But the surety will not be liable for new duties subsequently imposed, not germane to the office, because it cannot be said consistently with reason, that such duties were in the contemplation of the sureties at the time of executing the bond. This doctrine is expressly recognized by the Court of Appeals in People v. Vilus, supra, where the court say, "that imposing duties of another description and not appropriate to the office, would discharge sureties not coming within such contemplation."

The case of White v. East Saginaw, 43 Mich. 567, is a direct authority on this point. In this case after the execution by sureties of a sheriff's official bond, an act was passed taxing the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors, and sheriffs were required to collect the tax when warrants therefor were issued by the county treasurers. The court held that the duty of collecting taxes was not germane to the office of sheriff, and that therefore the sureties were not liable for the sheriff's default in the performance of that duty. This distinction between those subsequently imposed duties which are and those which are not germane to the office is manifestly so sound on principle that it may be considered as definitely established in this country, although there is but little in the way of authority on the point.

Whether an extension by the sovereign power of an officer's time in which to collect or pay over moneys, coming to or held by him officially, will discharge his sureties, is a question upon which the authorities are diametrically opposed. The majority of the cases hold that such an extension will not release the sureties on the ground that the provisions of the law as to time form no part of the contract; that they are ordained by the government for its own convenience and security; and are therefore subject to such changes as the Legislature may from time to time deem proper. Starting with this very reasonable interpretation of the law and the contract, the courts are inevitably led to the conclusion that the surety is not discharged by any subsequent change in the time, for the obvious reason that the time being no part of the contract, it cannot be said that the contract has been in any respect altered without the consent of the surety. The cases which adopt this reasoning and reach this conclusion are the following: State v. Swinney, 60 Miss. 39; Commonwealth v. Holmes, 25 Gratt. 771; Smith v. Commonwealth, id. 780; Prarie v. North, 78 N. C. 169; State v. Carleton, 1 Gill (Md.), 249. And the doctrine is supported by the United States Supreme Court in many cases. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat. 720; United States v. Nicholl, 12 id. 509; United States v. Vanzandt, 11 id. 184; United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 187. In this last case the court say: "The regulations requiring settlements to be made by its officers at short periods are designed for the protection of the government and merely directory to the officers and form no part of the contract." In Illinois, Tennessee and Missouri, the contrary doctrine has been established. Johnson v. Halker, 8 Heisk. 388; State v. Roberts, 68 Mo. 234; Davis v. People, 1 Gilm. (Ill).) 409; People v. MeHutton, 2 id. 638. While the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Prarie v. Jenkins, 75 N. C. 545, cited with approval the decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Jackson v. Halker, supra, yet in the later case of Prarie v. Worth, 78 N. C. 169, the court, without referring to the decision in Prarie v. Jenkins, used language which would seem to overthrow the view taken by it in that case. However as the question was not definitely presented in either case, what was said by the court in each, was of course a mere dictum. Another important question is the extent of the liability of the surety in point of time. The doctrine is well settled that in the absence of retrospective language in the bond, the

surety will not be responsible for the misconduct or the misappropriation of his principal antecedent to the term of office for which he executed the bond. Vivian v. Otis, 24 Wis. 518; Myers v. United States, 1 McLean, 493; County of Mahaska v. Ingalls, 16 Iowa, 81; Townsend v. Everett, 4 Ala. 607; United States v. Boyd, 5 How. 29; Inhab. of Rochester v. Randall, 105 Mass. 295; Bissell v. Saxton, 66 N. Y. 55; S. C., 77 id. 191; Hetten v. Lane, 43 Tex. 279; Hoboken v. Kamena, 41 N. J. L. 435; United States v. Eckford's Ex'rs, 1 How. 250; United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 187; Farrar v. United States, 5 id. 372; Bessinger v. Dickerson, 20 Iowa, 261. Numerous other authorities might be cited in support of this proposition, but it is unnecessary, as there can be doubt concerning the correctness of this rule.

However it seems to be established that the burden is on the surety, a default in payment having been shown to prove that the money was misapplied anterior to the inception of his liability. United States v. Stone, 106 U. S. 525-535; United States v. Eckford's Exrs., 1 How. 250; Bruce v. United States, 17 id. 437; Hether v. Lane, 43 Tex. 279.

In Bruce v. United States the court say: "Undoubtedly the sureties in the second term of office are not responsible for a default committed in the first. But if any part of the balance now claimed from him was misapplied during that period it was incumbent on the plaintiff in error to prove it."

Some of the cases have carried the presumption beyond the limit of reason and justice, and have made it conclusive.

These are cases 'in which it appeared by the books and accounts of the officer that the misappropriation had occurred during the term for which the surety was bound. They hold that the surety is concluded, and cannot show that the default in fact occurred before the time for which he is responsible. The leading case in favor of this doctrine is Baker v. Preston, 1 Gill, 235. It was decided by the Virginia Court of Appeals in 1821. The doctrine established by that case is accurately expressed in the syllabus: "The books kept by the treasurer are conclusive evidence of the balance actually in the treasury at any given time, both against the treasurer and his sureties, without being pleaded as an estoppel so as to charge them with balances carried forward from year to year, as if those balances were actually on hand."

The following other authorities are to the same effect: State v. Grammer, 29 Ind. 530; Morley v. Town of Metamora, 78 Ill. 394; City of Chicago v. Gage, 95 id. 593; Boone County v. Jones, 54 Iowa, 699.

But the decided weight of authority is in favor of the more reasonable and just rule, that although the books and accounts are evidence against the surety to show that the principal had committed no defalcation prior to the period of the inception of the surety's liability, yet they do not conclusively establish that fact, and that the contrary may be shown by compe. tent evidence. Nolly v. Callaway Co. Court, 11 Mo. 447; State v. Smith, 20 id. 226; Hatch v. Inhab. of Attleborough, 97 Mass. 533; State v. Fulkennider, 4 Ired. 364; Governor v. Sutton, 4 Dev. & Bat. 484; State V. Rhoades, 6 Nev. 352; State V. Newton, 33 Ark. 276; United States v. Boyd, 5 How. 50; United States v. Eckford's Exrs., 1 id. 250; Bissell v. Saxton, 66 N. Y. 55; United States v. Stone, 106 U. S. 525. It has been sometimes thought that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Girauldt, 11 How. 22, had overthrown the doctrine of the two earlier cases. But any doubt on the point which might have existed prior to the decision of United States v. Stone, supra, must be considered as having been finally removed by that case. After referring to the decision in United States v. Eckford's Exrs., 1 How. 250, the court say: "We repeat what was said in that

case: The amount charged to the collector at the commencement of the term is only prima facie evidence against the sureties. If they can show by circumstances or otherwise that the balance charged in whole or in part had been misapplied by the collector prior to the new appointment they are not liable for the sum so misapplied."

The rule that the accounts are conclusive against the sureties has been criticised by the courts of the very State in which it had its origin. Munford v. Overseers, 2 Rand. 314; Craddock v. Turner's Admx., 6 Leigh, 116. In the last case Tucker, president of the Court of Appeals, says, at page 126: "That case" (Baker v. Preston, supra) "has certainly not been very acceptable to the profession. It was most ably contested at the time by one of the most distinguished judges of the General Court then sitting as a member of the Special Court of Appeals which decided the case."

Another principle is well established, that where money is received by the officer before the commencement of the term for which the surety has become bound, but such money remains in the hands of the principal officially, and has not been misappropriated by him at the time of the execution of the bond by the surety, the surety will be liable for a subsequent embezzlement or loss of the funds. United States v. Stone, 106 U. S. 525; United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 187; Board of Ed. v. Fonda, 77 N. Y. 350-359; Hatch v. Inhab. of Attleborough, 97 Mass. 533; Dawes v. Edes, 13 id. 177; Bruce v. United States, 17 How. 437; People v.Shannon, 10 Ill. App. 355; De Hart v. McGuire, 3 Phila. 359. The question whether the surety is bound will depend upon the relation of the principal toward the government at the time of the execution of the bond with reference to the money then unpaid. If he holds the funds in his hands as a bailee the sureties are responsible. If he has in any way applied them to his own use, so that he has become the debtor of the government with respect to them, then the misappropriation of them is complete, and the surety is not liable.

The principle which governs the question is very clearly and succinctly stated by the New York Court of Appeals in Board of Ed. v. Fonda, 77 N. Y., 358: "We find the rule laid down thus: For any sum paid to a principal before the execution of a boud for official good conduct there is but one'ground on which the sureties can be held to answer, and that is that the principal still held the money in bank or otherwise. If still in his hands, he was up to that time bailee to the public; but if he had become a debtor or defaulter thereto his offense was already consummated."

The same rule is laid down in Farrar v. United Saates, 5 Pet. 372, and Rochester v. Randall, 105 Mass. 295. In the last case the court held that a false entry on the official books constituted an appropriation of the money by the officer for which the surety would be liable, the court saying: "There is no evidence that the specific money remained in his hauds after the close of that year."

But the Supreme Court of Indiana in two recent cases has held that the conversion of the money to his own use will not constitute a breach of the bond. Brown v. State, 78 Ind. 239; Board, etc., v. State, 79 id. 270. These authorities rest upon the foundation that a public officer, with respect to public moneys in his hands, is not a naked bailee, but a debtor, for all moneys he is bound to pay over. In the first case the court use the following language: "In Shelton v. State, 53 Ind. 331, it was said, in speaking of a public, officer that 'He is not like a trustee or agent, the mere bailee or custodian of the moneys in his hands.

The money

which he receives is his own money, and when he has accounted as required by law and by the terms of his bond, nothing further can be required of him.'

In Shelton v. State the court came to this conclusion

because of the authorities in that State which hold the surety and principal liable for all moneys which have come into the principal's possession officially, irrespective of the inquiry whether they have been lost through any misconduct on the officer's part, or were stolen or taken from him by force. The court said that this doctrine was inconsistent with the principle that the officer was a mere bailee, for then he would be liable only in cases where he had willfully stolen or carelessly lost the money. The court was undoubtedly mistaken when it stated that this absolute responsibility of a public officer is inconsistent with the theory that he holds the funds merely as a bailee or custodian. No one pretends that a common carrier is the owner of goods delivered to it for transportation, simply because it is absolutely bound for the safe carriage and delivery of the goods, irrespective of the question of negligence. A common carrier is so bound because public policy imperatively demands the existence of this responsibility.

The same public policy lies at the foundation of the rule which renders public officers and their sureties absolutely liable for all moneys which have come into their hands officially. The leading case is United States v. Prescott, 3 How. 578. In that case it was held that the felonious taking and carrying away the public moneys in the custody of a receiver of public moueys without any fault or negligence on his part, does not discharge him and his sureties, and cannot be set up as a defense in an action on his official bond. The court placed its decision solely and exclusively on the ground of public policy. At page 588 the court say: "Public policy requires that every depositary of the public money should be held to a strict accountability; not only that he should exercise the highest degree of vigilance, but that he should keep safely' the moneys which came to his hands. Any relaxation of these conditions would opon a door to frauds which might be practiced with impunity. A depositary would have nothing more to do than to lay his plans and arrange his proofs so as to establish his loss without laches on his part. Let such a principle be applied to our postmasters, collectors of customs, receivers of public moneys and others who receive more or less of the public funds, and what losses might not be anticipated by the public?"

It will be noticed that the consideration of public policy which forms the substratum of this doctrine is precisely the same one which underlies the commonlaw rule that defines the liability of coramon carriers, namely: That it is peculiarly within the power of the officer, as it is within the power of the common carrier to cover up or conceal his fraud or want of care. The following other cases rest the absolute liability of the officer to pay over funds which bave come into his possession on the same foundation of public policy: State v. Powell, 67 Mo. 395; Andrews v. Jenkins, 39 Wis. 468; United States v. Morgan, 11 How. 154; United States v. Dashiel, 4 Wall. 185; County Commrs. of Hampshire Co. v. Jones, 18 Minu. 199; United States v. Keehler, 9 Wall. 83; Boyden v.. United States, 13 id. 17; Bevans v. United States, id. 561; Commonwealth v. Comly, 3 Penn. St. 372; Boggs v. State, 46 Tex. 10; Inhab. of New Providence v. McEachron, 83 N. J. L. 339; S. C., on appeal, 35 id. 528. In Illinois, Ohio, New Mexico, Massachusetts and Iowa the unrestricted liability is placed upon the principlɔ that there is no provision in the bond against responsibility in any contingency, and therefore the officers and sureties are absolutely bound on the well-settled doctrine that any event, against which a party might have provided in his contract, shall never be alleged as an excuse for the non-performance of his agreement. District Township of Union v. Smith, 39 Iowa, 9; Thompson v. Township Trustees, 30 Ill. 99; State v. Harper, 6 Ohio St. 607;

United States v. Watts, 1 New Mexico, 553; Inhab. of Hancock v. Hazzard, 12 Cush. 112. This last case recognizes as lying at the foundation of the rule the doctrine of public policy which is supported by the majority of the cases, and it appears that the SupremeCourt of Indiana in Halbert v. State, 22 Ind. 125, decided that a public officer and his sureties were absolutely bound by reason of the absolute language of the bond, and not because the officer was a mere debtor to the government for the moneys in his hands.

It thus clearly appears that that court, in Brown v. State, supra, fell into an error by resting its decision on a mistaken notion as to the principle which lay at the foundation of a public officer's absolute responsibility. That principle is not that he is a debtor to the government for the funds, but that the absolute terms of the obligation and consideration of public policy impose upon him an unrestricted liability.

An important qualification of this extreme responsibility was established by the United States Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Thomas, 15 Wall. 337, where it was held that a collector or receiver of public moneys, under bond to keep it safely and pay it when required, is not bound to render the money at all events, but is excused from paying it over by the act of God or the public enemy without fault or negligence on his part.

The liability of a public officer and his sureties is therefore precisely the same as that of the common-law responsibility of a common carrier. To same effect is United States v. Humason, 6 Saw. C. C. 199.

The question is often presented as to the liability of the surety after the expiration of the term of office on a bond providing for the faithful performance by the principal of the duties of his office so long as he shall continue in office. The decisions are quite uniform on this point, and the rule they establish is that the surety is not liable, even though the statute provides that the officer shall remain in office after the expiration of his term until his successor has qualified, and the officer remains in office and commits defalcation after the term of his office has expired, there having been no successor elected or appointed or none having qualified. Arlington v. Merrick, 3 Saund. 403, is the leading case. The bond, after reciting that one J. had been appointed deputy postmaster for six months, was conditioned for the faithful execution by J. of the office "during all the time he shall continue postmaster.” Held, that the surety was not liable for funds embezzled by J. after the expiration of the six months. This case does not quite sustain the broad rule above expressed, because there was no statutory provision that the officer should remain in office until his successor should qualify. But in the following cases the precise rule was established, as in each of them it appeared that the officer was to hold over until the qualification of his successor, and in each the bond was conditioned for the faithful discharge of his duties during his continuance in office. Riddel v. School Dist., 15 Kans. 168; Mutual Loan & Build. Assn. v. Price, 16 Fla. 204; Chelmsford Co. v. Demarest, 7 Gray, 1.

In Thompson v. State, 37 Miss.518, the Supreme Court of that State held that a surety under such a statute and such a provision in the bond should be liable unti a successor had actually qualified. To same effect is Chairman of Common Schools v. Daniel, 6 Joues, 444. The doctrine of these two cases rests upon the assumption that the provision of the statute, that the officer shall continue to discharge the duties of his office until his successor has duly qualified, renders the term of office indefinite, and of course the natural sequence of this construction of the law is that the liability of the surety on the official bond is correspondingly indefinite. The argument may be thus expressed: The surety is fully informed by the law that the term of

office of his principal may be indefinite by reason of an omission to appoint or elect a successor. It is with this knowledge that he signs the bond. Why should he not be bound until such successor has been elected and has qualified? The fallacy of this reasoning lies in the assumption of the proposition from which the conclusion is deduced. The surety is not apprised by the law that his principal's term of office may be prolonged indefinitely. He knows that the sole object in inserting a provision in the law extending the tenure of the office until the appointment of a successor is to obviate the possibility of a vacancy in the office.

The purpose is not to extend the term indefinitely. This is the universal understanding as to the object of such a provision. It is very clearly expressed in Welch v. Seymour, 28 Coun., at page 391: "A provision for an extension of an official term until a successor is appointed is well understood and intended to be a precaution against a vacancy or lapse in the office, not to create an unlimited tenure."

The same is stated by the court in City Council of Montgomery v. Hughes, 65 Ala. p. 208. It is therefore manifest on principle that when a surety signs an official bond under such circumstances, he sigus it with the most implicit belief justified by the universal interpretation of such a provision in a statute, that the term of office will not be extended beyond the statutory term, and such reasonable time thereafter as may be necessary to secure the appointment and qualification of a successor in office. He has a perfect right to assume that his liability will be commensurate in point of time with this term. For the court to extend his responsibility to a period beyond such term is to interpolate into the surety's contract a provision not therein expressed, and in effect to fasten upon him a liability to which he has never assented.

The most reasonable rule is that which was enunciated by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Chelmsford Co. v. Demarest, 7 Gray, 1, and adopted in the following cases; Supervisors v. Kaine, 39 Wis. 468; Mutual Loan & Build. Assn. v. Price, 16 Fla. 204; Mayor, etc., of Rahway, 40 N. J. L. 207. These cases hold that the surety is liable for such reasonable time after the term and before the successor is appointed "as is reasonably sufficient for the election and qualification of his successor, and no longer."

Where either the statute provides that the officer shall hold over after his term until his successor is appointed or the bond is conditioned for the honest performance of the duties of the office by the principal during his continuance in office, the authorities are unanimous to the effect that there is no liability after the expiration of the statutory term. Whether the doctrine of a reasonable time would obtain in such a case has not been very often presented to the courts. It was presented in 40 N. J. L. 207, and the court held it did obtain. The authorities which support the proposition first expressed are the following: Hussell v. Long, 2 Maule & Sel. 363; Liverpool Water Works v. Atkinson, 6 East, 507; Kingston Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 33 Barb. 196; Slate Treasurer v. Mann, 34 Vt. 371; Leadly v. Evans, 2 Bing. 32; Welch v. Seymour, 28 Conn. 387; Kitson v. Julian, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 326; Dover v. Twombly, 42 N. H. 59; Moss v. State, 10 Mo. 338; South Carolina Soc. v. Johnson, 1 McCord, 41; Mayor v. Howe, 2 Harr. 190; County of Wapello, 10 Iowa, 39; Montgomery v. Hughes, 65 Ala. 201; Commonwealth v. Fairfax, 4 Hen. & Mumf. (Va.) 208. Of course where the bond in express terms provides that the surety shall be bound while the principal shall remain in office, whether in consequence of the original or of any other election, the surety will be responsible for any default occurring after the expiration of the first term, provided the principal is in office under

an election or appointment. Oswald v. Mayor of Borwick, 5 H. L. Cas. 890; Angero v. Keese, 1 Mees. & Wels. 390; People's Build. Assn. v. Wroth, 43 N. J. L. 70.

So where the office is for an indefinite period and the terms of the bond do not limit the time of liability the surety is liable so long as the principal holds the office. Richardson School Fund v. Dean, 130 Mass. 245; Amherst Bank v. Root, 2 Met. 522; Worcester Bank v. Reed, 9 Mass. 267; Cambridge v. Fifield, 126 id. 428; Commonwealth v. Reading Savings Bank, 129 id. 73; Dedham Bank v. Chickering, 3 Pick. 335.

Another important principle which is supported by all the adjudications is that when an officer is required to perform a duty which is special in its nature, and he is required to give a special bond for the faithful performance of such duty, the general bondsmen, in the absence of any provision to that effect, are not liable for his malfeasance in the discharge of such special duty. Board of Suprs. of Milwaukee Co. v. Ehlers, 45 Wis. 281; Williams v. Norton, 38 Me. 52; State v. Young, 23 Minn. 551; County of Redwood v. Tower, 28 id. 45; State v. Felton, 59 Miss. 402; Commonwealth v. Toms, 45 Penn. St. 408; State v. Corey, 16 Ohio St. 17; State v. Johnson, 55 Mo. 80; Henderson v. Cooner, 4 Nev. 429; People v. Moon, 3 Scam. 123; Waters v. State, 1 Gill, 302; United States v. Cheeseman, 3 Saw. C. C. 424; Governor v. Matlock, 1 Dev. 214; Governor v. Barr, id. 65; Crumpler v. Governor, id. 52; State v. Starnes, 5 Lea, 545.

An interesting question often arises in a contest between two sets of sureties upon two distinct official bonds executed for two distinct terms of office held by the same person. It not unfrequently happens that the principal, after having misappropriated a sum of money during one term, uses funds received by him during a succeeding term to make good his defalcation, and thereby creates a deficit in the sum for which he is bound to account during such subsequent term. The question is then presented as to which set of sureties is liable. It seems from the authorities that the respective liabilities of sureties and different bonds under these circumstances is to be determined by the law governing the application of payments. It is an universally recognized principle that a debtor may at the time of payment designate the debt to which his payment shall be applied, and this rule obtains even where the rights of sureties may be affected by such application. The decisions uniformly hold that the case of official sureties furnishes no exception to the rule; and they accord to the principal the right to use the funds collected during a subsequent term of office to extinguish a liability, created by misappropriation or in any other way, during a former term, provided | the government acts in good faith, knows nothing of the source from which the moneys so applied are derived, and has no knowledge that the officer iutends to defraud the sureties on the subsequent bond. This application of course creates a deficit in the second term for which the sureties on the second bond will be liable. Egremont v. Benjamin, 125 Mass. 15; State v, Smith, 26 Mo. 226; State v. Sooy, 39 N. J. L. 539; S. C., on appeal, 41 id. 394; Seymour v. Van Slyck, 8 Wend. 403, affirmed in Court of Errors on same point in 15 id. 19; Gwyne v. Burnell, 9 Bing. 544, 2 Bing. N. C. 7, and 7 Cl. & Fin. 572; Inhab. of Coterain v. Bell, 9 Metc. 499; Chapman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 721. Some of the cases hold that where there is an open and running account between the principal and the government, a general payment will extinguish the earlier items of the account, even though the effect of such an application be to exonerate the sureties on a former bond from liability, by the payment of moneys collected during a succeeding term, and to impose upon the sureties for such subsequent term a liability for

the deficit thereby created. Inhab. of Sandwich v. Fish, 2 Gray, 298; United States v. Wardell, 5 Mason, 82; Postmaster-General v. Furber, 4 id. 333; Readfield v. Shearer, 50 Me. 36.

There are several cases that seem to militate against this rule. United States v. Eckford's Ex'rs, 1 How. 250; Hoboken v. Kamena, 41 N. J. L.. 435; United States v. January, 7 Cranch, 572. Judge Story in a note to United States v. Wardell, supra, states that United States v. January did not decide the point; but the Supreme Court in United States v. Eckford's Ex'rs, decided 15 years later, held, that it did, and quoted with approval what was said by the court in that case on that point. In Hoboken v. Kamena, supra, the question was not directly involved, but the court expressed its opinion on the subject in these words: "Independent of any actual appropriation it appears to me that sound legal principle will not permit the application of the city funds of which the treasurer was in receipt subsequent to the taking effect of his last bond, to the relief of the surieties on the bond or bonds covering the time when the treasurer actually made default or was guilty of fraud or embezzlement."

The case of Seymour v. Van Slyck, 8 Wend. 403, affirmed in Court of Errors, 15 id. 19, recognizes the same doctrine. But both courts held that the intention of the officer to apply the payment upon the oldest items might be inferred from circumstan

ces.

In the Supreme Court Judge Sutherland, after referring to the general rule, that a payment on account is applied by law in extinguishment of the earliest items, says: "But in a case like this where, although the account is continued and unbroken, there has, during its progress, been a change of sureties, I am inclined to think the principle ought not to be applied. So far as the parties have not, either expressly or by necessary implication arising from the circumstances of the case, applied the payments, it is obviously just and equitable, as it regards the sureties, that each should have the benefit of the amount actually received by his principal during the period of his suretyship, so far as it can be ascertained." And this doctrine is reiterated in the Court of Errors by the chancellor in whose opinion a majority of the court concurred. In the following other cases the same rule was adopted and applied: Postmaster General v. Norwell, Gilpin, 106; Chapman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt, 721; Paw Paw v. Eggleston, 25 Mich. 36; Pickering v. Day, 3 Hous. 474; Inhab. of Porter, 47 Me. 515; Myers v. United States, 1 McLean, 493; United States v. Linn, 2 id. 501.

But where the government exercises its right of applying the payments at the time, and is ignorant of the source from which the money so applied is derived, and of any design on the part of the principal to defraud the subsequent sureties, when it acts in good faith, the application so made will bind the subsequent sureties, even though it imposes upon them a liability in exoneration of former sureties, by discharging the deficit of a former term with money received during a subsequent term and even though the officer fully applies all moneys received during such subsequent term to the use of the government by disbursing it in part as required by law, and by paying over the balance in discharge of his deficit, or by using the whole sum received during such term to make good such deficit. United States v. Giles, 9 Cranch, 212; Attorney-General v. Manderson, 12 Jur. 383; Chapman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 721.

In conclusion the reader's attention is called to the authorities which ennunciate the doctrine that sureties on an official bond are not discharged by the negligence, omission of duty, or malfeasance of another public officer, which may have rendered it possible for