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v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 485, 494. While the State ject to be rebutted or explained. Constructive may take private property for public use, it cannot notice is thus a conclusive presumption, or a preexercise the right except upon the payment of com- sumption of law, while implied notice is a presumppensation to be fixed by an impartial tribunal. Intion of fact. If this distinction were carefully prethe enforced sale of property of a corporation at served by writers upon this subject, it would enable prices to be fixed by the agents of those purchasing us to escape a good deal of confusion in regard to it, the line is passed which separates regulation from the subject of notice.” spoliation.


A purchaser having khowledge of any fact sufficient CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.

to put him upon inquiry as to the existence of some I.

right or title in conflict with that he is about to

purchase is presumed either to have made the THE case of Parker v. Conner, 93 N. Y. 118, is an ligence, etc., fatal to his claim as a bona fide pur

proper investigation or to have been guilty of negTHE

interesting one on the subject of constructive notice. It was the case of an alleged fraudulent

chaser. Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354; Camsale of personal property, and held that one who bridge Bank v. Delano, 48 id. 326; Walworth v. Farmpurchases in good faith from the vendee, is not ers' Loan Co. 1 id. 433. But the basis of this rule chargeable with constructive notice of the fraud by is negligence, and it is only applicable to cases mere negligence and omission to investigate facts where the purchaser or incumbrancer is chargeable calculated to awaken suspicion in prudent minds. with gross negligence in not making the examinRapallo, J., learnedly reviews the subject, and con

ation. Acer v. Westcott, 46 N. Y. 384. The rule cludes that in such cases the doctrines applicable to that what is sufficient to put a purchaser upon intransfers of negotiable paper are applicable. This quiry is notice of whatever the inquiry would have case is reported in the forthcoming 45th volume of disclosed, applies to actual, not constructiue notice. American Reports, and the editor appends the fol- | Battenhausen v. Bullock, 11 Brader (III.), 665. lowing note:

Circumstances amounting to mere suspicion of “ Constructive notice” has been defined as fol- fraud are not to be deemed notice, and where an inlows: In Birdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 220, 249, the ference of notice is to affect an innocent purchaser court said; “ Constructive notice is a legal infer- it must appear that the inquiry suggested if fairly ence from established facts.” Constructive notice pursued would result in the discovery of the defect. I take to be in nature no more than evidence of Simons v. Morse, 2 Fed. Rep. 325; Maul v. Rider, notice the presumptions of which are so violent that 59 Penn. St. 167; Wilson v. Hunter, 30 Ind. 466. If the court will not allow even its being controverted. the transferee of property has before him facts Plumb v, Fluitt, 2 Anst. 438; Rogers v. Imes, 8 N. which would put a person of ordinary intelligence H. 270. Chanceller Kent laid down the rule in and prudence on his guard or create a suspicion Sterry v, Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 261, in these words: which being followed up would lead him to find out “I hold him chargeable with constructive notice or that there was a fraudulent intent on the part of the notice in law because he had information sufficient transferrer, his abstaining from making such into put him on inquiry.” Constructive notice is of quiry is a want of good faith. Burnham v. Brentwo kinds, that which arises from testimony and nan, 42 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 51. By reasonable diligence that which results from a record. Griffith v.

is meant that implied where there is some reason to Griffith, 1 Hoff. Ch. 153.

awaken inquiry and direct diligence in a channel It will thus be seen that the distinction between in which it would be successful. Maul v. Rider, 59 “actual” and “ constructive ” notice lies essentially Penn. St. 167; Cambridge Bank v. Delano, 48 N. Y. in this: “actual notice is a question of fact for a

326. So the legal presumption is that all conveyjury, Tufts v. King, 18 Penn. St. 157; Bradbury v. ances are made in good faith and not fraudulently, Falmouth, 18 Me. 65, to be determined by evidence and the burden of proof rests upon one who seeks either direct or circumstantial or both and may be to impeach the same for fraud. O'Neal v. Boone, 82 rebutted.” On the other hand “constructive” notice Ill. 589. To impeach a sale for fraud as against the is a presumption of law which cannot be rebutted, vendor's creditors, both the vendor's fraudulent inwhether from evidence of facts or of knowledge or

tent and the vendee's knowledge of it (or of circumcircumstances, which if they had been acted on stances which charge him with the duty of inquiry) would have brought to light the very facts which must be shown. Hopkins v. Langton, 30 Wis. 379; would charge the party with actual notice and is a

Tantum v. Green, 21 N. J. Eq. 364; Jaeger v. Kelley, question of law for the court. Birdsall v. Russell, 52 N. Y. 274; Newman v. Cordell, 43 Barb. 448. 29 N. Y, 220; Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264. But in | There need not be “good and substantial evidence Wade on Notice, $ 40, p. 22, citing Story's Eq. Jur., of the vendor's fraudulent intent such as sends con. $ 410, it is said that “Such notice as depends upon viction home to the mind and establishes a well possession, upon knowledge of an agent, upon facts founded belief” to charge the vendee with notice to put one upon inquiry, and some other similar thereof. A less degree than this will charge the matters, although often called constructive notice, vendee with the duty of inquiry. Hopkins v. Langis rather implied notice or presumptive notice sub-ton, 30 Wis. 379. When the facts and circumstances

are such as to put a reasonable man on inquiry, that plainly means that actual notice shall be given of obligation is not satisfied by an inquiry addressed the fraudulent intent, or knowledge of circumto the chief actor in the suspected fraud, and who stances which are equivalent to such notice. Cirhas every motive for concealing the truth, when cumstances to put the purchaser on inquiry where better and reliable sources of information are open | full value has been paid are not sufficient. If he to him. Singer v. Jacobs, 11 Fed. Rep. 559. To knew of the fraud that would be enough. It is not make a sale void for fraud as against the creditors found that he had such knowledge in the case conof the seller, the buyer must have had notice of the sidered. As there is no such finding, we may asintended fraud if his purchase was in good faith sume that he had no knowledge of the fraud, and and for a valuable consideration. McCormick v. without this no case is established which would inHyatt, 33 Ind. 546; Ruhl v. Phillips, 48 N. Y. 125 validate the conveyance to him and warrant the If a grantee without knowledge of the intended conclusion of the referee. No authority has been fraud becomes a purchaser for value he should be cited which sustains the principle that a purchaser protected, although the grantor acted from fraudu- for a valuable consideration without previous notice lent motives. Holmes v. Clark, 48 Barb. 237. It is is chargeable with constructive notice of the fraudnot enough that the vendee has knowledge of the ulent intent of his grantor, and such a rule would fraudulent intent, it must be made to appear that he carry the doctrine of constructive notice to an exparticipated in it. Dudley v. Danforth, 61 N. Y. tent beyond any principle which has been sanctioned 626. To avoid a sale made to defraud creditors it by the courts, and cannot be upheld.” The ruling in is not required that the purchaser should have had Stearns v. Gage was applied in the case of Farley actual knowledge of the fraudulent purpose of the v. Carpenter, 27 Hun, 359. In that case the defendvendor. It is sufficient if he had constructive ant Abram Carpenter (the grantee), a brother of notice. Singer v. Jacobs, 11 Fed. Rep. 559; Atwood Charles Carpenter (the grantor), on examination v. Impson, 29 N. J. Eq. 150. But see to contrary, supplementary to execution among other things tesStearns v. Gage, 79 N. Y. 102.

tified, “I did not know at that time (meaning the The notice of fraudulent intent to affect the title time when the conveyance was made), that he owed of a purchaser for value must exist prior to the per- any thing aside from me; thought something up fecting of the sale. Gottberg v. Conner, 44 N. Y. from the way he talked; he asked me to deed this Sup. Ct. 554. Where constructive notice is alleged house and lot to his wife; Wednesday went to his to result from facts or circumstances, the presump-house, he sent for me; he wanted to sell me his tion may be repelled. Griffith v. Griffith, 1 Hoff. farm; I said 'what is up?' he said "you need not Ch. 153; Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264. A purchaser ask any questions nor say any thing for two or for a valuable consideration is not chargeable with three days; if I don't sell this to you I shall to some constructive notice that the conveyance to him was one else,' and I did not; what was up didn't know, made by his vendor with intent to defraud his cred- but thought there was something; he was always a itors; actual notice is required to impair his title. square fellow before this; supposed he was at this Stearns v. Gage, 79 N. Y. 102. In this case the court time.” The referee found that the conveyance was (pp. 186-8), after stating the rule of constructive taken by Abram without the knowledge of the notice of fraud as laid down in Williamson v. Browon, fraudulent intent of his grantor, and in considering 15 N. Y. 362, and Baker v. Bliss, 39 id. 70, say:"In the question the court say: “Fraud implies an evil the case at bar it is not apparent that the purchaser intent or illegal intent. Such intent can only exist was acquainted with any fact which might create a in case of knowledge. Under this statute fraud is well grounded belief that there was any defect in not a question of negligence, it is a question of the title of his grantor. There is evidence to show knowledge and intent. A party may be negligent that he had reason to believe and did suppose, that in not examining the records for liens and incuma full consideration had been paid for the farm, in- brances in real estate before purchase and still be dependent of the agreement to support the father strictly honest and innocent of fraud. The appelof his grantor. He also knew that his grantor had | lant's counsel contends that this decision (79 N. Y. worked for his father for a number of years and had 102), is in conflict with numerous other decisions in no occasion to question the validity of the claim the Court of Appeals and he cites the cases of 15 N. allowed for his services. Under such evidence it | Y. 354; 39 id. 10; 50 id. 345; 76 id. 386. * * * cannot be claimed that any question as to construc- In neither of those cases was fraud alleged or tive notice was presented upon the trial. Be that as claimed to exist on the part of the persons held to it may, however, we think that this is not material, be chargeable with constructive notice. Our as actual notice is required where a valuable consid- attention has not been called to a single case in the eration has been paid. The statute relating to Court of Appeals brought under this statute where fraudulent conveyances (2 R. S. 137, $ 5), provides fraud is charged as the gravamen of this action, in that its provisions shall not be construed in any which it has been held that there can be a recovery manner to affect or impair the title of a purchaser against the grantee without actual notice of the for a valuable consideration unless it shall appear fraudulent intent of his grantor." that such purchaser had previous notice of the It is not the duty of the purchaser to inquire into fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the motives of the seller for making the sale. Hence fraud rendering void the title of such grantor. This he is not chargeable with knowledge of a fraudulent



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purpose on the part of the seller merely because he insanity; but is a statement of the “state of mind," failed to avail himself of an opportunity of making which the law regards as relieving from responsibility. investigation which, if made, would have revealed

This state of mind may be different in different State ex rel. Pierce v. Merritt, 70 Mo.

jurisdictions as, (a) a state such that the defendant is

unable to distinguish right from wrong, or to know 275. Where a debtor sold his entire stock of goods the wrongfulness of his act; (b) a state such that defendto a purchaser with the intent to defraud his cred- ant is unable to perceive the consequences of his act; itors, a full consideration paid by such purchaser (0) a state in which the defendant had not the power

of self-control, is moved by an uncontrollable impulse; will not protect him if he has notice, actual or con

or in a given jurisdiction, any one of several states of structive, that the vendor is selling to hinder and mind may be considered as relieving from responsidelay his creditors. Singer v. Jacobs, 11 Fed. Rep. bility. 559. On this point the court said (p. 561); “A full Testimony, then, should be directed to the question, consideration paid in cash will not protect a pur

was the defendant, at the time he did the act, in the

state of mind which the law of the given jurisdiction chaser who has notice, actual or constructive, that

says relieves from responsibility ?" The question, the vendor is selling to hinder and delay his cred- was he then insane?" is confusing and misleading, itors; and the reason is, that by aiding the debtor because too broad. to convert his visible and bulky property, which

Expert testimony should be directed to the ques. cannot readily be concealed from creditors, into

tion, “In your opinion, founded on your knowledge

of this man's life, of the act charged, of the circummoney which it is easy to put beyond their reach,

stances connected with it, or his conduct before and he knowingly assists the debtor to carry out his since, of his antecedents, of his present appearance, fraudulent purpose.” Tantum v. Green, 21 N. J. together with your previous couclusions as to the Eq. 364. On the question of fraudulent intent the states of mind of persons under circumstances, and parties to the transfer may testify as to their object circumstances of this act and the conduct of this de

conducting themselves in a manner analogous to the and intent in making it. Abbott's Trial Ev. 739,

fendant, was the defendant, at the time of doing the 740; Bump on Fraud. Convey. (3 ed.) 593. Declar- act, in the state of mind which (as the law of this ations of the seller shortly before his sale are admis- jurisdiction says), “relieves from responsibility ?" sible to show his intent, although they were not

Plainly, the" definition of insanity” is uot a duty

for the witness, expert or others; but it is as suggested, made in the presence of the creditors or to their

for the judge to declare what the law lays down as the knowledge. Bishoff v. Iartley, 9 West Va. 100.

state of mind, by which a defendaut is relieved from NOTICE TO

- When responsibility. notice to an attorney will be imputed to client see II. In considering the legal aspects and relations of Fairfield Savings Bang v. Chase, 72 Me. 226; S. C.

crime and insanity; two things, as appears from the

above statement, need definition and explanation: 39 Am. Rep. 319, 322, note. Notice to an agent of

(a) Responsibility, and an unrecorded deed is notice to the principal. (b) The states of mind which the law regards as reDrake v. Barker, 54 Vt. 372. Whatever information lieving from responsibility. an attorney acquires in relation to the subject-mat- Responsibility is that condition a person is in when ter of a suit he will be presumed to have communi

he is declared to be punishable. A person is not recated the same to his client, and notice to him is sponsible until he has done or omitted something constructive notice to his client. Bierce v. Red

which brings him under the law. He may become re

sponsible at any moment; but an act, or an omission, Bluf, 31 Cal. 160. A principal is not affected by which may for present purposes be considered an act, is information imparted to the agent (attorney) before necessary before the term responsibility is properly the agency existed, and which has not been re- applicable. After the act, the law presumes, i. e., detained in mind by the agent. Yerger v. Barz, 56 claring on the strength of the common knowledge,

that men are similar, that the doer of the act is reIowa, 77. Notice to an agent of facts arising from

sponsible; or that presumption being met by evior connect with the sub-matter of the agency is con- dence, declares him responsible on the strength of evistructive notice to the principal where the notice dence, additional to that which the general knowledge comes to the agent while he is acting for the prin- of the similarity of men furnishes. This declaration cipal and in the course of the very transaction.

that he is responsible is, so far as the legal significance Bierce v. Red Bluff, 31 Cal. 160.

of the word is concerned, the declaration that he is subject or amenable to the law, puuishable.

Punishable is the condition a person is in when he has done, with intent, an act (an omission, or criminal

negligence may be shown to be subject to the same RESPONSIBILITY - WITH A FORECAST.

considerations as an act), which the law declares to be

a crime. I. Insanity being offered as a defense in a criminal A crime is an act which society finds to be so detriaction, the question for the judge to present to the mental to its welfare, as to make it seem expedient to jury is not, "was the defendant insane when he did attempt to deter individuals from a commission of it, the act charged ?” but “was he then in such a condi- by inflicting on those who commit it, certain burdens tion that the law, as it is, regards him as not respousi- known to be displeasing to mankind. ble therefor?

Intent is the consciousness or knowledge accompaThe question then of course arises, “what condi- | nying the commission of an act, that is of the primary tions are those of which the law says, that the fact of movement of the body following the determination, being in such, renders a man not responsible?"

that under the circumstances known to the aotor, the The answer to this question, not being an answer to act will probably be followed by a certain result. the question, " was the defendant insane?" is not a All acts, then, are criminal, so far as intent alone is “ test of insanity,” in the medical sense of the word concerned, except those strictly automatic or uncon

scious. Lack of knowledge of right and wrong, the be persuaded that other men, under circumstances presence of an overpowering impulse, or other "states and conditions which seem peculiar only because they of mind” generally considered as relieving from re- are exaggerated, may not have had the opportunity to sponsibility do not so relieve.

exercise this power of choice at all, and as fellow citiIt does not assist in restricting responsibility, to add zens, they excuse them, as jurors they acquit them. to the elements necessary to form criminality that of Now that sin is seen to be the natural result of the motive. The motive added being a desire that the necessary failure of the conduct of the individual to probable resulting act should take place. For the conform to the standards of the environing society; knowledge which we bave defined as intent, and which society always establishing standards, seen to be necesis present in all except automatic or unconscious acts, sary for its own well-being, to which the individual is necessarily includes a desire that the act be done. The unable to conform; and now that the determinations, muscular system cannot be directed to the execution the so-called choices of individuals are shown to be emof a conscious, non-automatic act, if the desire for ac- braced in the chain of causality, and in that sense to be complishment of that act be not present.

necessary, it seems proper that we reject the common, III. Our consideration of responsibility leads to the the biblical significance of the words blame, responsiconclusion, that every one is responsible for all except ble, and the like, and Jimit them to the meaning, simautomatio or unconscious acts, which is in violation of ply, that the person to whom they are applied is the the criminal law. Next as to the states of mind which one in whom the determination resulting in the act the law regards as relieving from responsibility: Igno- under consideration, has arisen. The common acceptrance of the conseqnences of the act does not so re- ance of this view, that constitution and evironment lieve, except in so far as it is a state of automatonism, are the only factors in conduct, would not make laws or unconsciousness as to the act charged, and that useless, but would lead to their more rational enactstate relieves from all the elements of responsibility. ments, for it would be perceived that their great value Ignorance of the quality of the act does not so relieve, is that of motives to right conduct, with the lesser one for the ignorance is either that the act is contrary to of improving the individual coming under them; it the law, and ignorance of the law excuses no man, or would not remove the moral quality from acts, for the that the act is contrary to prevailing rules of morality, moral quality would be seen to consist in conformity and the fact that one follows the dictates of his own or want of conformity to acknowledged standards of conscience is no excuse under the law, whether he dis- conduct, and those standards would be as necessary regards the prevailing rules of morality from choice and as elevated, resulting as they do from the felt or from ignorance.

necessity of a conduct in individuals advantageous to IV. So it appears that logically no abnormal or society as a whole, as they are at present; it would unusual state of mind relieves from responsibility, not prevent our praising and loving the good and disbecause no such state removes the element of intent praising and hating the evil man, for then as now the from conscious, non-automatic acts. But that the former would be seen to be the best thing that society presence, or supposed presence, of certain states of could encourage or that individuals could imitate; it mind does absolve from responsibility, in the opinion would vot remove any incentives to right living, for of judges and jurors, is plain from the almost daily all the present motives to such would still exist; it acquittals on the ground of insanity. Wheuce comes would not remove the discouragements to vice, for the this inconsistency? It may be shown to arise from the punishment of the law and the disapprobation of dim recognition of the fact that the determinations, society would still be present. In daily life such a and hence the resulting acts, of men are, like all other view of wrong doing, of non-conforming conduct, natural phenomena, subject to law, and in the sense would extend infinitely our charity. The evil disposed that they are caused, are necessary. The average man, mau would be thought of as one to whom all the moif questioned, asserts that he is free, thinking that he tives for good, present to most men, had not come, or means thereby more than the simple fact that as one on whom, through his constitution, such motives generally he is at liberty to carry out his determina- had not their usual influence. Each man's conduct tions; but, being conscious at the same time that he is would be directed to the adding motives for good connot blameworthy, in the sense of being a creator of duct to the influences bearing on others, not to sin, for much of his wrong conduct, he feels that prejudiced, unreasoning disapprobation of them. another man may be so constituted or so situated as Realizing that we are all of necessity what we are, to be relieved from responsibility, not only in the but that we may ourselves improve, that we may aid moral but also in the legal sense. Hence the acquittals others in bettering themselves, and that our posterity by reason of insanity in tribunals of justice, and the may be made still an advance upon us, our efforts excuses, on the ground of temperament or temptation, would be intelligently directed to self and mental imin daily life.

provement. V. The idea of the essential wickedness of man, of VI. The adoption of such a view of man's nature, original sin, is a necessary corollary of the prevalent would have an effect upon the law, perhaps ultimately views of man's place in the universe, as the child of a a great effect. I will venture on a forecast, of course God who is but a magnified man, and as having in merely tentative, of what the proceedings will be at himself the liberty to choose the wrong in opposition and after the trial of a person accused of a crime, at to the right, even though the motives to each be of some future day: equal weight. This supposed power of preferring evil, 1. The fact of the commission of the deed constitutof creating sin, is thought of as something which every ing the crime is established. man has, and which he can exercise or not, at pleasure. 2. The question, "did the accused commit it?" is Exercising it, he is sinful, blameworthy, and in law answered in accordance with the evidence, as now. as well as in daily life, responsible; refraining from its 3. If the answer be no, the accused is, of course, disexercise, he is good and praiseworthy. But as sug- charged. gested above, most men are so constituted that they 4. If the answer be yes, the further question arises, feel themselves not only not altogether praiseworthy "was it done automatically," or as I may be charged for their good determinations, but often not blame- with making man au automaton, by the view of his worthy for their evil ones; recognizing that in some nature set forth above, I will say, "unconsciously?” of their determinations this element of primary choice, The word unconsciously, as here used, has reference which they suppose is generally present, is altogether to the complete ignorance of the accused, that any wanting. Hence they can, without much difficulty, primary movement of his might result in the act in question. In this sense the acts of a druuken man are nished to consumers at reasonable rates to be fixed by an not necessarily unconscious, he being presumed to impartial tribunal designated therein. kuow that his drinking might result in the commission

The Constitution of California reserved the power to the State by him of the act charged.

to alter and amend and control charters of corporations 5. Again, if the answer to this question be yes, the

created by it. After the water company had made large

expenditures, the people adopted a new Constitution accused is discharged.

which provided that the rates for supplying water to a 6. If the answer to the question in (2) be “yes, and city or county should be fixed by the county supervisors with kuowledge,” a further examination is had of the or city council. Held, that this provision was not in violaaccused and of the circumstances of the crime, before tion of the Federal Constitution. a permanent commission established for the purpose, N error to the Supreme Court of California. The who make detailed discovery in regard to the following facts:

the city and county of San Francisco. The opinion (a) The ancestry or pedigree of the accused.

states the case. (6) His past life, including his education and surroundings.

WAITE, C. J. Article 4, section 31, of the Constitu(c) His character'as to criminality, as shown by his

tion of California adopted in 1849 is as follows: reputation in the broad sense of that word.

“Corporations may be formed under general laws, (d) His physical condition at the time of the com

but shall not be created by special act except for mumission of the act and the time of the examination.

nicipal purposes. All general laws and special acts (e) The circumstances of the act and those leading passed pursuant to this section may be altered from

time to time, or repealed.” up to it, including herein the temptations, the direct ultimate motives to it.

Acts were passed by the Legislature under this au(f) The mental state of the accused.

thority on the 14th of April, 1853, and the 30th of 7. The result of this inquiry being laid before a

April, 1855, providing for the formation of corporajudge or jury, decision is by them made as to the

tions for certain purposes, and on the 22d of April, 1818, mental condition of the accused, the condition in

these acts were extended so as to include the formawhich they declare him to be, together with the nature

tion of corporations for the purpose of suplying cities, of the act, being the guide to his treatment nnder the

counties, and towns with water. Under this extenlaw.

sion water companies were empowered to acquire 8. He may be declared to belong, as to his crimi.

lands and waters for their works by purchase and connality, to

demnation, and subject to the reasonable direction of Class A. Meaning thereby that he has no abnormal

the public authorities, to use streets, ways, alleys, and or unusual tendency to crime, but committed the act

public roads for laying their pipes, but it was expressly charged under peculiar circumstances, not likely again

provided, by an amendment enacted in 1861, “ that all to arise. Of this class the treatment is such as may

canals, reservoirs, ditches, pipes, aqueducts, and all chiefly act as a restraining motive to others; or to

conduits * * * shall be used exclusively for the Class B. Meaning that the accused has an abnormal

purpose of supplying any city or county, or any cities tendency to crime, but a tendency largely if not

or towns, in this State, or the inhabitants thereof wholly acquired from life surroundings. Of this class

with pure, fresh water." Section 4 is as follows: the treatment, in addition to the feature mentioned

“All corporations formed under the provisions of in (A) and common to those that follow, is directed

this act, or claiming any of the privileges of the same, mainly to moral education; or to

shall furnish pure, fresh water to the inhabitants of Class C. Meaning that the accused has an abnormal,

such city and county, or city or town, for family uses, probably inherited, tendency to crime, strong, but not

so long as the supply permits, at reasonable rates, plainly ineradicable. Of this class the treatment is

and without distinction of persons, upon proper delong confinement, with subsequeut supervison possibly

mand therefor, and shall furnish water to the extent extending through life, and at last until the criminal

of their means, to such city and county, or city or tendenoy has been apparently eradicated; or to

town, in case of fire or other great necessity, free of Class D. Meaning that the accused belongs to the

charge. And the rates to be charged for water shall group, already recoguized as existing, of persons hav

be determined by a board of commissioners, to be ing an inherited, ineradicable criminal nature. The

selected as follows: Two by such city and county, or treatment of this class is confinement for life, with

city or town authorities, and two by the water comthe purpose of rendering them as little injurious to

pany; and in case that four cannot agree to the valuasociety as possible, while not causing them to suffer

tion, then in that case, the four shall choose a fifth unnecessarily. Of each class the treatment varies

person, and he shall become a member of said board; somewhat with the nature of the crime, but depends

if the four commissioners cannot agree upon a fifth, in large part on the ascertained character of the indi

then the sheriff of the county shall appoint such fifth vidual. The presumption is always present that every

person. The decision of a majority of said board sball man is of normal character, and the mere fact of the

determine the rates to be charged for water for one commission of a forbidden act, without reference to

year, and until new rates shall be established. The attendant circumstances, is not considered as over

board of supervisors, or the proper city or town authrowing the presumption.

thorities, may prescribe such other proper rules relatJOHN CATTON DANA.

ing to the delivery of water, not inconsistent with this act and the laws and Constitution of this State."

The Spring Valley Water Works Company was STATE LEGISLATION IN RELATION TO COR

formed under this act on the 19th of June, 1858, and PORATE CHARTERS.

since that time has expended a very large amount of

money in the erection of exteusive and substantia) SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,

works for the supply of the city and county of San FEBRUARY 4, 1884.

Francisco with water. In January, 1878, the board of

supervisors of the city and county appointed Isaac B. SPRING VALLEY WATER WORKS V. SCHOTTLER.

Friedlander and H. B. Williams, and the company ap

pointed W. F. Babcock and Charles Webb Howard, A water company was created under the authority of a Stat

and these four afterward appointed Jerome Lincoln, ute of California to supply water to the city of San Francisco. The statute provided that water should be fur

to constitute a board of commissioners to determine, under the provisions of sectiou 4, the rates to be

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