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40. Class Legislation.

The words "due process of law" in the constitutional provision above mentioned is synonymous with "law of the land,” and this means general public law, binding upon all the members of the community under all circumstances, and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of particular individuals only, or particular classes of individuals.131 The constitution, therefore, forbids the legislature to single out particular individuals or classes of individuals, and make it a crime for them to engage in a business which it is lawful for others to engage in, or to make contracts which it is lawful for others to make.132

Thus, it is not competent for the legislature to single out operators of mines and manufacturers of iron and other minerals, and prohibit them from making contracts which it is lawful for other owners of property and employers of labor to make.133 For this reason, a statute is unconstitutional and void which attempts to prohibit persons engaged in mining and manufacturing from keeping a "truck store," or being interested in or controlling any store, for the purpose of furnishing supplies, tools, clothing, provisions, or groceries to their employes.134

The same is true of a statute prohibiting such persons from issuing, for the payment of labor, any order or other paper whatsoever, unless the same purports to be redeemable for its face value in lawful money, etc.,135 or depriving them and their em

131 Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 7 N. E. 631; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395; Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 43 N. E. 624; Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 43 N. E. 1108; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285.

132 Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E.. 285.

133 A statute making that an offense, if committed by a person engaged in one branch of mining, which, if done by persons in another branch of the same business, is lawful, without any reason for the distinction between the two, is unconstitutional. Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 43 N. E. 624.

134 Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395.

135 State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354.

ployes of the right to fix upon the weight of coal mined, and the amount due for mining the same, in any manner mutually satisfactory.136 A barber is deprived of his liberty and property without due process of law by a statute making it unlawful for him to do business on Sunday, where the statute does not apply to any other class of business.137

The police power does not justify class legislation.138

41. The Police Power in General.

The prohibition in the constitution against depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law does not prevent the legislature from imposing burdens upon persons or property, so long as it acts within the police power of the state. Under the police power, the legislature may constitutionally enact laws for the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons within the state, and the protection of all property within the state.139 And, subject to what has been said in sections preceding this, it is generally for the legislature, and not for the courts, to determine what laws and regulations are needed for this purpose.140 Among the laws sustainable as an exercise of the police power are license laws, quarantine laws, laws creating liability for causing death or injury to servants, laws requiring dangerous machinery to be properly guarded and used, so as to avoid injury, laws to pre

136 Harding v. People, 160 Ill. 459, 43 N. E. 624. 137 Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 43 N. E. 1108.

138 Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296, 43 N. E. 1108, and other cases above cited.

139 Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395; State v. Hyman, 98 Md. 596, 57 Atl. 6; Bland v. People, 32 Colo. 319, 76 Pac. 359; State v. Cantwell, 179 Mo. 245, 78 S. W. 569; Anderson v. State (Neb.) 96 N. W. 149.

140 Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. 265, 7 Atl. 913, affirmed in 127 U. S. 678; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343; State v. Foster, 22 R. I. 163, 46 Atl. 833, 50 L. R. A. 339; In re Boyce (Nev.) 75 Pac. 1, and cases cited in notes following.

vent monopolies, extortion, and fraudulent imposition, and also usury laws. 141

42. Regulations as to Food Products.

The legislature cannot arbitrarily prohibit absolutely the manufacture and sale of harmless articles of food. For this reason it has been held that a statute absolutely prohibiting and punishing the manufacture or sale for food of any substitute for butter or cheese produced from pure unadulterated cream or milk,— as oleomargarine, and not merely requiring such substitute to be marked so as to prevent fraud upon the public, is unconstitutional.142

Prevention of Fraud.-The legislature, however, has the power to enact laws for the protection of the public against fraud and deception in the sale of articles of food in common and general use. This is clearly a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state. Statutes, therefore, merely regulating the sale of articles of food, and punishing adulteration, deception, and fraud, are unquestionably valid; and whether a particular regulation of this character is necessary, reasonable, or expedient is a question for the legislature, and not for the courts.143

141 Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395.

142 People v. Marx, 99 N.. Y. 377, 2 N. E. 29, 52 Am. Rep. 34. And see Northwestern Mfg. Co. v. Wayne Cir. Judge, 58 Mich, 381, 25 N. W. 372, 55 Am. Rep. 693.

143 The following statutes of this character have been sustained by the courts:

Statutes prohibiting and punishing the sale or keeping for sale of oleomargarine or other substances in imitation of butter, without marking them so as to show what they are, and statutes regulating generally the sale of dairy products, and punishing their adulteration. Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. 265, 7 Atl. 913, affirmed in 127 U. S. 678; State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110; State v. Marshall, 64 N. H. 549, 15 Atl. 210; People v. Arensberg, 103 N. Y. 388, 8 N. E. 736, 57 Am. Rep. 741; Palmer v. State, 39 Ohio St. 236; State v. Horgan, 55 Minn. 183, 56 N. W. 688; Pierce v. State, 63 Md. 592.

Statutes prohibiting the sale of adulterated or watered milk. See the cases above cited, and see Butler v. Chambers, 36 Minn. 69, 30 N.

Protection of Public Morals, Health, and Comfort.—It is also a legitimate exercise of police power of the state to enact laws regulating the manufacture and sale of food products, and other articles, to such an extent as may be necessary to properly protect the morals, health, and comfort of the public. Thus, the legislature may regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors,144 and it may prevent the keeping of cows in an unhealthy or crowded condition, and the adulteration of dairy products,145 or of confectionery or other articles of food.146

43. Regulation of Places of Amusement.

It is also within the power of the state legislatures to regulate theatres, billiard rooms, and other places of amusement and sport, so as to prevent annoyance or disturbance of the community, corruption of the public morals, etc.147

W. 308; Com. v. Waite, 11 Allen (Mass.) 264, 87 Am. Dec. 711; Com. v. Evans, 132 Mass. 11; People v. West, 106 N. Y. 293, 12 N. E. 610, 60 Am. Rep. 452; State v. Smyth, 14 R. I. 100, 51 Am. Rep. 344.

Statutes prohibiting the sale of vinegar below a certain standard. People v. Worden Grocer Co., 118 Mich. 604, 77 N. W. 315.

Statutes requiring that baking powder containing alum shall be so marked as to show that fact. Stolz v. Thompson, 44 Minn. 271, 46 N. W. 410.

Statutes regulating the manufacture and sale of lard and lard com. pounds and substitutes, and of foods prepared therefrom. State v. Aslesen, 50 Minn. 5, 52 N. W. 220.

Statutes prohibiting the sale of adulterated confectionery. Com. v. Chase, 125 Mass. 202.

144 Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165, 63 Am. Dec. 487; Thurlow v. Com., 5 How. (U. S.) 504; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Woods v. State, 36 Ark. 38; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525, 69 Am. Dec. 226; Danville v. Hatcher, 101 Va. 523, 44 S. E. 723.

145 Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. 265, 7 Atl. 913, affirmed in 127 U. S. 678; Butler v. Chambers, 36 Minn. 69, 30 N. W. 308; note 143, supra.

146 Com. v. Chase, 125 Mass. 202; Stolz v. Thompson, 44 Minn. 271, 46 N. W. 410. And see the other cases cited in notes preceding.

147 Thus, the legislature may prohibit the keeper of a billiard room or bowling alley from allowing playing therein after a certain time in the evening or night. Com. v. Colton, 8 Gray (Mass.) 488.

44. Ex Post Facto Laws.

It is provided by the constitution of the United States that no "ex post facto law" shall be passed by congress,148 or by any state, 149 and in the state constitutions there is a similar limitation on the power of the legislature. An "ex post facto law," within the meaning of this prohibition, is "one which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time. the action was performed, or which increases the punishment, or, in short, which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a party, to his disadvantage.' sense, all acts passed after an offense is committed are ex post facto in relation to that offense, but the words are not used in so broad a sense in the constitution.

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Laws Creating or Aggravating Offenses.-This prohibition in the constitution clearly prevents the legislatures from punishing as a crime an act previously committed, and which was innocent or not punishable when committed, and from aggravating an offense previously committed.151

148 Const. U. S. art. 1, § 9.

149 Id. § 10.

150 Per Mr. Justice Washington in U. S. v. Hall, 2 Wash. C. C. 366, Fed. Cas. No. 15,285. And see Kring v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 333; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (U. S.) 277; Marion v. State, 16 Neb. 349, 20 N. W. 289, 20 Neb. 233, 29 N. W. 911, 57 Am. Rep. 825; In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377; Garvey v. People, 6 Colo. 559, 45 Am. Rep. 531.

In Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, Chief Justice Marshall said that an ex post facto law was a law which rendered “an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed."

And in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 386, Mr. Justice Chase defined such a law as (1) "any law which makes an act done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal;" (2) "any law which aggravates a crime, and makes it greater than it was when committed;" (3) "any law which changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;" (4) "any law which alters the legal rules of evidence." 151 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 386; Com. v. Edwards, 9 Dana (Ky.) 447; Marion v. State, 16 Neb. 349, 20 N. W. 289.

It has been held that a statute which purports to authorize the pros

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