id. 438; Talmadge v. Talmadge, 66 Ala. 199; Taney's Appeal, 97 Penn. St. 74; Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Mass. 158. Administration where a decedent dies in itinere, Hilliard v. Cox, 1 Salk. 37; Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. 750; Griffith v. Griffith, Sayer, 83; Allen v. Orans, 2 B. & Ad. 423; Well's case, 15 Jur. 160; White v. Rose, 3 Q. B. 493; Grant v. Great Western R. R., 7 U. C. C. P. 438; Fayette v. Livermore, 62 Me. 229. - JOHN H. STEWART, REPORTER. RELEASE OF DOWER CONSIDERATION FOR W PROMISE. NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT.* RUNDLETT v. Ladd. A relinquishment of dower by a wife may be a good and valuable consideration for a payment by her husband to her of a sum of money equal to the value of her dower right. As against his creditors the validity of such payment, like the validity of his conveyances of property to other persons, depends upon its being free from fraud. RIT of entry. The land was conveyed September 14, 1859, by the former owner, to the defendant, who is the wife of Daniel W. Ladd. She paid money for it when she received the deed. She received the money from her husband in the summer of 1859. Between 1850 and 1858 her husband sold other land, called the Hanson farm, in different parcels, to different persons, When the deeds were made, she refused to sign them unless a part of the money received for the farm was paid to her. Her husband promised to pay her a certain sum and she signed the deeds. The money he paid her, in the summer of 1859, was paid in performance of this promise. At the time he paid her the money, he was indebted to the plaintiff and to other persons. The plaintiff obtained a judgment and execution against him, and levied the execution ou the land which had been conveyed to his wife. The plaintiff excepted to the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that a verbal agreement between the husband and wife, that he would at some future time pay her for releasing her dower in the Hanson farm, was of no legal validity, and created no valid debt from the husband to the wife; aud that he had no lawful right to pay any money to her for such release as against any person to whom he owed a debt at the time of said payment." The question of fraud in the transaction between the defendant and her husband was submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict for the defendant. Stickney and Wiggin, for plaintiff. Worcester & Gafney, and Heath & Fink, for defend aut. FOSTER, J. The exception cannot be sustained. The dower right in the Hanson farm, which the defendant released, belonged not to her husband, but to her. It could not be conveyed by him, nor taken by his creditors on execution. Drew v. Munsey, Smith (N. H.) 317, 320; Bassett v. Bassett, 10 N. H. 64; Hallowell v. Simonson, 21 Ind. 398. Its value could be ascertained. Jackson v. Edwards, 7 Paige, 386, 408; Doty v. Baker, 11 Hun, 222, 225; Bartlett v. Van Zandt, 4 Sandf. Ch. 396. It does not appear that she received more than the value of it. Her husband's creditors, being unable to take it for his debts, were not injured by her receiving a part of the price for which the farm was sold, equal to the value of what she released. If she had not signed the deeds, the sum she received would not have been paid by the purchaser of the farm. If the farm had not been sold, and his creditors *To appear in 59 New Hampshire Reports. had levied executions on it, his interest in it would have been appraised and set off in payment of his debts, not at the value of the farm, but at the value of the farm, subject to her right of dower, the value of the farm less the value of her dower right. Her relinquishment of her right might be a good and valuable consideration for his paying her its value. As against the plaintiff, the validity of the payment, like the validity of his conveyances of property to other persons, depended upon its being free from fraud. Low v. Carter, 21 N. H. 433; Nims v. Bigelow, 45 id. 343; Lavender v. Blackstone, 2 Levinz, 146, 137; Motey v. Sawyer, 38 Me. 68, 74; Bullard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533, 541; Needham v. Sanger, 17 id. 500, 509; Garlick v. Strong, 3 Paige, 440; Doty v. Baker, 11 Hun, 222; Smart v. Haring, 14 id. 276; Quarles v. Lacy, 4 Munf. 251; Blanton v. Taylor, Gilmer, 209; Taylor v. Moore, 2 Rand. (Va.)563; Hale v. Plummer, 6 Ind. 121; Hallowell v. Simonson, 21 id. 398; Ward v. Crotty, 4 Met. (Ky.) 59; Marshall v Hutchinson, 5 B. Mon. 298, 307; Woodson v. Pool, 19 Mo. 340; Wright v. Stanard, 2 Brock. 311; 2 Kent Com. 174; 2 Story Eq., § 1372; Atherly Mar. Set. 162; 1 Bishop Mar. Women, §§ 720, 722-725, 758. Judgment on the verdict. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. JANUARY, 1884. APPEAL-RULE WHERE RECORD DOES NOT CONTAIN WHOLE TESTIMONY.-Where an appeal was made by defendants below on the ground of a refusal to admit evidence offered, the Appellate Court refused to reverse the judgment on the ground that as the record did not contain all the testimony, the court could not see that defendants were injured by the refusal to admit the testimony. Held error; the farthest any court has gone has been to hold, that when such court can see affirmatively that the error worked no injury to the party appealing, it will be disregarded. This court, in Deery v. Cray, 5 Wall. 807, used this language: "Wherever the application of this rule is sought, it must appear so clear as to be beyond doubt that the error did not and could not have prejudiced the party's rights." Gilmer v. Higley. Opinion by Miller, J. CORPORATION -RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDERS TO RESTRAIN ACTION OF DIRECTORS— ESTOPPEL.- Shareholders in a railroad company who made no opposition at the time to a contract by which the company acquired the ownership of another railroad, and to the issue of bonds by the company, held not entitled to interfere with the transactions. A stockholder must make a better showing of wrongs which he has suffered, and also of efforts to obtain relief against them, before a court of equity will interfere and set aside the transactions of a railway company or of its directors. It is not enough that there may be a doubt as to the authority or of the directors as to the wisdom of their proceedings. Grievances, real and substantial, must exist, and before an individual stockholder can be heard he must show, in the language of this court, that "he has exhausted all the means within his reach to obtain, within the corporation itself, the redress of his grievances or action in conformity to his wishes." Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450. Dimpfel v. Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Co. Opinion by Field, J. EQUITY-ACTION TO QUIET TITLE.-A purchaser at a tax sale to whom deeds had been executed, and who was entitled to possession whose title might be questioned by an adverse claimant for defects in the tax proceedings and upon other grounds, held entitled to maintain a suit under the Nebraska Statute in the nature of a bill quia timet. Authorities cited: Adams Eq. 202; Pomeroy Eq. Jur., § 248; Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall. 409; Curtis v. Sutter, 15 Cal. 257; Shipley v. Rangeley, Daveis, 242; Devonsher v. Newenham, 2 Sch. & Lef. 208; Alexander v. Pendleton, 8 Cranch, 462; Peirson v. Elliott, 6 Pet. 95; Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263; Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 99; Broderick Will Case, 21 Wall. 520. Holtand v. Challen. Opinion by Field, J. INTEREST-REFUSED FOR LACHES-ACTION FOR EXCESSIVE DUTIES.-Interest refused as damages where there was unreasonable laches in prosecuting a suit for the recovery back of excessive duties paid. Interest is given on money demands as damages for delay in payment, being just compensation to the plaintiff for a default on the part of his debtor. Where it is reserved expressly in the contract, or is implied by the nature of the promise, it becomes part of the debt, and is recoverable as of right; but when it is given as damages, it is often matter of discretion. In cases of recoveries for excessive duties paid under protest, it was held in Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. 75, that the jury might add interest, the plaintiff ordinarily being entitled to it from the time of the illegal exaction. But where interest is recoverable, not as part of the contract, but by way of damages, if the plaintiff has been guilty of laches in unreasonably delaying the prosecution of his claim, it may be properly withheld. Bann v. Dalzell, 3 C. & P. 376; Newell v. Keith, 11 Vt. 214; Adams Express Co. v. Milton, 11 Bush, 49. Redfield v. Ystalyeera Iron Co. Opinion by Matthews, J. JURISDICTION--FEDERAL QUESTION. Where a finding as to a defense not involving a Federal question is broad enough to maintain the decree, even though a Federal question involved in an other defense was decided wrong, the decree will be affirmed by this court without considering that question or expressing any opinion upon it. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, sustains this pratice. Jenkins v. Loewenthal. Opinion by Waite, C. J. - INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT MUNICIPAL BONDS WAGON BRIDGE.-A wagon bridge across the Platte river is a work of internal improvement, within the meaning of the statute of Nebraska of February 15, 1869; and that statute makes it the duty of county commissioners to levy a tax on the taxable property within a precinct in whose behalf bonds have been issued under that statute to aid in constructing such a bridge, sufficient to pay the annual interest on the bonds, and without regard to any limit imposed by, or voted in accordance with chapter 9 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes of 1866. United States v. Commissioners of Dodge. Opinion by Gray, J. PATENT-PROOF UNDER GENERAL DENIAL.-Under a general denial of the patentee's priority of invention, evidence of prior knowledge and use taken without objection is competent at the final hearing on the question of the validity of the patent. Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 395. Zane v. Soffe. Opinion by Bradley, J. REVENUE-APPRAISEMENT BY CUSTOMS-OFFICERS NOT REVIEWABLE BY JURY.-Under the statutes of Congress the appraisement by the custom officers, where duties have been paid under protest, cannot be reviewed by a jury in a suit to recover back duties. If in every suit brought to recover duties paid under protest, the jury were allowed to review the appraisement made by the customs officers, the result would be great uncertainty and inequality in the collection of duties on imports. It is quite possible that no two juries would agree upon the value of different invoices of the same goods. The legislation of Congress, referred to was designed to exclude any such method of ascertaining the dutiable value of goods. This court in referring to the general policy of the laws for the collection of duties, said in Bartlett v. Kane, 16 How. 263, "the interposition of the courts in the appraisement of importations would involve the collection of the revenue in inextricable confusion." And referring to section 3 of the act of March 3,1851, which is reproduced in section 2930 of the Revised Statutes, this court declared, in Belcher v. Linn, 24 How. 508, that in the absence of fraud, the decision of the customs officers is final and conclusive, and their appraisement, in contemplation of law, becomes for the purpose of calculating and assessing the duties due to the United States, the true dutiable value of the importation." To the same effect see Tappan v. United States, 2 Mason, 393, and Bailey v. Goodrich, 2 Cliff. 600. Hilton v. Merritt. Opinion by Woods, J. STATUTE -- PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION While if there is ambiguity or doubt a practical construction of a statute by officials acting under it for a long time, would be in the highest degree persuasive, if not absolutely controlling, in its effect, with language clear and precise and with its meaning evident there is no room for construction, and consequently no need of any thing to give it aid. The cases to this effect are numerous. Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206; United States v. Temple, 105 U. S. 97; Swift Co. v. United States, id. 695; Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 id. United States v. Graham. Oinion by Waite, C. J. NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.* CONSIDERATION -RELEASE OF ATTACHMENT SURETYSHIP-NOTICE.-The release of an attachment is a good consideration for a promise. Notice to a guarantor is unnecessary when the principal debtor is insolvent; also when the undertaking is absolute. Wallace v. Holmes, 2 N. H. 111; Hackett v. Pickering, 5 id. 19; Haynes v. Thom, 28 id. 386; Robinson v. Gilman, 43 id. 485, 492; Beebe v. Dudley, 26 id. 249; Batchelder v. Wendell, 36 id. 204; March v. Putney, 56 id. · 34. Evidence from a servant of a corporation of facts as to its business, communicated to him by another servant of the corporation, is in a suit between third parties hearsay, and inadmissible. Dearborn v. Sawyer. Opinion by Smith, J. DECEIT SALE of LAND.-Whether a false representation made by the vendor in a material matter, in a sale of land, is actionable, depends upon whether it relates to a matter concerning which both parties have not equal means of knowledge, and whether it is an expression of opinion or an affirmation of a fact. Hoitt v. Holcomb, 32 N. H. 185, 205; Irving v. Thomas, 18 Me. 418; Page v. Parker, 40 N. H. 47, 71; Lawton v. Kittredge, 30 id. 500, 508; Morse v. Shaw, 124 Simar V. Canaday, 53 N. Y. 298; Wallace, 9 N. H. 111, 115. False representations made by a vendor in the sale of land, relating to the quality and productiveness of the soil, its capacity to produce crops or to support cattle, calculated and intended to deceive the vendee, and having that effect, are actionable. Coon v. Atwell, 46 N. H. 510; Martin v. Jordan, 60 Me. 531. Messer v.Smyth. Opinion by Clark, J. ACTIONABLE FALSE REPRESENTATION Mass. 59; Morrill V. DEED-CONSTRUCTION AS TO CONTRADICTORY DESCRIPTIONS.-When there are two descriptions in a *To appear in 59 New Hampshire Reports deed, equally explicit and unambiguous, that description must control which best expresses the intention of the parties, as manifested by the whole instrument. A deed is to be construed according to the intention of the parties as manifested by the entire instrument, although such construction may not comport with the language of a particular part of it. Allen v. Holton, 20 Pick. 458, 463; Worthington v. Hyler, 4 Mass. 196; White v. Gay, 9 N. H. 126; Johnson v. Simpson, 36 id. 91; Lane v. Thompson, 43 id. 320, 324; Richardson v. Palmer, 38 id. 212. If there is an explicit and unambiguous grant of a thing, any exception or reservation which is manifestly contradictory will be rejected. Rutherford v. Tracy, 48 Mo. 325; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 104; Herrick v. Hopkins, 23 Me. 217; Pike v. Munroe, 36 id. 309; Ela v. Card, 2 N. H. 175. Driscoll v. Green. Opinion by Clark, J. A team, ABSENCE FROM STATE-EXEMPT TOOLS.-Mere temporary absence from the State does not deprive a debtor of the benefit of the exemption laws. Wilkinson v. Alley, 45 N. H. 551; Caswell v. Keith, 12 Gray, 351; Pierce v. Gray, 7 id. 69; Webster v. Orne, 45 Vt. 40. Whether chattels are exempt from attachment as tools of the debtor's occupation is a mixed question of law and fact, to be determined upon consideration of the debtor's employment, and the nature, character, and use of the chattels claimed as exempt. wagon, sled, and harness of a person engaged in the business of teaming are exempt. They are as much tools of his occupation as the plow, cart-wheels, and chains of a farmer (Wilkinson v. Alley, 45 N. H. 551); a fisherman's net and boat (Sammis v. Smith, 1 N. Y. 444); a music teacher's piano (Amend v. Murphy, 69 Ill. 337); a musician's cornet (Baker v. Willis, 123 Mass. 194); a printer's press, cases, and types (Patten v. Smith, 4 Conn. 450); or mechanics' tools used by a farmer in repairing his farming implements (Garrett v. Patchin, 29 Vt. 248). Rice v. Wadsworth. Opinion by Clark, J. NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. AGENCY-SALE OF LAND BY AGENT-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-It is not necessary, under the Statute of Fraud where an agent is intrusted with the sale of land, that he should sign the name of his principal. If he signs his own name, parol evidence is admissible to show the agency and charge the principal on the contract. Dykers v. Townsend, 24 N. Y. 57; Manufg. Co. v. Goddard, 14 How. 447-455; Curtis v. Blair, 26 Miss. 309-324; Williams v. Woods, 16 Md. 220; McConnell v. Brillhart, 17 Ill. 354; Johnson v. Dodge, id. 433; Williams v. Bacon, 2 Gray, 387; Merritt v. Clason, 12 Johns, 102; 2 Smith Lead. Cas. (6th ed.) 316. McWilliams v. Lawless. Opinion by Maxwell, J. [Decided Nov. 13, 1883.] EMINENT DOMAIN-EXPERT EVIDENCE AS TO THE USE. While courts have held that in right of way cases it is proper to take the opinion of witnesses (shown to be possessed of sufficient knowledge on the subject (upon the value of the premises before and after the taking, but few have gone the length of holding that the witness may also give his opinion as to the amount of damage to the remaining estate caused by the taking. It cannot be denied that as a general rule witnesses must testify to facts only. There are exceptions to this rule, one of which is where persons, professionally acquainted with the science or practice in question, are called upon to testify on questions of science, skill, trade, and others of a like kind. Another exception is found in the decisions of some of the courts, notably those of Massachusetts, and courts fol lowing them, on this question of damages to the remaining estate after the carving of a right of way for a railroad out of it. In Shattuck v. Stoneham Branch R. Co., 6 Allen, 115, the court bases its decision partly on some time-honored usage of that Commonwealth, and partly on "necessity and obvious propriety." On the other hand, the courts of Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and other States have adhered to that which is confessedly the general rule, and the safe one, of confining the testimony of witnesses to facts, including values, aud leave it to the jury to find the measure of damages from all the facts proved. Atlantic & G. W. R. Co. v. Campbell, 4 Ohio St. 583; Cleveland & P. R. Co. v. Ball, 5 id. 568; Morehouse v. Mathews, 2 N. Y. 514; Dunham v. Simmons, 3 Hill, 609; Paige v. Hazard, 5 id. 603; Troy & Boston R. Co. v. Northern Turnpike Co., 16 Barb. 100; Lincoln v. Saratoga & Schen. R. Co., 23 Wend. 425; Montgomery & W. P. R. Co. v. Varner, 19 Ala. 185; Alabama & F. R. Co. v. Burkett, 42 id. 83; Evansville, I. & C. S. R. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 10 Ind. 120; Baltimore, P. & C. R. Co. v. Johnson, 59 id. 480; Same v. Stoner, id. 579; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. S. & N. W. R. Co., 67 Ill. 142; Harrison v. Iowa Midland R. Co., 36 Iowa, 323: Prosser v. Wapello Co., 18 id. 327; Henry v. Dubuque, etc., R. Co., 2 id. 288; Dalzell v. City of Davenport, 12 id. 437; City of Parsons v. Lindsay, 26 Kau. 430. Burlington & Missouri River Railroad Co. v. Beebe. Opinion by Cobb, J. [Decided Oct. 9, 1883.] WITH MORTGAGE-SECURING NOTE, TRANSFERRED NOTE BY MERE DELIVERY.-A note payable to order was indorsed by the payee, and with a mortgage securing it delivered to the indorsee. Held, that this transferred title to the mortgage. A mortgage of real estate may be assigned orally by mere delivery, for a valuable consideration; and the same rule applies to any chose in action. Ford v. Stuart, 19 Johns. 342; Briggs v. Dorr, id. 95; Dawson v. Cole, 16 Johus. 51; Runyan v. Mersereau, 11 id. 534. The rule in such cases is stated by a late writer as follows: "If no writing passed, the assignment of a debt may be proved by parol, even though there was an agreement, unperformed, to give a written transfer. It is sufficient proof of a parol assignment that some evidence of the debt, such as a bond or mortgage, or a transcript of a judgment, or a note, for the debt, or a part of it, was delivered by the assignor to the assignee, with intent to transfer the title to the demand." Abb. Tr. Ev. 2; Hooker v. Eagle Bank, 30 N. Y. 83; Doremus v. Williams, 4 Hun, 458; 12 Am. Law Reg. 61. The assignment of a negotiable promissory note, secured by mortgage, carries with it the security. Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308, and cases cited. And in Daniel Neg. Inst. 557, it is said: "The assignment of a debt, by whatever form of transfer, carries with it any bill or note by which it is secured; and the converse of the proposition is equally true, that the transfer by indorsement or assignment of a bill or note carries with it all securities for its payment, whether a mortgage or otherwise." Kuhns v. Bankes. Opinion by Maxwell, J. [Decided Nov. 14, 1883.] MORTGAGE-SECURING NEGOTIABLE NOTE PASSES FREED FROM EQUITIES WITH NOTE.-A bona fide purchaser for value of a negotiable promissory note, secured by mortgage, before maturity, and without notice, takes the mortgage as he does the note, discharged of all equities which may exist between the original parties. Webb v. Hoselton, 4 Neb. 308; Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271; Pierce v. Faunce, 47 Me. 507; Potts v. Blackwell, 4 Jones Eq. 58; Fisher v. Otis, 3 Chand. 78; Reeves v. Scully, Walk. Ch. 248. Cheney v. Cooper. Opiuion by Maxwell, J. [Decided July 17, 1883.] RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. MORTGAGE-INTERFERENCE BY COURT WITH MORTGAGEE'S POWER OF SALE-SOLICITOR-MORTGAGEE.Although the court will not, except in a very strong case, interfere at the suit of a mortgagor to restrain an ordinary mortgagee from exercising his power of sale, except on the terms of the mortgagor paying into court what the mortgagee swears is due on the mortgage; where a solicitor acting for a client buys up securities given by the client, he is not entitled to sell until he has rendered to the client an account of what is due in respect of the advances made by him. The plaintiff, a lady, having given mortgages to several persons, was advised by the defendant, her then solicitor, that the best way to settle her affairs would be for the defendant to buy up and consolidate the mortgages. The plaintiff consenting, the defendant bought up the mortgages for a less sum than the total amount secured, and took transfers to himself. After the defendant had ceased to be the plaintiff's solicitor, her solicitors applied to him for information as to the amount of his claim. In reply the defendant stated that the amount due for principal, interest, and costs was between 3,500l. and 4,000l., and that he was willing to take 2,000l. if paid at once, but declined to give further information unless an undertaking to pay his costs was given. He also threatened to sell the mortgaged property, unless the 2,000l. was paid at a short date. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining the sale until after a proper account had been given of the amount due in respect of the defendant's advances, on the terms of the plaintiff paying into court a sum sufficient to cover the amount probably due. Ct. of Ap., July 17, 1883. Mac Leod v. Jones. Opinions by Brett, M. R., and Cotton and Bowen, L. JJ. (49 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 321.) SURETYSHIP-DISCHARGE OF SURETY BY DEALINGS WITH PRINCIPAL. -The rule that a surety is discharged by the creditor dealing with the principal, or with a co-surety, in a manner at variance with the contract, does not apply to the case of co-sureties who have contracted severally. The appellant agreed to guarantee advances made by the respondent bank to one K.to the amount of 1,000l.; M. had previously guaranteed advances to K. to the amount of 600l. The bank afterward released M. from his liability in consideration of a new guaranty given by him. Held, that such release constituted no defense in an action by the bank against the appellant on his guaranty, it not being averred that his right of contribution against M., if any, was injuriously affected. Privy Council, July 11, 1883. Ward v. National Bank of New Zealand. (49 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 315.) AGENCY-WHEN AGENT TO SELL MAY WARRANT.A servant intrusted by his master with the sale of a horse at a fair may have an implied authority to give a warranty to the purchaser. Brady v. Todd, 9 C. B. (N. S.) 592, commented on and distinguished. Q. B. Div., December 4, 1883. Brooks v. Hassell. Opinions by Lord Coleridge, C. J., and Stephen, J. (49 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 569.) CRIMINAL LAW- CONSTRUCTION - LARCENY.-The prisoner and another person went to an inn. The prisoner asked the barmaid for whisky. He put down half a sovereign, and received 9s. 6d. in silver in change. He then asked for the half-sovereign back, saying he thought he had change. She gave it back. His companion then asked for a cigar. She served him with it. The prisoner then put down 10s. in silver and a half-sovereign, asking the barmaid to give him a sovereign for it, which she did. His companion kept on engaging the barmaid's attention. The HE famous author of "Byles on Bills," and one of the puisne judges of the old Common Pleas, born in 1801, died on the 3rd ult. The following is from the London Law Journal: The career of Sir John Byles was that of a most successful advocate at the bar, and a very learned lawyer as barrister and judge in one branch of legal study. Byles on Bills" for accuracy is among the best law books in the English language. Lawyers and and clearness judges have for years turned to it for information with absolute confidence. It is not too much to say that without it the codification of the law of bills of exchange would have been impossible. Sir John Byles took an interest in this book up to a very few weeks of his death. A question whether its copyright had not been infringed was referred to him to decide whether any and what proceedings should be taken. We believe the matter was amicably arranged, but the incident is curious as showing that one of his last acts was in vindication of the book which in the future will be his chief title to fame. Sir John was thirty years of age before he was called to the bar, and up to that he had been in business. His business experiences, perhaps, suggested to him the production of a book on one of the most important branches of commercial law. The success of the book still further determined the bent of his legal studies and practice. He became a good commercial lawyer, but he never gained any great reputation in other branches of the law. His mind wanted that breadth and clearsightedness which are essential to the intellectual equipment of a great lawyer, who is to lay down propositions of universal application. He will never take the place filled by James, Willes or Jessel, but will always be known as Byles on Bills, a result to which the "artful aid of alliteration conduces. "Many are the stories told of Sir John Byles when at the bar and on the bench. His horse figures in several of them. When he was at the bar he had a horse, or rather a pony, which used to arrive at King's Bench Walk every afternoon at three o'clock. Whatever his engagements, Mr. Byles would manage by hook or by crook to take a ride, generally to the Regent's Park and back, on this animal, the sorry appearance of which was the amusement of the Temple. This horse, it is said, was sometimes called "Bill" to give opporBills;" but if tradition is to be believed, this was not tunity for the combination "there goes Byles on the name by which its master knew it. He, or he and his clerk between them, called the horse Business; " and when a too curious client asked where the Serjeant was, the clerk answered with a clear conscience that he was "out on Business." When on the bench, Mr. Justice Byles' taste in horseflesh does not seem to have improved. It is related of him that in an argument upon section 17 of the Statute of Frauds he put to the counsel arguing a case, by way of illustration. "Suppose Mr. So and So," he said, "that I were to agree to sell you my horse, do you mean to say that I could not recover the price unless," and so on. The illustration was so pointed that there was no way out of it but to say, "My lord, the section applies only to things of the value of 10.," a retort which all who had ever seen the horse thoroughly appreciated. Instances of his astuteness in advocacy were numerous. His mode of winning cases was not by carrying juries with him by a storm of eloquence, or cross-examining witnesses out of court, but by discovering the weak point in his adversary's case and tripping him up, or by the nice conduct of such resources as his own case possessed. On one occasion he was retained for the defendant with Mr., afterward Mr. Justice, Willes, whom he led at the bar, but who was afterward his senior in the Court of Common Pleas, in a case of some complication tried before Chief Justice Jervis. At the end of the day (Saturday), Mr. Byles submitted that there was no case, and the judge rose to give his decision next week. In the interval Willes asked Byles why he did not take a particular point which both had agreed in consultation to be fatal to the plaintiff's case. "I left that to the chief justice," said Byles; "I led up to it, and walked round it, so that he cannot miss it, but if I had taken it he would have decided against us at once." And so it proved, for on Monday morning the chief justice gave an elaborate judgment overruling all the points taken, but nonsuiting the plaintiff on a ground which he said he was astonished to find had not been taken by either of the very learned counsel for the defendant, but which in his opinion was conclusive. In another case Byles was for the plaintiff, and Edwin James for the defendant, in an action on a bond tried before Chief Justice Tindal. Byles was a long time in opening his case and examining his witnesses, until the chief justice became restless. Still more restless was Edwin James, who wanted to go elsewhere. Byles, seeing his impatience, whispered to him, "give me judgment for the principal, and I will let you off the interest." Accordingly a verdict was taken for the plaintiff for the amount of the bond without interest. Afterward Edwin James asked Byles why he had foregone the interest? "You need only have put in the bond," said he, “and you would have had both." "That was just the difficulty," said Byles, "the bond was not in court." In those days adjournments were not so easily granted as now, and in any case the costs of the day would have exceeded the interest. A reputation for successes like these made Byles a formidable adversary. On one occasion at Norwich he had for an opponent a counsel whose strong point was advocacy rather than law. Byles, who was for the defendant, went into the court before the judge sat, and in the presence of his opponent he called to his clerk, "What time does the midday train leave for London?" "Half-past twelve, sir." "Then mind you have everything ready; and meet me in good time at my lodgings." "But, Serjeant," said the plaintiff's counsel, "this is a long case; it will last at least all day." "A long case!" said Byles; "it will not last long; you are going to be non-suited." The advocate, who stood much in awe of his opponent's legal skill and knowledge, spoke to his client. The result was that the case was settled for a moderate sum, and Mr. Byles caught his train. Mr. Justice Byles was a strong Tory, and he had a horror of Judicature Acts, the fusion of law and equity, and other modern innovations which were floating in the air in 1873. He declared that he would not remain an hour longer on the bench than his fifteen years. Ou the first day of Hilary Term, 1858, he took his seat on bench of the Court of Common Pleas, and on the first day of Hilary, 1873, his resignation arrived. The moment was inconvenient for the appointment of a new judge, but the judge could not resign before, and he would not wait a moment. Of his career on the bench it is enough to say that he was acute, courteous, and upright, as he was kindly in private life. His name is not connected with many great decisions, but he took part in the case of Chorlton v. Lings, in which it was decided that women did not obtain Parliamentary votes by the representation of the people act, 1867, in virtue of the new franchise conferred on "every man." His judgment is an example of his rather quaint and old-fashioned judicial style. "No doubt," he says, the word "man" in a scientific treatise on zoology or fossil organic remains would include men, women and children as constituting the highest order of vertebrate animals. It is also used in an abstract and general sense in philosophical or religious disquisitions. But in almost every other connection the word " man " is used in contradistinction to "woman." * * * Women for centuries have always been considered legally incapable of voting for members of Parliament, as much so as of being themselves elected to serve as members. In addition to all which, we have the unanimous decision of the Scotch judges. And I trust their unanimous decision and our unanimous decision will forever exercise and lay this ghost of a doubt, which ought never to have made its appearance." The following anecdote is also floating around: "A learned counsel on one occasion was pleading a cause before Sir John Byles and made a quotation from a work, which,' said he, 'I hold in my hand, and is commonly called 'Byles on Bills.' Sir John Byles: Does the learned author give any authority for that statement? Counsel, referring to the work: No, my lord, I cannot find that he does. Sir John Byles: Ah! then do not trust him; I know him well." NOT ALL A DREAM. A lawyer by his well-worn desk The fire athwart the office hearth, The night was dark, the pelting storm Beat 'gainst the window pane; Before him lay his latest brief, Each point and ref'rence plain. On broken chairs, huge piles of books A sput'ring candle burning dim Could ne'er dispel the gloom, That like a pall in dusky folds O'er hung the silent room. The bell tolls out the hour of twelve, The watchman cries, "all's well." His ear seems deaf to earthly sounds, They ne'er can break the spell. Tired nature may have yielded sway Thro' mem'ry's pictured hall. He sees perchance his dear old home A hoidenish youth away at school, |