity does not require the obligation of an oath to A correspondent, whose communication appears prevent his demanding what is not due to him, and in another column, thinks that we were not respect- a dishonest man is not afraid of incurring the guilt ful enough to Mr. Carter's pamphlet on Codification. of perjury. In the exercise of my profession for We thought we paid it the greatest respect by read- more than forty years I have not more than twice ing it. We hope we said nothing disrespectful. known a party restrained by the sanctity of the The worst we said of it was that it was too long, oath from persisting in what he had before asserted." and that very few would read it. We stick to this, All this is chimerical. Unless it is conceded that and we think Mr. Carter will realize the truth of oaths induce perjury, they must be useful at least our criticism when he reads (as we presume he will) as a profession that the witness is telling the truth, Mr. Field's short answer an answer so short that and recognizes the solemnity of his situation. But everybody will be sure to read it without troubling oaths tend to make truthful men careful, moderate, themselves about the pamphlet to which it is an and candid, however ineffectual they may be with answer, and an answer so conclusive, as it seems to dishonest men.
NOTES OF CASES.
any preparation wbich could be recommended and sold for the same purpose.' This stipulation does not forbid him to manufacture and sell such a
an injunction will be granted to restrain the maker not himself use his name, or permit his name to be of a compound from using his name, or the trade- | used, on any such preparation. The only restraint mark of the medicine, when for a good considera
the covenant imposes on him is that his name shall tion he has sold the right to make and vend it, and
not appear by his consent on any such preparations. has stipulated that he will not use his own name, Can this stipulation be said to be in general reor permit another to use it for that purpose, and has straint of trade, or is it not rather a partial restraint, transferred his trade-mark thereto to the purchaser. and is it at all unreasonable? The absence of his The court said: “A contract is declared void un
name may limit the sales of any new preparation he der our Code when it is 'in general restraint of may compound; the preparation may be wanting in trade.' Code, $ 2750. This is but the announce- the magic word, but for its absence he contracted ment of a principle long recognized in the common and received a consideration therefor. He may law. In the case of Holmes v. Martin, 10 Ga. 503, compound and sell a score of other nostrums to cure this court announced, in construing a contract in- the diseases for which the ‘Lung Restorer' is fitted; volving this question: "A contract in general re- the only exhibition is, he must not put on them the straint of trade is void, but if in partial restraint cabalistic word ‘Brewer,' and thus violate the conof trade only, it may be supported, provided the tract into which he has entered. That he has done restraint is reasonable, and the contract founded on this the evidence abundantly shows, when he puba consideration. This distinction between such
lished and offered upon the market ‘Brewer's Sarstipulations as are in general restraint of trade, and saparilla Syrup, professing to be a permanent cure such as are in restraint of it only “as to particular for all diseases of the lungs and throat.” places and persons or for a limited time,' has long been recognized both in England and America; the latter, if founded on a good and valuable considera- For a lawyer's wife to make her husband's clerk tion, are valid; the former are invariably prohib- | jealous of her husband is "extreme cruelty,” justiited. The reason assigned for this difference is, fying a divorce. In Carpenter v. Carpenter, Kansas that all general restraints tend to promote monopo- Supreme Court, November 9, 1883, 1 Pac. Rep. 122, lies and tend to discourage industries, enterprise, it appeared that the defendant prepared and sent and fair competition, which reason does not apply anonymous letters to a clerk in the office of her husto partial restraints. This distinction between gen-band, falsely charging that a criminal intimacy exeral restraints and partial restraints has been recog- isted between her husband and the wife of such nized by this court also in 30 Ga. 414; 45 id. 319; clerk; and also prepared and sent anonymous let58 id. 567. This question was elaborately discussed ters to the editors of newspapers at Leavenworth, and many cases reviewed and cited in the leading making similar charges, with the expectation that case of Morse Drill and Machine Co. v. Morse, 103 such charges would be published in the newspapers Mass. 73. In Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R., 9 and be made public. Her husband, at the time, Eq. 345, the plaintiffs purchased a right of a cer- was a member of a church, and professed to be an tain process of manufacture, with an agreement by honest and faithful Christian, and had high aspirathe vendors that they would not directly or indi- tions for political preferment. These charges not rectly carry on, nor would they, to the best of their only tended to wound his feelings and to destroy power, allow to be carried on by others in any part his peace and happiness, and to impair his bodily of Europe, any company or manufactory having health, but they were also naturally calculated to such manufacture for its object, or in any way put his life in jeopardy; they were naturally calcuinterfere with the exclusive enjoyment of the lated, if the clerk believed that they were true, and purchasing company of the benefits agreed to be that a criminal intimacy existed between the plaintpurchased. It was held that the restraint was rea- iff and the clerk's wife, to cause the clerk to take sonable, and not greater, having regard to the sub- vengeance on the plaintiff. Held, that this conduct ject-matter of the contract, than was necessary for on the part of the plaintiff's wife constituted "exthe protection of the purchasers, and it was en- treme cruelty," within the meaning of the statute. forced against the vendors. But are the covenants The court said: “The legal question that arises of this contract in general restraint of trade? The upon these facts is whether they constitute 'extreme stipulation which, it is alleged, is void for all that cruelty' or not, within the meaning of the divorce cause is in these words: 'I agree never to use, or statute. It was formerly thought that to constitute permit my name to be used, or any preparation extreme cruelty, such as would authorize the grantwhich could be recommended and sold for the same ing of a divorce, physical violence was necessary; purpose.' Defendant below had already stipulated but the modern and better considered cases have and did sell all his interest, with trade-mark, etc., repudiated this doctrine as taking too low and senin the ‘Lung Restorer' to the defendants in error. sual a view of the marriage relation; and it is now Then in the stipulation above he agrees further very generally held that any unjustifiable conduct never to use, or permit my name to be used, on on the part of either the husband or wife which so