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of the tendency of the measures of government, or of their effects. The most unquestionable acts of insubordination occur, at one moment, at Hydrabad, Masulipatam,† Seringapatam, and other principal stations of the army. It is not necessary to take a particular view of the disorderly transactions that ensue, or of the persons implicated in them; these are set forth, at length, in the correspondence of the agents of government, and of the government itself, in a series of letters, under the title of State Papers. These most clearly shew the general defection of the company's officers, the loss of the controul of the government, and of its deputed authority, at every one of the places named. The orders of government, directing the detachment of troops, are openly disobeyed; and the authority of the officers, in local command, superseded by the assumed power of committees, appointed by the majority of officers, disaffected to the government. It does not, however, appear, at the time mentioned, that the Native soldiery had any knowledge of the cause, or the existence even of the misunderstanding between the government and its military servants.

Colonel Montresor and captain Sydenham, the resident at Hydrabad, express themselves decisively to this effect, at the end of the month of July. The greatest evil that could arise out of the revolt, might, therefore, be prevented, even now, if a suitable policy should be adopted. But all that the government is intent upon, first and last, is the reduction of the offending members of the army, by the rod of power.

With this view, colonel Malcolm is dispatched to Masulipatam, a favorite alike with the government and the army, but without the discretion of using his influence with effect. His mediation is einployed to enforce the submission of the refractory officers, without the relaxation of any military principle; to induce their surrender, to demand an instant and unqualified resignation to the extreme severity of martial law, which would,

* Vide page 320—353.

in the worst of circumstances, apply to their humbled situation, if that should be effected. This experienced officer soon perceived the unfavourable appearance of the season, and the temper of the garrison, for such a submission, and the inadequate means with which he was armed for the execution of the object of his mission. This he represents in the most urgent manner to Sir G. Barlow, and with it the universal disaffection of the army, a circumstance of which he supposes the governor to be incorrectly informed. He most earnestly intreats an amplification of his powers, and presses a modification of the austere measures of the government, venturing, in an allowable confidence, to suggest the manner of it; but offering himself, in a soldier-like devotion, if the governor should not approve his suggestion, to carry his will, at any peril, into execu tion.

Similar counsel is offered to the government by colonel Stuart, in Travancore, by colonel Macauley, and more especially by the resident, and commanding officer of the subsidiary force at Hydrabad; urged and repeated with a warmth, that discovers a keen and lively interest for the welfare of the state, and a sincere conviction of the dangers impending over it. All the ordinary horrors of civil war are depicted in appropriate colouring, with the accumulate evils arising out of local circumstances, and the peculiar constitution of the Indian army.

The advice, with the representations of the expected evils to be apprehended from hostile proceedings, are alike neglected by the governinent, and another attempt to subdue the revolt, by means of regular authority, is made by the nomination of colonel Close to the command of the subsidiary force at Hydrabad.

This officer is sent to his new command, like colonel Malcolm, without any powers in his hands, to conciliate the minds of those over whom he is set; and work obedience, by the natu ral weight of his station, and the influence of his private character.

+ Vide page 306—320, and again, page 326–369.

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more happy choice could not have been made; but this was rendered unavailing, from withholding the means by which alone his services could be made effective. The measures of col. Close, in his most arduous and perilous situation, appear not only from his own correspondence, but the reports from every other quarter, to have been at once bold and judicious; but, as it had been foreseen and foretold by himself, they were not successful. It wanted, indeed, little sagacity to discover, what colonel Close publicly observes, "that when the voice of the superior is disregarded, the inferior can have little hope of being heard."

In his letter of the 24th July, when he is meditating on his mission, this officer explains to the government his own views of the measures, and of the inadequacy of them to the state of things, and represents the experiment, through his agency, not only as unpromising of success, but unseasonable as to the moment at which it is to be made. He considers, most justly and prudently considers, that such an expedient is only fitted to an extreme struggle, an i should not be hazarded at an earlier stage. He could not but observe the danger of discovering to the Native troops, what had hitherto been concealed, the existing quarrels between their officers and the government, by which disclosure alone could his purpose be executed.

On the 10th of July, lord Minto first heard of the revolt of the garrison of Masulipatam, and seemed then to think it necessary to make the requisite arrangements for his departure to Madras. These were not completed, a long interval in so imperious a case, until the 5th of August, when his lordship actually sailed from Calcutta ; having previously published his intention and objects to the Bengal army, in an address, under date the 20th of July. In this paper the governorgeneral would appear to inculcate a belief in the persons to whom he refers himself, that his presence was about to be interposed with a view to the mediation of the differences that had unhappily arisen between the Madras army and the government. In this view, the orders of his lordship, which found their way to the coast, were undoubtedly seen, and were hailed by the company's army, as a propitious opening to conciliation. The operation of this official document was uniform throughout the army; producing every where a temper correspondent with the blush of the order; and a desire to avoid extremities that might countervail, or raise an obstacle in the way of the apparent intention of the governorgeneral.

Though the government of Fort St. George was sensible of this disposition in the army, it could not prudently neglect the means of defence or of annoyance.

A less considerate mind than colonel Close's, might well have pondered on Its civil measures were few, its the effect of such a disclosure. He views, as explained, being principally was reluctantly compelled to make it; military. These consisted chiefly of and the event accorded with his anti- endeavours to procure sclimited adcipation. It was not, however, wholly dresses, that were, after all, very scanwithout its use, from the dignified ex- tily preferred, of approbation and loyample it held out, in the display of the alty towards the government, One most exalted military virtues, rendered measure, indeed, was devised, novel in more conspicuous and more striking, its nature, and bold in its design, which by position and contrast. The barra- deserves a more peculiar mention : this tive of col. Close, giving a detailed, was no other than a demand of a test bat modest account of his proceedings of all the company's officers, of their at Hydrabad, cannot be read, and it is attachment to the government which recommended to be read, without a they served. By this expedient, it strong interest, and lively admiration.* was conceived, that the loyal and the *This report will be found amongst the State Papers at page 350 et infrà.

disaffected would be marked and separated from each other, and that the government might thereby ascertain the number of its steady adherents; but this could not be done without shewing also, a dangerous discovery, the strength of the discontented.

This test was to be proposed, without distinction, to every officer in the service, and in the event of the refusal of his subscription to it, he was to be removed from command, with the retention, however, of the pay of his rank.

A measure of this sort, arising out of a general jealousy of the service, and inferring an indefinite suspicion, naturally detached many from the assistance of the government, who might otherwise have afforded their services. It gave others, who might not have been prepared to place themselves under any circumstances, in direct opposition to the government, an opportunity of embracing a middle and safe course, by temporary retirement from office.

This measure was subject to these difficulties on the face of it; but there were other evil consequences to be apprehended, which, though not present, were not so remote, as to escape observation. It was impossible to carry it into execution, without informing the Native troops, a secret carefully concealed by their commanders, of the particulars of the misunderstanding between the government and their officers; and in the event of the refusal of the test, a circumstance that must have been anticipated, of severing the officers from the men, and thus breaking the intermediate link of connection of the latter with the government itself. These certain ills must result from the experiment; while the good could at best be doubtful, and might have been defeated by a strata

gem, too obvious almost to be noticed; and on which we may hereafter remark. The effect of this was to convince the government, (how satisfactory the assurance) that it had so conducted itself, as to have estranged the hearts of fourfifths of its military servants.

Another pitiful resource, for it can. not be dignified with the character of an avowed measure of government, was to practice, by means of emissaries, on the fidelity of the sepoys, by the misrepresentation of the views of their officers, and by the promise of rewards and honors, never perhaps in-. tended to be realised; corrupting the very source whence every manly sentiment can be expected to issue.

The military means of the government, were more respectable in themselves, and more efficient in their promise. These had an immediate view to the formation of a force of 12,000 men in the ceded districts, and other considerable detachments in the southern division of the army, and at the presidency. The force under colonel Davis, in Mysore, was esteemed sufficient for keeping the garrison of Seringapatam under check. These military arrangements are detailed in the mi nutes of council, and described with some minuteness in the general letter of the government of Fort St. George of the 10th of Sept.* but as there was not, happily, any occasion for putting them in action, save in a solitary instance, there is no necessity for a specification of them.

It would be needless to consider, from the event, whether these military arrangements, certainly not very promptly made, were sufficient or not to meet the critical state of affairs. There was happily, no occasion for an experiment of their efficiency or inade quacy to their object. Before the military force, under the controul of the government could be set in motion,

* Vide State Papers, page 287 et infrà.

+ The instance referred to was the attempt at the interception of the Chittledroog battalions on their march to Seringapatam; inducing the only sanguinary vent that occurred during the revolt. The particulars of this unhappy affair are stated, we wish not to repeat, or dwell upon them, at p. 342-346; and at p. 118-122.

an occurrence, as fortunate, as it was unexpected, obviated the necessity of an appeal to arms in a contest so unnatural. At this awful moment, the Hydrabad subsidiary force, which was the first to throw aside its allegiance to the government, discovered the earliest sentiment,as it often happens, of returning duty. It had been expected for some time, that Lord Minto would proceed to Fort St. George; but though his voyage had been delayed, it was well known that his lordship was in actual progress thither, and would ere this have arrived at that presidency, if untoward circumstances had not retarded his passage. Under an impression of his anticipated, if not actual arrival, the subsidiary force sent a tender of its unqualified submission to the pleasure of the governor-general, preferring their irrevived allegiance, by the subscription of the test of obedience to the local government, and by a recommendation of their example to the other branches of the army.

The influence of the conduct of this force was universally felt, and attended by the consequence expected. A similar submission was thereupon made by the garrisons of Seringapatam and Musulipatam, and lastly the Jaulna force.

It is, however, to be remarked, that the submission of the garrison of Masulipatam, was not effected from the peculiar circumstances of irritation locally prevailing, without the promise of an amnesty from general Pater, the commanding officer of the district. All these desirable events happened, in the interim of the voyage of Lord Minto from Calcutta to Madras; so that the government of Fort St. George, whatever might have been its feelings, from the inducement and tenour of the act of submission, which was addressed to the governor-general personally, had the substantial satisfaction, of knowing, that the revolt, if it had been raised as it may be thought, by its weakness or passions, had been layed by its own energy and perseve

rance.

When Lord Minto arrived at Fort

St. George on the 11th of September, he found nothing remaining for him. to accomplish, but to turn the events that had happened, though at great and alarming cost, to the future safety of the state.

His lordship was now called upon, a most important office, to express his definitive judgment on transactions, which had shaken the interest of the East India company, in a near and sensible part, and had endangered the general stability of its affairs. The governor-general seems to have felt all the difficulty and nicety of his situation; but without any fear, which might chance to present itself to a less determined mind, of his entire competency to acquit himself as he should of the charge. In writing to the court of directors on this delicate point, he thus deliberately expresses himself:

"I should have discharged imperfectly the trust for which the extraordinary powers I was then about to exercise had been vested in my person; I should have ill appreciated the momentous matter I had before me, and I should have lowered, in a manner prejudicial to the permanent efficiency of your Indian Government, the high and paramount authority of my office, which, for purposes alike of remedy and support, in their several cases, it is so important to hold high in the estimation and reverence of India, if I had professed only a blind concurrence in councils, in which I was come to preside; I should at the same time have brought to the government of Fort St. George a very feeble accession of strength, if my support had consisted only in an additional signature unsanctioned by the deliberation and decision, of a separate and superintending judgment. I determined, therefore, to pursue a personal investigation of the facts, followed by a mature deliberation on their results, before I should adopt any resolution, or even commit myself on any of the principal points depending."

The sense of the weight and dignity of his lordship's office is here most happily described, as are also the immediate

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duties which it enjoined; but it is to be feared, that his lordship had not estimated, at this moment, very accurately, the powers of the officer, from the natural frailty of his kind, to execute, under the circumstances of the exigency, all that was officially required of him. If his lordship had distrusted himself, as most men are apt to distrust themselves when their interest or their characters are concerned; he would have pe.ceived, even on his own mode of reasoning, how little he was fitted for the seat of impartial justice, which he fancied himself about to fill, and to which he still nore strangely boasts he was about to carry a pure and unoccupied judgment. If he had looked as fully into himself, as into the nature and demands of his office, his lordship would have trembled while he was talking of his case, not to commit himself on any principal points depending; when he had already delivered himself most minutely, not only in his letter of the 27th of May, but in other public and official dispatches, on almost every point of consequence that could come even incidentally under his deliberation. This observation would not have been offered, if his lordship had discovered a magnanimity in the judgment, afterwards pronounced by him, which had rescued his decision from the partiality or prejudice that might be supposed, on general principles, to attach to it.

His lordship appears to have been occupied from the 12 b to the 25th of September,an interval short enough for such a purpose, for the examination of the extremely voluminous documents of the government, as his lordship describes them, and the memorials and statements of individuals, and the complicated interests growing out of these adverse and opposed representations. On the last-mentioned day the governor ge neral's interesting determination is made known in general orders to the army.

This document, like other papers issuing from the same pen, is long and argumentative; when it should have been, and more especially here, sententious and brief. His lordship seems

to forget, a fatal oversight, throughout this declaration, that he is not exercis ing a final and definitive judgment, but assigning the means for an intermedi ate selection of particular persons for future trial; whose cause may be prejudiced by observations from so high an authority before it shall arrive at the court, which alone can take cognizance of it; unless they shall be submitted, which cannot be discerned in the present instance, with a peculiar and studied precaution. Most of the topics introduced in this paper, have an unfortunate tendency, not only to enhance the late offence of the army, but to heighten the guilt of the supposed offenders, by stripping it of every palliative circumstance; while other of these observations are obviously of a nature to stir and renew passions, not in the minds of the parties only, but of the persons who are to become subsequently the judges of the lives and fortunes of their fellow soldiers, now about to be submitted to their verdict. If it were necessary to pronounce an eulogium on the government of Sir G. Barlow, it might have been effected by other more seemly means, than by the disparagement of individuals in the sacred circumstance and act of being delivered over to the severity of the law; whose spirit it is never to condemn before a legal hearing and conviction.

There are also certain needless remarks in this order, that insinuate, or perhaps go a great way to dictate the extent of the sentence, which would be pleasing or expected by the govern ment in the approaching trials: remarks, viewing the authority whence they spring, and the body to whom they are addressed, which are strangely out of season, But these, if they fail to operate in one place, cannot fall without some weight, it would seem, on another; in converting those, to whom an option of trial or dismission is held out by the order, into seit accusers, in acceping the latter alternative, rather than hazard the event of the decision of a court martial, dressed out in all its possible, and formidable terrors, as depicted by the imposing and

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