III. STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION, §§ 512-514.

I. JURISDICTION IN GENERAL.

486. General Rule.-A country or state may punish any person, except foreign ambassadors or ministers and their servants, for offenses committed within its limits, but, as a general rule, the laws of a country or state have no operation beyond its territorial limits, and ordinarily, therefore, the courts of a country or state have no jurisdiction to punish for offenses committed beyond such limits.1

As we shall see in the course of this chapter, there are some real exceptions to this rule, and many apparent exceptions. In treating of the subject of jurisdiction, we shall first consider shortly the extent of the territorial limits of a country or state, and particularly of our own country and states, after which we shall consider the power of a nation or state to punish citizens or subjects of other nations or states, and the power to punish offenses by citizens or subjects abroad. We shall then treat

1 Reg. v. Keyn, L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 63, 13 Cox, C. C. 403, Beale's Cas. 897; State v. Barnett, 83 N. C. 615; People v. Merrill, 2 Park. Cr. R. (N. Y.) 590; U. S. v. Davis, 2 Sumn. 482, Fed. Cas. No. 14,932, Beale's Cas. 398; State v. Carter, 27 N. J. Law, 499, Beale's Cas. 407; State v. Wyckoff, 31 N. J. Law, 65, Beale's Cas. 399; People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 74 Am. Dec. 703; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909, 19 S. E. 602, 41 Am. St. Rep. 822; Johns v. State, 19 Ind. 421, 81 Am. Dec. 408; Phillips v. People, 55 Ill. 429; Beattie v. State (Ark.) 84 S. W. 477.

of the locality of crimes, and finally of United States and state jurisdiction in criminal matters.

487. Territorial Limits in General.

Since jurisdiction depends to a great extent upon territorial limits, it is often necessary, in criminal prosecutions, to ascertain exactly what the territorial limits of a country, state, or county are. Where two countries or states adjoin on the land, the line between them is fixed by occupancy and treaties in the case of the United States and foreign countries. As between the different states, it is fixed by original colonial grants, by enabling acts of congress, by compacts between the states with the consent of congress, or by suits between states in the supreme court of the United States to ascertain and establish boundaries. The boundary lines between the different counties of a state are fixed by the statutes of the states.

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488. Countries, States, or Counties Bounded by the Sea.

(a) In General.-It has repeatedly been said by writers on international law that the jurisdiction of a nation bordering on the sea extends not merely to low-water mark on the shore, but into the sea to the distance of a cannon shot, estimated at one marine league, or three miles, from low-water mark; and it has been very generally assumed from this that a nation has jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws if committed at any place within such limits. Whether this doctrine, however, gives jurisdiction to punish for acts committed at any place within the three-mile limit, in the absence of a statute, has been rendered very doubtful by a late decision in England, in which it was held by the court of criminal appeal, in the absence of any statute covering the case, that an indictment

2 See 1 Kent, Comm. 29; 1 Hale, P. C. 154; Com. v. Manchester, 152 Mass. 230, 25 N. E. 113, 23 Am. St. Rep. 820, Beale's Cas. 930; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240. And see 11 Am. Law Rev. 625 et seq.

for manslaughter would not lie against the master of a German vessel, who was himself a German subject, for negligently running into and sinking an English ship, and causing the death of an English subject thereon, though the collision and death occurred within three miles of the shores of England. A majority of the court held that the territorial limits of a nation do not extend beyond low-water mark on the shore; that, though a nation has a quasi jurisdiction over the sea for a distance of three miles from the shore for the purpose of military and police regulations, this part of the sea is no part of its territory; and that, in the absence of legislation on the subject, its courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and punish an act committed there by a foreigner on a foreign ship.3 Since this decision, a statute has been enacted in England extending the admiralty jurisdiction in criminal matters, and the jurisdiction of the central criminal court, to which such jurisdiction has been transferred, to the distance of a marine league into the sea.1

In this country, also, statutes to this effect have been enacted and upheld. In Massachusetts it was held that the territorial jurisdiction of the state over the adjacent seas, subject to the common right of navigation, extends to the distance of at least a marine league from the shore, and over bays running into the state which do not exceed in width two marine leagues at the mouth, and a statute regulating fisheries in such waters, and punishing violations of its provisions, was upheld.5 This decision was affirmed by the supreme court of the United States.

3 Reg. v. Keyn, L. R. 2 Exch. Div. 63, 13 Cox, C. C. 403, 46 L. J. Mag. Cas. 17, Beale's Cas. 897. And see U. S. v. Kessler, Baldw. 15, Fed. Cas. No. 15,528.

4 41 & 42 Vict. c. 73.

5 Com. v. Manchester, 152 Mass. 230, 25 N. E. 113, 23 Am. St. Rep. 820, Beale's Cas. 930. In this case, Buzzard's Bay was held to be within the territorial jurisdiction of Massachusetts.

6 Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240.

(b) Bays and Other Arms of the Sea.-When a river, haven, bay, or other arm of the sea, extends into a country or state, it is not only within the territorial limits of the country or state to an imaginary line drawn between the furthermost points of land, or fauces terrae, but it is also with the body of a county of the state, and subject to the common-law jurisdiction, if it is so narrow that a person standing on one shore can reasonably discern by the naked eye what is being done on the other shore. According to this doctrine it has been held that the county of Suffolk, in Massachusetts, extends to all the waters of Boston harbor between the circumjacent islands down to Great Brewster Island and Point Allerton, and that the courts of such county have jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of the state committed on a vessel lying in such waters.

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(c) Long Island Sound. The waters of Long Island sound are "high seas," within the meaning of the federal constitution and acts of congress, except such parts as are within the fauces terrae. Within the fauces terrae, as in the Huntington and Northport bays, and in New Haven harbor, but not outside, such waters are within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of the states of New York and Connecticut, and within the body of the counties thereof.10

489. Rivers and Lakes.

(a) In General.-The jurisdiction of a state extends over all rivers and lakes lying within its territorial limits, unless there is some compact to the contrary.11 Its jurisdiction over a river

71 Kent, Comm. 30; U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 336; U. S. v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, Fed. Cas. No. 15,268; Com. v. Peters, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 387; Manley v. People, 7 N. Y. 295.

8 U. S. v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, Fed. Cas. No. 15,268, per Mr. Justice Story. See Direct U. S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Tel. Co., 2 App. Cas. 394.

9 U. S. v. Jackalow, 1 Black (U. S.) 484; U. S. v. Peterson, 64 Fed. 145, 147.

10 Manley v. People, 7 N. Y. 295.

11 Biscoe v. State, 68 Md. 294; People v. Tyler, 7 Mich. 161, 74 Am. Dec. 703; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320.

forming the boundary between it and another state depends, in the absence of any compact, upon whether its territorial limits extend to the middle of the stream, or to the one or the other of the banks. When a great river is the boundary be tween two states, if the original property was in neither state, and there is no convention respecting it, each holds to the middle of the stream. But when one state was the original proprietor, and has granted the territory on one side only, it retains the river within its own domain, and the newly-created state extends only to the low-water mark on the river.12 There is a distinction, however, between ownership and jurisdiction, and there may be jurisdiction without ownership.12a Thus, it is the general, though perhaps not universal, rule, that jurisdiction of the surface of a river forming the boundary be tween the states has been made concurrent between the states throughout its whole width, though the actual state boundary may be at low water mark on one side of the river or may be at the thread of the stream.13 And statutory provisions, giving adjoining counties concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed within a certain distance of the county line, are

(b) The Great Lakes. It has been held by the supreme court of the United States that the great lakes in this country are within the general designation of "high seas" in the federal constitution and acts of congress, and it was therefore held that the federal courts had jurisdiction of an offense committed on an American vessel in the Detroit river beyond the

12 Chief Justice Marshall in Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 374; Booth v. Shepherd, 8 Ohio St. 243; Com. v. Garner, 3 Grat. (Va.) 655; McFall v. Com., 2 Metc. (Ky.) 394.

12a Vattel, Law of Nations, Bk. I, § 295; Com. v. Garner, 3 Grat. (Va.) 655, 709.

18 Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U. S. 573; Roberts v. Fullerton, 117 Wis. 222, 93 N. W. 1111, 65 L. R. A. 953.

13a Hackney v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 74 S. W. 554.