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ment, which was gallantly led on to the attack, under the command of lieutenant-colonel M'Leod.

The assault commenced at day-light; and, notwithstanding the heavy fire from the enemy's battery, and guns opening in all directions, his lines were carried with distinguished gallantry, after a sharp and most obstinate action, which terminated in the complete route and confusion of the foe, who were driven with the bayonet from the villages, and pursued beyond the verge of the jungle in their rear, which afforded a temporary shelter to the flying and the wounded.

After the villages had been cleared, and the enemy had been forced in all quarters, five miles, at least, from the ground previously occupied, colonel St. Leger took up his encampment where the pursuit ended; sending back a part of his troops to destroy the enemy's battery, and to reap the fruits of the recent victory, by securing the ordnance and public stores. The amount of the British loss did not exceed fifty, in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss is said to have been very large, though it was not ascertained at the time.

Owing to the excessive fatigue experienced in this severe operation, the British force was halted on the 18th, to refresh it for further pursuit of the enemy, which was not delayed beyond the following day.

On the 19th, colonel St. Leger addressed a letter to the government, communicating the welcome intelligence, that the British flag was flying on both the forts of Oodagherry and Papanaveram, without the necessity of a shot being fired, these strong fortresses having been deserted, the gates left open, and flags of truce hoisted on all sides, on the first ap proach of the British troops. Such was the terror inspired by their appearance, and the reputation of their preceding exploits.

In Oodagherry were captured 160 piece of cannon, mostly mounted on the works, and a quantity of ammunition and stores of all descriptions.

At this place the rajah had established one of his principal arsenals, with a fine foundry; the only one, it is believed, in use in India, for casting iron guns.

About 20,000 stand of arms, and 40 pieces of ordnance, with 1200 barrels of gunpowder, fell into the hands of the captors, at Papanave

ram.

The governor in council, sensible of the value of these rapid and successful operations, honoured them with the repeated thanks of the government. But the best homage paid to the energy and bravery of the troops, and their gallant leader, was the terror and dismay of the enemy; who, discomfited on all sides, sent in different proposals for a cessation of arms. The first letter, requesting terms, was addressed to colonel St. Leger, by the dewan; but whether it was written with a political intention to try the confidence of the British commander in his success, and the extent of his expectations in consequence of it; or whether it was written with a spirit, which, notwithstanding it had been depressed, was not yet rightly humbled for submission, it was couched in such a style as to impress a belief that the writer considered himself as granting, rather than soliciting a favour; in begging forsooth, that our troops might not advance; and in that event his numerous and disciplined forces should not fall upon them; but he would be inclined, such his gracious disposition, to into negotiations for peace. It is superfluous almost to observe, that no answer was given to a letter dictated in such a tone. But the bearer of it earnestly intreated that he might be allowed to carry back some acknowldgement of the receipt of the letter, or his head night chance to answer for his master's indiscretion, in so framing it, as to render a reply unattainable. The good nature of the British commandant, always the concomitant of a generous courage, attended to the anxious request, and the safety of the messenger, by grant

enter

a certificate of the delivery of the paper.

About the same time other letters were received in the British camp, from the commander-in-chief of the enemy's forces, the brother of the dewan, and from the king himself. These, and more especially the latter, breathed a different spirit, and spoke a very distinct language from the let ter of the minister. The first solicited a cessation of hostilities, and that the British detachment should keep its position, and on that condition the enemy's principal force would retire to a distant post. The second letter was said to be to the same effect; but containing the additional circumstance, that the king was ready to enter into an immediate negotiation with the resident, for renewing the amicable relations lately subsisting between the two governments, and which he, the king, bad never supposed to be interrupted, until the British troops had entered his dominions, and, although they had lately forced his barrier, and penetrated into the interior of his country, he had never once entertained the mad project of seriously opposing their progress, or using other means than friendly explanation to avert the evil. He particularly deprecated the march of the British detachment to his capital, which would be the cause, as he apprehended, of disturbing its tranquillity, and possibly of the utter desertion of the city, by its principal inhabitants, with their families and property. Though the British commandant was most anxious to push on his advances to form a junction with colonel Chalmers at Quilon, as well from the perilous situation of the subsidiary force, as the approach of the Monsoon; he yet considered that the application of the king was entitled to such respect as prudence might authorize him to shew to it. He, therefore, after the usual compliments, informed the king, that he had every disposition to meet his wishes, and would comply with them, so far as it was consistent with the safety of the troops under his com\mand, and the instruction of his go

vernment, who had left the adjustment of all civil relations to the British resident; that as the king's dependence on the faith of the British government seemed real and unfeigned, and as he was assured that it would be met with a correspondent spirit, he should only make those movements, which the season would not justify him in delaying, towards Travandarum, the king's capital; but in so peaceful a manner, as not to bear the appearance of the advance of an hostile army. To this end orders would be given to his troops to abstain from attack, or excess of any kind, unless they should first be molested, a circumstance which he could not anti-cipate, by the Travancore force. That when he should arrive, by easy marches, within ten miles of the capital, he would halt, until he should receive instructions from the resident, communicating the intention of the British government to receive or reject the king's proposals. To give effect to the proposed negotiation, he finally suggested that the troopers, bearing his answer, might be usefully employed by the king, in his communication with the resident; and who had accordingly been furnished with passports to promote this desirable purpose. Colonel St. Leger correctly considered that he might cede these indulgencies, from the circumstance well known to the king, that he had several of his strong fortresses in his hand; and what might also be conceived no secondary object in the eyes of the rajah, that he had possession of his principal and esteemed pagolas, and their brahmins, whose pollution might be the dreaded consequence of any treachery.

This pacificatory proposal encountered a temporary and whimsical obstacle, from an accidental circumstance of eastern etiquette, which could not have come within the contemplation of the British commandant. He had ordered, it seems, the naigue, the noncommissioned officer in charge of the party of cavalry, bearing the answer to the letter, not to deliver that paper into any other than the king's hands

so that when the former had arrived at the palace, and had made known his commission, he was acquainted with the impossibility of the king s receipt of the dispatches from his, or any other than sacred hands. The embarrassment did not continue long, but was expeditiously obviated by the good sense, and natural understanding of the Naigue; who was content, though an excellent soldier, to waive a strict conpliance with the letter of bis order, so that its spirit and intention was answered. He entered into a ready compromise, which would remove the difficulty of the most squeamish courtier,to deliver the paper to the minister,in the king's presence, so that he should have a personal opportunity of seeing that it was given by him to the rajah; being fully satisfied, that all that colonel St. Leger could intend by his order was, that the trooper should be certain that the answer would reach the rajab's own hands. It would not seem that the most rigid disciplinarian could form a reasonable objection to the latitude of the construction, put on his commandant's order.

The answer being conveyed by this contrivance to the king, and being fully weighed and considered, the troopers were by him dispatched, with a proposal grounded on it, to colonel M-Cauley, who was at this time stationed at Cochin, about forty miles from Travandarum.

Colonel St. Leger halted at Ocdagberry until the 21st, and was then about to proceed, lightly equipped, and by short marches, on his route, as originally proposed, to within a short distance of the capital, when he received information from colonel Chalmers, that he was yet unable to take the field, for the want of necessary equipments; a circumstance, that induced colonel St. Leger to forego his first intention, and to take up the first convenient position that should present itself between Oodagherry and Colachee-stationing a portion of his force in each of those places, until the commanding oflicer of the subsidiary force should effect a junction with him. It

was impracticable, it appears, for colonel St. Leger to detach a sufficient force, to give convoy to the supplies he had received for the use of colonel Chalmer's detachment, without exposing his baggage, a dangerous experiment, in the unsettled state of affairs, to the mercy of the enemy.

On the 22d the detachment moved in the direction of Colachee, taking position about midway between that place and Oodagherry; a sufficient body was thence ordered. to Colachee, and arrived there on the 23d, where it found two brass guns, and about 1000 stand of arms. The possession of this place, immediately on the coast, empowered colonel St. Leger not only to keepup an opencommunication with the sea, but to dispatch assistance by that medium to colonel Chalmers, which the success of his operations allowed him to afford. The first care of colonel St. Leger was to strengthen the redoubt, which already contained two brass nine-pounders, by an additional six-pounder, and to detach a small party to take possession of the city of Travancore, which lay between the encampment of the British force, and the garrison of Oodagherry: this was the last arrangement necessary for securing the richest part of Travancore, and rendering it impossible for the enemy to draw any supplies in this quarter, or to send even a detachment sout ward, without coming into contact with and risking an engagement with the British detachment.

If, instead of availing himself of this advantageons post, colonel St. Leger had sought an immediate junction, as he was originally instructed, with colonel Chalmers, he would not only have exposed his extensive convoy to direct peril, but he might have had to combat with a great disparity of force, calculating on the best-grounded reports, in a most difficult, and almost unknown country. The numbers of the enemy were at this time stated to amount to about 16.000 infantry, regulaily armed, and trained, and about 85,000 bowmen; a description of men capable of occasioning much an

noyance to an hostile army, moving through such a country. Not to enumerate all the obstacles in the way of such a movement, it may suffice to say, that Quilon was full eighty miles distant from col. St. Leger's encampment: that between that place and Travandarum, about forty miles from the British camp, there were three large rivers, two of them breast high, wide, and rapid. The road, for the most part, lies on a high bank, a very narrow ridge, running through the rice or paddy fields, and rising generally about twelve feet above the level of the plain, which can at all times be flooded, and usually is so. The bottom of these fields is of deep black earth, which renders a passage nearly impracticable in any way but by the elevated road. These fields wind through the hills, with the road in the centre, which is often commanded from both sides of the hills for three or four miles together, within musket shot, and sometimes even within the smaller distance of bow shot. All the rising grounds or hills, are divided into small enclosures, each of which has the strength of a military work, being in general seven feet high, with a very thick, prickly pear, or pine-apple hedge on the top; with a small gate, on certain sides, preserving a communication between the different enclosures. In each of these separate fields is a Nair's habitation: in other parts, on the summit of the rising grounds, the road is frequently good, laying between beautiful avenues of the finest trees; but these are defended on either side, by a thick, impenetrable jungle; with apertures cut at the bottom, through which the Nairs know how to direct their devious course, crawling on their knees, and by which one person only can proceed at a time; and this narrow way is often disputed by tigers, and other fierce and savage animals in habiting and infesting the woods. A country, so beset with natural obstacles, it would be difficult under any circumstances to traverse with a large body of men; but it would have been an inexcusable rashness in the commander of

an adverse army to attempt it, unless under the most urgent and imperious necessity; as this did not exist, it is not a matter of any surprise, that the British commandant selected the position, immediately described, affording so many advantages, for annoyance of the enemy, and not less opportunities for supplying the necessities of his friend.

On his first arrival at Colachee, colonel Sentleger received a dispatch from captain Townsend, whom he had left in command of the Aranbooley Gate, conveying the agreeable information, that he had cleared the Southern or Canniah Comarah lines, according to the instructious communicated to him, antecedent to the movement of the detachment into the interior of Travancore. This part of the barrier had been considered, in the first instance, too strong to be attempted by the detachment, unaccompanied as it was with a battering train; but its defence being weakened by the fall of the Northern lines, and the troops having generally deserted it, it fell into the hands of captain Townsend, as it had been foreseen by colonel Sentleger, without resistance, and was dismantled effectually in its ordnance and works.

The troopers dispatched on the 21st instant to the king of Travancore, and by him sent forward to the resident, with the subsidiary force, returned on the 24th to the British encampment, having marched in the interval 170 miles, sixty of which over the seabeach, in deep sand. They brought back with them the reply of the resident to the joint communications of the king and the British commander, which was forwarded to Travandarum, immedia ely on its receipt. From the arrangements thereupon made, that looked to the further progress of the troops towards the capital, it was to be conjectured, that the resident's reply was not favourable. It was now generally reported and believed, that the detachment would not stop short of Travandarum, unless the rajah should consent, within a given and short time, to

render up his minister, to deliver

:

the medical officer and party of the 12th regiment treacherously seduced on shore at Alippee-and to issue decisive orders for the dispersion of his troops in the different parts of his kingdom. The latter condition had in some sort be complied with already ; the troop rs having observed on their return several parties of soldiers retiring peaceably to their homes, under the orders of the rajah and what remained to be done required not, it should seem, any fresh promise from the king, his majesty having given the most positive assurances of a disposition to disband his troops, and of his intention netto oppose the progress of the British detachment, both in his communication with colonel Sentleger, and the resident himself. And with the two prece ing conditions, it must have been known by the resident, judging from his own representations, and those of his government, that the king had it not in his power to comply.

If the Dewan had usurped, as asserted, the sovereign authority of the state, and had made the King a secondary personage within his kingdom, it was in vain to seek from him the delivery of the usurper into the custody of the resident. Nor can any ground be conceived for so preposterous a proposition, connected with the dignity of a mighty state with another independent power, or any other motive be imputed for it, than one which would degrade the high sentiments of the British government to a level with the dictates of the lowest and worst passions of individuals. It is impossible to form any notion, if the King should have been able to place his minister in the power of the British government, of the purpose for which it insisted on the demand. With whatsoever heavy and detestable crimes that individual might have been charged or chargeable, it is not to be fancied that the British government could in cool blood, have proceeded to punish that wicked minister, without the means or authority of enquiring into his offences. And it may be imagined that such government had victims enough of this description in its possession, wasting

their lives and strength in dungeons, where the light and air of Heaven is not allowed to visit their eyes, or refresh their frames. It must be left for others, in their more refined policy to explain, for we confess that we cannot, the hidden reason and wisdom of the extraordinary condition here insisted on.

The unpossibility of the surrender of the British prisoners, surprised on the coast, has been shewn in a preceding page, that recounts the horrid and most melancholy end which attended them. It is, under present information, as impracticable to devise an excuse for the barbarity that marked it, as to descry a possible cause for it; but the expression of our grief, in respect to the sufferers, would be as unavailing at this period, as the tardy concern exhibited by the government for their relief; a concern, however, which cannot be accounted for, when shewn, on any other ground, than as raising up another perplexity, to confound the party with whom a desire at least was signified to negotiate.

The answer of the King to these strange proposals having not been received at the British camp on the 27th, colonel Sentleger, made a movement with the main body of his detachment, towards Travandarum, and on the same evening advanced about six miles beyond the ancient city of Travancore. This march of the troops was probably intended to quicken the determination of the Rajah, and was well directed to that effect.

For a long period, nothing had been heard of the designs or the operations of the Dewau: but it was about this date known, that after the event of the defeat of the Travancore troops at Cotar and Nagrecoil, the unhappy minister had precipitately fled to the capital, whence, hearing of the success and progress of the British detachment, and the brave and noble resistance of the subsidiary force in another quarter, he again took to flight in a north-west direction, among unassailable fastnesses, and in a country scarcely inhabitable; there hoping to find a temporary asylum, rather than expecting to

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