is not committed by one who receives stolen property, though he knows it to have been stolen, if his intent is to secure it for the true owner, and return it without a reward, and not to defraud them.604 The necessity for a fraudulent intent is to be implied even when a statute punishes any one who shall receive stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen, and is silent as to the intent.605

It is not necessary that the receiving shall be lucri causa, or, in other words, that the receiver shall act from motives of personal gain. If his object is to aid the thief, it is sufficient, for there is the necessary fraudulent intent.606

Ill. 16; Rice v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 215, 226; Arcia v. State, 26 Tex. App. 193, 9 S. W. 685.

If it is shown that stolen goods were received with knowledge that they were stolen, a fraudulent intent may be inferred. U. S. v. Lowenstein, supra.

604 "To constitute the offense of receiving stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen, the act of receiving or concealing must be accompanied by a criminal intent,—an intent to aid the thief, or to obtain a reward for restoring the property to the owner, or an intent to in some way derive profit from the act. There must be a guilty knowledge, a fraudulent intent, concurrent with the act. If the property was received or concealed with the purpose and intent of restoring it to the owner without reward, or with any other innocent intent, the mere knowledge that it was stolen property would not make the act criminal." Arcia v. State, 26 Tex. App. 193, 205, 9 S. W. 685.

Receiving stolen goods with the intent, by concealing the same, to induce the owner to pay a reward for their return to him, is a receipt with intent to defraud the owner. It was so held in State v. Pardee, 37 Ohio St. 63, under a statute making such an intent an element of the offense, and of course such an intent is sufficient at common law. People v. Wiley, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 194, Mikell's Cas. 904; Baker v. State, 58 Ark. 513, 25 S. W. 603.

605 People v. Johnson, 1 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 564, and other cases cited in note 603, supra; State v. Smith, 88 Iowa, 1, 55 N. W. 16, is to the contrary, but it cannot be sustained.

606 Rex v. Richardson, 6 Car. & P. 335, Beale's Cas. 758; State v. Hodges, 55 Md. 127; Rex v. Davis, 6 Car. & P. 177, Mikell's Cas. 903; State v. Rushing, 69 N. C. 29, 12 Am. Rep. 641; Com. v. Bean, 117 Mass. 141; U. S. v. Lowenstein, 21 D. C. 515.

In Illinois, the statute punishes any one who, "for his own gain, or

385. License from the Owner.

On a prosecution for receiving stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, the fact that the accused was authorized by the owner of the goods to receive them for him is no defense, if he received them with a fraudulent intent to deprive the owner of them.607

386. Receiving Goods Obtained by Embezzlement, False Pretenses, Robbery, etc.

In some states, by statute, it is made a substantive offense to receive goods that have been obtained by embezzlement, false pretenses, robbery, burglary, etc., knowing them to have been so obtained.608 What has been said in the preceding sections with reference to receiving stolen goods applies generally to prosecutions under such a statute. It must be shown that the property was obtained under circumstances constituting, in fact and in law, the offense of embezzlement, false pretenses, robbery, burglary, etc., as the case may be; and it must be shown that the accused, when he received them, knew that they had been so obtained.

387. Aiding in Concealment of Stolen Property.

By statute in some states, it is made a substantive offense to aid in the concealment of stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen.609 A person is guilty of aiding in the con

to prevent the owner from again possessing his property," shall buy, receive, or aid in concealing stolen goods, knowing them to have been . stolen. Under this statute, the accused must have received the goods for his own gain, or to prevent the owner from again possessing them. See Aldrich v. People, 101 Ill. 16.

607 Wright v. State, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 154, 26 Am. Dec. 258; Cassels v. State, 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 149. See, also, People v. Wiley, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 194.

608 Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass. 473, 4 N. E. 96, 54 Am. Rep. 485, Beale's Cas. 778. See State v. Lane, 68 Iowa, 384, 27 N. W. 266.

609 See People v. Reynolds, 2 Mich. 422; State v. St. Clair, 17 Iowa,

cealment of stolen property, within the meaning of such a statute, if he does any act which will assist the thief to convert it to his use, or which will assist in preventing its recovery by the owner. It is not necessary that the property shall have been actually hidden or secreted anywhere.610 The statutes in express terms made knowledge that the property was stolen an essential element of the offense, and what has been said, therefore, in dealing with the receiving of stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen, applies here.611

VI. MALICIOUS MISCHIEF.

388. In General. The offense known as "malicious mischief" is the malicious injuring or destroying of the property of another. It is a misdemeanor at common law, but from an early day it has been punished by statute in England, and it is very generally punished by statutes in this country.

389. Statutes.

Beginning with the statute of Westminster I., 13 Edw. I. § 46, and up to 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, statutes have been enacted in England from time to time punishing, either as a felony or as a misdemeanor, malicious injuries to various kinds of property, as buildings, manufactures and materials,612 machinery, trees, shrubs, vegetables, fences, etc.,614 mines and mining apparatus and machinery,615 sea or river banks, walls,

613

610 People v. Reynolds, 2 Mich. 422.

611 Ante, § 383.

612 See 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, §§ 13, 14; Rex v. Woodhead, 1 Mood. & R. 549; Reg. v. Smith, 6 Cox, C. C. 198; Rex v. Tacey, Russ. & R. 452; Reg. v. McGrath, 14 Cox, C. C. 598.

613 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, § 15; Reg. v. Fisher, 10 Cox, C. C. 146, L. R. 1 C. C. 7; Rex v. Mackerel, 4 Car. & P. 448.

614 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, §§ 19-24; Rex v. Taylor, Russ. & R. 373.

615 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, §§ 26-29; Reg. v. Whittingham, 9 Car. & P. 235; Reg. v. Norris, 9 Car. & P. 241; Reg. v. Matthews, 14 Cox, C. C.

9.

wharves, and similar works,616 railways and telegraphs,617 books, manuscripts, etc., in libraries and museums, 618 cattle and other animals,6: 619 and vessels.620 And there is a general section in the present statute punishing malicious injury to "any real or personal property whatsoever, either of a public or private nature," for which no punishment is otherwise provided.621

In this country, perhaps, there is no state in which the subject is so minutely and specifically covered by the statutes, but, no doubt, in all states there are statutes more or less like the English statutes, or particular sections of the statute of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, punishing, in some cases as a felony, and in others as a misdemeanor only, willful and malicious injury to private and public property.

390. Common Law.

Since the subject of malicious injury to property has from a very early day been entirely covered by statute in England, there are no English precedents of indictments for such an offense at common law. This, however, is not sufficient reason

616 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, §§ 30-32.

617 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, §§ 32-37; Reg. v. Upton, 5 Cox, C. C. 298; Reg. v. Hadfield, L. R. 1 C. C. 253, 11 Cox, C. C. 574; Reg. v. Gilmore, 15 Cox, C. C. 85.

618 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, § 39. 619 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, § 40; Rex v. Owens, 1 Mood. C. C. 205; Rex v. Haughton, 5 Car. & P. 559; Rex v. Haywood, 2 East, P. C. 1076, Russ. & R. 16; Reg. v. Bullock, L. R. 1 C. C. 115, 11 Cox, C. C. 125. "Cattle" includes horses, mares, geldings, and colts, Rex v. Paty, .2 East, P. C. 1074, 1 Leach, C. C. 72; Rex v. Moy, 2 East, P. C. 1076; Rex v. Mott, 2 East, P. C. 1075, 1 Leach, C. C. 73, note; Rex v. Haywood, 2 East, P. C. 1076, Russ. & R. 16; asses, Rex v. Whitney, 1 Mood. C. C. 3; and pigs, Rex v. Chapple, Russ. & R. 77.

620 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, §§ 42-47.

621 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, § 51; White v. Feast, L. R. 7 Q. B. 353. This section applies only to tangible property. It does not apply to a mere incorporeal right. Laws v. Eltringham, 8 Q. B. Div. 283, 15 Cox, C. C. 22.

for holding that malicious injury to the personal property of another is not a common-law offense,622 and there are decisions in this country holding that it is a misdemeanor at common law, not only because it is an outrage upon the feelings of the community, but also because the direct tendency of such an act is to provoke violent retaliation and cause a breach of the public peace.623 Thus, it has been held a misdemeanor, independently of any statute, to wickedly and maliciously maim or kill a domestic animal.624 There are some decisions against

this view.62

622 Com. v. Cramer, 2 Pears. (Pa.) 441, Mikell's Cas. 47. Blackstone said that acts of malicious injury to property were not crimes at common law. 4 Bl. Comm. 243. But this may well have been because statutes were enacted in England to cover the whole subject. See Ranger's Case, 2 East, P. C. 1074.

623 Respublica v. Teischer, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 335, Beale's Cas. 108; People v. Smith, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 258; State v. Robinson, 3 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 130, 32 Am. Dec. 661; Loomis v. Edgerton, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 419; and see State v. Watts, 48 Ark. 56, 2 S. W. 342, 3 Am. St. Rep. 216; Snap v. People, 19 Ill. 79.

In Com. v. Wing, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 1, 19 Am. Dec. 347, Beale's Cas. 119, it was held that maliciously discharging a gun, after being warned of the circumstances and danger, and thereby causing a woman to have convulsions, resulting in death, was indictable at common law as a wanton act of mischief.

624 Respublica v. Teischer, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 335, Beale's Cas. 108; People v. Smith, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 258; Com. v. Leach, 1 Mass. 59; State v. Scott, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 35. And see Boyd v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 39. See, also, Com. v. Falvey, 108 Mass. 304; Com. v. Cramer, 2 Pears. (Pa.) 441, Mikell's Cas. 47.

625 State v. Wheeler, 3 Vt. 344, 23 Am. Dec. 212. And see Black v. State, 2 Md. 376; State v. Beekman, 27 N. J. Law, 124. But see State v. Briggs, 1 Ark. (Vt.) 226.

In North Carolina it was held that destruction of property with malice towards the owner was a misdemeanor at common law. State v. Simpson, 2 Hawks (N. C.) 460; State v. Scott, 2 Dev. & B. (N. C.) 35; State v. Latham, 13 Ired. (N. C.) 33; State v. Jackson, 12 Ired. (N. C.) 329. But mere wounding of an animal, or other injury to property short of its destruction, though malicious, was held not to be indictable. State v. Manuel, 72 N. C. 201, 21 Am. Rep. 455; State v. Allen, 72 N. C. 114. So, also, in New Jersey. State v. Beekman, 27 N. J. Law, 124.