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bankruptcy, with intent to defraud creditors;129 to conduct a mock auction, or stifle competition at an auction sale.130 And many other cases might be cited.131

145. Conspiracy to Slander or Extort Money.

It is also well settled that it is a misdemeanor at common law for two or more persons to conspire to slander another, or to make a false charge against him, either for the purpose of injuring his reputation, or for the purpose of extorting money from him, as in the case of blackmail, though verbal defamation and extortion of money otherwise than under color of office are not crimes at all at common law.13:

146. Conspiracy to Injure Another in His Trade or Calling.

It is also an indictable offense at common law to maliciously conspire to injure another in his trade or calling by means

129 Reg. v. Hall, 1 Fost. & F. 33. And see Heymann v. Reg., L. R. & Q. B. 102, 12 Cox, C. C. 383, 28 L. T. (N. S.) 162; Com. v. Goldsmith, 12 Phila. (Pa.) 632.

130 Reg. v. Lewis, 11 Cox, C. C. 404; Levi v. Levi, 6 Car. & P. 239.

131 See Reg. v. Brown, 7 Cox, C. C. 442; Reg. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B. 49, 7 Jur. 848; Ellzey v. State, 57 Miss. 827; State v. Cole, 39 N. J. Law, 324.

Conspiracy between a servant and another to sell the master's goods at less than the proper price, and divide the difference, or otherwise defraud the master. Reg. v. DeKromme, 17 Cox, C. C. 492.

Conspiracy between a female servant and a man for the latter to personate her master, and marry her, with intent to defraud her master's relations out of a part of his property. Rex v. Robinson, 1 Leach, C. C. 37, 2 East, P. C. 1010.

132 As conspiracy to falsely charge one with being the father of a bastard child. Timberley's Case, Sid. 68; Child v. North, 1 Keb. 203; Rex v. Armstrong, Vent. 304; Reg. v. Best, 2 Ld. Raym. 1167.

For other cases of conspiracy to slander or extort money, see Rex v. Kinnersley, 1 Strange, 193; Rex v. Parsons, 1 W. Bl. 392; Rex v. Ripsal, 1 W. Bl. 368, 3 Burrow, 1320; Com. v. Tibbetts, 2 Mass. 536; State v. Hickling, 41 N. J. Law, 208, 32 Am. Rep. 198; Elkin v. People, 28 N. Y. 177; People v. Dyer, 79 Mich. 480, 44 N. W. 937; State v. Jackson, 82 N. C. 565. See, also, State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 317, 9 Am.

that are wrongful, though not criminal,133 as to ruin a tradesman's business by bribing his servants or apprentices to make inferior goods;134 or to hinder a tradesman from exercising his trade, or a laborer or mechanic from obtaining employment;135 or to impoverish and ruin an actor by hissing him and driving him from the stage;136 or to compel a master to discharge a workman.137

147. Conspiracy to do Acts Prejudicial to the Public Generally.

The ground upon which any act is punished as a crime is because it injures, or tends to injure, the community at large; and therefore, in this sense, all criminal conspiracies are prejudicial to the public, and are punished for this reason. In this section the expression is used in a narrower sense, to denote acts which are peculiarly prejudicial to the public generally, as distinguished from individuals. It has been laid down broadly that an indictment will lie at common law for a conspiracy to

Dec. 534, Mikell's Cas. 358, where the early cases are reviewed and dis cussed.

133 Rex v. Cope, 1 Strange, 144; Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach, C. C. 274; Rex v. Leigh, 2 Camp. 372, note; Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, C. C. 592; State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. Law, 151, 90 Am. Dec. 649, Beale's Cas. 828; Crump v. Com., 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620, 10 Am. St. Rep. 895, Beale's Cas. 833; State v. Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N. W. 1046.

134 Rex v. Cope, 1 Strange, 144. In this case, a prosecution was sustained for conspiracy to ruin the trade of a card maker by bribing his apprentices to put grease into the paste, so as to spoil the cards.

135 Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach, C. C. 274. See Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 28 Atl. 190, Mikell's Cas. 367, where damages were denied a lumber dealer against members of an association of builders and dealers injuring his trade by inducing wholesalers not to sell him supplies. The association was engaged in a strike contest with mechanics and it was held that plaintiff, by acceding to the demands of the laborers and furnishing to others who had also acceded, was aiding the strikers and that the acts of defendant were justifiable in carrying on the contest; a view that carried to its logical conclusion would involve everyone in the community in every strike. 136 Rex v. Leigh, 2 Camp. 372, note.

137 State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. Law, 151, 90 Am. Dec. 649, Beale's Cas. 828; State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690, 32 Atl. 814.

do an act which is neither illegal nor immoral in an individual, but to effect a purpose which has a tendency to injure the public. Thus, in a leading Massachusetts case it was held indictable to conspire to manufacture base and spurious indigo, with a fraudulent intent to sell the same to the public generally as genuine.138 Indictments have also been sustained for conspiracies to fraudulently put valueless shares in companies on the market, or to give shares a fictitious market value,139 and conspiracies to conduct a mock auction, with pretended bidders,140 etc.

148. Combinations among Workmen.

There are some cases in the reports in which it has been held a crime for workmen in any particular trade or calling to combine for the purpose of raising their wages, on the ground that such combinations are injurious to trade. In an early English case journeymen tailors were indicted for a conspiracy to raise their wages by refusing to work for less than a certain sum, and the indictment was sustained, though it was conceded that it would have been perfectly lawful for either of the defendants to raise his wages if he could, and to refuse to work unless he should be paid what he demanded.141 There have been some decisions to the same effect in this country.142 These decisions, however, have not been generally followed. By the weight of authority it is not unlawful, either in England or in this country, for workmen to combine, by the formation

138 Com. v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329, 3 Am. Dec. 54, Beale's Cas. 54. See, also, McKee v. State, 111 Ind. 378, 12 N. E. 510.

189 Scott v. Brown (1892) 2 Q. B. 724. And see Reg. v. Aspinall, L. R. 2 Q. B. 48, 13 Cox, C. C. 563.

140 Reg. v. Lewis, 11 Cox, C. C. 404.

141 Rex v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge, 8 Mod. 10, Beale's Cas. 820.

142 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 28 Am. Dec. 501; People v. Trequier, 1 Wheeler, C. C. (N. Y.) 142.

The case of the Journeymen Cordwainers, Yates, Sel. Cas. (N. Y.) 111.

of labor unions or otherwise, for the purpose of mutual protection against oppression or unfairness on the part of employers, provided they do not resort to or contemplate unlawful means to carry out their objects.143

But if the agreement between workmen contemplates the use of unlawful means for accomplishing their object, they are guilty of a criminal conspiracy, though the object may be innocent. Thus, they are criminally responsible if they contemplate coercing an employer to injure a third party by withdrawing from contract relations with him,143a or to discharge an employe in violation of a contract, or breaking a contract into which they have entered themselves.144 And a conspiracy to compel an employer to discharge an employe has been held indictable even where there was no contract for fixed time.1 Such a conspiracy is to injure a person in his trade or calling, within the principle referred to in a previous section.146 Nor

any

145

143 Com. v. Hunt, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346, Beale's Cas. 821; Com. v. Sheriff, 15 Phila. (Pa.) 393, Mikell's Cas. 363; Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Cox, C. C. 325. See note, 28 Am. Dec. 529.

In Reg. v. Rowlands, 2 Den. C. C. 364, 17 Q. B. 671, 5 Cox, C. C. 466, it was said: "The law is clear that workmen have a right to combine for their own protection, and to obtain such wages as they choose to agree to demand." And in Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox, C. C. 404, it was said: "With respect to the law relating to combinations of workmen, nothing can be more clearly established, in point of law, than that workmen are at liberty, while they are perfectly free from engagement, and have the option of entering into employ or not, to agree among themselves to say, 'We will not go into any employ unless we can get a certain rate of wages.'"

143a U. S. v. Cassidy, 67 Fed. 698.

*

144 Com. v. Hunt, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346, Beale's Cas. 821; State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. Law, 151, 90 Am. Dec. 649, Beale's Cas. 828; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl. 890; Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox, C. C. 404.

145 State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. Law, 151, 90 Am. Dec. 649, Beale's Cas. 828; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 Atl. 559, 59 Am. Rep. 710, Mikell's Cas. 377; State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690, 32 Atl. 814; Reg. v. Hewitt, 5 Cox, C. C. 162; Rex v. Bykerdike, 1 Moody & R. 179, Mikell's Cas. 362. And see People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 28 Am. Dec. 501.

146 Ante, § 144.

can workmen lawfully combine, and by intimidation, blacklisting, or boycotting prevent employers from obtaining trade, or other workmen from obtaining employment.147 The use of mere persuasion, however, without any intimidation, does not make the combination criminal.148

149. Combinations to Raise or Lower Prices.

In an English case it was held an indictable offense to conspire by false rumors to raise the price of the public government funds, with intent to injure such of the king's subjects as should purchase on a particular day, though it was conceded that to raise or lower the price of such funds was not a crime per se.149 And so it is of a conspiracy to raise the price of flour, salt, coal, or any other commodity in general use, by "cornering" the market.150

V. CONSENT AS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS.

150. In General.-Consent as between individuals is no defense on a prosecution for an act which directly injures or

147 Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox, C. C. 404; Reg. v. Hewitt, 5 Cox, C. C. 162; Reg. v. Rowlands, 2 Den. C. C. 364, 17 Q. B. 671; Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, C. C. 593; Reg. v. Bunn, 12 Cox, C. C. 316; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl. 890; State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690, 32 Atl. 814; Crump v. Com., 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620, 10 Am. St. Rep. 895, Beale's Cas. 833; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273, 9 Atl. 559, 59 Am. Rep. 710, Mikell's Cas. 377. 148 Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Cox, C. C. 325.

149 Rex v. Berenger, 3 Maule & S. 68. And see dicta to this effect in People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 9, 28 Am. Dec. 501.

150 Rex v. Norris, 2 Ld. Kenyon, 300; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 8 Am. Rep. 159, Beale's Cas. 839. See, also, Rex V. Hilbers, 2 Chit. 163.

In a late Kentucky case it was held that it is not criminal, at common law, for insurance companies or agents to combine to maintain rates of insurance. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Com., 106 Ky. 864, 51 S. W. 624. It was so held under a statute in Texas. Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S. W. 397. But the contrary was held under the Kansas statute. State v. Phipps, 50 Kan. 609, 31 Pac. 1097.

C. & M. Crimes-14.

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