of Father Hesburgh. We see no reason why these situations, too, should not be covered by the new remedies provided in the bill.

If a Federal district court determines that persons who had been listed by a Federal examiner were nevertheless not permitted to vote, the court is to provide for the casting of their ballots and is to require the inclusion of their votes in the total vote before any person shall be deemed to be elected.

We have some doubts as to the adequacy of this provision. Certainly it is less far reaching than the provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act with respect to union elections. Under that act, if a court finds that there have been violations of the act which may have affected the outcome of an election, the court declares the election void and directs the holding of a new election under the supervision of the Department of Labor.

In this bill, in contrast, there is no provision for the holding of a new election, let alone for the holding of one under Federal supervision.

Let me sum up the position of the AFL-CIO: We want to protect, in every possible way, the right of every single adult American to vote in every election.

We feel that an annual battle in the Congress on this issue should not be necessary. Time and again, steps have been taken to eliminate various schemes and devices, subtle or brutal, designed to deprive Negroes of the right to vote. And time and again, some of the States and localities have found new devices, new brutalities, designed to frustrate the will of the majority.

So we want the Congress to do the job once and for all, and we urge the Congress to do it now.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. No questions.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, would the Chairman yield a moment? I would like to say a personal word of welcome to the witness who is one of the distinguished residents in the Sixth Congressional District of Maryland. Thank you for your statement, particularly for the constructive suggestions as well as commenting on the bill as it was introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. Pardon me, Mr. Donohue.
Mr. DONOHUE. No questions.

Mr. BROOKS. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Corman.

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Meany, I am sure you are concerned about the threats to voting rights that are not covered in this bill, but I think we are faced with a terrible dilemma, first of all, as to the remedy of the Federal examiner under sections 3 and 4. That solves the problems that the Negro meets when he gets to the registrar, but just extending the appointment of examiners does not solve the problem of the night riders or the economic intimidation.

It seems to me against a background of the right to jury trials and criminal law we need some way to stop that kind of coercion. I do not believe the Federal examiner can do it and I do not believe that in some areas we can do it through the normal criminal law.

If you have any advice now or would want to submit it later, it seems to me that is really the tough part of legislating in this field.

How do you get to that kind of coercion which may occur regardless of how the man is registered? If the Federal examiner registers him, the community knows it. How do we protect him from that point on? Mr. MEANY. That, of course, is the problem, and that we are prepared to come up with some suggestions. Mr. Harris, our legal counsel, is going over this bill, and it is quite a complicated problem. We don't say that we have the answers but I think we will have some suggestions worthy of the consideration of the committee.

Mr. CORMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCulloch.

Mr. McCULLOCH. I am pleased to have the witness before us this. morning. Much of what he says strikes a very responsive chord. I am glad to note that Mr. Meany and his organization recognize the fact that legislation such as we have been talking about does not cover many festering spots and sores of discrimination solely by reason of race and color.

As I understood your answer to a question of one of my colleagues, your legal counsel will be at the disposal of the committee for suggested amendments that are constitutional, in your counsel's opinion. Mr. MEANY. We hope they are.

Mr. McCULLOCH. To reach these spots.

Mr. MEANY. We have a fatalistic attitude. We can talk about it but there are nine men across the street here who really have the final say.

Mr. McCULLOCH. Well, of course, it was satisfying to us who supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to have it held to be constitutional in the first all-important test, by a unanimous decision of the court. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cramer.

Mr. CRAMER. Well, I, too, thank the distinguished gentleman who has made a number of suggestions and comments that the committee could well heed. In saying that, I do not mean to exclude his reference to Florida or his reference to Texas.

I wonder, however, why the gentleman, if there was a reason, did not include Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Maryland as further examples cited by the Civil Rights Commission where areas of discrimination exist in voting and where this bill will not apply because they do not have literacy tests?

Mr. MEANY. Well, I didn't want to make my testimony too long by including them all.

Mr. CRAMER. It is interesting to note that the members of this subcommittee include one from Florida and one from Texas, however. You do agree, however, that there are instances of discrimination in those States?

Mr. MEANY. Yes; we know that.

Mr. CRAMER. The words you use on page 2 are to the effect you do not think that first-class citizenship should be limited to the States that have literacy tests, while, in effect, second-class citizenship is suffered in States without literacy tests.

That is precisely the same thought I expressed on a number of occasions.

I note on the top of page 3 your suggestion which touches upon a constitutional problem that I think is involved in the proposal before us. Perhaps your counsel could be of some help to the committee on this subject.

You suggest that other types of voting tests are enumerated in the bill everywhere, which may or may not have been used as devices for violating the 15th amendment.

Mr. MEANY. Yes.

Mr. CRAMER. Of course, this committee is faced with the basic constitutional issue which the Supreme Court itself has upheld on numerous occasions. That is, the State does have the right to fix certain voter requirements and it is only when those requirements are administered discriminatorily or are, on the face of it, discriminatory administration that the Court has found them to be violative of the 15th amendment. The administration bill could be condemned under the 15th amendment.

Of course this bill covers a number of "political subdivisions" that have never discriminated, even when there is no evidence of it, what

soever.

Mr. MEANY. I have been committed to the general idea that we don't think these tests or various devices should be used to prevent a person from voting.

Mr. CRAMER. I agree with that. The question constitutionally is in using a broad sweep. As does the administration bill, you would include a number of areas which admittedly, according to the Attorney General himself in testimony, have not discriminated.

Therefore we are faced, I think, with a serious constitutional question as to how you can subject to the penalties of this proposal, a political subdivision that does not intend to discriminate and has not, in fact, discriminated.

Mr. MEANY. Well, I am quite sure that we can present you with a brief on that question, too.

Mr. CRAMER. It would be very helpful if you could, so far as this member of the subcommittee is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

That result follows because the State provides the literacy test, and less than 50 percent of those of eligible voting age were registered or voted in November 1964.

Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, the Supreme Court has not stricken down literacy tests, as such, in every case but only in those instances where they are in such form that they obviously could be used to discriminate or in fact where they have been used in discriminatory manner in their administration.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the gentleman yield further?

Mr. CRAMER. The situation I referred to is that voting subdivisions, or "political subdivisions," which everyone admits have not discriminated and which have no intention to do so, would be covered.

Mr. MEANY. Well, you say there is no intent. We don't like the test because even in cases where they have not been used we feel they could be used.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CRAMER. Yes, I will be glad to.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the only question arises where some of these counties have more than 50 percent of those eligible to vote, voting, and they would be subject to the bill. The question before the court would be whether or not weighing the equities and inequities, whether the remedy provided in the bill is adequate, that is all, and that is what the 15th amendment says.

If it is adequate and appropriate for carrying out the principle of the 15th amendment, then the court would have to hold it constitutional.

Mr. CRAMER. Of course, I will say to the chairman that they have literacy tests in New York State as well. Would the gentleman be in favor of eliminating all literacy tests in New York, including the eighth-grade certificate?

Mr. ROGERS. Would the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. CRAMER. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. I did not understand how a unit would suffer under this if everybody is permitted to vote.

Mr. CRAMER. This is what bothers me. If you look at section 8, which undoubtedly the gentleman has, which requires a political subdivision to come to the District of Columbia to get an approval of any future action, be it a county or a city ordinance. A classic example used so far, and agreed to by the Attorney General, is a change from paper ballots to voting machines. If that were done by a city ordinance, in a city within a State that came within the scope of section 3(a)-now that is not 3(b) or (c)-the Attorney General would not have to ask for the appointment of examiner.

Now Alaska is a classic example of that. A community in Alaska, a city, if they wanted to change from paper ballots to voting machines falling under the classification of 3(a), would have to come to Washington in order to get an approval of that city ordinance.

Now, number one, does your counsel feel that is constitutional; and number two, does it make sense?

I am looking for guidance.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harris.

I want to state that we have two very eminent counsel flanking Mr. Meany, Mr. Tom Harris and Mr. Meany's old colleague Andrew Biemiller, on Mr. Meany's right.

Proceed.

Mr. HARRIS. As you know of course, Representative Cramer, there is a procedure whereby a State can undertake to validate its existing literacy test or other tests if it can show that it has not discriminated within the preceding 10 years.

Mr. CRAMER. But they have to come to Washington, of course, to prove that.

Mr. HARRIS. They have to do that in a three-judge court in the District of Columbia.

Mr. CRAMER. Right.

Mr. HARRIS. Now, if they do validate their existing legislation, then section 8, I take it, would not apply.

Mr. CRAMER. I understand.

Mr. LINDSAY. Would you yield?

Mr. HARRIS. Without section 8 we could go through for another 95 years the same rigamarole that we have been going through for the last 95, that when one State device is thrown out they simply enact another and go to court once more.

Mr. CRAMER. The point is it would be a very simple matter to make this approach applicable in areas where in fact there has been discrimination, would it not, and not make it applicable to areas where admittedly there has been no discrimination?

Mr. HARRIS. Well, I don't know about that.

Mr. CRAMER. Instead of putting the onus on the nondiscriminating area to prove that they are not guilty.

Mr. HARRIS. The area is presumed to be guilty if, (1) it has a test; and, (2) the vote has fallen under 50 percent.

Mr. CRAMER. Let's use Alaska for this example.

Mr. HARRIS. If Alaska has the option either of dropping the literacy test or of coming in and proving that it has not used it to discriminate, that does not seem to me to put any unduly harsh burden on it. Indeed, that seems to me a very trivial burden to ask Alaska to bear in comparison with the burden that has been put on Negro would-be voters in the South for the last 95 years.

Mr. CRAMER. Well, the bill would require that the States prove that for the last 10 years they have not discriminated. They would be required to overcome the complaints of every individual who might feel he has been discriminated against in any way.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes.

Mr. CRAMER. That could become a rather prolonged and extremely embarrassing situation to a community which has never discriminated and does not now intend to do so.

I just wonder if that is the best approach at getting at what everyone wishes, myself included, areas that do in fact discriminate.

Why penalize areas that do not and presume them guilty so they have to come to the District of Columbia and prove their innocence?

Mr. HARRIS. The reason of course, as the Attorney General explained in his testimony, is that a case by case, voting district by voting district approach has proven unworkable so that some more general test which can secure registration for Negroes is needed; otherwise, as you say, these proceedings can be long drawn out.

Well, they have been long drawn out, and any test which says that you have to go to court before the Negro can register, to show that the individual Negro was improperly denied the right to register or that people in that particular registration district were denied it, this would be drawn out forever and that, of course, is what the Attorney General is trying to avoid by establishing some reasonable general standards for striking down literacy tests or providing for the appointment of Federal examiners.

Mr. CRAMER. We are getting to the matter of what is a "reasonable standard" under the Constitution. Recognizing that you have two sections that would have to be waived: article I, sections II and IV which give the States the right to set voting standards. Up to this time, the State standards prevailed so long as they were not discrimi

natory.