action was not reviewable by the courts. Held that the writs of error
to this court should be dismissed as such decisions do not involve the
adjudication against the plaintiff in error of a right claimed under the
Federal Constitution but deny the relief demanded on grounds wholly
independent thereof. Giles v. Teasley, 146.

See FEDERAL QUESTION;

JURISDICTION, C 2.

B. OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
See JURISDICTION, A 3.

C. OF CIRCUIT COURTS.

1. Mere averment of Federal question not sufficient.

Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court does not arise simply because an averment
is made that the case is one arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States if it plainly appears that such averment is not real
or substantial but is without color of merit. Newburyport Water Co.
v. Newburyport, 561.

2. Question of, which may be certified direct to this court, defined.
The question of jurisdiction which the act of March 3, 1891, provides may
be certified direct to this court must be one involving the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Court as a Federal Court and not in respect of its general
authority as a judicial tribunal (Louisville Trust Co. v. Knott, 191 U. S.
225). Bache v. Hunt, 523.

3. Want of jurisdiction where alleged unconstitutional deprivation of property
is without authority of State.

Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is invoked on the ground of
deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it must appear at the outset that the alleged
deprivation was by act of the State. And where it appeared on the
face of plaintiff's own statement of his case that the act complained of
was not only unauthorized, but was forbidden, by the state legislation in
question, the Circuit Court rightly declined to proceed further and
dismissed the suit. Barney v. City of New York, 430; Huntington v.
City of New York, 441.

4. Want of jurisdiction where sole ground is constitutional question not estab-
lished by facts.

Where the sole ground on which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is in-
voked is that the case arises under the impairment of contract clause of
the Constitution of the United States, and the facts set up by complain-
ant are, as matter of law, wholly inadequate to establish any contract
rights as between them and the State, no dispute or controversy arises
in respect to an unwarranted invasion of such rights and the bill should
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Underground Railroad v. City
of New York, 416.

See PRACTICE, 4.

Finality of decision.

D. OF STATE COURTS.

That a statute does not conflict with the constitution of a State is settled
by the decision of its highest court. Carstairs v. Cochran, 10.

Alabama. Constitution of 1901 (see Jurisdiction, A 4). Giles v. Teasley,
146.

Colorado. Service of process (see Federal Question, 3). Cosmopolitan
Mining Co. v. Walsh, 460.

Maryland. Elections (see Constitutional Law, 9). Pope v. Williams, 621.
Michigan. Railway law of 1873 (see Constitutionol Law, 1). Grand
Rapids & Indiana Ry. Co. v. Osborn, 17.

Minnesota. Railroads, chap. 270, General Laws (see Constitutional Law, 5).
Minn. & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 53.

Nebraska. Enforcement of liens for taxes, Laws, 1875, February 19, p. 107
(see Constitutional Law, 6). Leigh v. Green, 79.

New York. Limitations of actions-Provisions of Code of Civil Procedure-
Foreign corporations. The provisions of § 394 of the New York Code
of Civil Procedure limiting the time within which an action may be
brought against a director or stockholder of a moneyed corporation or
banking association to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to
enforce a liability created by the common law or by statute, extends to ac-
tions against directors and stockholders of foreign corporations. Whether
a foreign corporation is or is not a moneyed corporation within the mean-
ing of § 394 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure will be determined

for the purpose of construing the New York statute of limitations by
reference to the meaning given to the term by the legislature and courts
of New York rather than of the State under whose laws the corporation
is organized. Although the double liability of a stockholder of a
moneyed corporation may be contractual in its nature if it is statutory
in origin it is a liability created by statute within the meaning of § 394
of the New York Code of Civil Procedure. Platt v. Wilmot, 602.
New York. Life insurance contracts (see Contracts). Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Hill, 551.

North Carolina. Railroad-Sale under foreclosure. Under the laws of
North Carolina, and the decisions of the highest court of that State
rendered prior to 1894, there was nothing to prevent property of a
railroad company sold under foreclosure passing to the purchaser free
from any obligation for debts of the former owner arising thereafter,
notwithstanding the purchaser was not a domestic railroad corpo-
ration. Julian v. Central Trust Co., 93.

Ohio. Change of venue, sec. 5030, Rev. Stat. (see Constitutional Law, 10).
Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Snell, 30. Mechanics' lien law of 1894,

secs. 3184, 3185, Rev. Stat. (see Constitutional Law, 7). Great Southern
Hotel Co. v. Jones, 532.

Texas. Local option. Secs. 3384-3394, Rev. Stat. and Arts. 402-407,
Penal Code (see Constitutional Law, 12). Rippey v. Texas, 504.

MAILS.

See EVIDENCE, 2.

MEANDER LINES.

See PUBLIC LANDS, 1.

MECHANICS' LIENS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.

MERGER.

See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 2.

MONOPOLIES.

See ANTI-TRUST ACT;

COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAint of Trade.

MONUMENTS.

See PUBLIC LANDS, 1.

MORTGAGE.

See COURTS, 1;

LOCAL LAW (N. C.);
PUBLIC LANDS, 4.

NATIONAL BANKS.

Stock as security for loan where no delivery-Power of bank to withhold transfer
of stock of debtor repealed-Notice of lien by bank not effected by void
condition in certificate.

The mere statement by a borrower from a national bank, made to the
president when the loan is obtained, that his stock in the bank is security
for the loan, there being no delivery of the certificates, does not amount
to a pledge of the stock, nor does it give the bank any lien thereon as
against one subsequently loaning on the stock in good faith and receiv-
ing the certificates as collateral. The provisions of section 36 of the
National Banking Act of 1863, empowering the withholding of transfer
of the stock of a shareholder indebted to the bank, were not only
omitted from the National Banking Act of 1864 but were expressly
repealed thereby. A provision in the charter and by-laws, and a con-
dition in a certificate of stock, of a national bank, forbidding the trans-
fer of stock where the stockholder is indebted to the bank, is void as
repugnant to the National Banking Act and in conflict with the public
policy embodied in that act, and creates no lien which the bank can
enforce by refusing to transfer the stock to a holder for value in good
faith. A condition in a certificate of stock of a national bank which
is void under the National Banking Act will not operate as a notice
to one loaning on the stock as collateral, that it is subject to a lien of
the bank which will affect the right of the pledgee of having the stock
transferred to him. Third National Bank v. Buffalo German Ins. Co.,
581.

NATURAL MONUMENTS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 1.

NEGROES.

See JURISDICTION, A 4.

NOTICE.

See NATIONAL BANKS.

OATHS.

See CLERKS OF COURT.

OFFICIAL RECORDS.

See EVIDENCE, 2.

PASS.

See CARRIERS.

PATENT FOR LAND.

See PUBLIC LANDS, 1, 3.

PLEADING.

See FEDERAL QUESTION, 1, 4;
INDIANS, 2.

PLEDGE.

See NATIONAL Banks.

POLICE POWER.

See STATES.

POWERS OF CONGRESS.
See ANTI-TRUST ACT;
PUBLIC LANDS, 3.

PRACTICE.

1. Actual and not moot controversies decided-Dismissal of appeal where judge
ment below complied with.

It is the duty of this court to decide actual controversies by a judgment
which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions of law. When it appears either on
the record, or by extrinsic evidence, that the judgment sought to be
reviewed has, pending the appeal, and without fault of the defendant
in error, been complied with, this court will not proceed to final judg-
ment but will dismiss the appeal or writ of error. American Book Co.
v. Kansas, 49.

2. Affirmance, by division, by highest state court, conclusive as to facts as found
by trial court.

When the highest court of a State affirms a judgment although by a divided

court it constitutes an affirmance of the finding of the trial court which
then, like the verdict of a jury, is conclusive as to the facts upon this
court. Minn. & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 53.

3. Finding of facts by state court binding.

Adams

On writ of error the finding of facts in the Supreme Court of the State is
binding upon, and will be the basis of, the decision of this court.
v. Church, 510.

4. Reversal of decree of Circuit Court where dismissal sought for lack of con-
stitutional questions.

Where the contention as to want of jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, arising

from the alleged absence of constitutional questions, is well founded, it
is the duty of this court not simply to dismiss the appeal, but to reverse
the decree at appellant's costs with instructions to the Circuit Court to
dismiss the bill for want of jurisdiction. Newburyport Water Co. v.
Newburyport, 561.

5. Right of this court to review decisions of state courts.

The right of this court to review the decisions of the highest court of a State