The CHAIRMAN. All of that is necessary to get the plane into operation, isn't it?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. These are necessary to maintain the plane in operation once you have it in operation.

Cumulatively, through fiscal year 1970, the Congress has approved $6.778 billion, of which $1.8 billion has been approved for R.D.T. & E. applicable to all models.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the estimated R.D.T. & E. cost originally by General Dynamics, when it submitted its proposal?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. The original estimate I can give you which the Air Force submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. According to the figures we have, it says adjusted proposal. This is on page 209 of our previous hearings, in March of 1963. It shows the adjusted proposal was $711.2 million.

Does that sound about right to you?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. The original Air Force estimate for research and development was $863 million.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, you gave us $918 million, at that time. Proceed.

First, how much have you in this year's budget for research and development?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Research and development in fiscal year 1971 budget? We have $64.5 million.

The CHAIRMAN, Proceed.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. I have indicated that cumulatively through fiscal year 1970 the Congress has approved $6.778 billion, of which $1.8 billion has been approved for R.D.T. & E. applicable for all models.

Our F-111 appropriations request for fiscal year 1971 totals $583.2 million, of which $64.5 million is to continue the R.D.T. & E. effort and $515.1 million funds production tasks, including the procurement of the final quantities of F-111F aircraft. The balance of $3.6 million is for military construction.

STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

I would now like to discuss progress toward a solution of the wing carry-through box structural problem.

The CHAIRMAN. According to these figures you have just given, if I calculate correctly, on the basis of these figures, assuming you would get the 547 planes in other words, you would get the 40 you are asking for if I calculate correctly, that would make the cost $12,200,000 each, according to these figures. Is that about correct?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Is that the program cost?

The CHAIRMAN. The figures you have given right here. You take $6 billion 778 million-maybe my calculation is wrong.

I wish you would take that later and calculate how much, according to this, it means for each plane.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. I will be happy to do that. (The information supplied follows:)

AVERAGE PROGRAM UNIT COST OF ALL F-111 AIRCRAFT

The $6.778 billion figure represents the approved program only through fiscal year 1970. To calculate the total program unit cost, the $7.466 billion figure given 43-096-702

earlier, as cost to completion, and the $28.4 million for military construction must be added and that sum and the total then divided by 547 aircraft. This would give us the current estimate of the overall program average unit cost of $13.70 million.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Continuing with the structural development problems, cyclic loads ground tests resumed on December 1, 1969 on a production wing box that had received the latest structural modifications designed to eliminate the causes of the previous ground test failures.

Like the previous tests, the present one is devised to repetitively load the test specimen until a failure occurs.

I am pleased to report that no such failure has yet occurred, even though we have accumulated far more load applications than had been attained in previous tests.

If the test specimen were to fail today, it would have validated that the present wing box, with the modifications that are currently being installed throughout the fleet, would provide an unrestricted service life to our using commands of at least 7 years.

That is a service life increase, Mr. Chairman, of approximately double that demonstrated by the earlier tests discussed in my October report.

We are hopeful that this test specimen does not fail until it has accumulated at least the number of load cycles necessary to validate a design service life of 10 years.

In order to achieve this figure with a high statistical level of confidence, the test specimen is being subjected to the wear and tear equivalent to 40 years-four times the number of loadings we expect the actual aircraft to experience in its projected 10-year inventory life. To further insure that these stringent criteria are met, we have begun programs to develop and fully certify two alternate wing box designs for use in the event the current test specimen fails prematurely. These designs are interchangeable in form and fit with the present wing box, so that should either be needed, the replacement installation can be performed with the minimum of difficulty and expenses.

If such a replacement should become necessary, it would most probably be accomplished 4 to 6 years from now; but certainly it would be done during one of the routine inspection and parts replacement programs we periodically conduct on all Air Force aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you anticipating a failure or is this a routine precaution you take on all development planes?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. This is a series of ground tests to establish the useful life.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the replacement. Is this a routine precaution you take in the development of all weapons systems? Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

It occurred to me it is either a routine thing you do, in anticipating the possible failure of critical parts like this in all weapons-do youand prepare for an anticipated situation like that? Or is this unusual? That is all I am asking.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Our normal maintenance procedure, Senator, for all aircraft is that we have estimated lifetimes for the principal components, and we replace those components usually at the expiration of that lifetime.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this unusual? Is this peculiar to this particular weapons system, or is it a usual thing?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. It is the usual thing.

The CHAIRMAN. I looked at it and I thought it ought to be cleared up. Senator GURNEY. Let me ask, General, what other alternate designs have you developed in connection with this airplane in addition to the wing box designs for possible failure in the future?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. That is the only alternate design that we are developing now, Senator. The reason, of course, for this alternate design is that we experienced static fatigue test problems with the wing box.

Senator GURNEY. But I don't see how that is responsive to Senator McClellan's question, when the testimony is that it is customary to develop alternate design and yet you say this is the only alternate designs developed in this airplane.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. I am sorry. In responding to Senator McClellan's earlier question, I was responding to the fact that we do, routinely, replace subsystems in our aircraft-engines, for example— after a certain number of hours of life.

Senator GURNEY. That is understandable, but that wasn't his question.

The CHAIRMAN. What I meant was that this looked unusual here. This is a structural thing. It looks as if you are anticipating the likelihood that it will fail and will have to be replaced, and you are getting alternate parts or designs for that particular part to replace it.

You go on to say in your statement, I think, that it could be replaced at a little inconvenience or expense, these different designs that you have in mind to replace.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Senator, you will recall when we spoke to you last October in the testimony, at that time we had about a 1,600hour life wing box. We did not know at that time whether we would be able, by the fixes that had been put on the wing box, to get it up to the present level of 3,000 hours, or eventually to the 4,000-hour level.

We felt it was prudent, therefore, to develop an alternate design in the event that we were unable to get the original wing box up to the desired lifetime.

So in that respect, this is a unique situation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I was trying to find out about. It looked to me on the face of it as if it was a bit unique. I anticipated that you had done this because of failures and experiences you have had up to now with this particular plane. Is that correct?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the Senator pursuing this a little further. I supposed you understood my question.

Then this is not common to the procurement of weapons systems except and unless some flaw, some defect, develops that causes you to anticipate future failure; is that correct?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. The development of an alternate design is used whenever there is question or doubt that the primary design is going to work either to the lifetime or up to the performance which we would like to have. This has happened in other programs with which I am familiar.

The CHAIRMAN. So that doubt did arrive in connection with this particular part in this plane.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Yes, it did.

Senator GURNEY. Could I ask one or two other questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator GURNEY. Who initiated the idea of the alternate design, the Air Force or contractor?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. The Air Force.

Senator GURNEY. How much is it going to cost you?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. I can give you some figures on current estimates, Senator Gurney. We estimate that the retrofits to the current wing box will be $25 million, and then the installation of those in production will be $16 million, and the cost to engineer the new box will be $4 million. So it is a total of about $45 million. Senator GURNEY. A total of about $45 million?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Yes.

Senator GURNEY. Who is paying for this?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. That will be adjudicated under the correction of deficiencies clause in the contract.

Senator GURNEY. In other words, this hasn't been negotiated out yet?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. It has not been negotiated out yet. Senator GURNEY. What does the contract say with regard to an item of this sort where there is a deficiency, where the Air Force has to step in and design an alternate scheme that costs more? What does the contract say about it?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. There is a correction of deficiency clause which provides a share ratio, 85 percent for the Government and 15 percent for the contractor, up to ceiling.

Senator GURNEY. That would be on the contractor's side, I guess, not the Government's.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Well, that is what the correction of deficiency clause says with respect to this article. There are other provisions of it but we don't need to go into them now.

The CHAIRMAN. General, I am not sure but I have a halfway suspicion that one of these replacement designs you have in mind is made out of titanium. Am I correct?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. We do have a development contract for the design of a diffusion bonded titanium wing box; that is

correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that was a terrible thing in the original hearings that anybody proposed to use titanium in this plane. That was one of the reasons given for rejecting the other competitor; was it not? Well, you wouldn't recall.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. I think the question with respect to Boeing's use of titanium related not to the integrity of the metal but to the processing which would be required.

The CHAIRMAN. General, they said it was not proven, it couldn't be relied on and so forth. This is the very part of the structure where they proposed to use it. I don't know yet if it is good or bad, but I do know that that was one of the reasons for rejecting the Boeing design. Maybe we are finding out that it is certainly worth testing, I don't know. But it occurred to me that maybe one of these replacements was made of titanium.

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. The Boeing design did propose a titanium box, as you know, Senator. As you know, I was not part of the source selection process so I can't say whether that was the reason why the source selection authority

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the record reflects. I can say, and I don't think anyone can refute it, that that is one of the reasons given, and the record will so reflect, why Boeing was rejected.

It just occurred to me that titanium may have been considered for this replacement.

Senator GURNEY. General, let me ask one or two other questions on this.

When did this error or suspicion about the weakness of this wing box come to the attention of the Air Force?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. It came to our attention, Senator Gurney, in a ground static test. I would like to emphasize that these were fatigue tests of a ground test article. There was no failure in the airplane. That was in August 1968.

Senator GURNEY. August 1968?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. Yes, sir.

Senator GURNEY. Had the Air Force or anyone in it ever been advised by anyone previous to August 1968 that this wing box might constitute a real problem in the design of this airplane?

Lieutenant General O'NEILL. I will ask General Esposito to answer

that.

Brigadier General ESPOSITO. Senator Gurney, the fatigue failure in August 1968 was the result of the normally scheduled fatigue test program which was being conducted to determine the adequacy of the fatigue life.

If there was going to be a failure, that was the proper place for that to be experienced, and the first place for it to be experienced. Senator GURNEY. I understand that, but that was not my question, General.

I asked was there any information available to anybody in the Air Force prior to August 1968 of this wing box being a possible weakness in the airplane, a design error or weakness?

Brigadier General ESPOSITO. We had no indication prior to that failure that there was a fatigue design or a fatigue deficiency with respect to this carry-through box.

Senator GURNEY. There had never been any information of any sort that might have led someone in the Air Force to explore this matter? Brigadier General ESPOSITO. Not that I am aware of, sir; no. Senator GURNEY. My information from a staff member is that in April 1967 there was an engineering report in the F-111 Program Office which raised this question of structural weakness in the wing box. Brigadier General ESPOSITO. In fatigue? In terms of the fatigue design of the wing box?

Senator GURNEY. Yes.

Brigadier General ESPOSITO. I am not acquainted with that.

Senator GURNEY. I will say, General, the staff has a copy of this report. Our staff knows about it. I am surprised that the Air Force doesn't, particularly the F-111 Program Office. They were in charge of this plane.