the land," yet, if there is other evidence, it will be established in conformity with the evidence, even for Jews, who reject Christianity, and whose religion the law of England does not tolerate.22 Boyle regards the opinion of Sir Thomas Sewell in Isaac v. Gomperts to have been, in point of law, that “religious instruction is not a necessary part of education," and that, if the purpose of the testator does not require it, it may be carried into effect "without regard to religion at all"; and he says also, with perfect truth, that Sir Thomas Plumer, in the case last cited, supports the same opinion. 28 This, it must be observed, is the law in a land where there is an established church, and where there is no toleration except for Christians of a certain faith. It is English toleration of schools for Jews, who reject Christianity; and less is extended by the complainants and their counsel, in this land of universal toleration, to the school of Mr. Girard, who does not reject it, but only omits expressly to require it.

(3) That the conscience of parents and pupils is violated by the exclusion of the Christian ministry. And have the founders of schools no conscience to be respected? Is the conscience of the giver to pass for nothing? Can those who may refuse the bounty altogether, on the terms on which it is given, set up their conscience to destroy the gift? Or, rather, are the rights of conscience to be made a pretext for destroying the charity, that none may enjoy it, even when their conscience consents?

Finally, I submit to the court that, if this exclusion or restriction in the testator's will is illegal, it is for that reason null and absolutely void, and the consequence is, not that the charity fails, but that the restraint-the condition-is defeated, and the court must establish the charity according to their sense of the law. It is a condition subsequent to the gift. The estate has vested in the trustees, and this restraint or condition is a restraint upon its use. If the restraint is illegal, the use is not bound by it. The complainants gain nothing by the objection but the unenviable satisfaction of holding up their benefactor to judicial censure, and possibly to more general reprehension.

33 Attorney General v. Dean and Canons of Christ Church, Jac. 485. 23 Boyle, 43, 44.

PROFESSIONAL OPINION ON THE JURISDICTION OF CORONERS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1840.

STATEMENT.

The board of managers of the Pennsylvania Hospital, of Philadelphia, requested Mr. Binney's opinion on certain questions raised in correspondence between the board of managers and the coroner, and also on the duties and rights of the coroner generally. They desired particularly to know the utmost extent of the coroner's right to hold inquests, whether it was his duty, as he asserted, to hold inquests over all cases of accidental death, or whether this duty was bounded by some decision or principle. In response to this request, Mr. Binney prepared the following opinion, which he "begged them to accept as a contribution towards their work of benevolence:"

OPINION.

I have considered the matter submitted to me. The extent of the coroner's claim of jurisdiction is indicated by two paragraphs in his letters of September 28 and October 3, 1840. In the former he says: "The responsibility of an oath makes it an imperative duty on my part to call your attention to the fact that many persons who die in the hospital, the victims of accident, are buried without my knowledge. Now, I believe that the law makes it a duty of the coroner to hold an inquest over the bodies of persons who die from casualties." In his letter of the 3d of October he says: "I will now refer you to such authorities as I trust will satisfy you that all deaths from accidents or casualties fall under the notice of the coroner;" and there follows a list of authorities hereafter to be noticed. The correspondence between the coroner and the board of managers of the hospital appears to have grown out of the case of a girl named Elizabeth Taylor, who had been brought into the hospital badly burned (by accident), and died at the end of the week from the time of the injury, having had perfect possession of her senses the whole time, and having herself declared the cause of the accıdent. Upon this, the coroner's remark in the last-mentioned letter is as follows: "The case to which you call my attention, of the girl who died in consequence of burns, is one which falls under the notice of the coroner." "You will find in the various authors that the coroner is bound to inquire into all deaths from murder, suicide, drowning, poisoning, sudden deaths, accidents, or casualties. You will find in these authors no exceptions as to

the nature of the casualties, or the time that may elapse preceding death."

The point at issue is, therefore, very distinctly shown, and the coroner's jurisdiction asserted by him in all cases of death by casualty, without regard to the nature of the casualty or the length of time that may intervene before death. I will hereafter give my reasons for entertaining a different opinion from that expressed by the coroner; but as his letter communicates to the board a number of authorities to support his claim, it is but a proper respect to this officer, who evidently entertains those views of his duty which he has expressed in his letters, to advert to these authorities in the first instance. He has cited them by book and page, without giving the particular import of any of them. I have examined them all, with an immaterial exception, and think that they do not support his claim, but, on the contrary, show it to be invalid. With the interpretation of their general language by judicial decisions, or commentaries of the highest order of excellence, such of the authorities as apply show that the qualification of the coroner's position is necessary as to the nature of the casualty and as to the time of death. The cited authorities are as follows: I Blackstone's Commentaries, 347; Fitzherbert's Abridgment, "Coroner," pl. 107, 329, 339, 421; Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, 170; 2 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, c. 9, § 23; Stamford's Pleas of the Crown, 51; 2 Levinz, 141; Latch, 166; St. 4 Edw. I.

I Blackstone's Commentaries, 347. The language of the commentator is this: The judicial power of the coroner "is in great measure ascertained by St. 4 Edw. I., de officio coronatoris, and consists, first, in inquiring, when any person is slain, or dies suddenly, or in prison, concerning the manner of his death.” Blackstone then adverts to other judicial powers of the coroner, as in cases of shipwreck and treasure trove, and as to his ministerial powers as the sheriff's substitute, but says nothing of death after casualties or accidents, nor does he explain what is meant by the phrase "dies suddenly."

Fitzherbert's Abridgment, pl. 329. This placitum shows the necessity of an inquest in the case of sudden death. A ville was amerced because a man was buried before the coroner had held a view, a sudden death by starving, to which I will advert hereafter with an authority from Lord Hale's Pleas of the Crown. Here, also, the characteristic is sudden death, and the particular cause given. Placitum 339 concerns the case of a man found dead in a field,-a cause of suspicion that he had come to his

death by violence, and therefore proper for an inquest. Placitum 421 concerns a person who had died in prison,-a case for the jurisdiction of the coroner at common law, even though the death was a natural one. Placitum 107 only shows that the coroner's inquest must be upon view of the body.

Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, 170. This page, which is an erroneous reference, for the octavo edition of Hawkins,1 treats of the court of the coroner, and contains pretty much that is apposite to the subject. At page 207 the author treats of the point, "how far a coroner is empowered," and he considers the authority under two heads,-first, in relation to death, and, secondly, in relation to other matters. It is under the first division that it is alone necessary to advert to what he says, which consists of a copious recital of St. 4 Edw. I., and then of the following commentary:

"It is observable that this statute, being wholly directory, and in affirmance of the common law, doth neither restrain the coroner from any branch of his power nor excuse him from the execution of any part of his duty not mentioned in it which was incidental to his office before; and from hence it follows that, although the statute mentions only his taking inquiries of the death of persons slain or drowned or suddenly dead, yet he may and ought to inquire of the death of all persons whatsoever who die in prison, to the end that the public may be satisfied whether such persons came to their end by the common course of nature, or by some unlawful violence or unreasonable hardships put upon them by those under whose power they were confined."

Sergeant Hawkins therefore adds to the cases of death enumerated in the statute only that of death in prison, for which he cites Fitzherbert, 421, the placitum before referred to, and Stamford's Pleas of the Crown, 51, the same authority which the coroner's letter cites. I do not possess Stamford, and it is not in the catalogue of the Law Association, nor, that I know of, in the city, but as it is the authority cited by Hawkins for the coroner's jurisdiction in the case of all deaths in prison, it is unnecessary to examine it, as this point is not doubted, nor is it in question.

2 Levinz, 141. The case at this page of Levinz is The King v. Parker, and does not relate at all to the coroner's power. It is the case of a coroner's inquest quashed because it found that a man felonice threw himself into the river, et seipsum emergit, which means to rise out of and not to drown himself in the water. Latch, 166. This is an anonymous case, which merely decides Volume 3, c. 9, pp. 101, 180.

2 Section 201, p. 109.

that it is the coroner's duty to take his inquest upon view of the body, which is not the point in controversy.

2 Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, c. 9, § 23. This section relates to precisely the same point as the anonymous case in Latch and the placitum in Fitzherbert, viz., that the inquest must be super visum corporis.

The last of the authorities to be considered among the references of the coroner is the statute itself, 4 Edw. I., de officio coronatoris, which, in setting forth the things which a coroner ought to inquire of, "if he be certified by the king's bailiffs or other honest men of the country," adverts to cases of houses broken, treasure trove, and certain appeals of wounding, rape, and mayhem, not necessary to be noticed. In regard to deaths, its language is as follows: "He shall go to the places where any be slain or suddenly dead," and then, if it be the case of a person slain, the coroner is to inquire where the person was slain, who were culpable of the act or force, who were present, and other particulars to bring the perpetrators of the deed to light. "In like manner it is to be inquired of them that be drowned or suddenly dead,” and, after such bodies are to be seen, whether they were so drowned or slain or strangled by the sign of a cord tied straight about their necks, or about any of their members, or upon any other hurt found upon their bodies. These are all the statutory heads of inquiry in the case of certain deaths, namely, persons slain, drowned, or suddenly dead. There is not a word as if death by casualty, and death happening at any time after a casualty, were heads of the coroner's jurisdiction. On the contrary, the deaths enumerated are of persons slain,-that is, killed by weapons, drowned, or suddenly dead; and with regard to the last description of deaths, the inquiries of the coroner are to be whether submersi, occisi, jugulati, or strangulati,—all of them implying violence in the manner of the death. When I say there is nothing in the statute to give the coroner jurisdiction in every case of death by casualty, or death happening at any time after casualty, I must be understood, not as meaning that the coroner has no jurisdiction of a death by casualty, or a death happening some time after a casualty, for there may be circumstances to give him jurisdiction when the fact upon inquiry shall turn out to be death by casualty or happening after it, but as meaning that there are no such heads of jurisdiction in the statute of casualty or death, without regard to suddenness; and this I understand to be the purpose for which the citation of authorities has been made by the coroner.