Turner v. Scott, 51 Penn. St. 126; Daniel v. Hill, 52 Ala. 430; McBride v. McBride, 26 Gratt. 480; and observed: "In the last mentioned case Judge Staples concisely states the law thus, 'All the authorities hold, indeed it is very clear, it is not necessary to the validity of a will, that it should have a testamentary form, or that the decedent should know he had performed a testamentary act, or that he should intend to perform such act. A deed poll, or an indenture, a bond, a marriage settlement, a letter, a promissory note, and the like have been held valid as a will.' * * * This view is sustained by adjudged cases, which in some instances, in expression, are singularly analogous. In Goods of Dobson, L. R., 1 P. & D. 88, the will reads thus: 'In case any fatal accident happening to me, being about to travel by railway, I hereby leave,' etc. This was held not to be contingent upon the event of the testator's death on the journey he was about to take when the will was executed. In Goods of Martin, id. 380, the testator says, 'Being physically weak in health, have obtained permission to cease from all duty for a few days, and I wish, during such time, to be removed from the brig 'Appellina' to the floating hospital ship 'Berwick Walls,' in order to recruit my health; and in the event of my death occurring during such time, I do hereby will,' etc. It was in proof that he recovered from the illness and afterward frequently expressed the desire that all his available property should go to a certain Orphan Asylum. Sir J. P. Wilde held the will not to be contingent or conditional, and awarded it probate. In French v. French, 14 W. Va. 459, the will was in these words: 'Let all men know hereby, if I get drowned this morning, March 7, 1882, that I bequeath all my property, personal and real, to my beloved wife, Florence. Witness my hand and ɛeal.' Judges Haymond, Johnson and More concurred in holding this will not to be conditional upon his being drowned that day. The paper was given to his wife when he started. He returned safely and died afterward, leaving that paper still in his wife's possession, which was, by the decision of majority of the Appellate Court, sustained as a valid unconditional will. Without committing ourselves to full approval of these several decisions under their respective circumstances and language employed, we refer to them as vastly stronger cases for holding the will contingent than this one, and where they were held not contingent. In the case under consideration it would seem as if allusion was made to the projected trip and the attendant contingencies which might occur, only as the inducement for his making the paper, which evidently embodied what he wanted, in any event, to be done with his property. It is almost like the case of Tarver v. Tarver, 9 Pet. 174, where the testator prefaces his disposition by saying, Being about to take a long journey, and knowing the uncertainty of life, he deemed it advisable to make a will,' which will was held not to be contingent. In Goods of Thorne, 4 Swab. & Tris., a will,

in which the testator says, 'I request that in the event of my death whilst serving in this horrid climate, or any accident happening to me,' etc., was held not to be conditional. If the wills we have referred to were not conditional ones, certainly we ought not to hold this one to be so. The whole justification for holding any paper, not made as a will, to be the will of the maker, is the furtherance of the testator's wishes. To hold this paper a will, and yet conditional, would certainly not be in accordance with his purpose."

A

COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES.

CORRESPONDENT sends us a copy of an opinion recently delivered by Judge Hoyt, of the District Court of Washington Territory, in the case of the United States v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., construing the word "adjacent" in the company's charter, which grants the privilege of cutting timber from "adjacent " public lands for use in the construction of the word, and holding that it has a broader meaning than "adjoining," and is synonymous with "neighboring." The court says: "Congress, in enacting section 2 of defendant's charter, saw fit to use the word 'adjacent,' and in determining the intent of this section we must investigate the meaning of the word 'adjacent,' as there used. Sometimes it has a meaning given it which is synonymous with the word 'adjoining,' but it is as often applied in a more extended sense, as in the 'vicinity' or the neighborhood' of, while adjoining and 'contiguous' are never used in such enlarged sense. Congress then having selected from several synonymous words the one having, as applied to the subject in the section in which it is used, the broadest meaning and most extended signification of the whole, must be held to have intended the broadest rather than the more restricted signification to be given to it in the interpretation of said section, and therefore to hold that this section restricted the defendant to lands adjoining or contiguous to the line of the road, would be contrary to all rules of interpretation, while if we apply the usual rules we must hold that its rights are extended by this section beyond lands adjoining or contiguous to its line of road to lands anywhere in the vicinity or neighborhood of its said line of road. Was the 'land in question in the neighborhood of defendant's line of road, within the meaning of section two? The design of this question was to allow the company to take timber from public lands to build its road, and when we once concede that under this section the defendant is authorized to go beyond adjoining lands, as the use of the word 'adjacent' compels us to do, it must follow that the use of the more enlarged word was for the benefit of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and it must be so construed by the court as to effect the object of its enactment. And we are of opinion that timber land nearest to the

line of the road must be held to be neighboring timber land, even although there may intervene large tracts of land not timbered. If this be so, then under the facts of these cases, as above stated, the lands from which the timber in question was cut was in the neighborhood of the line of the road where it was used, and therefore adjacent' thereto, within the meaning of section two of the charter of the defendant Northern Pacific Railroad Company. Besides, under the facts proven in these cases, the lands in question would probably come within a more restricted use of the word 'adjacent,' for the line of defendant's road runs for several hundred miles through a country almost entirely destitute of timber, and the belt upon which this timber in question was cut, was the first timber land near said road reached by it in the course of its construction; therefore though this timber be more than one hundred miles from the line of defendant's road, we are of the opinion that it must under the circumstances be held to be adjacent thereto,' within the meaning of section two of defendant's charter." Our correspondent points out that this is apparently opposed to Continental Improvement Co. v. Phelps, 47 Mich. 299, where it was held that the owner of property half a mile distant from a railway is not an "adjacent occupant or proprietor." But this was conceded, and not decided, the court simply remarking, "a very proper concession." The cases are quite distinguishable, for the Michigan case was upon the duty of the railroad company to an adjacent owner to fence its track.

6

FAMILY. In Carmichael v. North-western Mutual Benefit Association, Michigan Supreme Court, October 17, 1883, it was held that where the beneficiary resided under the same roof as the insured, who was unmarried, and was a member of the same social and domestic circle, and the insured, having no relatives remaining to him, regarded the beneficiary much as a daughter, they were of the same family within the meaning of the Michigan statute regarding insurable interest, and there was sufficient interest to support a life policy. The court said: "Now this word 'family' contained in the statute is an expression of great flexibility. It is applied in many ways. It may mean the husband and wife having no children and living alone together, or it may mean children or wife, and children, or blood relatives, or any group constituting a distinct domestic or social body. It is often used to denote a small select corps attached to an army chief, and has even been extended to whole sects, as in the case of the Shakers. We discover nothing in the statute implying a narrow sense, and we should not be inclined to attribute one where the result would cause injustice. It seems to us that the circumstances constitute a case within the meaning of the Legislature."

GOOD HUNTER. In a recent English County Court case of King-King v. Cave, it was held that a horse that was a "whistler" is not a "good hunter,"

for that phrase implies soundness in wind and eyes. Whistling is a noise made in respiration by a horse whilst trotting or cantering, and though at first it does not indicate any defect in pace or endurance, yet it is apt to increase, and indicate such defects. "

SEAMAN. - An engineer of a tug-boat on the Delaware river is a "seaman." Holt v. Cummings, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, October 29, 1883. The court said: "Common sailors only were originally termed seamen, but the rights of seamen, under the rulings of American courts, from time to time have been extended to the mate, surgeons, stewards, engineers, cooks, clerks, carpenters, firemen, deckhands, porters, and chamber-maids; all these classes of employees have been allowed to sue, in the admiralty, as mariners, or as persons, rendering maritime services, under a maritime contract: 1 Peters Adm. 246; 2 id. 268; Wilson v. The Ohio, 1 Gilpin, 514; 1 Conkl. Admir. 107; 2 Pars. Marit. Law, 582; The Sultana, 1 Brown, 13; Steam Propeller M. M. Caleb, 9 Ben. 159; The Hudson, 8 Fed. Rep. 167; North America, 5 Ben. 486; Allen v. Hallett, Abb. Adm. 576; Gurney v. Crocket, id. 490. In the case of Trainor v. The Superior, 1 Gilpin, 514, the general rule is given, that all those who contribute to the preservation of the vessel, or were employed in navigating her, are entitled to the rights of mariners; whilst in the cases of The Ocean Spray, 4 Sawyer, 105, and Minna, 11 Fed. Rep. 759, the rule is extended to all hands employed on the vessel, in furtherance of the main object of the enterprise in which she is engaged, except the master."

VOLUNTARILY. The effect in this word in a married woman's acknowledgment was thus commented on in Scott v. Simons, 70 Ala. 352: "If, under any circumstances, the acknowledgment of the wife that she executed a conveyance voluntarily could be deemed the equivalent of an acknowledgment that she executed it of her own free will and accord, and without fear, constraint, or persuasion of her husband,' it cannot, without a violation of the legislative intention, be deemed the equivalent under the act referred to. If it should be so taken and construed, the result would be, that a certificate of acknowledgment conforming to the former statutes, which were superseded, if made on a privy examination of the wife, would be sufficient. The word voluntarily, under the forms prescribed by those statutes, expressed that husband or wife, in the execution of a conveyance, was acting freely. The act of April 23, 1873, required that the certificate of acknowledgment should express more than was comprehended under the word voluntarily, as found in the pre-existing statutes, the word in such statute applying alike to husband or wife. The act intended the exclusion of the influence of the husband in producing assent of the wife to the alienation of the homestead. The protection of the wife from being tortured by fear, constrained by the domination of a stronger will, or seduced by the

flattery, importunity, solicitation, or suasion of the husband, was the purpose of the act. And it was intended that, on the privy examination, it should be made manifest to the officer taking it, that it was of her own volition, unmoved by the influence of the husband, she signed and assented to the alienation. The certificate of the examination indorsed on the alienation, it was intended, should manifest clearly, not only that the wife was acting from her own volition, but should negative the influence of the husband in producing the determination."

HEALTH. A provision in a city charter that the health department shall have power to regulate dwelling-houses, there being no clause about general welfare or general police powers, extends only to health in the sense of freedom from disease, and does not justify a requirement that outside walls shall be of a given thickness. Hubbard v. Paterson, 45 N. J. 310. The court said: "The contention is that the power to regulate and control the mode of constructing buildings, when given for the preservation and promotion of health, justifies such regulations as respect sanitary conditions and appliances alone, and not such as respect the thickness of the walls - a matter which, it is insisted, can produce no effect on the health of the city. If the word 'health' is to be understood as expressing merely the absence of disease, the contention is effective. But the word has a broader meaning. According to the lexicographers, health is 'soundness of body; freedom from disease, sickness or pain.'- Worcester; 'freedom from pain or sickness; the most perfect state of animal life.'- Bouvier. It is said to be derived from an Anglo-Saxon word, of which we yet retain a trace in the word 'hale,' and which may be rendered whole' or 'sound.' If this meaning be attributed to the word in this act, the powers given to preserve and promote health would naturally include not only such as would tend to prevent the origin or development of disease and its dispersion by contagion or infection, but also such as would tend to prevent the occurrence of bodily injuries or accidents. The word would then include the idea of safety as well as health in its ordinary and colloquial signification. In the charters of some municipal corporations such powers are expressly given for the preservation of the health and safety of citizens. But I am unable to conclude that we ought to attribute to the word 'health,' as used in this title, the broad meaning above referred to, which, though a correct, is not its usual meaning. When we find that the Legislature, by these sections, established a department of health and conferred powers for the preservation and promotion of health, the natural inference is that the department is charged with the execution of such sanitary measures as tend to prevent or diminish disease. are the ordinary functions of boards of health in cities or other municipal corporations in this State. There ought to be found in this act language clearly evincing that other functions are intended to be conferred on this department in Paterson before we should be justified in reaching such a conclusion,"

Such

CODIFICATION - REMARKS OF GEORGE H.
YEAMAN, BEFORE THE LAW RE-
FORM SOCIETY OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK.

Mr. Yeaman, upon taking the chair, after some prefatory remarks about law reform and the objects of the society to be organized, said:

The utility and the practicability of codification have both been established in the history of legislation and jurisprudence. As a new proposition, we might shrink from it as being a dangerous venture, or a task beyond our power. Such fears are now the mere timidity of a well-meaning conservatism. We have historical examples of its success and of its benefits, Opponents say, that a system of law must be left malleable and expansive; that science and civilization advance and change and create new rights, new exigencies; that law must be left to adapt itself to new facts and new circumstances; and that Codes are castiron systems which caunot do this.

In the light of the past, this objection is of no weight. And then it assumes what is not true. No friend or advocate of codification ever contended that a Code once made, the world will staud still. The most they claim is to simplify past confusion, clear up existing doubt, condeuse and crystallize the fruits of past labor, establish a mile-stone, in legislation and jurisprudence and then go forward-when necessary. Then shall we always be codifying, or amending existing Codes? Whenever necessary. But what is the demand, the necessity, the benefit of codification?

Suppose practicing lawyers-to say nothing of the layman, who is legally presumed to know the law, and has a right to know it, but as matter of fact does not know it and can't know it as it now exists, suppose lawyers had to consult statutes, reports, and text books, without indexes. An index though not an incipient Code, is at least a sign post. But we are not satisfied with these; we have our digests-digests of statutes and digests of decisions. Every digest is only telling us what the law is, but very useful in helping an imperfect Code. They are not always reliable in

us to find the fountains of the law. And what do we sometimes find, when we have gone to the fountain heads? Two streams springing from the same source and running in opposite directions, or two streams springing from different sources and trying to run straight across each other, causing conflict and confusion-muddy eddies in the law. To say nothing of the vast multiplication of reports, so numerous that no lawyer is able to own them, and if able, has not room enough for them either in his house or his office, nor in both combined, if there were no other reason for a Code it would be demanded and justified by the necessity of reconciling where we can, and where we cannot, of selecting the better reason, and declaring which is law.

There is probably not a State in this Union, as old as the youngest man present, that has not its one, or two, or three volumes of "Revised Statutes "-every revision of statutory law is a codification. If one can be or ought to be codified, why cannot and why ought not the other? If practice or civil procedure, if the penal law and penal procedure may be codified, why may not the body of the civil law?

I remember the time as a law student-not as a practitioner, for the Code reached my native State just as I was admitted to the bar; but I remember the time when a young lawyer (or for that matter, an old one) would walk into the court-house in pride and confidence, and go out in confusion and defeat, because he had called it assumpsit instead of covenant, or trespass instead of "on the case," or called it a bill when it ought to have been a declaration, and so on without

end. A few great lawyers in this State said that was not right. They were opposed and ridiculed, but they fought for the Code of Procedure and had it adopted, and now we can try controversies on their merits, to the wholesome neglect of the legal metaphysician's special pleading.

How is it that Rome has governed half the civilized world by her beneficent civil law for a thousand years and more, after she has ceased to govern the same fair regions with her arms? The Code of Justinian, a Code of laws, and not merely of procedure, made that possible. And yet we are to be told that we cannot do what the Roman lawyers did. For one I do not believe in the degeneracy of the human race; I do not believe that learning, industry and capacity for labor have diminished.

One objector will say: It is all right to have digests -your incipient or imperfect Codes-to have Revised Statutes; they can be made with scissors and paste (whoever thinks that let him try it), and all right to simplify procedure, mere practice; but the law, the body of the law, that is a different thing; that is so vast, so ramified, so intricate, so delicate, so important as the standard and safe-guard of rights, don't tamper with that. The argument is the other way. Its vastness, its importance, its complication, its delicacy, are just the reasons why the law needs codification and would be benefited by it. If it cannot be done, that is our fault, and not the fault of the system of codification. And we are told that the Civil Code, as now proposed, has not been well done. That would probably be assumed by its opponents; but if it really had not been well done, then so much the greater reason would there be for the existence of this society, though we may not concede the particular defects so far alleged against it. We advocate its adoption while aiding to perfect it.

A. P. Gould, for plaintiff.

D. N. Mortland, for defendant.

APPLETON, C. J. This is an action on the case. The plaintiff in his writ alleges that on December 19, 1875, he was seised of a dwelling-house on Hurricane Island of great value, yielding an annual rent of one hundred dollars which he would be receiving, were it not for the wrongful act of the defendant, and ought to receive from one Charles H. Sanborn and other tenants; that he leased the dwelling house and premises to said Sanborn for the term of one year, which sum said Sanborn was willing to pay; that the defendant was the occupant and owner of said Hurricane Island, and engaged in quarrying, cutting and working granite, and shipping the same to market; that there was no opportunity to lease any building, except to those in the defendant's employ; yet the defendant knowing this and to deprive the plaintiff of the rents and profits arising therefrom, did on December 29, 1875, order and direct the said Sanborn to pay him only twenty dollars a year, instead of ninety-six dol.

lars, and threatened to discharge said Sanborn if he did not comply with his order; by means whereof the plaintiff received but one dollar and sixty-seven cents per month, instead of eight dollars; that afterward on on August 1, 1876, said Tillson ordered and directed said Sanborn to leave said dwelling-house and refused to allow him to remain therein, and threatened to discharge him from his employment, unless he should leave said dwelling-house; and that the said Tillson threatened to discharge any and all persons from his employment, and expel them from the island, who should occupy said premises and become tenants of the plaintiff, by means of which orders, threats, and directions, the said Sanborn was induced to and did leave the premises, and refused to pay for the use of the same, and to occupy the same, whereby the plaintiff has been unable to rent, lease, or sell said dwelling-house, and has lost all benefit from the

same.

The second count is in trover for the conversion of the plaintiff's dwelling-house.

The evidence in support of the plaintiff's claim comes entirely from him, and witnesses called by him.

The defendant is the owner of Hurricane Island, has extensive quarries there, doing a large business, having important contracts with the government, and six hundred men in his employ.

The plaintiff went into the defendant's employ as a stone cutter in 1873, and purchased the house referred to in the declaration, in the fall of 1874, for two hundred and fifty dollars, and was discharged in October, 1875. He testified that he "made no attempt to injure General Tillson, previous to his (my) discharge; " that he "had been taking notes in regard to the management of the job," and was "going to keep the notes in case the job was ever investigated," that he "furnished information to the newspapers in regard to the management of the government works;" wrote articles in the Boston Herald and the Rockland Opinion; that when the latter paper was indicted for a libel growing out of the articles, he was here two weeks in procuring witnesses for the publisher; that he said he considered the [defendant a damned scoundrel, that he so testified, on the trial of the indictment, and that he "so considers him now."

The house was built on defendant's land by verbal permission of his clerk.

Such is the relation of the parties.

The plaintiff claims to recover in trover, but he testifies that General Tillson told him, "that he would not interfere with making a disposition of the property," ," "that he has never directly assumed to him (me) any control over that house," "that he wanted me to dispose of my property there and go off the island; he said he should not interfere with my disposing of it," "that any man that rented my house should not work for him." Here is no conversion of the property. The plaintiff might live there. He might sell or lease his estate. He had full control of his property, leaving the defendant at liberty in fixing the terms and conditions on which he would employ those laboring for him. Whatever they might do, here is no conversion of the house of the plaint

iff.

The first ground of complaint in the second count in the declaration is, that he "had leased the said dwelling house and premises to the said Charles H. Sanborn for the term of one year from the said day hereinbefore specified (December 29, 1875), for the sum of eight dollars per month, which sum the said Charles H. Sanborn was then and there ready and willing to pay." "Yet the said defendant, well knowing the premises, * * did on the said December 29, A. D. 1875, order and direct the said Charles H. Sanborn

*

to pay the plaintiff only twenty dollars a year, instead of the ninety-six dollars per year, and threatened to discharge said Sanborn from his employment if he did not comply with such order; by means whereof the said Sanborn was prevented from payment to the plaintiff any more than one dollar and sixty-seven cents, instead of eight dollars per month."

The plaintiff's evidence disproves every material allegation as there set forth, and the above is the most tangible ground of complaint to be found in the whole declaration.

The house was not leased for the year. It was personal property. The plaintiff was not seised of it. Sanborn testifies that the plaintiff rented the house to him "for eight dollars a month, so long as he (I) saw fit to occupy it," that he went into the house in October, 1875, and left in August, 1876, and that the amount he "paid Heywood was in the neighborhood of eighty dollars." The plaintiff nowhere alleges that he did not receive the rent as stipulated from Sanborn. The only evidence of ordering out is, what is testified to by Sauborn; that "he said he did not wish to injure me (Sanborn), but the man that lived in Heywood's house could not work for him." But this constitutes no ordering. It was what he had a right to say. It did not interfere with letting to others.

As the house was rented to Sanborn by the month, as long as he saw fit to occupy it," the contract was terminable at the option of Sanborn. He could terminate it when and for what reason he saw fit. The plaintiff could not complain of its termination, no matter how unreasonable it might be. He had no contract with Sanborn that he should remain. He might remain or not. In Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104, the defendants, after a will was made devising certain real estate to A., conspired to induce the testator to revoke it, and effected their object by means of false and fraudulent representations. Held, that A. could not maintain an action, as the revocation of the will merely deprived him of an expected gratuity, without interfering with any of his rights. So here no rights were interfered with. There was no obligation on the tenant to remain. None on the landlord to permit him to remain. All there is, the tenant did not renew his contract. Why he did not is no concern of the landlord. The tenancy was at will. The exercise of that will was the exercise of a perfect right. The motive which induced that exercise can be no ground of complaint, whether it was the chance of bettering his condition, to gratify a whim of his own or the ill will of another. The landlord cannot complain that a tenant declines to renew his lease. If Sanborn violated any contract, he is liable to the plaintiff in damages.

Besides an employer has a vital interest in the welfare of his men. He has a right to see that they are not plundered. It was a perfectly proper motive for the defendant to interpose to prevent an extortionate rent, as that of one hundred dollars a year for a shanty costing but two hundred and fifty dollars. His own interest and his interest in the success of his employees, without the imputation of any thing sinister on his part, afford good and sufficient reasons for his intervention.

The question raised is, whether the defendant is liable in damages to a landlord for a tenant's leaving, or for one or many declining to become or not becoming tenants, in consequence of his threats that he would employ no one who should become such landlord's tenants, or being his tenants should continue to remain such.

The defendant was doing a large business, having five or six hundred men in his employ. It was of the utmost importance to his success that his employees should be of good habits, friendly to his enterprise

race.

and interested in his prosperity. As between the employer and the employee, each may fix the terms and conditions on which the one will employ and the other be employed. "It is well settled," observes Shaw, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 133, "every free man, whether skilled laborer, mechan.c, farmer, or domestic servant, may work or not work, work or refuse to work, with any company or individual at his own option, except so far as he is bound by contract." The employer has equal and reciprocal rights to fix the terms and conditions upon which alone he will contract for employment. He is restricted to no color or The conditions upon which he insists may be silly or absurd. If acceded to they are binding on the employee. Whether wise or not, if legal it is no coucern of others. In Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 14, Chapman, C. J., uses this language: "Every man has a right to determine what branch of business he will pursue, and to make his contracts with whom he pleases and on what terms he can. * ** He may refuse to deal with any men or class of men. And it is no crime for any number of persons, without an unlawful object in view to associate themselves together and agree that they will not work for or deal with certain men or classes of men, or work under a certain price or without certain conditions." The employer has the same right of imposing conditions and limitations as those he may employ.

The workmen may agree that they will not work for an employer, "who should after notice, employ a journeyman, who habitually used it" (liquor), Commonwealth v. Hunt. A laborer would not be liable to a journeyman who lost employment by reason of such agreement, and the refusal of the employer any longer to hire him. So the master may equally impose as a condition, that his servants shall not board at a house where liquors are kept for sale, and the seller cannot maintain an action against him for the loss of profits on liquors he might have sold his boarders had they remained with him. He may impose as a condition of employment, that certain associates and associations shall be avoided. Good habits are not all that is desirable. An interest in the success of an enterprise is required. The master may impose as a condition of employment, that he shall not associate with one who is inimical to him-who is seeking to injure him- who is acting as a spy upon his proceedings, and who is libelling him in the newspapers.

So the employer, as he may by contract stipulate with his men where they shall not board, may equally determine where and of whom they may rent the houses they may occupy, and where they may not. The house may be in an unhealthy part of the city, or a disreputable neighborhood. But whatever the reason, good, bad, or indifferent, no one has a right to complain.

The owner has no cause of complaint when one says he will not occupy his house, nor when another says he will refrain from doing an act it it be occupied. The defendant was under no obligation-owed no duty to the plaintiff that he should permit his men to occupy his house, any more than to a boarding-house keeper that he should permit his men to board with him. The idea of a boarding-house keeper suing a man because he declines or refuses to employ his boarders, or the owner of a house, because he will not employ his tenants, is utterly at variance with the right of individuals to make their own contracts. A landlord has no right of action against an employer of men, because he refuses to employ his tenants or boarders. Nor are his rights enlarged because the reason of such refusal is, that they are his tenants or boarders.

Neither is the employer liable if having the tenants or boarders of a landlord in his employ he discharges