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to the capital stock of a railroad company, without re- Hornblower, one of the ablest opponents of the Civil ferring the question of subscription to a popular vote. Code. In the course of his remarks, Mr. Hornblower Keithsburg v. Frick, 34 III. 405, 421; Q. M. & P. R Co. finds occasion to criticise my feeble efforts in behalf of v. Morris, 84 id. 410; Marshall v. Silliman, 61 id. 218, the Civil Code. While fully recognizing the kindly 225; Quincy v. Cooke, 107 U. S. 654. The Legislature spirit of the criticism, I must protest against what I therefore could make the election of 1868, legal and believe to be an unintentional misstatement of my binding as an expression of the popular will; and views. I deny that I have derived my chief illustraupon the basis of the election thus legalized, empower tion of the necessity of codification from the litigation or authorize the corporate authorities of the munici- over the rights and liabilities of married women in this pality to issue the bonds for the amount indicated by the State. I am fully aware that the law upon this subpopular vote. The right of the city to issue the bonds ject has to some extent been complicated by the enwas saved by the proviso of the Constitution. City of actment of the Married Women's Acts, and that any Jonesboro v. Cairo & St. Louis R. Co. Opinion by argument in favor of the Civil Code based solely upon Harland, J.
the chaotic condition of this branch of the law, would PRACTICE - - ALLOWANCE
SUPERSE- be assailed upon the very grounds stated by Mr. HornDEAS.- If a court in session and acting judicially blower. I have therefore in every argument, whether allows au appeal which is entered of record without written or oral, advanced by me in favor of the Civil taking a bond within sixty days after rendering a do- Code, been careful to refer to those branches of the cree, a justice or judge of the Appellate Court may, in common law which still preserve their pristine “flexihis discretion. grant a supersedeas after the expiration bility” (so-called) unsullied by the touch of statutory of that time under the provisions of section 1,007, law, e. g., parent and child, partnership, agency, United States Revised Statutes. Anson, Baugs & Com- suretyship, fraud, and have endeavored to show that pany y. Blue Ridge R. Co., 23 How. 1; Brobst v. even the elementary principles of the most ordinary Brobst, 2 Wall. 96; Seymour v. Freer, 5 id. 822; The legal relations and contracts are either still in an unDos Hermanos, 10 Wheat. 306; Kitchen v. Randolph, settled condition, or have only been declared by our 93 U. S. 92; Edmondson v. Bloomshire, 7 Wall. 307; Appellate Court within the most recent period, while Railroad Company v. Blair, 100 U. S. 662. Peugh v. the Civil Code stated these very principles in clear and Davis. Opinion by Waite, C. J.
definite terms as early as 1865. The argument to be derived in favor of code-law against judge-law from
such a review of recent litigation over elementary CRIMINAL LAW.
legal principles, seems to me to be irrefragable. But INSANITY-BURDEN OF PROOF.- The defense of in
besides stating the law as it is, and thus putting an
end to litigation over legal principles which ought to sanity must be established by a preponderance of
be deemed fundamental and well settled, the Civil proof; and in such the burden is not on the State to
Code also introduces some salutary amendments of satisfy the jury of the sanity of the prisoner beyond
the law. These, though few in number, are all in the a reasonable doubt. New Jersey Supreme Court, June Term, 1883. Graves v. State of New Jersey. | amendments, probably the most beneficial is that
direct line of progress and reform. Among these Opinion by Beasley, C. J. (16 Vroom, 203.)
which enables a married woman to contract with perMERGER — OF DISTINCT FELONIES FORMER CON
sons other than her husband, as if she were single, and VICTION.- One may be convicted of either of two
thus does away with the confusion arising from the felonies which have so merged that, if the proper plea present limitation to contracts referring to her sepa. were interposed, he could not be convicted of both.
rate business, or for the benefit of her separate estate. State v. Archer, 54 N. H. 465, 468; State v. Snyder, 50 It was in advocacy of this change that I referred to the id. 150, 155, 159; State v. Emerson, 53 id. 619; State v.
numerous recent decisions upon this branch of the Leavitt, 32 Me. 183; State v. Smith, 43 Vt. 324; Com- law. monwealth v. Squire, 1 Metc. 258, 264, 265; Common- But Mr. Hornblower may justly claim that my wealth v. M'Pike, 3 Cush. 181, 185; Commonwealth v.
personal relation to his argument is of less importance Burke, 14 Gray, 100; Commonwealth v. Bakeman, 105
than the question of the intrinsic merit of the arguMass. 53, 61; Commonwealth v. Dean, 109 id. 349, 351,
ment itself. Let us then examine the logic of his 352; State v. Shepard, 7 Conn, 54; State v. Parmelee,
reasoning. If I understand him rightly, Mr. Horn9 id. 259; People v. Smith, 57 Barb. 46; Barnett v.
blower's argument reduced to the syllogistic form is People, 54 III. 325, 330, 331; Regina v. Neale, 1 C. & K. as follows: Uncertainty and litigation were caused in 591 ; S. C., 1 Den. Cr. C. 36; Regina v. Button, 11 A. & the law of married women by the statutes called the E. (N. S.) 929, 947, 948; Bauk Prosecutions, Russ. & Married Women Acts; the Civil Code is a statute; Ry. 378; 3 Inst. 139; 2 Hawk. P. C., ch. 29, § 1; 1 therefore the Civil Code will produce uncertainty and Russ. Cr. 31; 1 Bish. Cr. L., § 608; Lewis Cr. L. 599; litigation. Admitting for the present, for argument's Bick. Cr. Pr. 15. New Hampshire Supreme Court. sake, that the uncertainty and litigation complained State of New Hampshire v. Buzzell. Opinion by Bing- of were caused by the Married Women Acts, our reply ham, J. (59 N. H. 65.)
to his argumevt is short and simple: Firstly, the MURDER-SUFFICIENCY OF DESCRIPTION OF WOUND.- Married Women Acts were loose, unscientific statutes, In an information for murder, the location of the covering only part of the subject with which they purwound is sufficiently described as “ upon the body." ported to deal, and in this respect are probably the State v. Brown, A. Kans. 49; Sanchez v. People; 22 N. best illustrations of what a good statute ought not to be Y. 147; Real y. People, 42 id. 270; Jones v. State, 35 80 that even if it were true that these acts created the Ind. 122. Kansas Supreme Court, July Term, 1883. uncertainty and litigation complained of, it could not State of Kansas V. Yordi. Opinion by Brower, J. logically be inferred that the same evils would result (40 Kans. 221.)
from a clear, systematic statute dealing with the whole
subject as is done in the Civil Code; Secondly, the CORRESPONDENCE.
Civil Code is not a statute in the sense in which Mr.
Hornblower uses the term. It will be discovered upon MR. FRANKENHEIMER TO MR. HORNBLOWER. examination that much of the uncertainty and litigaEditor of the Albany Law Journal:
tion arising from the enactment of the Married Women The last number of your JOURNAL contained an elabo- Acts, grow out of the application of that absurd rule rate argument against codification from Mr. William B. of statutory construction, that every legislative amendment of the law must be construed strictly as law to the mummified rigidity of the law, which existed in derogation of the common law. But it is expressly before the enactment of the enabling acts, and to the provided that the Civil Code shall not be construed chaos of the law, which exists to-day. strictly as an ordinary statute (section 3,156). By this
JOHN FRANKENHEIMER. provision the essential element of weakness in all NEW YORK, March 31, 1884. statutory law is eliminated from the Civil Code, and the argument derived from the practical working of statutes in derogation of the common law cannot logio. ally be applied to the Civil Code.
MR. GOEPP TO MR. HORNBLOWER. But is it true that the present uncertainty in refer- Editor of the Albany Law Journal: ence to the law of married women was caused by the
Your correspondent, in the communication in which adoption of the enabling acts ? Mr. Hornblower admits that these acts were a necessity — pray why?gle illustration in an article, containing a good many
he so alarmingly repeats my dame, deals with one sinIf the law was fixed and certain before the passage of
more, to which he offers no objection. With regard to these acts, why introduce uncertainty by their enact
this one, I have only to say that the object in addressment? The answer is patent; the certainty of the
ing it was to show how the absence of a code, by learcommon law was the fixed rigidity of death. This
ing us without any standard for distinguishing the renowned common law, whose glorious “flexibility”
important doctrines of the law from the unimportant, every opponent of the Civil Code is wont to sing in rap
obliges me vainly to travel a hundred miles in search turous tones, could not divest itself of the doctrine
of a decision, for the purpose of citing it, which, if we of the total merger of the wife's civil existence in that
had a code to cite, would deservedly rank as an unimof the husband, a doctrine which sprang from the
portant gloss, the absence of which would have no apmedieval union of sacerdotalism and feudalism. Although the equity judges, with their rules derived preciable effect on the decision of the tribunal.
Respectfully, from the codified civil law of Rome, endeavored to
C. GOEPP. bring the legal status of married women into harmony NEW YORK, March 31, 1884. with the spirit of the nineteenth century, their efforts were all in vain. The so-called “flexible" common law clung with “inflexible” tenacity to its medieval doctrine, and opposed with “inflexible determination every attempt to clothe married women with the
NOTES. civil rights of responsible beings.
The common law in clinging to this dead doctrine, Those Canada law journalists are a very sensible became petrified itself. To galvanize the dead spirit class of men. The Canada Legal News says: “We of the law into life, the Married Women Acts were
may, as a far-away outsider—an Arctic bear or any passed. But lo and behold! This “flexible" common
thing else you choose--say that the American Lau Relaw would not be roused into new life. It still holds
view, the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, the Criminal Lau on with a veritable death grip to the anachronism of Magazine, and one or two more, are a credit to the the wife's merger in the husband, and is killing the profession."—We copy on our third page to-day an very life of those statutes which were intended to give exceedingly interesting, as well as able, article by the it new life. And so it has come about that the Mar
leading organ of the bar of this State, the ALBANY ried Women Acts, twisted and distorted by judges LAW JOURNAL. It is on the subject of codification, imbued with the spirit of the common law, have been which has been lately forced upon the attention of the prevented from accomplishing completely the object people of this state by the stubbornness, malice, and for which they were enacted. I admit that much liti. narrow selfishness with which certain old fogy-lawyers gation has grown out of the enactment of these acts.
have fought the execution of the command of our But this litigation merely incorporates the struggle of State Constitution that the laws shall be codified. the common law against the removal of a dead and The LAW JOURNAL displays its high legal ability, its withered doctrine — the struggle of the spirit of the dialectical power and its faculty of humor, in the ease middle ages against the light and progress of the pres- with which it exposes the sophisms of the lawyers who ent age. We may therefore justly claim that the liti- rainly fight the reform and simplification of the laws. gation complained of is the result of the narrow in- A subject which concerns every intelligent good citiflexible spirit of the common law, and is not directly zen is treated with a simplicity, skill and interest that attributable to the statutes referred to. Mr. Horn- will make the reading of the article we copy a pleasure. blower protests against the amendment of the law -New York Mail. The American Law Register for effected by the Civil Code upon this subject as being March contains a leading article on Demurrage, by revolution and not codification. Has Mr. Hornblower Theodore M. Etting, and the following cases in full: examined the hetrogeneous mass of decisions upon the Jolliffe v. Baker (Q. B. Div.), on error in quantity in law of married women evolved by the Court of Ap- contract for purchase of land, with note by Edmund peals within the last few years? I doubt whether he H. Bennett; Dickinson v. Coates (Mo.), on assignment will claim, after such examination, that the law upon of deposit by check, with note by Christopher G. this subject can be codified, in the sense in which he Tiedeman; Nicholson v. Coombs (Ind.), on alteration employs the term. Mr. Hornblower interprets codi- of note by adding maker, with note by W. W. Thornfication to mean a systematio statement of the law as ton; First National Bank of Nevada v. Bryan (Iowa), it is. But upon this subject there is at present no law, on defense of duress as against bona fide purchaser of only chaos, In such a condition of affairs it is the
note, with note by M. D. Ewell. -In Grunson T. proper function of a code to announce a clear and State, 89 Ind. 533, Elliott, J., one of the ablest judicial simple principle which shall be in harmony with the writers in this country, remarks:. “We kuow that spirit of the age. This is accomplished by the pro- there has been much discussion upon the subject of posed Civil Code. Mr. Hornblower may call this revo- larceny, and that many subtle distinctions have been lution. Call it what you please, it is in fact nothing made, but these discussions are for the most part, as but the reestablishment of order out of anarchy. I profitless as the ancient theological discussion whether for one I am not frightened by the term revolution. If angels could dance on the point of a needle.” That is this be revolution, then I prefer the revolution of the
to say, we suppose, a needless discussion.
The Albany Law Journal.
ger of "miscarriage of justice” when one counsel is a young and pretty woman. We are glad to see
the Journal candidly confessing that the potent ALBANY, APRIL 12, 1884.
argument against women lawyers is the jealousy of the male lawyers. It says:
“Suitors will be nat
urally inclined to employ a pretty woman lawyer to CURRENT TOPICS.
plead their cases, relying on the effect of beauty,
and the winning way natural to women. This of R. Leonard A. Jones, the well-known legal
course puts a man lawyer on an unequal footing
with this woman competitor. If therefore women Legal Literature, and is desirous of obtaining the are to be admitted to practice law, we suggest that names of unsigned leading articles in this journal. they be permitted to practice only in courts preThe contributors of such articles will confer a
sided over by a woman, and before a jury composed favor by sending their names to Mr. Jones, 209 of women. We do not object to a woman practicWashington street, Boston, Mass.
ing law, but she should not be permitted to do so,
if an unfair advantage is given her over her male A correspondent takes us to task for saying that competitors. A woman would never have an unfair
As “whatever is said of General Butler must gen
advantage before a jury composed of women.” erally be against him," but that “he is a capital law
there are as many women as men in the world, they yer, one of the very ablest of the present time," and
ought to be willing to take their chances. Let
there be a “survival of the fittest.” Now we are accuses us of gross inconsistency in these state
not jealous - not even of our good-looking, clever, ments, apparently not being able to see how a man can be a good lawyer, and yet be a bungling gen
and successful rival, the editor of the Chicago Legal
News. erai, a demagogue, an insincere and designing politician, and a person of low moral tone. Our correspondent is unlawyer-like in failing to give due
The legal profession of this State will find a great effect to our “generally." We think that being a
deal of interest in the Memorial of the Old City good lawyer does not include all the cardinal vir
Hall in this city, prepared by Messrs. Henry Smith, tues nor cover a multitude of sins. Especially we
Hamilton Harris, and W. C. McHarg, in pursuance think that “generally " General Butler is all wrong,
of the direction of Justice Westbrook, at the sugnot only in a military but in a civic sense. We gestion of the bar of this county. The old city admire the man's prodigious abilities, but we have
hall was completed in 1832, and was destroyed by
fire on the 10th of February, 1880. very small respect for his public career and morals
The Memorial no more than we have for those of Napoleon the speaks of “the pure white marble walls so pleasing First, for example.
to the eye, the Doric columns simple in their clas
sic dignity and crowning all the gilded dome, so Even Mr. Justice Gray himself can hardly fail to long an object of pride to citizens and an attractive be amused by our correspondent, “ The Modern picture to the traveller or tourist as he approached Webster," who writes in another column about
this ancient capital.” Did Boston get their idea Implied Powers in the Federal Constitution. The
of its gilded dome from our city hall? We ask for
information, opinion criticised appears to be rather unpopular,
The Memorial continues: "There but it seems to us to deal with a subject political
was but little ornamentation to the interior of the rather than legal. We should suppose that Mr. building, yet the artistic or æsthetic was not Carter might deduce, from the conflicting and wholly wanting. A full length statue of that disfluctuating decisions of the Supreme Court on con
tinguished statesman and lawyer, Alexander Hamilstitutional questions, a very potent argument | ton, stood in the centre of the upper hall between against written Constitutions. But after all, if it is
the court room and the common council chamber. difficult to obtain agreement and consistency in de- And upon one of the sides of that hall was a bascisions upon a written rule, how can we hope for
relief of another of New York's eminent statesmen, any thing better for an unwritten rule? We com
DeWitt Clinton, with a view of the primitive canal mend this query to “The Modern Webster,” who boat in the distance, and on the opposite wall a although one of the greatest wits in the legal pro
like figure of Sir Walter Scott in like style of art, fession, is a strong opponent of general codification. but whether so placed in honor of his official rank We would by no means insinuate that
as deputy sheriff of Selkerkshire, or as a tribute of
respect to the author of Marmion and Waverly, we “Great wits to madness sure are near allied, And thin partitions do their bounds divide."
are not at this distance of time able to determine." We hope these plaster glories have been duly pre
served. They could hardly be more unsubstantial, The Denver Law Journal deprecates the admission if less artistic, than the Hunt cartoons in the new of women as lawyers on the ground that there are Assembly chamber. The Memorial does not speak already “too many old women practicing law, even in glowing terms of the interior of the new city among male practitioners." We hope the Journal hall. We have no acquaintance with the interior, means no double entendre when it says there is dan- | but in exterior the new edifice seems to us one of
Vol. 29 – No. 15.
the most beautiful municipal buildings in this country.
so staple an article as Cotton ought not to have occurred, but it is after all probably self-evident.
The anticipated cyclone from the far West, in regard to the judges' gowns, has at last struck us.
In a recent charge to a grand jury Justice Daniels The Denver Law Journal says: “ The judges of the cardinal sins of usury, lotteries, etc., and spoke
contrived to vary the usual monotonous recital of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York in terms of severe reprehension of the customary have yielded to the importunities of our contem- methods of selecting jurors. Perhaps the grand porary, the Albany Law JOURNAL, and a few members of the bar, and have adopted silken gowns as
jury could not very well help the manner of their their judicial robes. Must we assume that the silk of future juries, but the occasion was convenient
own selection, or provide for the proper selection robe will add weight to the opinions hereafter announced by that court ? Facilis descensus acerni,
for the promulgation of the judge's views, which etc. In the West this act will
we have no doubt were excellent, and having heard
the opinions of the New York court to be viewed ine the severity and plainness of his remarks,
one of his ethical discourses to a jury we can imagwith suspicion, and the fact of their yielding About the first thing necessary to the reformation be regarded as an indication of weakness on their part, which will detract much from their au
of our jury system is to prevent all the decent and thority. If however the plutocratic members of the intelligent men in the community from getting ex
cused. bar of New York are satisfied with their judges why a manufacturer should be excused; if he has a
We do not know any reason, for example, aping the English customs in this respect, we have no reason to grumble.” This is the hardest blow great many men in his employ he owes the greater up to date. That Virgilian quotation is really un
duty to the community which protects him in his kind. And why“ plutocratic”? Perhaps because large interests. The true way to reform the jury of the descent to Avernus. It is a little relief to turn system is the same which is essential to the reto Sam Slick, whose commentary on gowns is recalled duty, and not defend or encourage them in shirk
form of politics. Compel good citizens to do their to us by the Canadian Lau Times: said the sheriff
, and all was as still as moonlight. I ing it. It is all very well for men to whine about It looked strange to me, you may depend, for the think better of these virtuous citizens if they would
the criminal disorder of the country, but we should lawyers looked like so many ministers all dressed in black gowns and white bands on, only they acted like honest people, and not squirm and wriggle to
put the right men into office, and pay their tases more like players than preachers, a plaguey sight. But, said I, is this not the case in your country is escape jury duty. The laziness
, indifference, disthere not some sort of professional garb worn by
honesty, and selfishness of the best people in the
community the bar of the United States, and do not the bar
are chargeable with much of the
wrong-doing of the worst. risters and the court exchange those salutations which the common courtesies of life not only sanction but imperatively require as essential to the pre
NOTES OF CASES. servation of mutual respect and general good breeding? What on airth, said the clockmaker, can a black gownd have to do with intelligence ? Them
In Moebus v. Becker, New Jersey Supreme Court, sort of liveries may do in Europe, but they don't November, 1883, 7 N. J. L. J. 104, two minors went convene to our free and enlightened citizens. It's gunning together, and one threw up stones for the too foreign for us, too unphilosophical, too feudal, other to shoot at, and the shooter's gun being cocked and a remnant of the dark ages. No, sir; our law- it went off accidentally and wounded the stone
thrower. yers do as they like. Some on 'em dress in black
“The boys were friends, enjoying a holiand some in white; some carry walking-sticks and day together, drank some 'Russian bitters,' were some umbrellas, some whittle sticks with
inexperienced and unsuccessful as gunners.” Held, knives and some shave the table, and some put their a question of negligence for the jury. The court legs onder the desks and some put 'em a-top of said: “The duty which a person lawfully carrying them, just as it suits them. They set as they please, fire-arms owes to others is not different from that dress as they please, and talk as they please; we are
which is imposed on all who have control of any a free people. I guess, if a judge in our country burtful thing, except in the degree of care to be exwas to order the lawyers to appear all dressed in ercised. As fire-arms are more than ordinarily danblack, they'd soon ax him who elected him di- gerous when loaded, those who handle them are rector-general of fashions, and where he found bound to use more than ordinary care to prevent such arbitrary power in the Constitution as that, injury to others. The cases cited in the plaintiff's committed to any man."
brief of actions for injuries caused by the explosion of fire-arms, and many others are found in the notes
to Morgan v. Cox, 22 Mo. 373, collected in 1 Thomp. An apology is due Mr. John Cotton Dana for a Neg. 238. Beginning with the leading case of misprint of his middle name in the signature of his Weare v. Ward, Hob. 134, all hold a strict rule of article on "Responsibility," ante, 248. An error in accountability for the want of extraordinary care in
their use, but in no case is it said that where persons statute as applicable to the rate of interest only, are gunning voluntarily together each may be held and not to the time of payment, which will permit responsible for every accident or mishap that may the payment of interest at periods shorter than the occur to the other, while thus engaged; or that it is time a note has to run, furnishes, in our view, no necessarily negligence to carry a gun cocked when reasonable ground for the advancement of interest in pursuit of game, or that in passing through brush, before it accrues or is earned.
The crossing ditches, climbing fences, or resting upon loans by banking institutions being for short perithem, the gun must be uncocked; nor if one should ods, and the difference between discount and inpass in front of the other by his request, or on his terest being in consequence so inconsiderable, it is own motion, and by stumbling or falling the gun of not unreasonable that the Legislature should disthe other is discharged and a wound inflicted, that criminate between private lenders and banks and the only question to be considered by the jury is the those who deal in commercial paper by way of amount of damages to be paid, and that negligence trade. It is quite obvious that unless the practice will be inferred as a presumption of law. Each of deducting interest in advance is limited to short case must stand upon its own peculiar facts, and loans as by bank discounts, the usury will become rational rather than distinctive legal conclusions greater in proportion as the period for which the must usually be drawn from them. Whether in usury is taken becomes longer. Thus in a loan of this case the damage to the defendant was the re- one thousand dollars for twelve and a half years, at sult of the pointing of the gun, or the accidental eight per cent per annum paid in advance, the printurning of the rail of the fence, causing the defend-cipal will be exhausted in the interest deducted, ant to fall, and the discharge of the gun, as he has and the borrower will receive nothing." testified, was a question for the jury, and not for the court.”
In Parker v. Stroud, 31 Hun, 578, it was held,
that personal demand of payment of a note of the In Insurance Co. v. Carpenter, 39 Ohio St. 264, it maker is valid as against the indorser, although was held that an agreement to pay lawful interest not made at the specified place of payment. The in advance is usurious. The court said: “It is court, Brady, J., said: “The plaintiff insists that contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff the prior demands are of no avail, inasmuch as they in error, that the statute fixes the rate of interest
were not made at the bank where the note was payand not the time of payment, and that as a contract able. But this proposition should not be susto pay the rate semi-annually is not usurious, there tained, for the reason that the maker, when applied is no principle that would prevent the contract to personally, admitted his inability to pay, from from providing for the payment of the rate semi- which it is clear that there were no funds in the annually or annually in advance. This means bank for the purpose. The presentation at the neither more nor less than that the borrower may be bank, if necessary as a matter of form, should then bound to pay interest at a stipulated rate of eight have been made, in addition to the personal deper cent per annum upon money of which he has mand, if the plaintiff designed to hold the indornever had the use, and yet the contract be free ser. He knew from the maker's declaration that from usury. Interest for money is the reward or the note could not be paid, and he was therefore compensation which is paid by the borrower to the advised of the essential fact which put upon him lender, or by the debtor to the creditor, for its use. the obligation to send notice to the indorser. * * * If it is paid in advance or deducted at the time of The demand at the bank was a mere form, the rethe loan, the principal, of which the borrower is to sult of which might readily be anticipated by the have the use, is reduced pro tanto, and the lender plaintiff, with his knowledge of the maker's finanshould not be compensated for the use of money cial condition, of which he had been advised, and which in fact he has not loaned. B., for illustra- it was an idle ceremony as to such result. It has tion, borrows and gives his note for $12,000, pay- not been declared in any case which has been able in one year after date, with interest at the rate found, that a presentation for payment, to the of cight per cent per annum, and the interest is de- maker of a note payable on demand, is not an ducted in advance. He receives only $11,040, actual demand, although the note is payable at a which he uses for one year; but as compensation particular place.” Daniels, J., concurred, doubttherefor, pays the stipulated rate of interest on ing, yielding, as he said, to the "superior wistwelve thousand dollars. By computation it will dom " of his associates. be seen that he has paid interest at the rate of eight and sixty-eight one-hundredths per cent on the amount which he has actually received. He has
COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES. lost the use of the $960 held back by the lender, which he would have had, if the interest had been SHOW - INDICATE.— In Coyle v. Com., Pennsyl. payable only after it had accrued or been earned. vania Supreme Court, January, 1884, the court His payment of interest on the sum so deducted is said: “Although the words show' and 'indicate' without consideration, and solely for the benefit of are sometimes interchangeable in popular use, they the lender. A construction of the language of the are not always so. The present ordinary use of the