ries. Further, there are some injuries of so small and little Trifling inju consideration in the law that no action will lie for them (h); for instance, in respect to payment of tithe, the principle which may be extracted from the cases appears to be, that for small quantities of corn involuntarily left in the process of raking tithe shall not be payable, unless there be any particular fraud or intention to deprive the parson of his full right. Where, however, a farmer pursued such a mode of harvesting barley, that a considerable quantity of rakings was left scattered after the barley was bound into sheaves, the Court held, that tithe was payable in respect of these rakings, although no actual fraud was imputed to the farmer, and although he and his servants were careful to leave as little rakings as possible in that mode of harvesting the crop (i). It may be observed, however, that for an injury to real property incorporeal an action may be supported, however small the damage, and therefore a commoner may maintain an action on the case for an injury done to the common, though his proportion of the damage be found to amount only to a farthing (k); and generally the superior courts of law have jurisdiction to hear and determine all suits, without any reference to the magnitude of the amount claimed or demanded, or to the extent of the injury complained of, subject, however, to the power of the judge to certify under stat. 43 Eliz. c. 6, where the damages recovered are less than 40s., and thereby deprive the plaintiff of his costs. (h) See per Powys, J., Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 944, answered by Holt, C. J., Id. 953; Whitcher v. Hall, 5 B. & C. 269, 277; 2 Bla. Com. 262, where the rule respecting land gained by alluvion is referred to the maxim treated of in the text. (k) Pindar v. Wadsworth, 2 East, Indictment for trespass. But as in each county there exists an inferior jurisdiction, known as the County Court, which holds pleas betwixt party and party where the debt or damage is under 40s., and as in most parts of England there are local inferior courts, usually called courts of request or courts of conscience, which have exclusive jurisdiction where the debt sued for does not exceed a certain specified amount, if an action be brought in one of the superior courts for a debt under such amount, the Court will stay the proceedings, or advantage may be taken by the defendant in different ways pointed out by each particular act; but it must clearly appear that the Court in which the action was brought is competent, and has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same; otherwise, though the demand be under 40s., the action may be brought in a superior court (1), for the smallness of the damages affords no reason why the complainant should lose them (m). Lastly, in an indictment against several for a trespass, all are principals, because the law does not descend to distinguish the different shades of guilt in petty misdemeanours (n). (1) Bagley's Pr. 2, 3; Chit. Gen. Pr., Part 4, p. 318. See Dempster v. Purnell, 4 Scott, N. R., 30; Laughton v. Taylor, 6 M. & W. 695. (m) Tubb v. Woodward, 6 T. R. 175; Busby v. Fearon, 8 T. R. 235; Chit. Gen. Pr., Part 1, p. 28. (n) 4 Bla. Com. 36. It may be well to mention one other maxim in connexion with those included in this chapter, and which is sometimes cited, although not thought fit for insertion in the text it is as follows: AD EA QUE FREQUENTIUS ACCI The following instance may be referred to as illustrating its meaning and application. Where a private act of Parliament, intituled, " An Act to enable a certain Insurance Society to sue and be sued in the Name of their Secretary," enacted, that they might commence all actions and suits in his 160 CHAPTER V. Injuries SI.-PROPERTY-ITS RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES. As the above title, which, on consideration, seemed the most appropriate, might lead to the expectation that much more would be found in this section than the author has proposed to treat of, it is thought better to state, in limine, that the following maxims, with the remarks appended to each respectively, are intended to explain some points, which may be considered of general importance and practical utility, in connexion with the following subjects:-The legitimate mode of enjoying property; the liabilities incurred by a wrongful use of it; and also some of the rights and incidents annexed to and transferable with it by the operation of the common law. On so extensive a subject much more might undoubtedly have been said; it is, however, hoped, that sufficient instances have been given to shew with accuracy the bearing and application of each rule. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LÆDAS. (9 Rep. 59).Enjoy your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another person (a). A man must so use his own rights and property as to do wrongful use no injury to those of his neighbour, for in all civil acts the caused by a of property. (a) 2 Selw. N. P., 10th ed., 1114. law does not so much regard the intent of the actor as the loss and damage of the party suffering. In trespass, qu. cl. fr., the defendant pleaded, that he had land adjoining plaintiff's close, and upon it a hedge of thorns; that he cut the thorns, and that they, ipso invito, fell upon the plaintiff's land, and the defendant took them off as soon as he could, which was the same trespass, &c. On demurrer, judgment was given for the plaintiff, on the ground, that, though a man do a lawful thing, yet, if any damage thereby befals another, he shall be answerable if he could have avoided it. Thus, if a man lop a tree, and the boughs fall upon another, ipso invito, yet an action lies; so, if a man shoot at a butt and hurt another unawares, an action lies. A. has land through which a river runs to turn B.'s mill. A. lops the trees growing on the river side, and the loppings accidentally impede the progress of the stream, which hinders the mill from working. A. will be liable. So, if I am building my own house, and a piece of timber falls on my neighbour's house, and injures it, an action lies; or, if a man assault me, and I lift up my staff to defend myself, and in lifting it strike another, an action lies by that person, and yet I did a lawful thing; and the reason of all these cases is, because he that is damaged ought to be recompensed; but it is otherwise in criminal cases, for in them, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (b): the intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime (c). (b) Lambert v. Bessey, T. Raym. 422; per Blackstone, J., Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403; per Lord Kenyon, C. J., Haycraft v. Creasy, 2 East, 104; Turberville v. Stampe, 1 Ld. Raym. 264; recognised Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 B. N. C. 468; Grocers' Company v. Donne, 3 B. N. C. 34; Aldridge v. Great Western Railway Co., 4 Scott, N. R., 156, and cases there cited. (c) Per Ld. Kenyon, C. J., Fowler v. Padget, 7 T. R. 514; 3 Inst. 54; cited Borradaile v. Hunter, 5 Scott, N. R., 429, 430. M |