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the self-imposed and dangerous duty of volunteering advice and warning. Add to this that she is mistrustful of all foreign nations, and will ally herself cordially, so that their joint interference might be authoritative, not even with France, and we arrive at a position very difficult to be maintained with dignity. The honour of having maintained this position, on the whole successfully, may be fairly claimed for Lord Russell. Now, when the paroxysm of indignant passion has passed away, the country begins to feel, and even to admit, how much it owes the Minister who saved us from a war with Germany.1 Still more frankly does the country admit how much it owes the Minister, who, resisting the whole weight of the Tory party, saved us from a war with America. It was England's great good fortune that, during the American struggle, her foreign policy was conducted by Lord Russell. We do not indeed think that even he went far enough in restraining Confederate trickery. As was before argued in this Journal, a ship which, like the 'Alabama,' escaped by fraud, should never thereafter have been allowed the shelter of British ports. But if this error be chargeable against Lord Russell, what would have been the conduct of a Tory Foreign Minister, animated by aristocratic favour for the South, and carrying out the legal doctrines of Sir Hugh Cairns? It was no light matter that those delicate negotiations were conducted by a Minister whose singleness of purpose was never doubted, and whose keen sympathies with freedom were beyond dispute.

Italy presents an example, if possible even more striking, of what high import it is to other nations whether Liberal or Tory sentiments guide the policy of England. When Lord Derby was last in office, Napoleon could never rid himself of a fear that England might declare herself on the side of Austria in the great contest for Italian freedom. Lord Palmerston came into power, and the unity of Italy was upheld by England, even against the schemes and desires of France. And yet, notwithstanding these sympathies, England is in no danger of being dragged, by a Liberal administration, even into a war on behalf of right and liberty, as she has been dragged ere this by Tory administrations into wars in defence of tyranny and wrong. The true meaning and proper limits of the doctrine of non

1 Certain political writers have, since Lord Palmerston's death, taken upon themselves to assert, that, if the late Premier had been allowed his own way, he would have at once declared war on behalf of Denmark. None of them have given any authority for this statement; and we take leave, in the absence of authority, to doubt it altogether. But if it were so, then all we can say is, that the nation owes even more to Lord Russell and Mr. Gladstone than is commonly supposed.

intervention have been clearly given by Lord Russell, in his Introduction to the new edition of his Essay :

'On the subject of foreign politics much obscurity prevails in the minds of men as to the principles by which British policy has been guided in the past, and will be guided in the future. Much of this obscurity arises from the double sense which is attached to the term intervention. The usual and more proper meaning of the term intervention is interference in the internal affairs of other nations. The new and less accurate application of the term is to all interference in the disputes of independent nations. The former is the sense in which intervention took place by Austria, Prussia, and Russia in the internal affairs of Piedmont and of Naples in the year 1821, and by France and the Northern Powers in the internal affairs of Spain in the year 1823. The incorrect use of the term is, when it is applied to the interference prompted by Mr. Canning, in the year 1826, when England interposed, as she was bound by treaty to do, in defence of the independence of Portugal.

'It is obvious that great confusion would arise from using the same term, and applying the same argument to the two kinds of interference.

'All public writers have declared that a nation has the right to settle its own form of government, provided it does not injure other nations in its mode of doing so; just as every householder may regulate his own house, provided he does not cause a nuisance to the neighbourhood.

But if one nation attacks another, all nations are at liberty to judge whether their interests, and the general independence, are affected thereby.

'Thus, the first kind of intervention should, as a rule, be forbidden and avoided. Of late years, we have seen that intervention in the internal affairs of Italy and of Spain, against which Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning protested in vain in 1821 and 1823, entirely renounced both by Austria and by France.

'It is true that France has interfered in the internal affairs of Rome and of Mexico, and that England has interfered in the internal affairs of China; but in these instances it has been declared that such intervention was exceptional and temporary, and was contrary to the general principles upon which the foreign policy of England and France were founded.

'But the case would be quite different if when a great Power attacks a small independent State with a view to conquest, other Powers were as a rule to remain quiescent. In that case we may be sure that two consequences would follow,-first, that there would soon remain none but great Powers; and, secondly, that all those great Powers would have a despotic form of government, no other being endurable in the eyes of mighty sovereigns in the command of numerous and formidable armies. Such was in fact the danger which threatened Europe both before and after the great catastrophe of 1814.'

It does not, however, follow from this that we must interfere in all cases where a little power is attacked by a big one. England rightly refused to prevent France from oppressing Spain in 1823; and the other day she refused, with not less justice, to defend Denmark against Germany, or Poland against Russia. No country should interpose between other nations save when she can do so in such force as to insure immediate peace. Better no interference at all than interference which leads only to prolonged war. But neither, on the other hand, does it follow that wherever prudence may forbid action, no advice or warning should be tendered. We know that the popular theory is, 'Silence, unless you are prepared to strike,' and that the violation of this theory is often made the ground of reproach against many of our statesmen. But we believe the theory to be false, and the reproach ill-founded. It was with surprise that we saw a writer, generally so above clap-trap as Mr. Arnold, enforcing, in the last number of the Cornhill, this well-worn count in the indictment against his country. His courteous Prussian friend, who condescendingly told him he did not dislike England, only thought little of her,' and the well-informed Prussian paper which classed the English soldier with the Turkish, both went on the same ground-that England, though still ready to state her mind, was less ready than formerly to fight. We do not maintain that England must never fight; but we do maintain that England, even at the risk of being thought little of by Mr. Arnold's friends, may sometimes raise her voice when she has no purpose of fighting. True, she must not in such circumstances threaten; still less should she hold out any hope of real assistance to the weaker side; but it does not follow that she is to look on unmoved and silent,

If the time is ever to arise when opinion is to have weight among nations, the expression of opinion must not be restrained. Private war has yielded to this influence; it will be long ere public war is equally rare upon the earth, yet that happy day may come. And nothing so much hastens its coming as the condemnation of any war by the united voice of civilized nations. It seems to us, then, that it is the duty of statesmen to express the feelings of the people in whose name they are entitled to speak, without timidly and selfishly considering what is called dignity, without an ignominious fear of diplomatic rebuffs, the real discredit of which lies with those from whom they come. Nor, because advice may be thrown back with disdain, does it always follow that it is forgotten and rejected. Though Russia contemptuously repelled our remonstrances on behalf of Poland, has she taken no pains to convince Europe that her treatment of the rebels has been, on the whole, humane? Still less should we

conclude that the expression of goodwill is a thing of no account. Italy now regards England as her most trusted friend. We have raised no hand in her defence; and yet she esteems us more highly than the victors of Magenta or Solferino. We owe this solely to the sympathy which our Liberal statesmen have consistently expressed for the Italian cause; to such writing and speaking as the writing and speaking of Mr. Gladstone; to the policy which, except during the unfortunate interregnum of Lord Malmesbury, our Foreign Ministers have for years steadily pursued; warning Austria that treaties trampled under foot on the banks of the Vistula can hardly be upheld on the banks of the Po; refusing to guarantee Venetia to her oppressors, even should they set Lombardy free-one of the most honourable acts in the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston. Only by an unforeseen combination of circumstances can England regain the material power she had in Europe at Waterloo; but she has not lost her moral predominance, nor do we think that even her obstinate love of peace makes the loss of it a necessity.

The American contest is now closed; and we may therefore trust that, even under Tory rule, there is no immediate promise of war for England. But dangers past may in some other form recur, and on Tory diplomacy in any American dispute we should look with unaffected dread. Less mischievous towards ourselves, but even worse for others, would be the results of Tory diplomacy in Europe. Doubtless no Government could now force England to ally herself actively with Continental oppression; but it would be intolerable that Lord Malmesbury should again exert her influence in behalf of the degrading tyranny of Austrian vicegerents in Italy; or that she should sympathize in any measure with the boorish and subservient aristocracy of Prussia. We cannot regard this as a light matter. The prospects of freedom on the Continent at this present time are not bright. The wretched policy of Count Bismark can hardly fail to excite envy and emulation. Prussia, where a fair promise of liberty once dawned, is now borne down by a rule more stupid and coarse in its oppressiveness than any other in Europe. Such a triumph cannot fail to attract many imitators. The Prussian Minister has already done more to damage the cause of freedom in Europe than the whole house of Napoleon. What between Imperialism based on universal suffrage on the one hand, and divine right of kings, upheld by a subservient aristocracy, on the other, the liberties of Europe are in a parlous state.' At such a time it seems to us a matter of no slight moment into which scale the weight of England be thrown. It may be that this is but a foolish sense of national self-importance; yet few

Englishmen, we suspect, will altogether repudiate the idea. Rightly or wrongly we all cherish the belief that freedom from of old has sat on our heights-

Grave mother of majestic works,

From her isle-altar gazing down;'

and can we bear to think that, in a time of darkness to many, we ourselves should hide her presence, and make her 'mighty voice' be dumb!

What the Home policy of the Tories has been in the past need be told to no one. Mr. Bright stated the past of the Tory party severely but truly at Rochdale. It is not the language of exaggeration, but of simple truth, to say that it has consisted of unvarying and bitter, though happily fruitless opposition to every good measure which has been carried for many years. It would have put down freedom of conscience; it opposed freedom in trade; it upheld religious disabilities, unjust privileges, and mischievous monopolies, with an impartial persistency. It is impossible not to sympathize with Mr. Bright's wonder that a party with such a history can venture to have any opinion at all. But the self-complacency of mankind is not easily repressed. The Tories still claim the right to have opinions, and, fortunately for us, they have the privilege of expressing them. The Quarterly Review is, as it were, the useful tail, which, before each meeting of Parliament, sounds the rattle of warning to all good-natured Liberals who might feel disposed to pity and forgive. And that Tory opinions are of the old leaven still-not tempered by time, nor wiser from experience, was clearly shown in the prolonged shriek of indignation and dismay with which the last number of that periodical concluded. The cries' which at this awful crisis the combined ingenuity of Tadpole and Taper have raised for the salvation of England, are The Church in danger!' and Our ancient aristocracy!' -the appointment of Mr. Goschen being taken as prophetic of the downfall of the one, that of Mr. Forster as implying the destruction of the other. Mr. Goschen's opinions are denounced as unsectarian;' and we are carefully informed that our plain-spoken fathers' would have called them 'infidel,'—a style of plain speaking in which the Quarterly always excelled, and evidently would fain revive. With this man in office, the Church, we are told, must prepare for a vehement renewal of assaults, which have been for some time intermitted. Such an appointment was bad enough in itself; but when we add to it the dismissal of Sir Robert Peel, the two facts taken together become, in the view of the Quarterly, quite awful in the impres

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