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familiarly used in such a sense, and these are among the phrase is, 'in the Western States; ' it means out its established definitions." Plaintiff's counsel con- of this State." Adams v. Leland, 30 N. Y. 309. tended that the exemption was limited to damage BANK NOTE. – A "ten dollar bill” is a “ bank to the boiler alone. Strong v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 31 note." State v. Freeman, 89 N. C. 469. The court N. Y. 103.

said: “In common parlance they mean identically STRANDING. “Is understood to be the striking the same thing. When one speaks of a ten dollar of a vessel upon a rock, bank, reef, or the like.” bill, it is universally understood he means a bank Strong v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 31 N. Y. 103.

bill of the denomination of ten dollars, or a treasury ADJOINING. — Two towns contiguous at either of note of the same denomination. There is no other the corners are “adjoining.” Holmes v. Carley, 31 institution that we are aware of, besides banks, N. Y. 289. The court said: “We have no legal which issue what are called "bills,' to be used as definition to show what distance the junction be- current money. Three ten dollar bills, then, must be tween two towns must continue in order to adjoin. taken to be three bank notes of the denomination of A person standing at the nearest point of proximity ten dollars." of Marathon and Virgil could at a step, without an Effects. In a will this may include land, if effort at a stride, stand with one foot in Marathon, such was the apparent intention. Page v. Fousk, where both the parties reside, and the other in 89 N. C. 447, citing Hogan V. Jackson, Cowp. 304; Virgil, where the justice resides, and it might be, Campbell v. Prescott, 15 Ves. 507; Smyth v. Smyth, for aught that the case sbows to the contrary, upon L. R. 8 Ch.561. the threshold of the justice's office. But distances NIGHT, AFTERNOON. “ Eleven o'clock in the upon a scale have nothing to do with the interpreta- afternoon ” is equivalent to "after nine o'clock at tion of this statute, except in so far as they are night.” People v. Husted, Michigan Supreme Court, measured by the limits of towns lying next adjoin- February 8, 1884. The court said: " Counsel for ing. If we are right in the interpretation of this defendant insists that the complaint names an imstatute as to its intent, it is not material whether possible time, and he cites Webster's and Worcester's the words employed in it for this purpose are unabridged dictionaries to prove that the word literally, and according to the standard lexicons of afternoon ' signifies from ‘noon' until 'evening, our language, the best that could be selected. Nor and that'night' is the time from sunset until sunis it a question controlled or demonstrated by the rise. Accurately and properly speaking the definirules of mathematics, or any other science. Though tions are correct. But we think the distinction as theoretical geometry may demonstrate that the line applied to the complaint in this case is too critical. between these two towns, like all other lines, is The pleader was not referring to the period of time without magnitude -- has only a mental existence, between 'noon ’and evening,' but to the hours dwells only in the imagination, and yet is in effect that had elapsed since the hour of noon, and when such a separator as to prevent contact between that is stated to be until twenty minutes past eleven these corners of the town, yet such a demonstration, o'clock, it is pretty certain that in this latitude, it however true in theory, is also only true in imagina- was after the hour of nine o'clock at night." tion; it is quite too destructive of the law of DOMESTIC ANIMAL. A performing bear is not physics, or material substances, to be practically "domestic animal.” So held in a recent English useful in the interpretation of a statute; indeed, it

The London Lar Times says: "A bear, is destructive of the argument upon that side of the whether tame or not, scarcely comes within the question, and of giving any meaning whatever to every-day acceptance of the words 'domestic the words of this statute; it even proves that towns animal.' At the same time, when a bear is trained that lie side by side do not adjoin. According to or kept in captivity, it seems unreasonable to exthe ordinary understanding of men, and physically clude him from the protection clearly given by the and materially, these towns, by touching and coming statute to every other animal likely to become doin contact with each other, are next and adjoining mesticated within the reach of the English law. We each other."

think Mr. Hannay, who tried the case, can hardly have STANDING OR RIDING UPON THE PLATFORM. – A given sufficient weight to the recent case of Colam passenger in a railway car, seeing a collision inevi. v. Paget. That case decides that a linnet kept in table, rushed out of the door to escape, and as he captivity and used as a decoy in snaring other stepped upon the platform was injured. Held, that linnets is within the statute. The reasoning of the he was not "standing or riding upon the platform, judgment in that case, if we recollect rightly, in contravention of the rules. The court said: “He though it does not appear from the report, was was hurrying as fast as he could to leave the car, founded upon the etymology of the word 'domesin order to escape an imminent peril. The statute tic' which was described as covering any animal was intended to prevent the imprudent act of or thing attached to or located in a domus. Ву standing or riding on the platform, but not to parity of reasoning, a bear kept on precisely the same absolve railroad companies from responsibility for footing as many large dogs, and engaged every every injury which might happen at that place, night in a performance at a theatre, would certainly when a passenger is passing over it, while justifiably seem to be entitled to the privileges of 'a domestic entering or leaving the cars."

animal,' even if his habits were not strictly speaking OUT WEST. — “The common understanding of domesticated.” It has even been held that a dog is

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not å "domestic animal.” State v. Harriman, 75 * domestic animals,' and as domestic animals alone Me. 562. The court said: “ That by the common are mentioned, it would be contrary to all rules of law the dog belongs to the wild class of animals is construction to extend the meaning of a statute so recognized by all the authorities, and in that state

highly penal beyond its exact terms." But Chief he was and is utterly worthless, his flesh even being Justice Appleton could not stand this, and he anfit for food, so that legally he was said to have no dissented as follows: “A dog is the subject intrinsic value, and 'though a man may have a bare of ownership. Trespass will lie for an injury to bim. property therein and maintain a civil action for the Trover is maintainable for his conversion. Replevin loss of them, yet they are not of such estimation, as will restore him to the possession of his master. He that the stealing them amounts to larceny.' 4 BI.

may be bought and sold. An action may be had for Com. 236; 2 Bish. Cr. Law, $ 773. It is true that his price. The owner has all the remedies for the dogs have extensively become domesticated, so that

vindication of his rights of property in this animal it is usual and perhaps not an improper use of as in any other species of personal property he may language to call them domestic animals,' but as

possess. He is a domestic animal. From the time they still retain in a great measure their natural

of the pyramids to the present day, from the frozen propensities, they may more properly be called pole to the torrid zone, wherever man has been there domestic animals with vicious habits. They still has been his dog. Cuvier has asserted that the dog keep their wild characteristics which ally them to

was perhaps necessary for the establishment of civil the class of animals ferre naturæ, much society, and that a little reflection will convince us so, that in their domestic state they furnish no sup- that barbarous nations owe much of their civilizaport to the family, add nothing in a legal sense to tion above the brute to the possession of the dog. the wealth of the community, are not inventoried

He is the friend and companion of his master – as property of a debtor or dead man's estate, or as

accompanying him in his walks, his servant, aiding liable to taxation unless under a special provision him in his hunting, the playmate of his children – of the statute; but when kept it is for pleasure, or if an inmate of his house, „protecting it against all any usefulness is obtained from them it is founded assailants. It may be said that he was ‘feræ naturæ' upon this very ferocity natural to them, by but all animals, naturalists say, were originally which they are made to serve as a watch or for

'feræ naturæ,' but have been reclaimed by man, as hunting. From his greater attachment to his master horses, sheep or cattle; but however tamed, they in the domestic state, from which arises a well

have never like the dog, become domesticated in founded expectation of his return when lost, the law

the home, under the roof and by the fireside of their gives the owner the right of reclamation, but in

master. The dog was a part of the agricultural all other respects the owner has only that qualified establishment of the Romans and is treated of as property in him which he may have in wild animals

such. There were the canes villatici to guard the generally. These continuing instincts, from which

villa of the Roman senator, the canes venatici accomarise the danger that he may at any time relapse panying him in hunting expeditions, and the canes into his savage state, have made it necessary in all pastorales by whom his flocks were guarded. Virgil States to have a code of laws peculiarly applicable in his Georgics, has given direction as to their to the dog and not applicable to domestic animals;

management and education.

To-day, in many not for the protection of his life, but rather for the countries they are used for draught, as in France protection of the community from his ferocity. and Holland, and everywhere regarded as possessing Smith v. Forehand, 100 Mass. 140; 20 Alb. Law

value and as the subject matter of traffic. The Jour. 6. Under these laws the dog is recognized as

language of the statute is most general “ any domestic property so far as to afford a civil remedy for an animal.' The words are not technical or words of injury but seldom if ever any other. In many cases

art. They are words of the common people and it is made lawful for a man to kill the dog of another, should be construed as such. Nothing would more as when he becomes a public nuisance. 1 Bish. Cr.

astonish the people for whom the laws are made Law, $ 1080, and note; and in various other instances than to learn that a bull or a hog was a domestic as provided in our own State. Rev. Stat., ch.

animal and that a dog was not. The lexicographers 30. Thus it will be perceived that originally the define a dog as a 'domestic animal.' 'A well-known dog belonged to the class of animals ferce naturæ, domestic animal.' Johnson's Dictionary. “A welland that up to the present time the law has treated known domestic animal of the genus canis.' Worhim as continuing in that class and has never recog

cester's Dictionary. In Bouvier's Law Dictionary, nized him as belonging to the domestic class. The he is defined as a well-known domestic animal.' two statutes, chapter 30, Revised Statutes, and chapter Otway the poet, says of them, 127, the first relating to dogs and the latter to

They are honest creatures domestic animals, are so different that they cannot

And ne'er betray their masters, never fawn be reconciled. If a person is liable to be convicted On any they love not.' for killing a dog under chapter 127, he may be So, in the encyclopedias he is canis familiaris, and punished for what he has a legal right to do under called a domestic animal; so that in the ordinary chapter 30. But as dogs have never been recognized use of language he is within the clear provisions of in the law as belonging to the class denominated the statute under which this indictment was found. “The domestic dog has occasioned many legal dis- equally applicable to any State court in like circum


stances. putes and the presumption of the common law of England is that he is tame.' Campbell on Negligence, s

Being thus committed for contempt, Robb sued out

a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of 27. By Revised Statute, chapter 6, section 5, a tax is

California; and this court, after hearing the case, held. imposed on dogs. This is a distinct and statutory that the Superior Court of San Francisco had jurisdicrecognition of their being property and having value, tion and authority to compel him, by imprisonment and that the owner has the same rights to their pro

for contempt, to produce the body of Bayley, and retection that he has for any thing else he may own.

manded him to suffer the punishment adjudged for

his contempt of court. In re Robb, 1 Pac. Rep. 881. In the present case the Newfoundland dog, ‘Rich,' This decision proceeds upon the assumption that the of the value of one hundred dollars, was ' in the in- Superior Court of San Francisco had jurisdiction to closure and immediate care of his master.' He was issue the writ of habeas corpus in this case, and conse. domesticated.”

quently the right to enforce obedience to its order on CHILD.

the part of Robb, and that too, notwithstanding the " Any child" in a statute may include

fact that he held Bayley under color of the authortwins. In Hall v. Com., Hardin (Ky.), 479, the ity of the United States. defendant was charged with bastardy under a statute Being thus remanded to custody, Robb sued out a which provided that the father “of any

bastard writ of habeas corpus from the Circuit Court of the child,” etc., should, etc.


United States for the District of California; and this provision on the ground that the corpus delicti was

habeas corpus shows upon its face that the petitioner two children at one birth. But the court overruled

is held in good faith, as a fugitive from justice, under his plea. Said Edwards, C. J.: “Neither Spallen- color of the authority of the United States, no State zini, Buffon, or other naturalists have asserted in judge or court has jurisdiction to issue the writ. 2. their theories that the impregnation of the female

That where the return to the writ, one having with double fætus by the same man was impossible; issuing the writ has no jurisdiction to proceed further

been issued, shows this fact, the State judge or court and in every year's practice many an honest man has with the case. 3. That jurisdiction in such cases is ex. the merit of fathering two fine girls at a birth, by clusively vested in the courts of the United States. many an honest woman; so that there is nothing The court, in pursuance of these views, discharged incredible in the charge in this particular instance.

Robb from custody, holding that the Superior Court If he was the father of both as the conviction states,

of San Francisco had no jurisdiction in the case, and

hence that Robb had not been guilty of contempt in he was the father of either, and the expression of

refusing to produce the body of Bayley in court. the statute any bastard child' will apply to each Judge Sawyer, in stating the opinion of the court, and either." “Every year's practice” in this con- quoted as follows, sectious 52;8 and 5279 of the Renection is certainly unique.

vised Statutes of the United States :

“Section 5278. Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person, as a fugi

tive from justice of the executive authority of any EXTRADITION - IN RE ROBB.

State or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit

made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, НЕ

charging the person demanded with having committrict of California, has in the recent case of In re ted tre:son, felony, or other crime, certified as authenRobb, 19 Fed. Rep. 26, rendered a decision, relating to

tic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State inter-State extradition, that raises an important ques

or Territory from wbence the person so charged has tion in respect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction of fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of State courts in extradition cases. Judge Sawyer de- the State or Territory to which such person bas filed livered the opinion of the court. The facts are as fol

to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause lows:

notice to be given to the executive authority making The governor of Oregon made a requisition upon the

such demand, or to the agent of such authority apgovernor of California for the delivery, as a fugitive pointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugifrom justice, of C. H. Bayley, and appointed W. S. tive to be delivered to such agent when he shall apRobb as the agent to receive the fugitive and transport pear." him to the former State. The governor of California "Section 5279. Any agent so appointed who receives thereupon issued his warrant for the arrest and deliv- the fugitive into his custody shall be empowered to ery of Bayley, which being duly executed, placed him transport him to the State or Territory from which he in the legal custody of Robb, the agent of Oregon. has fled. And every person who, by force, sets at Bayley then sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the liberty or rescues the fugitive from such agent, while Superior Court of San Francisco; and to this writ 80 transporting him, shall be fined not more than five Robb made a return to the effect that he held the hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one prisoner under the authority of the United States, and year.” on this ground declined to produce his body in court. Having quoted this statute, Judge Sawyer then proThe court denied the sufficiency of the return, ad- ceeded to say: judged Robb to be guilty of contempt, and ordered When the governor of a State,acting under this stathim to be committed to prison until he produced the ute,upon the demand of the authorities of another state, body of Bayley, or should be legally discharged. issues his warrant for the arrest of a party charged

The Superior Court of San Francisco assumed and with crime, and that party is arrested by any proper asserted its jurisdiction to inquire into the lawfulness officer, and delivered over to the party empowered by of the custody in which Bayley was held, and bence the State in which the offense was committed, to be its right to enforce obedience to its order. Robb, on carried to that State and delivered to its proper authe other hand, for the reason assigned in his return, thorities, we have no doubt that the governor issuing denied this jurisdiction. The reason for the denial is the warrant, the officers executing it, and the party to

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wbom he is delivered, are acting by virtue and under charged from the custody, in a proceeding on habeas the authority of the act of Congress, and no other, corpus, by a justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconand pro hac vice are officers or agents of the United sin, which discharge was subsequently affirmed by the States."

Supreme Court of that State. The case was, in the Having stated the facts of the case as they appeared second instance that of a person, who having been inin the return of Robb to the writ of habeus corpus is- dicted by a Federal grand jury, was tried on that insued by the Superior Court of San Francisco, the judge dictment and convicted before a Federal court, then further said:

sentenced by that court to imprisonment, and then in “It appearing to the court that Bayley was in cus- a proceeding on habeas corpus discharged therefrom tody under the laws of the United States, the court by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. What the Subad no jurisdiction to proceed further, or to require preme Court of the United States did with this case, him to produce the body of said prisoner. The court in both of these forms, was to reverse the decisions of took a different view on this point, adjudged petitioner the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, on the ground, as to be guilty of contempt in declining to produce the fully stated in the opinion delivered by Chief Justice body of Bayley, and to be imprisoned until he should Taney, that Booth being in the custody of an officer of comply with the commands of the writ in this particu. the United States under the authority or color of the lar. If the court, after being informed of the cause of authority of the United States, his discharge thererestraint, had jurisdiction and authority to proceed from by a State judge or by the Supreine Court of the further, and compel the production of the body of State was without jurisdiction, and therefore unlawBayley, notwithstanding the facts shown, then the ful. judgment for contempt is lawful, and the petitioner The case of Tarble was substantially similar in the must be remanded; but if it had no authority to principle involved. He was held in custody by a duly proceed and compel the production of the body of appointed recruiting officer of the United States, as Bayley, then it had no power to punish petitioner for an enlisted soldier, and discharged from that custody contempt, and he could not be in contempt iu not pro- by a court commissioner of Dane county in Wiscondacing him, and the authority of the court to proceed sin, authorized by the laws of that State to issue writs is the question to be determined.”

of habeas corpus; and this order was subsequently af. Judge Sawyer disposes of this question by citing the firmed by the Supreme Court of the State. This judgcases of Ableman v. Booth, and United States v. Booth, ment was reversed by the Supreme Court of the 21 How. 506, and Tarble's case, 13 Wall. 397, and re- United States, on the ground as stated by Mr. Justice gards them as conclusive to the effect that the Supe. Field, that “a Siate judge has no jurisdiction to issue rior Court of San Francisco, after being informed by a writ of habeas corpus, or to continue proceedings the return of Robb that he beld Bayley under the au- under it when issued, for the discharge of a person thority of the United States as contained in the ex- held under the authority, or claim and color of the autradition law of Congress, had no jurisdiction to pro. thority of the United States by an officer of that governceed further with the case, and that jurisdiction in all ment." such cases is exclusively vested in the courts of the Such in their substantial facts and in what was deUnited States.

cided, are the cases cited by Judge Sawyer. The This is a result very different from that which State question then is, whether these cases are so parallel courts have adopted. It is well known that these to a case of inter-State extradition that the doctrine courts, ever since the enactment of the extradition established in respect to the former is equally applilaw of 1793, have, whenever the occasion has called for cable to the latter. The judge assumes such a paralit, assumed without the slightest hesitation their lelism, and theu proceeds to the obvious conclusion. rightful jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, There can be no doubt that the governor of a State, on the application of persons arrested and held under in issuing his warrant for tbe arrest and delivery of a extradition warrants issued by State governors under fugitive criminal, upon the demand of the governor the authority of this law, and to hear and determine of another State, is acting under the authority or color such cases, discharging the parties, or remanding them of the authority of the United States, and conseto custody, according to the facts as appearing on the quently that the arrest and detention are under color hearing. This they did before the occurrence of the of the same authority. The arrest and detention purcases cited by Judge Sawyer, and they have continued port to be under the authority of the United States; to do so ever since. It is not to be supposed that they and the Supreme Court of the United States, in Prigg have pursued this course in total ignorance of the rul- v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539, declared iug of the Supreme Court of the United States in these the law of Congress giving to State governors this aucases, or with any intention to defy the authority of thority to be constitutional. It is on this ground that that court. Their practice conclusively shows that the Federal courts have claimed and exerci sed juristhey have not regarded the ruling in these cases as in- diction in extradition cases. Ex parte Smith, 3 Mcconsistent with the jurisdiction which they have so Lean, 121; Matter of Titus, 8 Ben. 411; Matter of John often assumed and exercised. This practice upon its Leary, 10 id. 197; and In re Doo Woon, 18 Fed. Rep. face is a direct contradiction of the view taken by 898. An arrest for extradition is, in this respect, essenJudge Bawyer.

tially parallel to the cases cited by Judge Sawyer. The question then arises whether Judge Sawyer is Is it also true that a State governor in ordering the correct in the conclusion which he draws from the arrest and delivery of a fugitive criminal, the State cases cited by him; and this question we proceed to sheriff or officer making the arrest, and the agent of consider. The cited cases were not extradition cases; the demanding State who receives the fugitive into his and if they nevertheless establish his conclusion, then custody, are officers of the United States, and that in they must do so because they are substantially parallel this respect, an extradition case is essentially parallel to the case that was pending before him. Is this the to the cases cited by Judge Sawyer? He answers this fact?

question in the affirmative, saying that they “pro hac The case of Booth was, in the first instance, that of a vice are officers or agents of the United States," withperson arrested under the warrant of a duly appointed out giving any reasons for this opinion. commissioner of the United States for an offense No significance is to be attached to the phrase "pro against the laws of the United States, and under the hac vice" as used in this connection, since neither the authority of this warrant held in custody by a duly Coustitution nor the law knows any thing about offiappointed marshal of the United States, and then dis- cers of the United States who are merely such "pro it.


hac vice,” as distinguished from those who are really duty assigned to him by Congress is a question over officers or agents of the United States. Officers of the which Congress cannot by law exercise the least conUnited States are not made by any pro hac vice" trol; and no court of the United States is or can be process. One who is not such an officer cannot be empowered to exert any control over him. He is, in this made such by the judicial prefix of " pro hac vice.” respect, as independent of the United States as is the

The law of Congress certainly does not, in express Czar of Russia. terms, make the persons engaged in conducting It is not true then that the governor of a State is an extradition process officers of the United States, under the extradition law of Congress, an officer of the or imply that such is their official character. It im- United States in either demanding or delivering up plies just the opposite. It speaks of the executive fugitive criminals. He lacks the three fundamental authority" of the demanding State, and of “the exe- characteristics of such an officer. To call him such is to cutive authority" of the State required to make the apply the title to him when the essential meaning is delivery, and of “the agent” appointed and commis- absent; and to make the mere phrase, without the sioned by the former authority to receive the fugitive, meaning, the basis for a judicial inference is not a and says nothing about the sheriff or other State offi- sound process of legal reasoning. cers who may be ordered by the governor to make the The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking arrest. This surely is not a description of an officer through Mr. Justice Swayne in Taylor v. Taintor, 16 of the United States. The forms of expression used Wall. 366, 370, and referring to cases of extradition undo not suggest the idea; and there is nothing in the der the Constitution and the law of Congress, said: extradition provision of the Constitution to suggest “In such cases the governor acts in his official charac

ter, and represents the sovereignty of the State in gir. One of the necessary features of an officer of the ing efficacy to the Constitution of the United States United States is an office created by a law of the and the law of Congress. If he refuse, there is no United States, to be held and occupied by a lawful means of compulsion." incumbent, to which powers and duties are attached The “official character” of the governor of a State by law, and which generally is a source of emolument is that of the supreme executive authority of a State; to the incumbent as a compensation for his services. and according to the doctrine here stated, he acts, Now the extradition law of Congress creates no office when executing the extradition provision of the Com of any description, and does not assign the extradi-stitution and the law, not as a Federal agent or officer, tion process to any Federal office already established but in “his official character" as governor; and in so by law. What it does is to assign the duty of its exe- doing, he represents not the sovereignty of the United cution, in the circumstances specified, to the governor States, but that of the particular State of which he is of the State to whom the demand is addressed by the governor, and which acts through him. The manner governor of another State, and also to imply that the of the action is regulated by the law of Congress; but latter governor will appoint an agent to receive the the action itself is that of a sovereign State through fugitive, which agent it empowers to do the work com- its chief executive magistrate. This is certainly true mitted to him by the governor that appointed him in respect to the demanding State; and the Supreme for the service. There is here no creation of an office, Court of the United States, following the natural and and certainly not a Federal office.

obvious meaning of the law, says that the same is Another feature of an office of the United States we true in respect to the State asked to make the deliv. have in the fact that he must be appointed to an of- ery. fice by the President, with the advice and consent of Inter-State extradition then, though regulated by the Senate; and if Congress shall so determine by law Federal law, is a transaction between two independent in respect to “inferior officers” of the United States, and sovereign States, considered in their political the appointment of such an officer may be made by the character; and each State acts through its governor, President alone, by the courts of law, or by the heads and he acts for the State in “ his official character" as of departments. Const., art. 3, § 2. The Constitution governor, and in so acting he “represeuts the soveknows nothing about an officer of the United States reignty" of that State, The process of the extradiexcept as he is appointed to an office of the United tion, so far as the work of actual execution is conStates in this way. It surely will not be claimed that the cerned, is exclusively a matter of State agency, and is extradition law of Congress contains any such appoint- made such by the law of Congress. The demand is by ment. It does not purport to do so; and if it did, it a State governor. The delivery is by a State goverwould be unconstitutional, since the appointing power nor. The warrant of arrest is issued by such a goveris not vested in Congress. Congress may establish nor. The actual arrest is made by a State officer. The offices of the United States by law; but it is not its party receiving the fugitive is a State officer, deriving prerogative to appoint their incumbents.

his appointment from the demanding governor. To A third feature marking an officer of the United make this agency a Federal agency is to give it a charStates is that of responsibility to the United States in acter which the law does not assign to it, and which, respect to the performance of the duties of his office, as a matter of fact, it does not possess at all. aud of liability to removal therefrom under the regu- How, it may be asked, can these State officers exelations of law, and also to prosecution for misdemean- cute a law of the United States? This question ap ors in office. Does this feature attach to the governor plies only to the governors of States, since the other of a State under the extradition law of Congress, or State officers involved in the matter derive their auunder any other law enacted by Congress ? Far other- thority from them, and are simply their agents; and wise. The matter of fact is, according to the decision as to governors, the proper answer is that Congress, by in Kentucky y. Dennison, 24 How. 66, that a State a law which the Supreme Court of the United States governor may, if he chooses, exeoute this extradition has declared to be constitutional, and which mast law, and may, if he chooses, refuse to do so, without therefore be taken to be valid for this purpose, has any responsibility to the United States in case of re- seen fit in this particular case to give them the power fusal, and without any power in the United States to to execute a law of the United States. The fact tbat coinpel him to do otherwise. He is, in this respect, they possess this power is explained by the law itself; beyond the control of the United States by any co- and with the wisdom of the legislation we have nothercive or punitive measure, beyond the reach of a ing to do in this inquiry. mandamus or an impeachment by any agency of the Congress has provided, in respect to the election of general government. Whether he shall perform the senators of the United States, that "it shall be the

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