tion and the actual physical possession is obtained. A person who obtains goods by false pretenses in one state or county, and carries them into another, is not guilty in the latter of the offense of obtaining goods by false pretenses. The doctrine with respect to larceny123 does not apply in such a case.1

502. Embezzlement.

124

The offense of embezzlement, which, as we have seen, is the fraudulent conversion by a person of money or property intrusted to him by another, is committed in the state or county in which the money or property is converted, and not necessarily where it is received.125 To constitute a conversion, however, there need be no disposal or expenditure of the money or property, but the offense is complete whenever a person who has been intrusted therewith forms an intent to convert it to his own use, and has possession with such intent. A person, therefore, may be indicted for embezzlement in the jurisdiction in which he had possession of the property or money with intent to convert it to his own use, or in the jurisdiction in which he fraudulently refused or failed to account for it to his employer, as it was his duty to do, although he may not have expended or disposed of it in such jurisdiction.126 In an English case, the prisoner, who was traveling salesman for a tradesman living at Nottingham, received money for his em

123 Ante, § 499.

124 Reg. v. Stanbury, Leigh & C. 128, 9 Cox, C. C. 94.

125 Reg. v. Treadgold, 39 Law Times (N. S.) 291; People v. Murphy, 51 Cal. 376; Ex parte Palmer, 86 Cal. 631; Dix v. State, 89 Wis. 250, 61 N. W. 760; Campbell v. State, 35 Ohio St. 70; State v. New, 22 Minn. 76; Wallis v. State, 54 Ark. 611, 16 S. W. 821.

126 Rex v. Hobson, Russ. & R. 56, 2 Leach, C. C. 975; Rex v. Taylor, Russ. & R. 63, 2 Leach, C. C. 974, 3 Bos. & P. 596; Reg. v. Murdock, 2 Den. C. C. 298, 5 Cox, C. C. 360; Reg. v. Rogers, 3 Q. B. Div. 28, 14 Cox, C. C. 22; State v. Small, 26 Kan. 209; State v. Baumhager, 28 Minn. 226, 9 N. W. 704; Brown v. State, 23 Tex. App. 214, 4 S. W. 588; Campbell v. State, 35 Ohio St. 70; State v. Bailey, 50 Ohio St. 636, 36 N. E. 233. And see State v. New, 22 Minn. 76. Compare Dix v. State, 89 Wis. 250, 61 N. W. 760.

neglected to return

About two months employer in Not

ployer in the county of Derbyshire, and and account for it, as it was his duty to do. after his receipt of the money, he met his tingham, and, when asked about the money, said that he had spent it. It was held that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on an indictment for embezzlement in Nottingham.127 In another case, where a traveler employed to collect money in the country, and remit it at once to his employers in Middlesex, collected money in Yorkshire, appropriated it there, and rendered false accounts to his employers by post, it was held that he was rightfully convicted of embezzlement in Middlesex. 128 In a late Ohio case, a contract of employment was made in Lucas county, in that state, by which the accused was authorized to canvass for the sale of and sell his employer's goods in Sandusky county, and required to account therefor in Lucas county weekly, either by letter or in person, and, at his request, goods were sent by express from his employer's place of business, in Lucas county, to him in Sandusky county, where he received and sold them. He converted part of the proceeds to his own use in Sandusky county, and part in the state of New York. After the sale of the goods, he wrote a false account of the transaction to his employers, and mailed it to them on the railroad train while absconding, and they received it in Lucas county. Under these circumstances, it was held that an indictment for embezzlement would lie in Lucas county. "If the entire transaction constituting the embezzlement occurred in one county only," said the court, "the venue, as a matter of course, should be laid therein." But if the transaction extended to different counties, the authorities generally hold that the jurisdiction of the county in which the act of conversion occurred is not exclusive.129

127 Reg. v. Murdock, 2 Den. C. C. 298, 5 Cox, C. C. 360.

128 Reg. v. Rogers, 3 Q. B. Div. 28, 14 Cox, C. C. 22. And see State v. Bailey, 50 Ohio St. 636, 36 N. E. 233.

129 State v. Bailey, 50 Ohio St. 636, 36 N. E. 233.

Agent Outside the State.-An agent may be guilty of embezzlement in a state without ever being personally within the limits of the state. Thus, in a California case it was held that an agent, residing out of the state of California, of a principal in the state, committed embezzlement in the state by drawing telegraphic checks on the principal, in the course of his agency, and converting the money to his own use, with intent to embezzle the same.

130

Possession of Property Embezzled in Another State.-Following out the principle under which one who steals property in one state, and carries it into another, is held guilty of larceny in the latter, it has been held in Massachusetts that a person who embezzles property in another state, and brings it into Massachusetts, may be indicted there for embezzlement, as each moment's possession is a new conversion.131

Particular Statutes.-In Texas, by statute, "embezzlement may be prosecuted in any county of the state in which the offender may have taken or received the property, or through or into which he may have undertaken to transport it."132 In Maine, by statute, it is an offense punishable in that state if a person to whom property has been intrusted to be by him carried for hire, and delivered in another state, shall, before such delivery, fraudulently convert the same to his own use, and it makes no difference, under this statute, whether the act of conversion is within or without the state.133

503. Receiving Stolen Goods.

To constitute the offense of receiving stolen goods in a particular state or country, it is not only necessary that the goods be received there, but they must be stolen goods, and the lar

130 Ex parte Hedley, 31 Cal. 109.

131 Com. v. Parker, 165 Mass. 526, 43 N. E. 499. Knowlton, J., dissented.

132 Cole v. State, 16 Tex. App. 461; Reed v. State, 16 Tex. App. 586; Cohen v. State, 20 Tex. App. 224.

183 State v. Haskell, 33 Me. 127.

ceny must have been committed against the laws of the particular state or country, that is, they must have been stolen there. It is obvious, therefore, that, with regard to this of fense, we meet with the same difficulties and the same conflict of opinion as in the case of larceny. If goods are stolen in one county, and carried into another county of the same state, and there received, the offense of receiving stolen goods is certainly committed in the latter county. As to this there can be no question.134 If goods are stolen in one country, and brought into another, or on the high seas, and brought into a country, and there received, the offense of receiving stolen goods is not committed, for there has been no larceny of which the courts of that country can take cognizance.135 If goods are stolen in one of the states, or in a territory, and brought into another state, and there received, whether the offense of receiving stolen goods is committed in the latter will depend upon whether, in that state, the bringing into the state of goods stolen in another state is regarded as larceny.1 136 If it is, the offense of receiving is committed;137 otherwise not.138 If it is larceny to carry into a state goods stolen in another state, and a person steals goods in one state, and sends them by an innocent agent into another, one who receives them from such agent in the latter state, with knowledge that they have been so stolen, is guilty of receiving stolen goods, for, in contemplation of law, he receives them from the original thief.139 If goods are stolen in one county, and shipped by carrier to a person in another county, in accordance with a preconcerted arrange

134 Ante, § 499b.

135 Reg. v. Carr, 15 Cox, C. C. 131, note, Beale's Cas. 774; Reg. v. Debruiel, 11 Cox, C. C. 207; ante, § 499c. As we have seen, in sev eral states the courts have taken a contrary view. Ante, § 499c, note 105.

136 Ante, § 499d.

137 Com. v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 14, 3 Am. Dec. 17; Com. v. White, 123 Mass. 430, 25 Am. Rep. 116.

138 Ante, § 499d.

139 Com. v. White, 123 Mass. 430, 25 Am. Rep. 116; ante, §§ 497, 499.

ment, delivery to the carrier is a delivery to the person to whom they are sent, and he is therefore guilty of receiving the stolen goods in the county where they are delivered to the carrier. 140 The offense of receiving stolen goods is committed where the goods are received, and not elsewhere. Carrying them elsewhere afterwards is not a new receiving.1 141

504. Forgery and Uttering.

In the absence of a statute, an indictment for forgery will lie only in the state and county in which the act of forgery is committed,142 but it is otherwise in some jurisdictions by statute. 143 As to the locality in which a forged instrument is to be considered as uttered, there is some conflict of opinion. By the weight of authority, the uttering is not complete until the instrument is transferred and comes to the hands or possession of some person other than the utterer, his agent, or servant, and the place where it is received by such other person is the place where the offense of uttering is committed.144 And, according to this view, it is held that, if the instrument is sent

140 State v. Habib, 18 R. I. 558. As we have seen, receipt and possession by an agent is sufficient to constitute a receiving. Ante, § 381(d).

141 Roach v. State, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 39; Campbell v. People, 109 Ill. 565; Licette v. State, 75 Ga. 253.

142 Com. v. Parmenter, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 279. And see State v. Poindexter, 23 W. Va. 805; Cohen v. People, 7 Colo. 274; Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507, Beale's Cas. 404.

143 In Texas, by statute, forgery may be prosecuted in any county in the state in which the instrument was forged or used or passed, or attempted to be used or passed. Mason v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 95, 22 S. W. 144, 408.

Under a Texas statute punishing any person who, out of the state, should commit an offense punished by the laws of the state, and not requiring personal presence, it was held that an indictment would lie in Texas for forging, in another state, instruments affecting the title to lands in Texas. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. App. 289.

144 People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 509; Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507, Beale's Cas. 404; State v. Hudson, 13 Mont. 112; Com. v. Searle, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 332, 4 Am. Dec. 446.