to the particular act. If such capacity existed, the accused is fully responsible, though in other respects he may have been insane.269

Mere Weakness of Mind, where there is sufficient capacity to know that the act is wrong, is no ground of exemption.270

Ability to Comprehend Ingredients of Offense.-But when a person is in fact of unsound mind, it is necessary, in order

269 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott, N. R. 595, Beale's Cas. 231, Mikell's Cas. 256; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216; Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658; Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161; U. S. v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,679; Brown v. Com., 78 Pa. 122; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146; Hornish v. People, 142 Ill. 620, 32 N. E. 677; Dunn v. People, 109 Ill. 635; Thomas v. State, 40 Tex. 60, 63; post, § 96b.

The capacity to plan a crime does not necessarily imply sanity. And it has been held wrong, therefore, to instruct the jury that a person accused of homicide is responsible, if he had sufficient power of mind "to deliberate and premeditate a design to effect the death" of the deceased. Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N. W. 912, 46 Am. Rep. 26. It has been held that there is no grade of insanity sufficient to acquit of murder, but not of manslaughter. U. S. v. Lee, 4 Mackey

(D. C.) 489, 54 Am. Rep. 293. But see Anderson v. State, 43 Conn. 514, 21 Am. Rep. 669.

270 Patterson v. People, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 625; Wartena v. State, 105 Ind. 445, 5 N. E. 20; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482, 21 N. E. 285; Travers v. U. S., 6 App. D. C. 450; State v. Flowers, 58 Kan. 702, 50 Pac. 938; State v. Palmer, 161 Mo. 152, 61 S. W. 651, Mikell's Cas. 297.

"While a slight departure from a well-balanced mind may be pronounced insanity in medical science, yet such a rule cannot be recognized in the administration of the law when a person is on trial for the commission of a high crime. The just and necessary protection of society requires the recognition of a rule which demands a greater degree of insanity to exempt from punishment." Per Chief Justice Mercur in Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. 262, 271.

It is proper to refuse to charge the jury that the mental condition of the accused, to render him responsible, "must have been such that he was capable of a careful weighing of reasons in order to a decision." State v. Swift, 57 Conn. 496, 18 Atl. 664.

Mere oddity or hypochondria is not insanity. Hawe v. State, 11 Neb. 537, 10 N. W. 452, 38 Am. Rep. 375; State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223.

Where the defense is idiocy the jury must be satisfied of the prisoner's capacity. Com. v. Heath, 11 Gray (Mass.) 303.

C. & M. Crimes-10.

that he may be capable of committing a crime, that he shall have sufficient mind "to see all the essential ingredients of the offense, and acknowledge their existence.”271

96. Insane Delusion.

(a) In General.-A man may be insane as to certain objects, or on certain subjects only, and perfectly sane with respect to other objects and on other subjects. In such a case he labors under partial insanity, or insane delusions. Because of disease of the mind he sees objects in a false light, or believes in the existence of facts which do not exist. This phase of insanity was also covered by the answer of the judges in the McNaghten Case referred to in the preceding section. They said: In case "he labors under a partial delusion only, and is not in other respects insane, he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if, under the influence of his delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defense, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune, and he killed him in revenge for such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment."272

This statement of the law as to partial insanity, or insane de

271 People v. Cummins, 47 Mich. 334, 11 N. W. 184, 186. For this reason, in the case cited, where temporary insanity was set up as a defense in the prosecution for larceny, it was held erroneous to charge that, if the accused knew enough to know that he was taking property that did not belong to him, he was sane enough to be guilty. He might have had mind enough to know this, it was said, and yet not enough to fraudulently intend to deprive the owner permanently of his property.

272McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott, N. R. 595, Beale's Cas. 231, Mikell's Cas. 256.

lusions, is still recognized in England,273 and has been adopted and applied by some of the courts in this country.274

It has not been accepted, however, by all of our courts. Some of them apply the same test in the case of partial insanity as in the case of general insanity, namely, the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong as to the particular act, regarding the question of delusion as important only in so far as it throws light on the question of such capacity.275

An insane delusion, as was stated in the McNaghten Case, above referred to, is no ground of exemption, unless the party would be exempt if the facts were really as he supposed.276

273 See Reg. v. Burton, 3 Fost. & F. 772; Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281.

274 Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216; People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275; Com. v. Rogers, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458, Beale's Cas. 235; Com. v. Freth, 3 Phila. (Pa.) 105, 5 Clark, 455; Com. v. Winnemone, 1 Brewst. (Pa.) 356; Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. 262; Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658; Smith v. State, 55 Ark. 259, 18 S. W. 237; Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310; State v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574; Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 31 Am. Rep. 360, Mikell's Cas. 306; Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 70, 45 S. W. 21, Mikell's Cas. 259.

If a person commits a homicide while in such a condition of somnambulism that he does not comprehend his situation, and the circumstances surrounding him, but supposes that he is being assailed, and that it is necessary for him to kill to save his life, or prevent great bodily harm, he is not responsible. Fain v. Com., 78 Ky. 183, 39 Am. Rep. 213, Mikell's Cas. 220, n., 297.

275 "If a man," said Judge Cox, in his charge to the jury in Guiteau's Case, "is under an insane delusion that another is attempting his life, and kills him in self defense, he does not know that he is committing an unnecessary homicide. If a man insanely believes that he has a command from the Almighty to kill, it is difficult to understand how such a man can know that it is wrong for him to do it. A man may have some other insane delusion, which would be quite consistent with a knowledge that such an act is wrong,-such as that he had received an injury, and he might kill in revenge for it, knowing that it would be wrong." Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161. See, also, People v. Pine, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 566; Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 31 Am. Rep. 360, Mikell's Cas. 306; U. S. v. Faulkner, 35 Fed. 730; State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341; Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 70, 45 S. W. 21.

276 Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307, 35 Am. Rep. 20; People v. Taylor,

Thus, a man is responsible for a homicide notwithstanding he was laboring under an insane delusion that the deceased was trying to marry his mother, and the killing was caused thereby,277

(b) Connection between the Delusion and the Act.—In all cases of delusion, the delusion must be connected with the act in the relation of cause and effect. A man is not exempt from responsibility merely because he is partially insane. If he does an act, the nature of which he understands, and which he knows to be wrong, he is none the less responsible because he is insane on other subjects.278

(c) Erroneous Belief Based upon Reasoning and Reflection. -A delusion, to be an insane delusion, so as to exempt a man from responsibility, must be the result of disease of the mind rendering him incapable of reason with respect to the object of the delusion. It must be an unreasoning belief in the existence of facts, and not merely an erroneous belief based upon reason

138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275; Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658; Com. v. Wireback, 190 Pa. 138, 42 Atl. 542; Thurman v. State, 32 Neb. 224, 49 N. W. 338; People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329; State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241.

277 Bolling v. State, 54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658.

This rule was also applied by the New York court of appeals in the late case of People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275, where a convict had killed a fellow convict under an alleged insane delusion that the deceased was spying upon him, and had divulged a plan to escape.

And in People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329, it was applied where a husband killed his wife under an alleged insane delusion, for several months, that she was putting poison in his food.

278 McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 1 Car. & K. 130, 8 Scott, N. R. 595, Beale's Cas. 231, Mikell's Cas. 256; Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161; Freeman v. People, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 9, 47 Am. Dec. 216; Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 S. W. 312; Smith v. State, 55 Ark. 259, 18 S. W. 237; Bovard v. State, 30 Miss. 600; Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665; People v. Coffman, 24 Cal. 230; State v. Geddis, 42 Iowa, 264; State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442, 446, 30 N. W. 742; State v. Stickley, 41 Iowa, 232; State v. Danby, 1 Houst. (Del.) 166; Dejarnette v. Com., 75 Va. 867, 877; State v. Maier, 36 W. Va. 757, 15 S. E. 991; State v. Huting, 21 Mo. 464; U. S. v. Ridgeway, 31 Fed. 144.

ing and reflection. This distinction was brought out with admirable clearness by Judge Cox in his charge to the jury in the Guiteau Case. An opinion, he said, however erroneous or absurd, formed upon reasoning and reflection, or examination of evidence, is not an insane delusion, and never exempts a man from responsibility for his acts. If a man, from mental disease, should believe that God had appeared to him, and commanded him to kill his child as a sacrifice, this would be an insane delusion, and, if he should sacrifice his child in obedience to the supposed command of the Almighty, he would not be responsible for the homicide; but if a man, by reading newspapers and by reasoning, however absurdly, should come to the conclusion that the good of the country required the removal of the president, and should assassinate him, he would be guilty of murder.279

97. Insane Irresistible Impulse.

(a) View That It is no Defense.—Whether or not an insane

279 It was further said by Judge Cox in the Guiteau case: "The important thing is that an insane delusion is never the result of reasoning and reflection. It is not generated by them, and it cannot be dispelled by them. A man may reason himself, and be reasoned by others, into absurd opinions, and may be persuaded into impracticable schemes and vicious resolutions, but he cannot be reasoned or persuaded into insanity or insane delusions. Whenever convictions are founded on evidence, or comparison of facts and opinions and arguments, they are not insane delusions. The insane delusion does not relate to mere sentiments or theories on abstract questions in law, politics, or religion. All these are subjects of opinions, which are beliefs founded on reasoning and reflection. * When men reason, the law

*

requires them to reason correctly, as far as their practical duties are concerned. When they have the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, they are bound to do it. Opinions, properly so called, i. e., beliefs resulting from reasoning, reflection, or examination of evidence, afford no protection against the penal consequences of crime. A man may reason himself into a conviction of the expediency and patriotic character of political assassination, but to allow him to find shelter behind that belief, as an insane delusion, would be monstrous." Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161. And see State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241.