truth from facts," testing theory against reality, and castigated cadres for blind reliance on the Thoughts of Chairman Mao. Thus, on several key questions. Teng and Hua differed publicly. In brief, Teng advocates modernization at a greater cost to revolutionary values than HUA, who argues that Mao's teachings provide "correct" guidelines for the future.

Of course, there have been purges. Wu Teh, Chief of Peking Municipal Party was removed in October 1978, and the anti-Teng verdict of the Tienanmen riots in 1976 was reversed. Others remain, such as Wang Tung-hsing, who was active in originally purging Teng in 1966. However, Wang was demoted in December 1978 from fifth to sixth in the party hierarchy and lost his position as head of the general office of the party. Thus, Teng continues to make gains.

Earlier in March 1978, the Fifth National People's Congress endorsed Teng's policies and appointed many of his associates as State Council Ministers. Then in the summer of 1978, provincial appointments further strengthened Teng. With the dismissal of the Tientsin mayor in June, only three secretaries in Hunan (Mao's province), Shantung and Tibet loom as possible Teng adversaries.

Vice Premier Teng appears to have strengthened his role as the policy chief with a recent series of political appointments. The powerful post of Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party has been awarded to Hu Yao-pang. He will also serve as Director of the party's Propaganda Department, thereby putting a Teng loyalist in control of key party departments. The same Central Committee Plenum in December 1978 also appointed economist Chen Yun as a party Vice-Chairman (ranking fifth in the hierarchy), Teng YingChao (Madame Chou En-lai) and military hero Wang Chen as Politburo members. All are probably Teng supporters.

Although all these appointments reflects support for Teng's policies, Teng has yet to emplace younger and post-Teng transitional personnel in the Politburo. The absence of this crucial development, the lack of Politburo members under age 70 with any extensive international experience and the continued balancing between the victims and victors of the Cultural Revolution, suggest key divisions in the Chinese leadership which make modernization still a temporary policy. Teng obviously hopes to institutionalize modernization through the installation of his loyalists in the party structure, by the consumation of long-term trade agreements and the inclusion of rapid modernization in the new constitution adopted in March 1978. This strategy is designed to force continuation of modernization as Teng and his allies depart the political arena.

In essence, tough economic decisions and the festering wounds of political competition during the Cultural Revolution threaten political stability and make modernization a hostage to future political developments. As the social repercussions of modernization emerge, the conflict over revolutionary values will intensify.

IDEOLOGY

Since Mao died in September 1976, the pendulum has swung from ideological dogmatism to flexible pragmatism, characterized by the

reemergence of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Today the PRC's emphasis is on economic modernization, not revolutionary ideology.

The new leadership's goals for 1985 were announced at the 1978 China's National People's Congress. The targets set are quite ambitious: annual growth rates of 10 percent in industry and 4 to 5 percent in agriculture; triple steel output to 60 million tons and increase grain output by about 40 percent to 400 million tons.

In addition to urging more efficient management and improved planning, China's leaders now endorse greater use of material incentives, stress on profits as a standard for economic performance, and emphasis on professional skills rather than ideological orthodoxy. They have promised rapid development of science and technology, higher standards in education, a limited cultural thaw, greater attention to legal procedures, and a rise in living standards for workers.

This policy of de-Maoization with only limited public criticism of Mao is actually a selective utilization of Mao's writings to help establish the legitimacy of new rulers. Mao Tse-tung has been openly criticized in wall posters. An official CCP party meeting, the December 18-22 Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, has stated that Mao was not perfect. Mao's historical role and the validity of the Cultural Revolution are likely to remain as issues. The "modernization" and limited liberalization policies of the new leadership are marketed through a glorification of Mao, selective citings of Mao's many and sometimes contradictory writings, and the continuation of the revolution. Thus, a vast mausoleum to Mao has been built and his theory of three worlds is hailed as Mao's great strategic contribution. However, the four modernizations-industry, agriculture, national defense, science and technology-run directly counter to Mao's prescriptions and his Cultural Revolution. Moreover, these efforts will demand expanded foreign trade and technology-always under Chinese control-but increasing China's exposure and links with the West. Although it is difficult to judge whether this pragmatic change represents a beginning of a new era in China or simply a reformulation of Maoist doctrine, the change is evident. These reforms, including restoring examinations, and curtailing extensive indoctrination instead of skill training, admit Mao's "revolutionary concepts" are failures.

PRESENT CHINESE POLITICS

The Peking political situation is, of course, difficult to evaluate. Recently the Western press reported a split between Chairman Hua Kuofeng and Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-p'ing. However, Teng himself has denied these reports. More importantly, such an outward struggle is not in the interest of China or her leaders. There have been periodic leadership struggles in China since 1949. Indeed, Chinese history is a lengthy lesson in how to maintain national unity despite regional loyalties, complex administrative problems and ambitious leaders. With the conclusion of recent party conferences in December 1978, it appears that Teng Hsiao-p'ing's politics of modernization-on Chinese terms have been endorsed. Nevertheless, if these policies fail because of economic difficulties (as did the 1958 "Great Leap Forward"), mismanagement or idealogical disputes, a new and unknown situation will arise. Historically, these periods of Western influence have been

either preceded or followed by ideological struggles. Teng's emphasis on science and technology and deemphasis on political indoctrination contains the seeds of such a clash. The close relationship of the modernization scheme and twice-rehabilitated Teng indicates the tenuous nature of the current program.

The relationship of Hua and Teng to the military is unclear. Hua evidently controlled the crucial internal political security element, the 8341st Unit, which seized the "Gang of Four." But it no longer is clear that this unit retains the same power. Teng apparently has great support among the regular armed forces that presumably are pleased with his strong support for modernization of the military forces. The most likely course of action is that one faction will accept an inferior role. While there is broad support among the Chinese leadership for normalization of relations with the United States, Teng was apparently in charge of the negotiations and pushed for the pragmatic compromises in the Chinese side that made normalization possible. However, any use of military coercion to alter the present leadership pattern would be destabilizing to China, Western trade and the Asian regional balance. A regime focused on internal disorder has no foreign policy as was evident in China during the Cultural Revolution. Whether the Soviet Union would be tempted to intervene, either overtly or covertly, is conjecture, but must not be ignored.

Totalitarian governments are not immune to power struggles. Such struggles must be carefully monitored because of the impact of sudden leadership changes in the international arena.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The starting point for discussing human rights in China is the statement by a Chinese official that five or six percent of the population is undergoing "re-education." 1 With a population at that time of more than 900 million, this meant 45 to 54 million people were, by Chinese standards, deprived of basic liberties. In December 1978, Amnesty International issued a report, "Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China," detailing the suppression of basic liberties, the imprisonment and execution of millions of people. Indeed, earlier reports of the Chinese methods for dealing with dissidents resulted in the expulsion of Canadian journalist Ross Munro in 1977. Politics, not the legal process, determine justice in China.

Some argue that the collective nature of the Chinese people and the absence of Western morality negate the expectation that China will observe basic decency in dealing with its people. Apparently, the need to acquire legitimacy and build morale has led the new leadership to blame the "Gang of Four" with terrorizing the people. This charge has led to constitutional reforms, including restoring the right of the accused to a public trial, approval of the procuracy (traditionally both a prosecutor and guardian of the legal process) prior to formal arrest, election of the People's Congress by secret ballot, and regulations governing the conduct of the police. In essence, even though outside observers cannot monitor Chinese justice, it appears a wave of "socialist legality" is in motion.

1 New York Times, March 25, 1977, p. A–9.

Of course, personal and political freedoms are unknown. For example, Chinese must have permission to change jobs or residences. Further, a wall of courteous control encourages foreigners to use special shops and avoid mingling with the public. In effect, politics are closed, free speech and due process by Western standards do not exist. It is futile to expect these freedoms in a communist state, but a positive trend is evident. It is more important to judge human rights practices by the trend, not by absolutes. Few countries enjoy the liberties we have in the United States.

Unlike some critics, I do not believe these violations of human rights are sufficient reason to oppose diplomatic relations between the United States and China. The minimal formalities of recognition do not condone abusive practices. Indeed, where there is a long-standing allied relationship, the United States is morally obligated to seek improvements in human rights, if necessary. Ideally such improvement can be accomplished quietly. I therefore do not share the belief of senior Chinese officials that human rights in China should not be the subject of mutual dialogue. Critics of mere recognition, while not suspending moral concern, are overstating a valid moral point for their own political desires continued recognition of the Republic of China. Yet, that authoritarian, basically single-party regime on Taiwan is repressive in a political sense because two million "mainlanders" maintain effective control over 15 million Taiwanese people. Martial law continues in force, as does censorship, secret arrests, and travel restrictions. Admittedly, these offenses are not as severe or widespread as China's totalitarian regime. However, these corresponding faults should not blind our foreign policy to our own national interests which do justify normalization. Thus, recognition does not violate human rights principles and may even enable us to facilitate greater acceptance of these legal and political rights in China.

Recent reports of a secret communist party internal degree, Administrative Order No. 11, removing "rightists" from the category of citizens considered enemies of the state, has had the effect of rehabilitating millions of earlier purge victims. Yet, landlords, rich peasants, bad elements and counter-revolutionaries are still condemned. But, it does seem that important changes suggesting slightly greater liberalization are taking place. The recent display of wall posters in Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin and Canton arguing for such rights suggests we can influence internal events. Although limitations were rapidly placed on the Tienanmen Square demonstrations supporting democracy, poster discussion on a broad range of previously forbidden topics continues. Certainly a quarter of the human race demands our best efforts to influence human rights in China.

FUTURE CHINESE POLITICS

Mao's death removed the dominant political figure and created a new political environment. Currently, two groups clustered loosely around Chairman Hua (both of the Party and of its Military Affairs Committee) and twice-purged Teng Hsiao-p'ing, cooperate and perhaps compete in governing China. Neither man can purge opponents at will. There is admittedly a potential for conflict when Marshall Yeh Chine-ying, senior Vice Chairman of the Party and the Military Affairs Committee, the current balancer, dies. Despite his advancing age, however, stability seems likely in the immediate future since

neither group is anxious to return China to the political disruption of another "Cultural Revolution" or divisive in-fighting. In recent months, the outward signs of differences between Hua and Teng have decreased markedly. Possibly Hua has now, if grudgingly, endorsed Teng's pragmatic modernization program and his attempt to recast the Chinese political system. Leadership agreement, however, is tenuous. The official communique marking the December 1978 CCP Central Committee plenum indicated that the party could not reach agreement on how to assess political developments in China since the start of the Cultural Revolution (1966) and noted that the session had decided to "shelve" this sensitive issue for the present time. Presumably there is strong continuing, disagreement between officials who were criticized during the Cultural Revolution and later rehabilitated and others whose careers benefited from their close association with the Maoist policies. At the same time, recent People's Daily's commentaries continue to reflect disagreements between leaders who favor a continuing emphasis on Maoist ideology and those who believe that Maoist ideology is an impediment to material progress. For the short term, these two men will probably be able to work together, with Teng setting the pace.

In the longer terms, however, the very ambitions expressed in the "four modernizations" and the probable impact upon Chinese society, may lead to political divisions. For example, the urban areas—especially the coastal cities seem destined to profit greatly from economic modernization. Meanwhile, the peasants on rural communes will probably suffer even greater gaps in income and create alienation that will be seen in under-production, higher prices, black marketeering, hoarding and other forms of pressure. As allocation decisions intensify national divisions, cries of revisionism will be heard. Such an ideological dispute coupled with lethargic production will lead to new difficulties. Added to these possbilities must be the unknown impact of exposure to Western trade and tourism, the education of Chinese students abroad, and the effect of technological exchange upon the society.

Future demographic pressures will also create sociological problems. More than 400 million Chinese have been born since the Revolution and lack any memory of war-ravaged China. Cutting issues such as admissions to universities or membership in the party-the precursors of better jobs in a new China-will inevitably lead to social pressures since such people may be less likely to docilely follow orders. Such people, over time, will be another factor in the evolution of Chinese politics.

The ease with which attitudinal shifts occur must be cause for concern. From the "Great Leap Forward" of 1958 through the Cultural Revolution, from the up-and-down political games, from the antiAmerican propaganda of 1950-1972, followed by a sort of friendship, serious but unanswerable questions about political stability arise. No one knows how broad and deep the potential political instability of China is or when it may erupt. Might not everything that is policy this year be damned in 1990?