part time, in national development work such as harvesting crops and construction.

DOCTRINE

China's current official military doctrine, largely based on the military writings of Mao Tse-tung, are the product of nearly 50 years of military experience under the most varied conditions. It incorporates the concepts of numerous military strategists-from Sun Tsu (The Art of War, circa 350 B.C.) through Napoleon and Clausewitz to those of modern times. At various stages, Japanese, German and Soviet military advisers have all been influential. The PLA's experience in the Korean War has also left its mark on Chinese military thinking. In addition, Mao's military doctrine has assimilated some innovations derived from the conventional and nuclear technology of the present era. However unlike my 1976 visit, the Chinese did not endlessly repeat Mao's dictum, which paraphrased is: when the enemy attacks, we retreat; when the enemy stops, we harass; when the enemy retreats, we attack.

With the current status of military forces China has available, that policy still remains as the most likely option.

The concepts of Peoples War and Wars of National Liberation are China's two major military doctrines. The concept of Peoples War is the doctrine for the defense of China in the event of either a conventional or nuclear attack. In Peoples War-i.e., total war-the PLA and paramilitary forces, supported by a mobilized populace would conduct a protracted war against an invader. This concept is often mistakenly referred to as a guerrilla warfare strategy. Although circumstances in China's war with Japan dictated heavy reliance on guerrilla tactics, the theoretical underpinnings of Peoples War has always been decidedly conventional. According to Mao, there are three types of warfare: mobile, positional and guerrilla. The most important, mobile warfare, is characterized by "... regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the offense and fluidity." Positional warfare, similar in many respects to the U.S. conception of positional defense, supplements mobile operations when necessary. Mao recognized, however, that this type of warfare, particularly when attacking prepared positions, requires massive firepower and well equipped forces scarce resources in the PLA, even today. Guerilla warfare makes its contribution by adding the dimension of war behind the enemy's lines coordinated with the PLA's regular ongoing battles and campaigns.

Using elements of all three types of warfare, the PLA's objective is to defend China's borders as far forward as terrain and circumstances permit. Today, along the east coast and in the south, the PLA appears poised to contest vigorously any enemy attempt to establish even a foothold on Chinese soil. In the north, particularly in Manchuria, terrain and the numerous possible avenues of approach dictate a more cautious strategy. Positional defense has been established in the first defensible terrain back from the border (about 200 miles) along major entry corridors. Behind this defensive belt, the PLA's best equipped and most mobile forces are positioned in depth to contain any penetrations or if necessary fight a mobile war on the Manchurian plain.

The concept of the Wars of National Liberation is a revolutionary doctrine that is exported to indigenous, insurgent movements outside of China. In their support of "wars of national liberation," the Chinese do not necessarily promise or provide direct military aid. While political and ideological encouragement is given, the emphasis is on selfreliance as the only way to achieve victory.

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL

THE CHINESE HIGH COMMAND

Command and control of the PLA is exercised by the Military Commission (MC of the Chinese Communist Party) while the Ministry of National Defense (MND) provides administrative support. Operational control is maintained by the General Staff, which includes the General Staff Department (GSD), the General Rear Services Department (GRSD), and the General Political Department (GPD).

Specific operational functions are carried out at the direction of the General Staff, by the headquarters of the various arms and services. These include the navy, the air force, the armored force, the artillery force, the engineer corps, the railway engineer corps, the second artillery (strategic missile) corps, the capital construction engineer corps, and the antichemical warfare corps. There is no ground force or infantry headquarters as such.

REGIONAL COMMANDS

Although command of the PLA is highly centralized in the hands of the General Staff in Peking, elaborate territorial command and control structures exist for all three services, including eleven ground force military regions (MR, three fleets and cleven air districts. The MR's and Fleets, in addition to their service affiliation, apparently serve as joint service headquarters and would function as operational commands in wartime. Strategic missions of the air force and overall planning for air operations are directed from Peking, but once tactical air sorties are allocated, these assets are probably controlled by, and incorporated into the local joint service commander's operational plan. Although few details are known, command of China's ballistic missile force is clearly maintained by central-level authorities.

The structure of the PLA's military regions provides further insight into Chinese thinking on what they believe is the most appropriate organization for combat. For example, the regular ground forces are divided into two general categories: main forces and local forces. Main forces, commanded by the General Staff, are assigned to, and controlled by, MR's based on GSD's threat perceptions at any given time, and are available whenever necessary to redeploy for operations anywhere in China. Main force units include infantry, armored, artillery and airborne divisions and separate regiments. Local forces, also known as regional forces or local defense forces, are those regular troops stationed in and assigned the task of defending a particular locale or geographic area of China. They are responsible for the immediate defense of China's coastal areas and land frontiers and, in additional, share responsibility for the internal defense and

security of the PRC. Although these forces are commanded by the region, control is delegated to military district and subdistrict headquarters. These latter commands are also responsible to local civilian party officials, and provide the military expertise necessary to administer and train the militia.

The Chinese currently perceive the Soviet Union as their greatest military threat, and have positioned a large portion of the PLA's most capable forces in the four northern military regions. The potential for an attack from the sea along their east coast has not, however, been neglected. Ground and air forces stationed in the coastal regions are almost equal numerically to those on the northern border. Forces in the south are adequate for a determined resistance against any encroachment by Vietnam, but would require a substantial diversion of forces from other areas before the PLA could contemplate initiating a major offensive. Along the Sino-Indian border, PLA forces are sufficient to

38-342 O-79-4

thwart an Indian incursion and launch limited border forays. A major invasion would require a massive logisical buildup and additional forces, particularly air power. In addition, the rugged terrain severely restricts large-scale operations by either side and would make sustained combat difficult.

SINO-SOVIET BORDER WAR

The threat of war between China and the U.S.S.R. has diminished since the border clashes and Soviet hints of a preemptive nuclear strike in 1969. Although a gradual Soviet military buildup in the Far East had been ongoing since the early 1960's, it apparently was not viewed in Peking by many as a serious threat or a significant alteration of the forces balance. Peking appeared content to continue the ideological war of words, not fearing that things might deteriorate into a military confrontation. They genuinely seemed to have been caught off guard when the border skirmishes escalated, and the threat of a major war with the Soviet Union loomed large. Once the seriousness of the threat was recognized, however, Peking moved quickly to ameliorate the situation and reduce tensions. The first step was to agree to face-to-face talks with the Soviets at the Peking airport in September 1969.

Almost immediately thereafter a reorientation of the PLA commenced greatly strengthening the northern border. These moves shifted the focus of the PLA's defenses from seaward approaches to the concept of all-around defense. In the process a large number of forces were repositioned, new units established, and the production of military weapons and equipment increased dramatically.

In 1971 Peking's perception of the imminence of hostilities appears to have been sharply reduced, however. The frantic pace of developments of the earlier period was replaced by programs designed for the long haul-albeit in a new threat environment-and continued improvement on its military preparations begun in 1969. In a related development the beginnings of a new era in Sino-United States relations dawned that eventually would lead to the dramatic breakthrough in 1972 at Shanghai.

The PLA is much better prepared to deal with a Soviet conventional attack today than it was in 1969, but would suffer from distinct disadvantages on a nuclear or chemical battlefield. China does, however, possess a small ballistic missile force that provides a modest deterrent to the Soviet use of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The PLA probably could inflict catastrophic damage on populated areas of the Soviet Far East and severely disrupt Soviet ground operations in China even after a Soviet first strike. But, the U.S.S.R.'s larger and more diversified arsenal of nuclear weapons gives Soviet forces a distinct advantage in any such conflict. Moreover, Chinese forces are ill prepared to sustain large-scale conventional combat in a nuclear or chemical environment. Even so the nuclear balance is a virtual standoff unless Soviet national interests became so threatened that high risks seemed more bearable.

In a conventional war the Chinese probably could stop a Soviet offensive before all of Manchuria was lost. On the other hand, a PLA counteroffensive to dislodge the U.S.S.R. from Chinese territory probably would also fail. Such a stalemate leading to a war of attrition would favor the Chinese. Any Soviet attempt to occupy and pacify a hostile territory virtually the size of Western Europe would surely