is certainly guilty of this offense if he receives stolen property from an innocent agent of the thief with the necessary guilty knowledge and intent.586

(c) Husband and Wife.-A husband may be convicted of receiving property which his wife has stolen voluntarily and without any constraint on his part, if he receives it with knowledge that she has stolen it.587 But it seems that a wife cannot be guilty of receiving from her husband.588

(d) Principal and Agent-Partners.-A principal is indictable for receiving stolen property, if it is received by his agent by his direction or authority.589 And if stolen property is received by a person as agent for another without authority, the latter becomes liable if he ratifies the receipt with guilty

himself, or from any other particular person, but buying or receiving, etc., such property, knowing it to be stolen, from any person whatsoever."

There is a decision against this view in Foster v. State, 106 Ind. 272, 6 N. E. 641, in which the court cited Bishop and Wharton and two earlier Indiana cases-Kaufman v. State, 49 Ind. 248, and Owen v. State, 52 Ind. 379. Neither of these cases, however, are in point, and while the decision is supported by Bishop and Wharton, neither of these writers are sustained by the authorities cited by them. There is no reason for saying that property ceases to be "stolen property," i. e., property that has been stolen, as soon as it is delivered to a person who knows it has been stolen.

586 Com. v. White, 123 Mass. 430, 25 Am. Rep. 116.

587 Reg. v. McAthey, Leigh & C. 250, 9 Cox, C. C. 251.

588 2 Bish. New Crim. Law, § 1142 (2); Reg. v. Brooks, Dears. C. C. 184, 14 Eng. Law & Eq. 580; Reg. v. Wardroper, Bell, C. C. 249, 8 Cox, C. C. 284.

589 State v. Stroud, 95 N. C. 626. In this case it was said: "To constitute the criminal offense of receiving, it is not necessary that the goods should be traced to the actual personal possession of the person charged with receiving. It would certainly make him a receiver, in contemplation of law, if the stolen property was received by his servant or agent, acting under his directions, he knowing at the time of giving the orders that it was stolen, for 'qui facit per alium facit per se.' It is the same as if he had done it himself." See, also, Reg. v. Miller, 6 Cox, C. C. 353, Beale's Cas. 759; Reg. v. Smith, 6 Cox, C. C. 554, Dears. C. C. 494; State v. Habib, 18 R. I. 558, 30 Atl. 462.

knowledge, and assumes control of the property.590 Thus, if a wife assumes to act as agent of her husband in receiving stolen property, and he afterwards ratifies her act with full knowledge of the facts, and assumes control of the property, he is guilty of receiving. 591 In like manner, a partner is indictable if, with guilty knowledge, he ratifies the receipt of stolen property by his copartner on behalf of the firm, and assumes control separately or jointly with his partner.592

(e) Distinguished from Larceny from Thief.—The offense of receiving stolen goods is not committed by one who takes goods from a thief by trespass without his consent, and carries them away, animo furandi. This, as we have seen, is larceny.

593

382. Character of the Property as Stolen Property.

To convict a person of receiving stolen property, it is necessary to show that, in fact and in law, the property was stolen.594

590 Reg. v. Woodward, Leigh & C. 122, 9 Cox, C. C. 95, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 104, Beale's Cas. 763, Mikell's Cas. 898; Sanderson v. Com., 11 Ky. L. R. 341, 12 S. W. 136.

591 In Reg. v. Woodward, supra, stolen goods were delivered by the thief to a wife in the absence of her husband, and she paid something on account, but the price was not fixed. The husband and the thief afterwards met, and the husband, with the knowledge that the goods had been stolen, agreed upon the price and paid the balance. It was held that he was guilty of receiving the goods, knowing them to have been stolen.

592 Sanderson v. Com., 11 Ky. L. R. 341, 12 S. W. 136. And see Faunce v. People, 51 III. 311.

"While one partner cannot commit a crime for which his copartner, who is innocent, can be held criminally responsible, we cannot well see why one partner may not be guilty of receiving stolen goods, where his copartner has first received them with a guilty knowledge, and they are controlled and used by both with the guilty design and purpose on the part of both to deprive the owner of his property." Sanderson v. Com., supra.

593 2 Bish. New Crim. Law, § 1140 (6). See Reg. v. Wade, 1 Car. & K. 739, Beale's Cas. 758.

594 Com. v. King, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 284; Anderson v. State, 38 Fla.

It is also necessary that the property shall have been stolen property at the time it was received by the accused. It is not enough to show that he thought it was stolen property. The offense, therefore, is not committed if the property, before its receipt, has come back into the possession of the owner or his agent.595 The fact that the character of stolen property is

3, 20 So. 765; Wilson v. State, 12 Tex. App. 481; O'Connell v. State, 55 Ga. 296.

A wife, even though she may have committed adultery, cannot steal her husband's goods (ante, § 313d), and therefore her paramour, receiving from her goods which she has taken from her husband, cannot be guilty of receiving stolen goods. Reg. v. Kenny, 2 Q. B. Div. 307, 13 Cox, C. C. 397; Reg. v. Streeter [1900] 2 Q. B. 601, Mikell's Cas. 892. An indictment for receiving stolen goods cannot be maintained if the evidence shows that the person from whom the defendant is alleged to have received them obtained them under circumstances making him guilty of embezzlement, or of obtaining goods by false pretenses, as distinguished from larceny. In Com. v. King, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 284, which was an indictment for receiving stolen bank bills, it appeared that the person from whom the defendant was alleged to have received the bills had obtained them from a bank for his master, on a check drawn by the latter, and that they had not reached the possession of the master before their appropriation. It was held that, as the servant's appropriation of the bills was embezzlement, and not larceny, the indictment could not be maintained.

The question as to the locality in which the property was stolen is elsewhere considered. See post, § 503.

595 In U. S. v. De Bare, 6 Biss. 358, Fed. Cas. No. 14,935, the accused was indicted and convicted of receiving stolen postage stamps. The proof was that the thief deposited them in an express office, directed to the accused, and, after his arrest, gave a written order for them to a postmaster, who took them, and who afterwards, by order of the postoffice department, redeposited them in the express office, so that they were forwarded to the accused, and received by him. It was held that the conviction was wrong, as the stamps were no longer stolen property after they reached the hands of the postmaster, who was the agent of the government. See to the same effect, Reg. v. Schmidt, L. R. 1 C. C. 15, 10 Cox, C. C. 172, Beale's Cas. 769, Mikell's Cas. 885; Reg. v. Dolan, 6 Cox, C. C. 449, Dears. C. C. 436, 29 Eng. Law & Eq. 533, Beale's Cas. 765 (overruling Reg. v. Lyons, Car. & M. 217, 41 E. C. L. 122); Reg. v. Villensky [1892] 2 Q. B. 597 (following Reg. v. Schmidt, supra, and Reg. v. Dolan, supra); Reg. v. Hancock, 38 L. T. (N. S.) 787, 14 Cox, C. C. 119.

changed before it reaches the receiver is immaterial, if he knows that it is stolen property. It is no defense, therefore, on a prosecution for receiving stolen bonds, to show that they were fraudulently altered by the thief before they were received by the accused.590

383. Knowledge That the Property was Stolen.

At common law, and by the express terms of the various statutes, it is necessary that the receiver shall know that the property has been stolen ;597 and he must know this at the time he receives it.598 It has been said that if a person receives stolen property with full knowledge of all the circumstances under which it was taken, and those circumstances show, as a matter of law, that it was obtained by larceny, it is not necessary to show that he knew that the circumstances made the taking larceny. He is chargeable with knowledge of the law from his knowledge of the facts. This, however, is doubtful.599 If

596 Com. v. White, 123 Mass. 430, 25 Am. Rep. 116. So, where a sheep is stolen and killed, and a person receives part of the mutton. Rex v. Cowell, 2 East, P. C. 617, Mikell's Cas. 883.

597 Reg. v. Adams, 1 Fost. & F. 86, Beale's Cas. 777; Huggins v. People, 135 Ill. 243, 25 N. E. 1002, 25 Am. St. Rep. 357; People v. Levison, 16 Cal. 98, 76 Am. Dec. 505; Durant v. People, 13 Mich. 351; May v. People, 60 Ill. 119; Aldrich v. People, 101 Ill. 16; State v. Houston, 29 S. C. 108, 6 S. E. 943; State v. Caveness, 78 N. C. 484; Copperman v. People, 56 N. Y. 591; Williamson v. Com. (Va.) 23 S. E. 762; Hey v. Com., 32 Grat. (Va.) 946.

The mere naked possession of stolen goods, without further evidence, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction, for it does not show guilty knowledge. Castleberry v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 382, 33 S. W. 875, 60 Am. St. Rep. 53. Compare, however, People v. Weldon, 111 N. Y. 569, 19 N. E. 279.

598 "To be guilty, he must have known at the moment of receiving it that it has been stolen, and he must at that time have also received it with a felonious intent." State v. Caveness, 78 N. C. 484, 491, Mikell's Cas. 902.

599 Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass. 473, 4 N. E. 96, 54 Am. Rep. 485, Beale's Cas. 778. In this case the decision was this: The Massachusetts statute created two distinct offenses,-receiving stolen goods,

a person receives property, believing it to have been stolen, he is guilty, though he does not know the facts and circumstances of the taking.600 And if it appears from the evidence that the accused received the property under such circumstances that any reasonable man of ordinary observation would have known that it was stolen, the jury are authorized to find that he knew it was stolen.601 The question, however, is one of fact, and the jury are not bound to infer knowledge from such circumstances.602

384. Fraudulent Intent.

To constitute this offense, it is necessary that the property shall be received with a fraudulent intent.603 Thus, the offense knowing them to have been stolen, and receiving embezzled property, knowing it to have been embezzled. The accused was charged with the first offense, and it was held that, if he knew all the facts under which the property was taken, and the facts showed larceny, as distinguished from embezzlement, it was no defense that he thought the facts constituted embezzlement. Compare, however, Reg. v. Adams, 1 Fost. & F. 86, Beale's Cas. 777.

600 Com. v. Leonard, supra. And see Reg. v. White, 1 Fost. & F. 665, Beale's Cas. 778.

601 Collins v. State, 33 Ala. 434, 73 Am. Dec. 426; Murio v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 210, 20 S. W. 356; Com. v. Finn, 108 Mass. 466; Frank v. State, 67 Miss. 125, 6 So. 842, Mikell's Cas. 901; Huggins v. People, 135 Ill. 243, 25 N. E. 1002, 25 Am. St. Rep. 357.

In State v. Feuerhaken, 96 Iowa, 299, it was held that it was not error to instruct the jury that, if all the facts and circumstances surrounding the receiving of the goods by the defendant were such as would reasonably satisfy a man of the defendant's age and intelligence that the goods were stolen, or if he failed to follow up the inquiry so suggested, for fear he would learn the truth, and know that the goods were stolen, then the defendant should be as rigidly held responsible as if he had actual knowledge.

A mere suspicion of facts that should put one on inquiry will not authorize an inference of guilt. State v. Goldman, 65 N. J. Law, 394, 47 Atl. 641.

602 Collins v. State, 33 Ala. 434, 73 Am. Dec. 426.

603 People v. Johnson, 1 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 564; State v. Hodges, 55 Md. 127; U. S. v. Lowenstein, 21 D. C. 515; Aldrich v. People, 101