contemplated a federalist organization, the Patent of February contemplated a centralized organization, worked by a real Parliament, which might eventually grow to be as powerful as our own. There is nothing in such a conception that can be otherwise than agreeable to an Englishman. But that is not the question. The question is, are the circumstances of Austria such as to make it possible to create and to work such an organization? The events of the last five years have answered that question for us, but in the early spring of 1861 it was not so easy to answer. The experiment was of course to the last degree hazardous; but one can hardly blame a statesman who held M. Schmerling's views with regard to Central European politics, if he determined to make a fight for it.

The first thing to be done was to call together the Hungarian Diet, which had not met since the Revolution, and to try whether it could not be induced to come to terms. The next step was to summon the new Reichsrath, in the constitution of which an arrangement was introduced for turning it into a special or restricted Reichsrath,' for the discussion of the affairs of the German and Germanized provinces, so that its activity would not necessarily be suspended, even if the Hungarians were to prove obstinate.

The Hungarian Diet met upon the 6th of April; at first in Buda, and immediately afterwards in Pesth. Some time was occupied with the verification of the elections, and then the struggle of parties commenced. The point debated was whether the Diet should reply to the Crown by an address or by a resolution. The moderates, led by Deak, preferred an address; the extreme party, led by Count Teleki, preferred a resolution, taking their stand upon the undoubted fact that the Emperor was not, according to the laws of the pre-revolutionary period, de jure king of Hungary; for, as we have already seen, according to the old view, Princeps est qui jurat, qui jurata servat, et qui coronatus est.' Just at this crisis Count Teleki committed suicide, having found himself in a position from which he thought he could not escape without either being false to his political convictions or breaking a promise which he had given to the Emperor. The views of the Address party' in the end prevailed, but they made some concessions to the views of their opponents, and amongst other things omitted the title of 'Imperial Royal' in addressing the Emperor. This was objected to at Vienna, and the address was finally voted unanimously in the form in which it was originally proposed by Deak.

6

It is far from impossible that, if the Government had shown itself disposed to make concessions to Hungary, it would have

VOL. XLIV.-NO. LXXXVII.

F

got better terms than it is now likely to have to put up with; but concession was the last thing of which it thought. The jurists in the service of M. Schmerling answered the Hungarian address, and showed, at least to their own satisfaction, that Hungary had no shadow of right to stand upon, that the Revolution had swept away all her old franchises, and that she was in no better position than any other province of the Empire. Between parties so diametrically opposed as those of Deak and Schmerling, it was evident that there could be no rapprochement, and so in August the Diet was dissolved, and the Cabinet of Vienna determined to break the spirit of the nation, by reinvigorating for the countries beyond the Leitha the worst maxims of M. Bach.

The day will come, we hope, when the story of the stern resistance of Hungary, during the period of four years which intervened between the dissolution of the Diet and the issuing of the manifesto of the 20th of last September, will be fully told to Western Europe. There would, we think, be material in it for many pages like the best of those in Baron Eötvös's Village Notary. We are far from wishing to assert that such a record would contain only pages creditable to Hungary. At the county meetings, held previously to the meeting of the Diet in 1861, much appears to have been said and done which was quite unjustifiable, but the Hungarians were right in the main, and we must forgive, in a people which has been so misgoverned, many excesses which would be unpardonable if the ordinary march of affairs had not been broken by revolution and counter-revolution. Mr. Boner's chapters on Transylvanian politics show the effect that the vehement onesidedness of the Magyars produced on the mind of a friendly observer, who was not persuaded of what we believe to be true, that, namely, the system attempted to be carried out in Hungary after the dissolution of the Diet could lead to no good result.

We may now return to Vienna, where the Reichsrath assembled a week or two later than the Hungarian Diet, and was opened by a speech of great vigour, in which a breach with the old absolutist system was distinctly promised. The place of meeting was but badly filled, for neither Hungary, Croatia, Transylvania, Galicia, Venice, nor Istria had sent deputies, and of the three hundred and forty-three members who ought to have attended, only some two hundred were there. It soon became clear that of these two hundred about two-thirds were distinctly Centralist and Governmental in tone, altogether opposed to the ideas of the Federalist, or, as they have been called,

State-right party. In the Upper House, too, the Governmental majority was decisive. The tone of these majorities, as shown in their first debates, had a bad influence, it would seem, upon Ministers, or, if this was not the case, the traditions of the Bach system and of the pre-revolutionary period, were too strong to be overcome, for certainly very little was done during the years in which M. Schmerling enjoyed power, even for the Germanic and Germanized provinces. Trade was still in fetters, the transgressions of the press were punished by long and cruel imprisonments, no right of association for political purposes could even be dreamt of, and societies formed for non-political purposes were always in danger of being suppressed, if they strayed at all too near the charmed boundary. During its later period the Reichsrath showed itself far less complaisant to ministers, and they had to endure very sharp criticisms; but a dispassionate observer will hardly consider that the results of the working of the February Patent in Austria were such as to make him very much regret the suspension of the sort of constitutional life. which was enjoyed under it.

Ever since the dissolution of the Hungarian Diet, and the retirement of Vay and Szechen, close relations had been kept up between the Hungarian 'Old Conservatives' and the Federalist section of the Reichsrath. They showed, on the other hand, great attention to Deak, and endeavoured to come to an understanding with him, as the leader of the moderate Hungarian Liberals. At last, about Easter 1865, a highly conciliatory article appeared in his organ at Pesth, and that was speedily followed by three letters from Pesth, which appeared in the Debatte, setting forth authoritatively the programme of the moderate Hungarian Liberals. The Debatte, acting in the interest of the Old Conservatives,' claimed for these remarkable letters a careful and candid perusal, which they obtained in very wide circles, nor can we doubt that they contributed materially to prepare the way for a good understanding.

The principal points laid down in these letters are, that, without the retirement of M. Schmerling, no good understanding between Hungary and Vienna could be dreamt of; that Deak was in the habit of speaking in the most friendly terms of the Lower House of the Reichsrath; and that his friends were generally in favour of a conciliatory policy. They then go on to point out that the Hungarians take their stand upon the Pragmatic Sanction, and that to leave so firm a standing-ground would be impossible. Looking, then, to the Pragmatic Sanction as the ultimate authority on all questions between Hungary and its monarch, the writer asks-

1. Are there any affairs which are common to all the lands of the Austrian Empire?

2. If so, what are they?

3. How should they be managed?

The first of these questions was answered by the laws of 1848 and the addresses of the Diet in 1861.

There are affairs which are common to all the lands of the Austrian Empire.

The answer to the second question can easily be deduced from the Pragmatic Sanction, if we suffer ourselves to be guided by the principle, that all affairs which are common to all the lands of the Austrian Empire, are so only in so far as their being treated as common affairs is necessary to the safety of the monarchy.

The Pragmatic Sanction, then, contemplates all the Austrian lands as belonging to one common ruler. The first common affair is then the keeping up the position and dignity of the common ruler. Next, the Pragmatic Sanction binds the several lands to mutual support. That mutual support must be of a twofold kind, peaceful and warlike—that is, diplomatic and military. Hence the management of foreign relations and of the army are common affairs. The management of foreign relations must necessarily be entirely common, and guided by one hand. Not so the army. The command of the army, and all that relates to its internal management, must belong to the Emperor; but the right of determining all matters relating to Hungarian troops, which it is not necessary to the idea of a common army, should belong to one hand, must belong to the Diet. This refers to such matters as time of service, recruiting, amount of force, billeting, and so forth. Of course, there is nothing in this demand to exclude common deliberation as to the quota of troops to be furnished by Hungary.

Another common affair is the providing of money for all common affairs, and it would be the duty of the Hungarian Finance Minister to furnish to the Imperial Finance Minister, Hungary's proper quota; but he would at the same time manage the finances of the nation, in so far as they were not common affairs, according to the pleasure of the Diet. So, too, the highest and broadest questions of commercial policy must also, in the nature of things, be common affairs, and a good understanding about them can hardly be difficult to arrive at when we remember that the tendency of the age is in all countries towards uniformity.

The answer to the last question is more difficult, and the writer speaks, when he comes to deal with it, with more diffi

dence. His leading principles are: that a central Parliament is impossible; that a separate Hungarian Ministry is indispensable; and that the countries east and west of the Leitha must be considered as two aggregations of lands, having a parity of rights. Into his other suggestions we need not go, for they have, to a considerable extent, been already left behind by the progress of events; but we have analysed his first two letters in some detail, because they form the very best short answer which we have met with, to the question: What is it precisely that the Hungarians want?

We ought, perhaps, to say something of the man to whom all Hungary is now looking, and whose views are supposed to be embodied in these letters.

Francis Deak was born in the year 1803, on an estate belonging to his father, in the county of Szalad. He studied at Raab, and, like most of the Hungarian gentry, began to attend the county meetings as soon as he was of age. There he soon became conspicuous, and acquired the goodwill of the Cortes, or electors, in so high a degree, that he had no difficulty in succeeding his elder brother as their deputy to the Diet, which sat from 1832 to 1836. By 1840, his position as the leader of the Liberal party was acknowledged, and he had become known beyond the limits of his country, for his profound acquaintance with her laws, as well as for his wisdom, political tact, and conciliatory temper. He was not a member of the Diet of 1847, but held a portfolio in Count Louis Batthyani's first Cabinet, in 1848. This he resigned when Kossuth and his immediate supporters seemed bent upon pushing matters to extremity; and his last public appearance during the revolutionary period was as a negotiator in the camp of Windischgrätz, when that commander was marching upon Pesth. After the Revolution, the Government of Prince Schwartzenberg tried to induce him to aid them in their plans for re-arranging the institutions of Hungary. Although, however, the changes which he had proposed to introduce as Minister were very great, their leading ideas were so utterly different from those which were entertained at this period in Vienna, that he declined the advances made to him, and lived as a private citizen, till the events of 1861 brought him, as we have seen, once more into prominence. And now, again, the wheel has come full circle,' and he stands before Europe as the first man of his people. If his wise and moderate policy succeeds, no one now living will better deserve the title of 'pater patriæ.'

Even before the reconstruction of the Cabinet last summer, the royal visit to Hungary, the retirement of M. Schmerling, and