In cluded. Where a juror is accepted as being impartial' he must remain so during the trial. To permit him to accept favors from either party, is to place him under obligations to such party, the tendency of which is to bias his judgment. Nor is it material that such favors were not intended to influence the juror, as it cannot be determined how far they may have had that effect. And such misconduct will vitiate the verdict. Tomlinson v. Derby, 14 Am. Law Reg. 543, one of the jurors during the progress of the trial expressed an opinion as to the merits of the case to persons who were not on the jury, and the verdict was set aside. The court say (page 545): "Since the case of Bennett v. Howard, 3 Day, 219, the law of this State has been that when a juror has had conversation with a party not of the panel respecting the case on trial, it is sufficient cause to set aside the verdict, unless it appears that the successful party in the suit has not been benefitted by the juror's misconduct or the losing party injured. 1Swift, Dig. 775; State v. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47; Pettibone v. Phelps, 13 id. 445; Hamilton v. Pease, 38 id. 115. The whole tendency of the misconduct in this case was to benefit the plaintiff and injure the defendant, and it is highly probable that it operated to enhance the amount of damages the plaintiff recovered. Ensign v. Harney. Opinion by Maxwell, J. [Decided Dec. 18, 1883.] INSURANCE LAW. FIRE POLICY -WAIVER OF PROOFS OF LOSS - TOTAL LOSS OF INSURED BUILDING.- (1) The waiver of the proofs of loss, required in a fire insurance policy, may be inferred by the act of the insurer, evincing a recognition of liability or a denial of obligation exclusively for other reasons. Inland Ins. Co. v. Stauffer, 9 Ca. 397; Home Ins. Co. v. Davis, 2 Out. 280; Ben. Franklin Ins. Co. v. Flynn, id. 627. The refusal to pay a loss on the ground solely of a want of title in the insured, held evidence of a waiver. (2) Where the policy embraced a house alone, which was valued at $700, and the loss was total, and of that loss the company had full notice, held, under the authority of the Lycoming Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Schollenberger, 8 Wr. 259, and Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Moyer, 10 Week. Not. 129, that no further notice or proofs of loss were necessary. As a rule the law does not require vain things, and technical proofs could but restate that of which the company was already informed. Pennsylvania Sup. Ct., April 16, 1883. Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Daugherty. Opinion by Gordon, J. FIRE POLICY -ALIENATION OF TITLE NOT AVOIDING POLICY.-The true construction of a provision in the charter of a fire insurance company, that in case the property "be alienated by sale, or otherwise, the policy shall thereupon be void," but may be ratified and confirmed to him on application to the directors within thirty days, is, that an alienation makes the policy not void but voidable at the election of the company. If the company choose to waive their right to avoid it, and agree that it shall be good in the hands of the assignee, it becomes in substance a new and bind ing contract with him on the basis of the old one for the remainder of the term. And the assignee acceptiug it from a mutual company becomes a member thereof, and is liable for the assessments on the premium note, and may maintain an action on the policy in case of loss. When an assignment of an insurance policy has once received the assent of the directors, fairly procured, they cannot withdraw it Burbank v. Rocking against the will of the assignee. ham Ins. Co., 24 N. H. 550; Wyman v. Prosser, 36 Barb. 368; Wyman v. Wyman, 26 N. Y. 253; Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Graybill, 74 Penn. St. 17; Pierce v. Insurance Co., 50 N. H. 297, 301; Barnes v. Union Ins. Co. 45 id. 21; Hale v. Insurance Co., 32 id. 295; Cumings v. Cheshire Co. Ins. Co., 55 id. 457; Stimpson v. Monmouth Ins. Co., 47 Me. 379; Cumings v. Hildreth, 117 Mass. 309. Maine Sup. Jud. Ct., May 23, 1883. Grant v. Elliot & Kittery Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 75 Me. 196. Opinion by Barrows, J. FIRE POLICY - WHISKY IN BOND-WHEN TAX INCLUDED. — An insurance policy is a contract of indemnity, and in the absence of any thing to the contrary in the contract, or in the course of dealing between the parties, covers the entire proprietary interest of the assured. A policy upon whisky in bond, without reference to the government tax, entitles the assured to include the tax in his recovery, in case of loss, if the assured is liable for the tax. U.S. Circuit Court, Kentucky, Aug. 14, 1883. Hedger v. Union Insurance Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 500. Opinion by Barr, J. FIRE POLICY ON GOODS TRANSPORTED-DEFEAT OF RIGHT OF SUBROGATION AVOIDING.- Under an open policy of insurance on goods while in transit by railroad, it was stipulated that the insurance company should, in case of loss, be subrogated to all claims against the carrier. Certain goods covered by the policy were destroyed in a railroad collision, having been shipped under a bill of lading which provided that in case of loss, by which the railroad company incurred any liability, the railroad company should have the benefit of any insurance which might have been effected on the goods. Held, in an action by the insured against the insurance company, that he could not recover, having by the bill of lading defeated the right of subrogation against the carrier to which the insurance company was entitled. U. S. Circ. Ct., Maryland, June 4, 1883. Carstairs v. Mechanies & Traders' Insurance Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 473. Opinion by Morris, J. (18 T. R. 473). LIFE POLICY FOR BENEFIT OF MARRIED WOMAN WHEN INTEREST NOT ASSIGNABLE-- NEW HAMPSHIRE STATUTE.-- Under the New Hampshire Statute, a married woman's interest in a policy of life insurance, effected for her use and benefit, cannot be revoked by the party procuring the insurance, and assigned by him for his own benefit. In Gould v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154, in reference to a similar statute, the court say: "The manifest purpose is not only to prevent the creditors from reaching the fund by proceedings in law or equity, but to restrain the debtor from revoking, in a moment of caprice or embarrassment, the trust which he has once created, upon a meritorious, and by the statute, a sufficient consideration." See, also, Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9; Secor v. Dalton, cited in Bliss on Life Ins. 528; Insurance Co. v. Burroughs, 34 Conn. 305; Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419; Baker v. Young, id. 453. New Hampshire Sup. Ct. Stokell v. Kimball. Opinion by Foster, J. (59 N. H. 13). CORRESPONDENCE. LUCRI CAUSA. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Among the "Notes of Cases," in the last issue of the LAW JOURNAL, I noticed a brief reference to the case of the "People v. Woodward (31 Hun. 57), in which it was held that taking a horse from another's stable, killing it, and burying it in a pit, does not necessarily constitute larceny. The judges by whom the decision was established declare that in order to constitute larceny, there must have been a felonious intent animo furandi, or the lucri causa of the civilians, while Learned, J., in a dissenting opinion, holds that lucri causa is not an essential to the crime named. The opinion of the latter is without doubt a strong appeal for the reason of the rule contended for, but the weight of common-law authorities is in favor of the decision rendered. Thus the correct definition of larceny has been declared to be "the wrongful or fraudulent taking, etc., with a felonious intent to convert the goods to the taker's own use, and make them his property." Jacob's Fisher's Digest, Vol. III, p. 3302, citing authorities. At the same time it would seem that there has always been a tendency of the courts to break away from the rigidity of the commonlaw rule, and while not directly admitting that lucri causa is immaterial, they have in effect confessed it to be so in more than one instance. Thus where the prisoner, a servant of A. applied for and received at the post-office all A.'s letters, and delivered them to A. with the exception of one, which the prisoner destroyed, in the hope of suppressing inquiries respecting her character, it was held to be a larceny; "for supposing that it was a necessary ingredient in that crime, that it should be done lucri causa (which is not admitted), there were sufficient advantages to be obtained by the prisoner in making away with the written character." 1 Den. Cr. Cas. 180. A more remarkable case was where some servants in husbandry, having the care of their master's team, entered his granary by means of a false key, and took out of it two bushels of beans, which they gave to his horses. Of eleven judges, three were of opinion that there was no felouy; while of the eight judges who were for conviction, some (it is not stated how many) alleged that by the better feeding of the horses, the men's labor was lessened, so that defines larceny to be when "a person, with the intent to deprive or defraud the true owner of his property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person takes," etc.; from which it appears that lucri causa is no more an essential ingredient in the crime of larceny. SEYMOUR VAN SANTWOOD. TROY, March 11, 1884. TENURE OF THE NEW JUDGES. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: The amendment to Article VI of the Constitution, miscalled section 28, and adopted November, 1882, does not provide for the election of any successors to the additional justices therein authorized. It provides only for an election at the general election next after the adoption of the amendment. The people probably thought that the need of additional justices was temporary. Section 6, as amended in 1879, provided that the Supreme Court should be composed of the justices then in office, with one additional, and of their successors. This made the number thirty-fonr; and this section remains unaltered. Thus too, the Legislature made the newly elected justices enter on their office at a different time from that provided for the others; and hold office about six months less than the fourteen years. they took the beans to give themselves ease- which THE was constructively, at least, lucri causa! (Query: whether the dissenting judges, in answer to this allegation, might not as logically have advanced the argument that by feeding the horses, the servants ought not rather to expect their labors to be increased · at least as far as stable work was concerned.) Rus. & R. C. C. 307. And when a similar case afterward came to be decided by the judges, it was said to be no longer res integra. And in still another case where the prisoner having forced open a stable door, took out a horse, led it about a mile to an old coal pit, and there backed it down and killed it, his object being that the horse might not contribute to furnish evidence against one who was under a charge for stealing it, Thompson, C. B., saved the point; six judges against five holding it not essential that the taking should be lucri causa. They thought a taking fraudulenter, with intent wholly to deprive the owner of the property, sufficient. Rex. v. Cabbage, Lent Ass. 1815, 1 R. & R. 292; S. C., Russ. C. & M. 41. In the principal case, the court cited section 654, of the Penal Code, as supporting the proposition that the malicious killing of a horse is a misdemeanor. The thirty-first of Hun,has not yet reached me; can it be possible that the crime was committed after December 1, 1882, and was therefore subject to the provisions of the Penal Code ? We are not surprised when our often over-worked judges occasionally deliver themselves of conscientious and elaborate opinions, which end in establishing (?) some apex juris upon a question already settled by plain statutory enactment; but we cannot be so recreant to our brothers at the bar, as to believe that in this case the district attorney could have overlooked section 528, of the Penal Code, which COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. X. HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, March 18, 1884. Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event Herman Veeder, respondent, v. William Mudgett et al., appellants; Thomas B. Holcomb, administrator, respondent, v. Friend H. Holcomb, appellant. Judgment affirmed with costs- Mary McGough, administratrix, respondent, v. Thomas R. Sharpe, as receiver, appellant; Charles G. Peters, administrator, respondent, v. Lewis Edwards, appellant; Ellen Roach, administratrix, respondent, v. The Fort Orange Paper Company, appellant; Winifred Cooper, administratrix, respondent, v. The New York, Lake Erie & Western R. Co., appellant. Motion to recall remittitur denied, with costs - Susan M. Murray and another, executors, respondents, v. Phebe Marshall, appellant. Notice to discontinue appeal allowed on the payment of thirty-nine dollars costs before argument and disbursements in this court.- The New York, Lake Erie & Western R. Co., appellant, v. The Board of Supervisors of Delaware county, respondent. Motion to recall remittitur denied without costs. In re Distribution, etc., of John C. Zabst, deceased.— (1) Motion to amend notice of appeal, granted upon pay ment of ten dollars to appellant. (2) Motion to dismiss appeal, denied without costs.-James V. A. Davis, v. Aroratees P. Crandall, appellant.- Motion to discontinue appeal. Granted on payment by the appellant to the respondants' attorney of ten dollars costsHannah Mead, administratrix, appellant, v. Lucretia C. Smith, executrix, respondent. Motion to put cause on preferred calendar, denied William C. Herrick, appellant, v. The Germania Fire Ins. Co., respondent. Motion for reargument, denied with costsIn re Estate of Elizabeth McCarter. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, MARCH 29, 1884. CURRENT TOPICS. HE Century for April has an interesting article THE tych law, entitled "Mob or Magistrate." If its statistics are trustworthy they show a frightful state of society. It is here alleged that in 1882 there were 1,266 murders in this country, and about 1,500 in 1883. In 1883 there were 93 legal executions and 118 lynchings. There can be no just dissent from the following condemnation of lynching: "When a score of men can find no better way of expressing their detestation of murder than by becoming murderers themselves, our civilization seems to have reduced itself to an absurdity. Moreover, lynch law is not much more accurate in its measurement and dispensation of justice than the lax administration against which it protests. The mob is neither judicial nor chivalrous; the weak and defenseless are far more likely to suffer at its hands than the strong and prosperous, as is shown by the fact that the victims of more than half the lynchings reported last year were southern negroes." We fully assent also to the following: "The fact that thirteen out of fourteen murderers escape the gallows is the one damning fact that blackens the record of our criminal jurisprudence. No American ought to indulge in any boasting about his native land, while the evidence remains that the laws made for the protection of human life are thus thamelessly trampled under foot. No occupant of the bench, and no member of the bar ought to rest until those monstrous abuses which result in the utter defeat of justice are thoroughly corrected." But we cannot go with the writer when he says: "Nevertheless, the failure of criminal justice, which makes room for mobs and lynching, is a greater disgrace than the savagery of the mobs." This, according to his own argument, is asserting that murder is a less disgrace than inefficient execution of the laws. importance in our criminal procedure. If, in our fear lest an innocent man may suffer, the law itself, which is the only protection of innocent men, becomes utterly paralyzed, then there is a call for a revision of our methods and our maxims, and the infusion of a new spirit into our laws. Every judge who will brush aside the hair-splitting devices of the lawyers, and insist that criminal trials shall be conducted with rigor and directness of purpose, will deserve, and will be likely to win, the approval of his fellow-citizens." The remedy is in the hands of every community, and its efficiency is measured by its love of order. It is probable that the vast majority of these murders are committed in lawless communities. It is bad enough in old and thickly settled communities, but not so bad as in the new and sparsely settled communities, where distances are great and the executive power is weak. Our criminal magistrates all over the land would do well, however, to heed these utterances. If criminal justice were everywhere meted out with the swiftness and severity that has for many years distinguished the recorder's court in New York there would be less crime. It is difficult to say, practically, how the reform should be brought about. Prisoners have a right to the observance of legal forms, but magistrates should take care not to give them exaggerated importance. Lawyers, also, would do well to take heed how they lend themselves to trifling quibbling in behalf of clients. This is one of the things that is bringing our profession into disrepute. Why cannot our criminal trials be as prompt, as swift, and as certain as in England? If they were, we should not have a quarter of the murders, nor any lynching. Speaking of the threatened decay of the influence of the legal profession, we note that the London Law Journal calls attention to the fact that "the office of speaker seems to be falling out of the hands of the lawyers. * * ** A succession of three lay speakers seems to show either that lawyers care less for politics, or that politics care less for lawyers." We are of the impression that the office of speaker in our National House of Representatives has not been generally held by lawyers. Perhaps some of our readers can inform us. The Century writer hits the proper remedy for this state of affairs: "The only classes of persons interested in maintaining the present state of things are the criminals and the criminal lawyers, and it is not for their exclusive benefit that society is organized. The contrast between the swift, firm and sure methods of English and Continental courts in dealing with great criminals, and the tardy, feeble and abortive methods of our own, should sting our National pride to some energetic measures of reform. The people must rouse themselves to demand a more vigorous enforcement of the laws, and they must see to it that judges and prosecuting attorneys are chosen who have the ability and the will to bring evil-doers to justice. The judges on the bench may well inquire whether the protection of the criminal has not assumed disproportionate And in Lucretius, iii, 883, is the following: VOL. 29-No. 13. In a recent charge to the jury in regard to cremation, Justice Stephen cited Lucan as speaking of the practice. Some one charges the learned judge with error in this, and avers that he must have meant Lucretius. We are informed that both authors speak of the practice. In Lucan's "Pharsalia," vii, 809, we find: "Nil agis hac irâ: tabesne cadavera solvat "Proinde ubi se videas hominem indignarier ipsum The Law Journal says: "Lucretius, so far as rusty scholarship can follow a crabbed style, appears to be dealing rather with the different forms of death and ideas of the future than of the disposal of the body, while the passage from Lucan is apposite and graceful." These English judges are quite apt to be right in their classics. Mrs. Kilgore tried again for admission to another section of the Philadelphia Common Pleas, and was refused, Judge Finletter dissenting. The court put the denial partly on the ground of protection to woman, partly on the ground of nature's order, and partly on the ground of the shock to sentiment. No stress seems to have been laid on the phraseology of the statute. The court remarked: "The very fact that the employment of woman to do that which by common consent a man only should do causes a shock, is an argument of some force from nature itself. It is the emphatic assumption of a general principle. I do not stop to reason by analogy from the lower creation, for there the instinct implanted at once settles the question. The argument drawn from the abuse of power by the male sex does not destroy the principle which is assailed. Legislation itself has of recent years largely extended and protected the rights of married women, and yet any one familiar with the decisions of our own Supreme Court has not failed to notice the fact that recent decisions have curtailed the liberal interpretation of the laws relating to married women which at first swayed the court, because it was found by experience that that which was properly intended as a shield had in many cases proved to be a doubleedged sword; and it is a question yet to be solved how far this inversion, so to speak, of the order of nature will not finally produce an unnatural competition between the sexes, and what is worse, a condition of society wherein worthless husbands, fathers, sons and brothers will depend upon the exertions of those who ought to receive and enjoy that protection which nature intended." This is amusing. "Common consent "- whose " common consent?" Why, that of the men, for a majority of the human race, namely, the demand the right to earn their own living, in their own way. We are heartily tired of this nonsense about competition between the sexes wrought by the ameliorating laws of married women, and if women ask for the right to support their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers, we do not know why they should not have it. One would suppose these Philadelphia common pleas people were living forty years back. women We have received a very interesting pamphlet, entitled "A Dictionary of Baptismal Names for Children, containing 2,000 names, with their meaning and the countries from which they originated." The names are arranged in two general divisions of sexes, and alphabetically, under each, but are not alphabetically sub-arranged, which is a grave defect. We note some appropriate for forthcoming lawyers: Arnold, a maintainer of honor; Aristides, a lover of justice; Austin, lover of justice; Brian, having a thundering voice; Harold, a champion; Hector, a stout defender; Hortensius, an orator; Ibzan, a judge; Lycurgus, a lawyer; Marcus, a defender; Othniel, a judge; Allam, Sergius, Torquil, counsellor; Solon, lawyer; William, defending many. The Codes have at last got out of committee in the Senate. The Civil Code has been reported favorably, by a majority of one. The revision by Mr. Throop is also favorably reported by a majority of one. We hardly think the people need both measures. We believe they need the Civil Code, and we think much of the Throop revision is well enough, although as a whole it would be out of the question if the Civil Code were to be adopted. Now the question is just where it ought to be, and we hope the lay element in the Senate will assert its judg ment independently of the lawyers who are so nearly equally divided in opinion. statute to ministers of the gospel. He was, and since 1830 had been, a minister of the Reformed Church, in America, in good standing; by reason of old age and loss of his sight he had for the last fifteen years withdrawn from the active duties of his profession, although he had during all that period performed its functions occasionally as opportunities presented themselves. He was engaged in no secular occupation. Held, that he was entitled to the exemption. The court said: "Being a minister, and engaged in no other calling, he was entitled to the exemption, notwithstanding he was disqualified for active duty by age and infirmity.” In State v. Roberts, 59 N. H. 484, it was held that a person is liable for catching fish in the prohibited season from water, though within his own land, unless it be so enclosed as to prevent the free passage of the fish. The court said: "The right of the Legislature to enact penal laws to prevent the undue destruction of fish does depend upon the fact that any particular body of water does not furnish a supply of fish, but upon the fact that like other wild animals they are free, and the owner of the soil under the water containing them has not on that account any property in them. The fact that the defendant owned the land around North pond gave him no exclusive property in the four trout before they were caught, unless their natural freedom had been destroyed by falling under the absolute control of the riparian owner. If the trout were not the prolific source of other trout for connecting streams, their freedom of passage to and from and through the pond prevented the defendant, a riparian owner, from acquiring property in them against the right of the State to preserve them for the enjoyment of future anglers. The fact that the fish were in water surrounded by the defendant's land, unless the water was so inclosed as to be absolutely within his control, and the free passage of the fish to and from it was entirely and rightfully obstructed, gave him no more property in them than he would have obtained in a wild deer that came upon his land, or a wild bird that might have alighted upon it. If the fish had free passage to and from the pond, their capture out of season by the defendant was within the prohibition of the statute." In the case of Spring Valley Water Works v. Supervisors of San Francisco, which appears elsewhere in this number, the Supreme Court of the United States hold that where a corporation framed to supply water to a locality and its inhabitants was organized under a California statute, which provided that water should be furnished consumers at reasonable rates to be fixed by an impartial tribunal designated therein, but which by reason of a constitutional restriction reserved to the State the right to amend and alter the charter of such a corporation, the State is not forbidden by the Federal Constitution to confer upon the authorities of the locality the power to fix the rates at which the corporation shall supply water to consumers. Mr. Justice Field dissented from the conclusion reached by the majority of the court. He declares that the impression which exists in the minds of some lawyers and judges, that the reservation in charters of cor In Com. v. Guildhart, Quarter Session of Philadelphia, March 14, 1884, Leg. Int. March 21, 1884, it was held that an apprentice may be punished for misconduct by imprisonment. The defendant, a tanner's apprentice, was imprisoned for twentyfour hours in the witnesses' part of the county prison, for willfully quitting work, whereby his master's skins soured and were spoiled. The court said: "It is to be regretted that the system of apprenticeship has nearly gone out of use. The rela-porations and in laws authorizing the formation of tion of master and apprentice was one of the most valuable relations in society. Some of the most worthy, reputable and wealthy citizens of this country commenced work as apprentices and rose to the highest positions in the government. There are yet living in this city many excellent persons who were apprentices in their youth. A system so beneficent ought not to be suffered to fall into disuse; but it seems that it is being gradually abandoned, and we are becoming dependent for skilled mechanics upon immigration from foreign countries. A trade education is as important as a college education. If the latter is regarded as a distinction worth acquiring, the former is equally so, for it supplies the necessities of society that depend on skill and knowledge in the practical business of life. Boys who have such an opportunity as this defendant to learn a good trade are to be congratulated. There are thousands of boys, and men too, who would be glad to have such a position. Under the old custom the apprentice lived with his master, and was clothed, fed and treated as one of his family; but after a time, a money payment in lieu of domestic custody and care was substituted, and this met the approval of the Supreme Court (Com. v. Conrow, 2 Barr, 402), and was subsequently authorized by statute (Aet of March 17, 1865). When the indentures are entered into, certain duties and obligations arise on both sides, which may be enforced by the court. If the apprentice lives with his master, the latter may administer proper punishment upon the apprentice, and is not liable for unjust punishment arising from error of judgment; but he cannot in See corporations, of a power to alter or repeal such |