fruitless, but fatal to themselves; and, accordingly, for the last twenty years of their settlement in that island, such projects were never again repeated. The present governor of Ceylon was in possession of these facts, and of this experience, before he doomed our soldiers to such inevitable destruction; they are recorded in a very valuable and interesting account of Ceylon, written by an officer of the army we first sent there, and the materials for which history were collected under the immediate eye of the governor. I wish, Sir, the writer of that history had been more correctly prophetic, when he says, "our government will, doubtless, avoid "the errors of former European masters of "Ceylon, who wasted, unprofitably, in vain 66 attempts to subdue the natives, that time " and those resources which might have "rendered this island one of the most va"luable colonies in the world."-With respect to the consequences of this war (independent of the unprofitable termination of it, and the mortification we must feel at having our brave troops apparently so idly sacrificed) they are really, Sir, of the most alarming nature. I need scarcely remind the House of the contiguity of Ceylon to the continent of India. India is allowed to be the great object of French ambition; we act upon this supposition in all our political calculations; it is with reference to this that Ceylon derives its greatest importance as a conquest; it is with reference to India that the harbour of Trincomalé is beyond all value; and yet, Sir, with a war carrying on in India on an enormous scale, with a French squadron in the Indian seas full of troops, so often said to be captured, but still unaccounted for, with the French ports full of vessels and troops ready for expeditions, with a necessity at home for our regular army, more urgent than was ever known, and with that regular army more than ever neglected, we are placed in the distressing dilemma, that we must either, by with-holding assistance from the government of Ceylon, endanger our possession of that most important colony, or we must, in this hour of need and necessity, deprive ourselves of a part of our most valuable and most rare species of defence. I am informed, Sir, that 1000 troops of the line are now embarking, or have embarked already, for Ceylon. I am sure such supply is necessary for the security of the colony; but I ask the House if they will permit the country to make so important a sacrifice without a full and most minute enquiry into what has caused the necessity for so unfortunate a measure. Sir, there is another most dreadful consequence

of this war; after the little discretion our government has hitherto shewn in going to war for apparently so trifling an object, I am afraid when the passions and resentment of our countrymen are roused by the recollection of what has lately passed at Candy, I am afraid that any prospect of peace with these Candians is very remote. I am afraid we are doomed to an internal war with this race of people, and that Ceylon, instead of being the valuable acquisition it is so naturally made for, will prove only to be the grave of our armies. I do hope, Sir, that ministers in their dispatches to the governor will not fail to remind and to press upon him the past experience of this island; I hope, Sir, they will remind him of that great lesson for all Europeans, the late fate of St. Domingo. As long, Sir, as the natives of Candia or St. Domingo shall possess the local advantages they now de; as long as the inhabitants of Europe shall be subject to the diseases they now are, I believe, Sir, that all our attempts to subdue the natives of these countries must prove not only fruitless but fatal to ourselves. I think, Sir, if this war shall appear to have been as rank and impolitic in its origin and commencement, and as calamitous in its consequences as I have stated it to be, I think the opinion of this House will be, that there is abundant matter for enquiry into this subject. There are too, Sir, transactions of this war that I have touched upon before, which I apprehend the House must likewise think call for particular enquiry: I allude to our interference in the politics of Candy; to our dethroning and making of princes and new forms of government in that country. If, Sir, we are really in earn est when we profess our respect for established governments, and our abhorrence of all usurpations; if we really wish for any character of consistency in the eyes of Europe, upon this important subject, it is high time that we bestow some criticism upon the very singular transactions of our colonial governors. I am not aware, Sir, of any other reasons I can adduce in support of the enquiry I wish to be instituted; but before I conclude, Sir, I beg to advert to a very cruel and unfeeling account that has lately been published by his Majesty's ministers, purporting to be a dispatch from the government of Ceylon, and giving an account of the murder of our garrison at Candy. This letter, Sir, is an attempt to account for the final disasters of this war, and which rest entirely with the governor by insinuations

the most fatal to the honour and character of a British officer who has fought and who has perished in the service of his country; and

this, Sir, in the absence of any species of testimony on which such insinuation could be founded. I do entreat this House, on behalf of the character of this most unfortunate officer, to recollect how he was situated :— there were only 200 British troops, 160 of those were sick in their beds; the remaining 40, I presume, were not very healthy, they were surrounded by at least 10,000 Candians, they were cut off from provisions, and they were 60 miles from our nearest settlement in this situation they were ordered by our new ally, the First Adigar, to lay down their arms, and they were deserted by the Malays in our service. Does any man believe it to be physically possible that these 40 men, so unhappily circumstanced, could have cut their way through all these difficulties? Of this, at least, we may be certain, that had they attempted so to do, the 160 who were sick would have been murdered. I contend, then, that if in the absence of all testimony respecting the conduct of this unfortunate officer, we allow ourselves to speculate upon his motives, we are bound in fairness to believe, that he was influenced by a very natural and generous sympathy for this great majority of his sick and helpless fellow-soldiers, and that in acting as he did, he consulted what he conceived to be the best, not only for himself alone, but for the whole garrison of Candy.-Mr. Creevey concluded by moving for "Copies of all papers, letters, and dispatches, from his Majesty's governor of Ceylon to the government of Candia in that island, and from the Candian government to his Majesty's governor respecting the cause or origin of the war in Ceylon 2. Copies of all correspondence, between his Majesty's governor of Ceylon and officers commanding his Majesty's troops in that island during the war in Ceylon: 3. Cc. pies of all treaties entered into between his Majesty's governor of Ceylon and the Candian government: 4. All the returns of his Majesty's forces in Ceylon, from the first of January, 1803, to the present time."-On the first motion being put,

Lord Castlereagh said, he should trouble the House with as few words as possible, as when the papers were laid before the House, they would then have an opportunity of forming an opinion upon the subject. He assented to the general principle, that when a war was entered into in any part of our colonial possessions, unless gov. could state some reason of expediency for not producing such information, that Parliament had a right to possess itself of full information with respect to the origin and causes of that war. To this point the

present motion went, and so far he had no objection; but he should certainly object to any motion which went to produce information as to the state of our force in Ceylon, as that would be shewing the enemy the number of troops we had in the island to defend it, and might tend to invite an attack. It might be also inexpedient to disclose the state of any negotiation carrying on in the island by the governor. He only wished that no prejudicial impression might remain in the minds of gentlemen. The hon. gent. (Mr. Creevey) had stated the war to have originated in a dispute about property to the amount of only 300 1. but the value was of little consequence; the Candian gov. had long demonstrated an hostile mind towards us, and the detention of property, about which the first dispute took place, was only one of the symptoms of that hostile disposition. The form of the motion was, he said, not accurate, as Ceylon formed no part of the dominions of the East India Company, but was annexed to the Crown; he had, therefore, framed a motion which he would make, if the hon. gent. would consent to withdraw his. He concluded by reading his motion," that an humble address be presented to his Majesty, praying that his Majesty would be graciously pleased to order to be laid before the House, copies or extracts of such letters and papers as had been received from the hon. Frederick North, governor of Ceylon, relative to the causes of the hostilities which had taken place between his Majesty's gov. and the King of Candy."--Mr. Creevey having consented to withdraw his motion, the motion of Lord Castlereagh was agreed to.

Mr. Creevey then moved for copies of all dispatches and letters from the governor of Ceylon to the British officers employed there, and from the latter to the former.

Lord Castlereagh objected to this motion, as calling for information which it would be inexpedient to produce, and therefore moved the previous question.

Mr. Fox was utterly astonished at the language held by the noble lord as to the production of this paper. The noble lord had asserted that a time would come when no objection could exist to the production of the paper; but had he given the least argument against its production at the present moment? Had he offered a single tittle of reason to prove that the present time was not the fit moment for its being laid before Parliament? Was it a matter undeserving of instant inquiry, that a part of our force in Ceylon had sustained not only disaster,

but disgrace; that blame had been thrown on the conduct of the officer who commanded that party of troops by the governor of the settlement: and that no document was before Parliament, to enable them to ascertain, whether such an imputation was or was not well founded? He could not conceive a stronger ground of Parliamentary inquiry than that laid down by his hon. friend. It was really extraordinary to hear ministers resisting the production of information on a subject where the necessity of information was admitted by every description of mankind who chose for a moment to exercise their judgment, If this was not the moment for inquiry, he wished to know when that moment would arrive? Did the noble lord mean to say that no inquiry should be made till the con clusion of the war? If that was to be the case, the grand object of the motion would be lost. Nothing could then be gained but the punishment of the criminal party. But the great object was to prevent the continuance of existing disasters. Viewing the motion as founded on the clearest grounds, it had his most cordial support.

General Maitland thought that the hon. member who spoke last had not fully understood the force of the noble lord's observations. To him it appeared, that from the noble lord's statement the production of the paper in question would be attended with inconvenience, and this was a fair Parliamentary ground for refusing its production. If the description of the state of Ceylon was such as the hon. mover described it, he thought that the paper relative to this matter ought not to be produced. It could only have the effect of conveying dangerous information to the enemy. The first paper contained every thing now wanted. A time for the production of the others without inconvenience would arrive, and he trusted that this period was not very remote.

Mr. G. Johnstone was of opinion, that any argument drawn from the impolicy of giving information to the enemy was quite inapplicable. If we looked to the situation of Ceylon, it was evident that before this time, the war must have come to a crisis. Our troops must either have prevailed, or been expelled from the settlement, or destroyed. Under existing circumstances, besides, it could not be conceived for a moment that the French government would entertain the project of sending such a body of troops to India as would endanger our eastern possessions. He was decidedly therefore for the inquiry. The noble lord had said that govt, was in posses

sion of very scanty information. the general complaint against the of all our foreign possessions. 1 such unsatisfactory details as to the portant events, that neither Parlia the public were able to form co nions on the subject. The motion culated to procure more information hon. member who introduced it, the thanks both of the House and lic. He was entitled to thanks fo tion, and the ability with which h fended it.

Lord Castlereagh in explanati that when he spoke of the scanty tion of govt., he alluded to the u massacre of the garrison of Candy. Geary strongly supported the m Mr. Wallace was against it.

Colonel Calcraft was astonished gument of an hon. general on the of the House. That hon. gen. h the motion on a case which he h not allow to be in existence. His was, that as Ceylon was in a stat ness, it would be improper to pro ments to establish the existence of ness. But even while using this he had denied the existence of t which it was founded. He himse cidedly for the inquiry.

Lord Henry Petty was astonis sort of argument set up by minist the motion. It would be a very c of argument for those entrusted management of a ship on a voyag proposition was made to examin bers or general state, to say, that s quiry would come much better vessel got into port. But this wa the argument of ministers on th occasion. His lordship declared doubted much whether there exis of effectually carrying on with s war in Ceylon; and surely it w prudent to inquire into these mea resolution was taken to protract a contest. He had heard a rumo governor general of India had det attempt the conquest of Candy 10,000 men were to be sent from tinent of India for that purpose. the House to know the grounds and the probability of success, lives of so many brave men were ficed. He was therefore decidedi of inquiry.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer the papers already ordered would cient information to ground upor ulterior decision as to the point v

war in Ceylon was undertaken on justifiable grounds.-The object, the causes, and circumstances of the war would be explained by these papers, and if the House should then think that the war was unjust, it would be competent for them to advise his Majesty to prevent its further prosecution. With respect to the statement of the noble lord (Petty) of 10,000 men being about to be sent to Ceylon from Madras, no information of that nature had been received by his Majesty's ministers.-The question was then loudly called for, and the House divided.

47

For the Original Motion....
For the Previous Question.. 70

[MAHRATTA WAR]-Mr. Francis mov. ed, that the 35th clause of the 24th of the King, should be read, viz.- -"whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation; be it enacted, &c.," and then addressed himself to the Speaker to the following effect.-Sir, in moving to have this clause now read, I have two objects, 1st. to remind the House of their own unanimous resolu tion, on which the subsequent act of Parliameat was founded; and then to shew that, in the motion which I propose to submit to the House, I am governed by that resolution, and aim at nothing but to inforce the execution of that law. In this purpose, and on this ground, I hope for the support and concurrence of the House; because I do not believe it will be asserted by any man, that VOL. I.

it is very right to pass laws for the better government of a distant dominion, and very wrong to inquire whether such laws are obeyed or not. In my opinion it would be a wiser policy and a safer practice not to make any laws, than to suffer them to be slighted with impunity. Habits of disobedience áre very catching; and they are the more dangerous in proportion to the distance of the offending parties, and to the facility which that distance gives them, to conceal or disguise their transactions. I state these principles generally, as a rational ground of parliamentary, suspicion and inquiry, whenever the government of India appear to be engaged in measures which the law prohibits; and not at all meaning to affirm, that such measures, when they are thoroughly examined, may not admit of a sufficient justification. The business and duty of this day does not call upon me to accuse any man, or to affirm that any thing deserving the censure of Parliament has been done. My object is to inquire, and then, according to the result of the inquiry, to desist or to proceed. All I contend for, in the first instance, is, that a British governor who ċmmences a war in India, is prima facie doing that which the law prohibits; that his own act of itself puts him on his defence; that he is bound to justify on the case; and that, until he has so justified his conduct, the presumptions are against him. All the authorities of this country have united with one voice to condemn and forbid the carrying on war in India for any purpose but defence, or on any ground but necessity. I need not tell the House that the practice in India has been almost uniformly, or with very short exceptions, directly opposed to the prohibition. While the Directors of the India Company had any power, they certainly laid down very wise principles, and gave very proper orders on this subject. When their power over their own governors was found to be insufficient, the legislature interposed, bur, as it appears by the facts, with no more success than the Directors. Since the prohibitory act passed in 1783, I appeal to the House whether we have heard of any thing from India but war and conquest; many. victories, and great acquisitions, with only now and then a short interval of repose, to take breath and begin again. There is another ground of presumption against the necessity and justice of these wars, which seems to me as strong and conclusive, as any presumption can be before the contrary is prov ed; I mean, Sir, that almost all these wars are supposed to originate in acts of provocation and aggression committed by the weak 3 I

against the strong. The strength of any single Indian state at any time, and now I I believe of all of them put together, is not to be compared to the military power and re sources of the English. I do not say that these nations have no means of defence, or that the Mahratias, for example, can do us no mischief; but that, considering the great disparity of force, it requires very clear evidence to make it credible, that whereas the disposition of the British power in India, is always, if possible, to preserve the peace, and to be satisfied with what we possess, this excellent disposition is never suffered to prevail because the Indian Princes are so restless and unruly, that we cannot, in common juitice to ourselves, refrain from invading them. The fable says, the fierce, rebellious lamb, would never suffer the mild, gentle, moderate wolf to be quiet: if it was not you it was your father. These propositions may be true, but they require some proof; and, when the proof is produced, I shall desire it always to be observed and remembered that the evidence, that comes before us, is er parte. We hear little or nothing of what the opposite, and possibly the injured party, have to say for themselves. Ever since I have known any thing of Indian affairs, I have found that the prevailing disease of our governments there has been a rage for making war. The strong though ineffectual remedies which have from time to time been applied to this disorder, are a sufficient proof of its existence. That individuals may find their account in the conduct of such wars, I do not mean to dispute. But I deny that they are or can be for the benefit of the India Company or the nation, particularly in the present circumstances of the Company's affairs. In these circumstances, and in actual possession of half the peninsula, you engage in a new war with the Mahrattas, the success of which can give you nothing but an addition of territory, which you cannot keep without an intolerable increase of your military establishments, and a perpetual drain of all your resources, of men as well as money, and which you ought not to keep if you could. Whether the Mahrattas have united in defence of their country, or to carry the war into the heart of our best provinces, as they have done in former times, or with what loss or expense our success against them may have been purchased, are questions on which we are utterly in the dark. By public report alone we are informed, that a war of great extent at least, and liable to many important consequences, is now carrying on in india, and that no information of it has been communicated to

Parliament. Sir, I can safely assure this House, that the Mahrattas, though not capable of meeting us in the field, or at all likely to encounter us in a pitched battle, are nevertheless very well able to do us a great deal of mischief. In the year 1778, the Presidency of Bombay received and gave their protection to a Mahratta fugitive called Ragoba, and mustered all the force they could collect to escort him back to Poona, and to make themselves masters of that place. If the expedition had succeeded, I do not doubt that the persons who were engaged in it, would have been very well paid for their trouble. The event was, that their army was surrounded, starved, and compelled to capitulate. At some earlier periods of the history of India, the Mahrattas have frequently crossed the rivers and made rapid incursions into the upper provinces of Bengal and Bahar, carrying universal desolation with them wherever they went, ruining the country, and making it impossible to collect the revenues. I know no reason, why they may not make the same attempts again, and with the same success. With such bodies of horse as they can collect at a very short warning, from fifty to a hundred thousand in different quarters, they may pour into our provinces, over-run and lay waste the country, and then make their retreat with the same rapidity, without its being possible for us either to meet or to overtake them. This is their mode of making war, and it has always succeeded with them. They are the Tartars of India. In these circumstances, I ask, is it proper or not that Parliament should know, why this war was undertaken, for what purposes it has been pursued, and with what success it has been attended; and finally, has it the sanction and approbation of the Court of Directors, and of his Majesty's ministers? I cannot be lieve it possible.-If it should be stated, as I have some reason to expect it may, that the papers to which these motions allude, have not in fact been received by the Court of Directors, that answer must silence me for the present, but I must say that, in another point of view, it will be very unsatisfactory. The orders given by lord Wellesley, in consequence of which the hostilities began on the Malabar coast, must have been dated some time in June or early in July last. I beg of the House to observe the dates: we are now in the middle of March; so that 8 months and a half must have elapsed since the orders were given, and no information received at home on that subject. This is a case which the act of Parliament has foreseen and provided for. The words of the law are, that