certain proportion of the army reserve men should be called to the colours. Adequate precautions would therefore appear to have been devised to provide for the various duties so constantly devolving on the British army, either as to its greater or less important functions. Circumstances, however, have recently occurred, which have called special attention to these arrangements, and to these it will be desirable now to refer. It will have been observed that the general principle of linked battalions hangs partly on an approximate equality in their number at home and abroad.

Various exigencies, occurring in succession, within the last eighteen months, have however considerably disturbed the arrangement. The strengthening of our Mediterranean garrisons in 1878, the necessary additions to our numbers in India, in consequence of the war in Afghanistan, and the considerable forces sent out within the last few months, and now actively engaged at the Cape of Good Hope, all these circumstances have largely affected the question, so that the actual distribution of the infantry battalions is now as follows:

It will thus be seen that, instead of having seventy battalions serving abroad, we have now eighty-six, many of them engaged on active service, whilst only fifty-five remain at home, in lieu of seventy-one. It may perhaps be argued that an army is intended for fighting, and that its usefulness in this respect should not be circumscribed merely with a view of adapting its distribution to the circumstances of a new system. That is perfectly true, but, on the other hand, it is equally evident that our forces are on a peace footing, and the establishments as such are only calculated to carry out a certain set of duties, which even in peace are more onerous than those which usually fall to the lot of an army. Consequently, if our foreign possessions require additional protection, and if we are to undertake extensive military expeditions far away, it becomes necessary not only to bring into operation the powers of expansion, as indicated by the Committees of 1872 and 1877, but to augment the army as a whole.

It has already been shown that for the greater purpose, viz., the creation of a reserve to be added to the active strength of the army in the event of a great emergency, the system has been tested, and its success established. It is now alleged that national emergencies on the greater scale do not frequently occur, that what does happen is a so-called small emergency, such as a colonial war, or it may be more than one at once, and it will be as well therefore to recapitulate shortly

the nature of the arrangements laid down, with a view of meeting such minor military exigencies.

1. A proximate equality was to be maintained in the number of battalions at home and abroad, in time of peace.

2. The first eighteen battalions at home were to be kept up to something nearly approaching to a war strength, to be the first corps d'armée for foreign service, and the next eighteen battalions at a strength approaching the first, so as to become with rapidity a second corps d'armée.

3. In the event of war, the depôts of such battalions as might be ordered abroad were to be largely augmented.

4. The Committee of 1877 contemplated the necessity of calling out a portion of the army reserve and a partial embodiment of the militia,12

As regards the first, the model of 1872 has been gradually departed from. Even before the disaster of Isandlana, in January 1879, which rendered it necessary to despatch several additional battalions hastily to the Cape, the number serving at home had been consider ably diminished; so that now we have actually eighty-six battalions abroad in lieu of the normal number of seventy. Again, the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief with respect to the war strength of the first eighteen battalions have not been fully carried out, and only a slight increase has been made to the home depôts. Finally, not only have no reserves and no militia been called out, but even the voluntary offers of the reserve men to rejoin were not accepted, owing apparently to a doubt as to its legality, which however has, I understand, been referred to the law officers of the Crown, and has proved to be unfounded.

In short, we have had rather an unforeseen accumulation of what are termed minor emergencies, 13 occurring at a time when the proposals and policy intended to meet them have not been fully maintained. We have been for months past engaged in considerable military operations, in two different and distant parts of the world at the same time, and have attempted to carry them out without any call upon our reserved strength, and without any augmentation of the army, the estimates of this year, as originally presented, even showing a proposed reduction of about 4,000 men.

The circumstances therefore afford no evidence that the recent reforms are at fault, but merely that several accidental and apparently unforeseen events have occurred in succession, which have led to a

12 Pages 9 and 10. Report of the Militia Committee of 1877.

13 The Zulu war has been called a minor emergency; but if a comparison be instituted between the number of troops under Lord Chelmsford and those originally sent to the East under Lord Raglan, it will scarcely appear in that light. Let us hope, at any rate, that the difficulty will now soon disappear altogether, and that we shall again see the renewed influence of a time when, in Milton's memorable words, 'Peace has its victories, no less renowned than war.'

far larger proportion of the army having to serve abroad than is usually contemplated and provided for. It has been lately remarked, as if it were a matter of surprise, that our forces serving at home are somewhat reduced in numbers, and that a considerable portion are recruits still in training. The only real matter of surprise is that any other result can have been expected. The rate of enlistment now approaches 29,000 men per annum, being nearly one-third of the usual home establishment; and as sixteen battalions have recently been transferred from the United Kingdom to our foreign possessions, and have not been replaced, and furthermore, as no men are sent to India under twenty years of age, it naturally follows, as no augmentations have taken place, and no reserves or militia called out, that the army at home must be diminished in numbers, and a considerable portion of those with the colours only partially trained. If these conditions are not satisfactory, means are available for remedying them, as already indicated; means which are far more readily available than any which have heretofore existed, because the army now possesses an elasticity and a reserve of power, hitherto often sought after, but never before realised. It may not be deemed necessary to call these forces into play; that is a question for the Government to decide; but that they exist is undoubted.

It will be time enough to entertain the question whether the system of short service and localisation requires to be altered, when the committee of distinguished officers who are now considering the subject shall have ascertained that the system has been really tried. If the memorandum of the Commander-in-chief, of 1872, has not been fully carried into effect; if Sir Patrick Macdougall's rules have never been executed; if the first corps d'armée was not ready in the manner laid down; if the militia battalions have not been embodied; if the territorial regiments recommended by Colonel Stanley's Committee of 1877 have never been constituted; then, whatever else may be concluded, it will certainly be impossible to determine that the system has failed. What has failed is what has been tried; not something else, which has not been tried. I do not for a moment believe that the chairman, Lord Airey, and his eminent colleagues will determine anything of the kind. Having for some years past watched with interest the effect of the gradual changes in our army, I am in hopes that the above observations may be of some advantage to those who are anxious to study a problem of unusual difficulty, and of the highest national importance.

JOHN ADYE.

THE UNION OF THE LIBERAL PARTY.

WHATEVER differences of opinion there may be as to the next general election, there is universal agreement as to the importance of the issues which it will decide, and as to the influence which that decision is likely to exert on the future of the country. The prolongation of the present Tory rule for seven more years is a prospect which it needs some courage to contemplate with any degree of composure, and that is what a Tory victory in the constituency really means. No doubt the unforeseen continually happens, and it would be rash, almost to madness, to speculate on the possibilities of seven years; but it would be rasher still to build upon the occurrence of unforeseen circumstances which may alter the current of events, and change the relations of parties. It is more than possible that the Tories may suffer from those evils which are sure, sooner or later, to result from a long tenure of power. Intestine divisions may, and probably will, develope themselves; a sense of security may breed insolence, and insolence produce revolt within the Ministerial ranks and reaction outside them; the seeds of discontent, which the most cautious and able government is sure to scatter, will spring up in a plentiful crop of personal and class grievances; and a hostile public opinion will be silently formed whose strength will be unsuspected until it is revealed in overt acts of opposition; blunders are sure to be made, possibly jobs perpetrated, and thus public indignation roused to a fury which no Ministry would be able to resist. These and other casualties must undoubtedly threaten the permanence of any victory which may be won at the poll, in 1879 or 1880. But it would be worse than folly to calculate on such chances, which, be it remembered, are always less menacing to a Tory than to a Liberal administration.

There is a compactness and coherence in the force of Conservatism which it is absolutely certain the friends of progress cannot attain. Nothing is more common than to taunt Mr. Gladstone with having dissolved in five years the splendid majority with which he took office, while his great rival has, during a period of the same length, increased rather than decreased his available force. Considering that Lord Beaconsfield has succeeded in driving from him two of the ablest and most honoured statesmen of his VOL. VI.-No. 30. BB

party, and has tried to fill their places with two obscure politicians, whose presence in the Cabinet, as heads of our military and naval forces, must be as great a surprise to themselves as it certainly is to the country, the justice of the comparison between the two great rivals is at least open to question. But it is a correct representation of an essential difference between the two parties. The most remarkable feature in the present condition of the Tory party is the amount of unity and strength which it preserves, at least to the outside world, notwithstanding the defection of men like Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon. A similar secession from the Gladstone administration would have meant the resignation of the Government, if not the collapse of the party. If, for example, Lord Granville and the Duke of Argyll had abandoned Mr. Gladstone because of irreconcilable differences on questions of policy, is it at all probable that he would have been able to continue in office? It is conceivable that, if the differences had arisen relative to some reform, on which the party was unanimous, and on which it was backed up by a strong national opinion, but which was too advanced in character to be accepted by these noble lords, the popular feeling would so have welded the party together as to have preserved it from the disintegrating influences which under ordinary circumstances must have been fatal. But in the case of the retiring Tory Ministers there was no sign of the universal sympathy of the party with the Premier in opposition to his colleagues until they had actually resigned. Before the step was taken it was supposed that they represented a powerful element in the party; but no sooner had they retired than they became mere ciphers. The party could not afford dissensions, and it was content to sacrifice men whom it had honoured, and to crush any lingering sympathy which there might be with them, rather than give a chance of victory to a hated enemy.

It is difficult to believe that some of the members of the party are not in their secret heart ashamed of the manifest weakness of the Ministry. Mr. Newdegate gave expression to a feeling of the kind when he sarcastically asked whether the Estimates were in the charge of the member for Louth or of the Secretary to the Treasury. The spectacle of this estimable official quietly doing the bidding of Mr. Parnell, postponing such votes as the member for Meath said ought to be delayed, and gratefully accepting those which he permitted to pass, was a humiliation to Parliament as well as to the Government; and Mr. Newdegate cannot have been alone in his indignant protest. But the Ministry accept the rôle, complain of it to the country, and when the session ends, without having any result to show, will throw all the responsibility on the handful of obstructives, and it may be will appeal to the constituencies on this very ground. The sense of humour must be strangely lacking in the Cabinet, or they would be conscious of the ridiculous aspect in which they present