if the property has a market value, and not the value to the owner.224 Where there is no market value, the valuation should be a reasonable one.225

If two persons stole goods above the value of twelve pence from the same person at the same time it was held to be grand larceny in both,226 but it was otherwise if the acts of each were several at several times, and the goods taken at each time were of the value of twelve pence or under.227 And if a person stole goods at different times, so that the larcenies were separate and distinct acts, even though from the same person, he was held not to be guilty of grand larceny if the property taken at any one time was not above the value of twelve pence, though all the property might be above that value.228

336. Felony or Misdemeanor.

Under the statute of Westminster, both grand larceny and petit larceny were felonies, though petit larcenies were not so severely punished.229 In this country, where the statutes make such a distinction, petit larceny is generally a misdemeanor only, 230

224 State v. Doepke, 68 Mo. 208, 30 Am. Rep. 785, Mikell's Cas. 827, n. 225 2 East, P. C. 736, Mikell's Cas. 827, n.; State v. Doepke, supra. 226 2 East, P. C. 740; 1 Hale, P. C. 530.

227 2 East, P. C. 740; 1 Hale, P. C. 530.

228 2 East, P. C. 740; Rex v. Petrie, 1 Leach, C. C. 294; Rex v. Birdseye, 4 Car. & P. 386, Mikell's Cas. 828. Compare 1 Hale, P. C. 530, 531. There is no presumption in favorem vitae that several articles were stolen at different times so that there were several petit larcenies. Rex v. Jones, 4 Car. & P. 217, Mikell's Cas. 827.

229 1 Hale, P. C. 530; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 33, § 36; 2 East, P. C. 736; 4 Bl. Comm. 229; Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169; Ward v. People, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 395.

In England, after the statute of Westminster, the punishment for grand larceny was death and forfeiture of goods, subject to the benefit of clergy. The punishment for petit larceny was forfeiture of goods and whipping, or some other corporal punishment less than death. 1 Hale, P. C. 530.

230 See State v. Setter, 57 Conn. 466, 18 Atl. 782.

(G) Compound Larcenies.

337. Definition.-Compound larceny is larceny committed under certain aggravating circumstances, by reason of which it is punished more severely than simple larceny. Thus1. At common law, robbery is a compound larceny,—a felonious taking and carrying away of the property of another from his person or in his presence, by violence or by putting him in fear. 2. By statute in most jurisdictions larceny under certain circumstances is made a compound larceny. principal statutory compound larcenies are:

The

(a) Larceny from the person of another, not by violence or putting in fear.

(b) Larceny from particular places, as a dwelling

338. Robbery.

house, house, shop, vessel, etc., not accompanied by a breaking and entry with intent to steal, as in burglary.

The only common-law compound larceny is robbery. If larceny is committed by stealing from the person or in the presence of another, and is accomplished by violence or by putting him in fear, it becomes robbery, and not merely larceny. Robbery is treated and punished as a distinct felony, and will therefore be considered separately in another place.231

339. Larceny from the Person.

(a) Statutes Requiring a Private Stealing. The English statute of 8 Eliz. c. 4, § 2, deprived of the benefit of clergy, to

In New York petit larceny is a misdemeanor. Pen. Code, § 535; People v. Finn, 87 N. Y. 533.

In North Carolina, the distinction between grand and petit larceny has been abolished, and all larceny has been reduced to the grade of petit larceny. See State v. Gaston, 73 N. C. 93, 21 Am. Rep. 459; State v. Stroud, 95 N. C. 626.

231 Post, § 370.

which simple larceny was subject, the felonious taking of money, goods, or chattels "from the person of any other, privily, without his knowledge," in any place whatsoever.232 And there are some statutes in this country punishing larceny under such circumstances as a distinct crime.233 A taking from the person of another openly, and with his knowledge, is not within such a statute.234 A sudden snatching of property, where there is no such resistance and violence as is necessary to establish robbery,235 is a private or secret taking, within the meaning of the statute.2

236

(b) Statutes not Requiring a Private Taking.-The present English statute omits the words "privily, without his knowledge," found in the statute of Elizabeth, and punishes generally a stealing "from the person" of another; and the same is true of most of the statutes in this country.237 Under these statutes it is not necessary that the property be stolen secretly and without the other's knowledge, but the offense is committed when the taking is open and with his knowledge.288

232 As this statute did not create a new offense, but merely deprived a person convicted of larceny from the person of the benefit of clergy, and as petit larceny did not stand in need of the benefit of clergy, it was considered that the statute did not apply to petit larceny from the person. 4 Bl. Comm. 241; 1 Hale, P. C. 529; 2 East, P. C. 701.

This reasoning does not apply to our statutes, though they sometimes do require that the property shall be of a certain value, or over. See Code Va. 1887, § 3707, as amended in 1893-94 (Supp. 1898, § 3707). 233 See Pen. Code Ga. § 175; Pen. Code Tex. arts. 879, 880.

284 Brown's Case, 2 East, P. C. 702. And see Fanning v. State, 66 Ga. 167; Woodard v. State, 9 Tex. App. 412.

235 Post, § 374.

236 Steward's Case, 2 East, P. C. 702; Danby's Case, Id.; Reg. v. Walls, 2 Car. & K. 214; Fanning v. State, 66 Ga. 167; Clemmons v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 279, 45 S. W. 911.

237 See 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, § 40; Code Va. 1887, § 3707, as amended in 1893-94 (Supp. 1898, § 3707).

238 Rex v. Francis, 2 Strange, 1015, Beale's Cas. 699; Com. v. Dimond, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 235; Johnson v. Com., 24 Grat. (Va.) 555.

Bishop cites Moye v. State, 65 Ga. 754, as holding that such a statute contemplates a secret taking without the knowledge of the owner; but

(c) Taking "from the Person."-The statutes expressly require that the taking shall be "from the person," but, except where it is otherwise expressly provided,239 the property need not be attached to the person, or actually on the person, but it is sufficient if it be at the time under the protection of the person.240 It must be under the protection of the person, and it is not always enough to show that it was in his presence. Thus, where a man went to bed with a prostitute, leaving his watch in his hat on the table, and the woman stole the watch while he was asleep, it was held not to be larceny from the person, but larceny in the dwelling house.241

(d) Persons Drunken or Asleep.-It has been contended that the statutes contemplate a taking from the care of a person, and that the offense, therefore, cannot be committed from one who is asleep or drunken to insensibility, as such a person is

he evidently failed to examine the statute under which that case was decided. The Georgia statute does not appear in the report of the case, but an examination of it would have shown that, like the statute of Elizabeth, it in terms punishes larceny from the person of another "privately, and without his knowledge." Pen. Code Ga. § 175.

239 By express provision of the Texas statute, the taking must be actually from the person, and a taking of property in the mere pres ence of the owner is not enough. Pen. Code Tex. art. 880; Woodard v. State, 9 Tex. App. 412.

240 It was so held in Reg. v. Selway, 8 Cox, C. C. 235, Beale's Cas. 700, under the English statute punishing larceny "from the person." In this case, it appeared that the prosecutor, who was paralyzed, received, while sitting on a sofa in his room, a violent blow on the head from one of the defendants, while the other went to a cupboard in the same room, and stole a cash box therefrom. It was held that it was a question for the jury whether the cash box was at the time under the protection of the prosecutor, and that, if so, a charge of stealing from the person would be sustained.

See, also, Rex v. Francis, 2 Strange, 1015, Beale's Cas. 699, where it was held that a taking of property in the presence of the owner (the property having been knocked from his hand, and taken by the accused from the ground) was, in point of law, a taking from the per

son.

241 Rex v. Hamilton, 8 Car. & P. 49. See, to the same effect, Com. v. Smith, 111 Mass. 429.

incapable of exercising care; and some of the earlier cases were in favor of this view.242 No such doctrine, however, is now recognized, but it is held that the offense may be committed as well when the victim is asleep or drunk as when he is awake and sober.243 A watch in the pocket of a sleeping or drunken man is certainly under the protection of his person. In the English cases it has been held that a person who is asleep or drunk may be within the protection of the statute,244 but some of the judges have held that the statute does not apply where the victim has voluntarily become drunk, without being induced to do so by the craft or cunning of the accused.245

(e) Asportation.-To constitute larceny from the person, there must be some asportation, as in the case of simple larceny and robbery, unless the statute, as in Texas, expressly declares that an asportation is not necessary.

246

(f) Intent.—It is also necessary that there shall be a felonious intent,—the same intent as in simple larceny at common law.247

(g) Robbery Distinguished.-Larceny from the person is distinguished from robbery in that in robbery the taking is accomplished by violence or by putting in fear, while in larceny

242 See 2 East, P. C. 703, 704; Rex v. Hamilton, 8 Car. & P. 49. 243 See Branny's Case, 1 Leach, C. C. 241, note, where the victim was drunk; and Thompson's Case, 1 Leach, C. C. 443, 2 East, P. C. 705; Willan's Case, 1 Leach, C. C. 495, 2 East, P. C. 705.

244 See the cases cited in the note preceding.

245 Rex v. Gribble, 1 Leach, C. C. 240, 2 East, P. C. 706; Rex v. Kennedy, 2 Leach, C. C. 788, 2 East, P. C. 706.

These cases were decided on the ground that the statute "was intended to protect the property which persons, by proper vigilance and caution, should not be enabled to secure," and that "it did not extend to persons who, by intoxication, had exposed themselves to the dangers of depredation, by destroying those faculties of the mind by the exercise of which the larceny might probably be prevented." Rex v. Gribble, supra.

246 The cases on this point will be found under simple larceny and robbery. See ante, §§ 321-325; post, § 370 et seq.

See Pen. Code Tex. art. 763; Flynn v. State, 42 Tex. 301.

247 Ante, § 326 et seq.