the courts have differed widely in construing the statutes, even when they have been substantially the same, and that in many cases the judges of the same court have differed. In construing a statute the court should not hold that it dispenses with the necessity for a criminal intent unless such an intent on the part of the legislature is clear beyond any reasonable doubt.

legitimately have any other basis. They are not the products of any of the general maxims of civil or natural law. On the contrary, each of this set of cases is, or should have been, the result of the judicial ascertainment of the mind of the legislature in the given instance. In such investigations, the dictates of natural justice, such as that a guilty mind is an essential element of crime, cannot be the ground of decision, but are merely circumstances of weight, to have their effect in the effort to discover the legislative purpose. As there is an undoubted competency in the lawmaker to declare an act criminal, irrespective of the knowledge or motive of the doer of such act, there can be, of necessity, no judicial authority having the power to require, in the enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown. In such instances, the entire function of the court is to find out the intention of the legis lature, and to enforce the law in absolute conformity to such intention, and in looking over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial guide. And naturally, in such an inquiry, the decisions have fallen into two classes, because there have been two cardinal considerations of directly opposite tendency, influencing the minds of judges; the one being the injustice of punishing unconscious violations of law, and the other the necessity, in view of public utility, of punishing, at times, some of that very class of offenses."

7 See Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. Div. 168, Beale's Cas. 280; Mikell's Cas. 134, 178; Gordon v. State, 52 Ala. 308, 23 Am. Rep. 575; Duncan v. State, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 148.

In Reg. v. Tinkler, 1 Fost. & F. 513, Beale's Cas. 285, where a man was indicted under a statute for the abduction of a girl under sixteen years of age, and it did not appear that he had any improper motive, Chief Justice Cockburn directed the jury that, if they thought he merely wished to have the child live with him, and honestly believed that he had a right to the custody of the child, because of a promise made by him to her father on his death bed, they should acquit him, although he in fact had no such right.

In Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. Div. 168, Beale's Cas. 286, Mikell's Cas. 134, 178, decided in England in 1889, in the court of appeal, queen's bench division, the statute under which the defendant, a woman, was indicted, provided that any person who, being married, should marry

(c) Particular Cases.-Among the various statutes which some of the courts, but not all, have construed as not requiring a criminal intent, are statutes punishing bigamy, statutes for the protection of game and fish, statutes punishing public officers for the expenditure of public moneys in excess of appropriations, etc.,10 statutes punishing the sale of chattel mortgaged

any other person during the life of his or her wife or husband, should be guilty of a felony. There was a proviso that the act should not extend to any person marrying a second time, after the absence of his or her wife or husband for the space of seven years, without being known to such person to have been living within that time. The defendant had married a second time while her husband was living, and before he had been absent for seven years, but it appeared that she believed, and had good reason to believe, that he was dead. She was convicted, notwithstanding the absence of a criminal intent. On appeal, the case was considered by all of the judges, and most of them delivered opinions. The majority held that the statute was not to be construed as dispensing with the necessity for a criminal intent, and the conviction was quashed. The minority were of opinion that the legislature intended to absolutely prohibit any person from marrying a second time before the expiration of the seven years, without knowing of the death of his or her former spouse, and that any person so marrying should do so at his or her peril.

8 Com. v. Mash, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 472, Beale's Cas. 304; State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800, 34 L. R. A. 784, overruling State v. Gardner, 5 Nev. 377. Contra, Reg. v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. Div. 168, Beale's Cas. 286, Mikell's Cas. 134, 178; ante, note 7; Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459. And see post, § 70 (c).

State v. Huff, 89 Me. 521, 36 Atl. 1000 (seining for smelts, in violation of a statute). State v. Ward, 75 Vt. 438, 56 Atl. 85 (shooting deer without horns).

10 In New Jersey, a statute punished any member of certain public boards who should disburse or vote for the disbursement of public moneys in excess of appropriations, or incur obligations in excess of appropriations, or the limit of expenditures provided by law, and said nothing at all about the intent. On a prosecution for violation of this statute, it was held that a criminal intent was not necessary, and that the accused was guilty, though he acted in good faith, under advice of counsel, and with due care and caution. Halstead v. State, 41

N. J. Law, 552, 32 Am. Rep. 247, Mikell's Cas. 192.

C. & M. Crimes-6.

11

property, 10a statutes punishing the sale of adulterated food products,10b statutes punishing the sale of intoxicating liquors to slaves, or to minors or drunkards,12 etc. Generally, the cases in which this question arises are cases in which ignorance or mistake of fact is set up as a defense, and these are treated more fully in another place.1

57. Ignorance of Law.

13

There is one real exception, even at common law, to the rule that a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime. This exception is in the case of acts done in unavoidable ignorance of the law prohibiting and punishing them. Every man is conclusively presumed to know the law, and, except as to those crimes requiring a specific intent, if he violates the law, he cannot set up his ignorance as a defense, though as a matter of fact it might negative the existence of an actual criminal intent. And it can make no difference how reasonable, or even unavoidable, his ignorance may have been.14

58. Criminal Intention Presumed from Act.

It is a general rule that every man of sufficient mental capacity to know what he is doing is presumed to have intended the natural or probable consequences of his voluntary acts. This rule has repeatedly been applied in the criminal law, and to a great variety of cases. If a man voluntarily, and without any mistake as to the facts, does an act which, according to the nat

10a State v. Heldenbrand, 62 Neb. 136, 87 N. W. 25, 89 Am. St. Rep. 743.

10b State v. Schlenker, 112 Iowa, 642, 84 N. W. 698, 84 Am. St. Rep. 360; State v. Ryan, 70 N. H. 196, 46 Atl. 49, 85 Am. St. Rep. 629; State v. Rogers, 95 Me. 94, 49 Atl. 564, 85 Am. St. Rep. 395; Fox v. State, 94 Md. 143, 50 Atl. 700, 89 Am. St. Rep. 419.

11 State v. Presnell, 12 Ired. (N. C.) 103, Beale's Cas. 177.

12 Post, § 70 (b).

13 Post, § 70 et seq.

14 Post, § 73 et seq.

ural course of events, will probably injure another in a particular way, it will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that he intended such consequences.15

Conclusive Presumption.—In many cases a criminal intention will be conclusively presumed from voluntary acts.16

Common Law. Thus, where a man uses language towards another which is calculated to bring on an affray, and engages in a fight when the other assaults him, he cannot, on a prosecution for an affray, be heard to say that he did not intend to bring about a breach of the peace.17 So, if a person deliberately, and without ignorance of fact, shoots in the direction of another, it will be presumed that he intended to kill him, and he may be convicted of murder, or assault with intent to murder, according to the circumstances.18

Violation of Statutes.-If a statute prohibits an act under certain circumstances, and a person does the act, not under any mistake of fact, a criminal intention is conclusively presumed.' .19

15 Com. v. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 173, Beale's Cas. 183; Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, Beale's Cas. 179; Com. v. York, 9 Metc. (50 Mass.) 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; Dunaway v. People, 110 Ill. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 686; State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, 31 Am. Rep. 260; State v. King, 86 N. C. 603; Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21; State v. White Oak River Corp., 111 N. C. 661, 16 S. E. 331.

16 "Where an act, in itself indifferent, if done with a particular intent becomes criminal, the intent must be proved and found; but where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant, and, in failure thereof, the law implies a criminal intent." Per Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Woodfall, 5 Burrow, 2667. See, also, State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22.

17 State v. King, 86 N. C. 603.

18 Dunaway v. People, 110 Ill. 333, 51 Am. Rep. 686; Walker v. State, 8 Ind. 290; State v. Gilman, 69 Me. 163, 31 Am. Rep. 260; post, §§ 208, 244.

19 Com. v. Connelly, 163 Mass. 539, 40 N. E. 862; State v. McLean, 121 N. C. 589, 28 S. E. 140; State v. White Oak River Corp., 111 N. C. 661, 16 S. E. 331.

Thus, if a person, in violation of a statute, intentionally opens a grave for the purpose of removing anything interred therein, a criminal intent is conclusively presumed. State v. McLean, supra.

And so it is where a carrier discriminates in the transportation of

59. Responsibility for Unintended Results.

(a) In General.-To constitute a criminal intent, so as to render a person responsible for the results of his acts, it is not always necessary that he shall have intended the particular results for which he is punished. If his intention was not innocent, he may in many cases be held criminally responsible for results that were clearly not contemplated.19a

(b) Intention to Commit a Crime.-If a person intends to commit one offense, and by reason of mistake of fact, or for any other reason, commits another, he may in many cases be punished for the latter.20 There is no injustice in this. Thus, a homicidal act, taking effect on a person other than the one whom the slayer intended, makes him guilty of the same degree of homicide of which he would have been guilty had the person intended been slain.21 So, it is murder to unintentionally kill another, while engaged in the commission of some felony.22 And it is manslaughter to unintentionally kill a person in com

passengers or goods, in direct violation of a statute. State v. Southern Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 1052, 30 S. E. 133.

19a All crimes have their conception in a corrupt intent, and have their consummation and issuing in some particular fact; which, though it be not the fact at which the intention of the malefactor levelled, yet the law giveth him no advantage of the error, if another particular ensue of as high a nature. Bacon's Maxims, Reg. 15, Mikell's Cas. 134. 20 See State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa, 447; Reg. v. Latimer, 16 Cox, C. C. 70, Mikell's Cas. 163. And see post, § 71. A slave, who kills a white man, intending to kill a negro, is guilty of a criminal homicide in the degree in which he would have been guilty if the person slain had been a negro; and he is subject to the punishment prescribed for the commission of the offense upon a white person. Isham v. State, 38 Ala. 213, Mikell's Cas. 148.

21 Reg. v. Smith, 7, Cox, C. C. 51, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 567; State v. Smith, 2 Strob. (S. C.) 77, 47 Am. Dec. 589, Beale's Cas. 468; Angell v. State, 36 Tex. 542, 14 Am. Rep. 380; Isham v. State, 38 Ala. 213, Mikell's Cas. 148; Com. v. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. 470, 37 Atl. 521, 59 Am. St. Rep. 670; Wheatley v. Com., 26 Ky. L. R. 436, 81 S. W. 687; People v. Suesser, 142 Cal. 354, 75 Pac. 1093; post, § 241 (b).

22 Reg. v. Greenwood, 7 Cox, C. C. 404, Beale's Cas. 424; Reddick v. Com., 17 Ky. L. R. 1020, 33 S. W. 416; post, § 248.