himself, in which he strongly recommends and supports this address of the officers, notwithstanding, that he had but a few months before sent directions to the officers commanding the principal stations of the army to suppress an address then in circulation for the very same purpose, namely, that of obtaining an equalization of allowces at Madras and Bengal. And here we pause, to remark on the very extraordinary and censurable conduct of lieutenant-general Macdowall in recommending and supporting a memorial, more reprehensible in its nature and language than that, which at a short preceding period, he had interposed his authority to suppress.

We can the less wonder that if thus encouraged and supported the officers find fault with and complain of every act of the government which in any way affects their personal interests, however necessary it may be to the well being and safety of the

state.

47. Although the address of the officers is not yet before us in an authenticated form, we think it proper to take the present opportunity to make some observations upon the topics contained in it.

48. The general preliminary representation made by the officers, of the nature and disadvantages of the company's service, we conceive to be highly objectionable and incorrect. The complaint that they are banished to a distance from their country and friends, for a considerable portion of their lives, is a complaint applicable to his majesty's and to most other military services well known to be essential to theirs, when they first enter it, and therefore not a becoming topic of complaint in military men, besides which we have to observe, that no one enters into our military service in India, but on his own application, and with the full knowledge that he can advance in it only in a course of years; but when the officers add, "we are doomed to toil through many a painful year, on an allow ance scarcely adequate to our subsistence, until after a period of twenty-two years service in India, we have the melancholy alternative of returning home to live in dependence and comparative poverty on the pensions of our ranks, or of combating with age and infirmities in a clime avowedly hostile to our constitutions;" when they make this representation of their situation and prospects, they surely forget that the military allowances of the company are higher than those of any other military service in the world, although the necessaries of life are comparatively cheap in India; that they attain the highest rank without purchase or expense, and that the provision for retiring officers is such as no other service has ever afforded, and such as the finances of the company are even strained to sup

port.

49. After these preliminary observations, the address proceeds to complain of the abolition of the Bezar allowances, an arrangement which is not confined to Madras, but extended to the other presidencies, which is in strict conformity to the articles of war, which prohibit the levy of duties by military officers on all articles of consumption, and is evidently founded on the most incontrovertible principles of sound policy.

50. It is not politic to give officers an interest in the amount of imposts levied on military markets, because it has an evident tendency to make the soldiers discontented with their officers by feeling themselves taxed for the benefit of those who command them. In evidence of which a very recent instance might be quoted.

51. It is further to be observed, that in India the amount of the collections in mi!itary Bazars has always depended principally on the extension of the spirituous liquors to the troops. To give an officer therefore an interest in the amount of duties derivable from such a source is to set his interest directly at variance with his duty, and to hold out to him a reward for encouraging that intoxication which it is his first duty to discountenance and suppress.

52. It is not meant by these observations to state that these inconveniences have actually taken place under the administration of the company's present officers, but it has a sufficient reason for the abolition of 2 general arrangement that it has a tendency to produce consequences highly injurious to the service. This observation is applicable to every part of the succeeding argument.

53. The next complaint stated in the address is the abolition of the allowance of full batta to officers commanding stations, but this allowance has been rather transferred and extended than abolished, and that upon principles of the most obvious propriety; for on the recommendation of Sir John Cradock the full batta was transferred from the officers commanding stations to officers commanding corps, from officers in a fixed and quiet situation, to officers engaged in the more active duties of their profession.

54. The next subject of complaint brought forward is, that the orders of the court of directors for removing his majesty's officers from the command of stations where their regiments are not quartered, and_for appointing military men to the pay offices of the army, have not been carried into effect by the Madras government.

55. How far our orders on these subjects have been yet carried into effect we are unable precisely to ascertain, but we know that they have been executed to a certain extent; and as we have no doubt of the disposition of our governor in council at

Fort St. George to execute these and all other orders in the most punctual manner, and with the greatest practicable expedition, we do not doubt that ere this time considerable progress has been made in arrangements which evidently would not admit of instantaneous adoption, without danger to the public interests and to the regularity of public business.

56 It is possible, indeed, that cases may occur in which both the officers in the king's and company's service may be properly selected for the command of stations where there respective regiments are not quartered, and if such should occur it will be your duty to see that this is done without partiality to either, stating your reasons at large for any deviation from the general rule.

57. The address then goes on to complain of the abolition of the tent-contract, an arrangement founded upon arguments which we believe to be incontrovertible, although some of the facts upon which the arguments for its abolition were grounded are brought forward in the address as reasons for its continuation.

58. The address states that during war the allowances for the tent-contract were unequal to the expenses, a fact which we conceive is decisive against its propriety, although the only inference drawn from it in the address is, that the contract should be continued during peace.

59. This argument might have some force if the tent-contract were to be considered oply with reference to the advantages to the officers who held it; although we are of opinion that even in this limited view of the subject the continuation of the contract had been sufficiently extended in point of time to allow those officers an opportunity of reimbursing themselves during peace for the extraordinary expenses which they might have, incurred during the war. Some, perhaps many, of officers who held the contract during the war, must have been removed since the peace, by death, promotion, or retirement from the commands to which it was attached, without having had the opportunity of reimbursing themselves; and this furnishes another strong argument against the tent contract, when viewed only with reference to the interests of individuals

60. The reasons however for abolishing the tent contract, which appear to us of most force, are, that it provided at a great and constant expense for putting all the Native corps in readiness to move, when from the nature of things many of them must at all times necessarily remain stationary; that the expense of fulfilling the terms of the contract being much greater in the field than in garrison, the officers contracting were placed in a situation in which their interest might eventually be in opposition to their duty; that it must interfere

with the discipline of corps by withdrawing the attention and occupying the time of commanding officers in cases not connected with the discipline of their respective regiments and battalions; and finally, that it made the commanders of corps officers of disbursements and expenditure, not as they always ought to be, of check and control over the disbursements of others. These reasons had induced lord Cornwallis, after establishing the teut contract in war, to revoke it in time of peace; and upon the obvious ground that it was an arrangement made to promote not the advantages of the officers, but the efficiency of the service.

61. The address then again reverts to the claim of an equalization of military allowances at Madras and Bengal; a claim which though it neither be grounded on any solid principles, nor can ever be admitted as the basis of any practicable regulation, we shall examine somewhat more in detail than we have thought necessary in considering the other subjects of the address, because it is a question of extensive prospect, embracing many points besides the one now brought before us.

62. In the different presidencies of the company in India distinctions have from the beginning subsisted in respect to emoluments and advantages (not only in the military, but in every other department); these distinctions have arisen from the comparative importance of the presidencies themselves, and of the public business to be transacted under them.

63. Thus Bengal, the first great territorial possession of the company, had its establishments early settled with some analogy to its income, and that country as being the seat of government, the centre of the British interests in India, came to have a standard of public allowances, which could not be exactly imitated at the other presidencies, under very different circumstances.

64. The style of living also among the Europeans has, we presume, gradualty adapted itself to the scale of income.

65. The persons nominated to civil and military employments have entered the services perfectly aware of these inequalities; and are therefore not entitled to expect that they should be afterwards removed.

66. The company have hence always resisted the idea of a general equalization of allowances and emoluments of the different presidencies, are not founded on right or reason, or the nature of things.

67. Supposing for a moment that such a principle could be admitted and enforced, the consequence in the present state of the finances of the company must be to reduce the few remaining distinctions of the Bengal presidency to a level with those of Madras and Bombay, as it would be utterly impossible to provide for the extreme of raising the emoluments of the inferior presidencies to a level with those of Bengal, extended as this rise must be to all the civil as well as military branches

of the service, if once the principle of equalization were adopted.

68. In all the presidencies, however, the scale of allowances has been more than sufficient for comfortable subsistence, and in the case of all the privates and non-commissioned officers of the army, the rates have been at all times very generally the same at all the presidencies.

69. From a concurrence of circumstances it has also happened, that an approximation to an equalization of allowances has in fact taken place, in so far as to reduce the allow ances of the Bengal military service generally almost to an equality with those of the other presidencies; and if the comparative slowness of promotion at that presidency be taken into the estimate, it might not be incorrect to say, that the military service in Bengal has not been for many years past upon a superior footing, upon the whole, than that at either of the other presidencies.

If the Madras officers possess a reasonable plea to have all their allowances put on a level with those of Bengal, the Bengal officers have a plea, at least as specious, to an equalization of rank in proportion to length of service. The infantry have the same plea of complaint against the quicker promotion in the cavalry, and the artillery against both. In short, there can be no end to the operation of this principle of equalization, if it is allowed to supersede all established usages, and all codsiderations of expedi

ency.

72. Upon the same principles, if the necessities of the state require that a diminution should take place in the expenditure of any or of all the settlements in India, it is not to be expected that such reduction shall fall first or only upon those who receive the higher salaries, whether civil or military, at one or at another presidency; but the government has an undoubted right, legal and moral, to decide consistently with the principles of justice, what part of the service will best admit of that reduction which the necessities of the state demand.

73. But it is unnecessary to press this principle, however incontestible, as in point of fact reductions have been ordered, and are in a train of execution at all the presidencies, and affecting all the branches of the com pany's service, civil and military; reductions which are absolutely necessary to the existence of the company, and consequently to the maintenance and provision of all their servants, as well in India as in Europe, as well in the retired and pensioned establishments, as in the more early and active stages of service.

74. Another subject of complaint made by the officers of the Madras army is, that the commander-in-chief, whom, in invitation of himself, they style the representative of the army" has been excluded from a seat in council.

66

75. The propriety of granting a seat in council to lieutenant-general Macdowall, or to any other commander-in-chief, is a question so entirely unconnected with the interests of the officers themselves, and the constitution of the army under the company and the British government, that it is not easy to consider its introduction into their address in any other light than as an espousal on the part of the officers of lieutenant-general Macdowall's unreasonable complaints on this subject, in return for the countenance which he has so improperly shown to the equally unreasonable complaints of the officers."

76. It is not more necessary that the com mander-in-chief should have a seat in coun cil at Fort St. George, than that the commander-in-chief in England should be a member of the cabinet; and although advantages may result from his personal assistance in council, still the benefits of his advice and co-operation may be obtained, and the mili tary arrangements of government may be conducted in an efficient manner, even if he should not have a seat at the board. This part of the memorial however does not call for any detailed examination, yet it may be proper to observe, that although the officers complain that their interests may suffer by the commander-in-chief not having a seat in council, yet in fact most of the measures of which the memorial itself complains as grievances were suggested by the commander-in-chief, Sir John Cradock, and adopted whilst he was in council.

77. On the striking impropriety and mischievous ambiguity of the phrase, representative of the army," we have commented in another part of this letter. We shall now, therefore, only observe, that the adopting, by the officers, of this reprehensible phrase furnishes another instance of the evil consequences of the countenance before referred to.

The last subject of complaint adduced in the address is the formation of a general fund for the off-reckonings of the army, which is stated to have been formed for the purpose

of equalizing the advantages derivable from that fund to the colonels of three presidencies, by which the colonels on the Madras establishment have suffered a diminution of income, whilst those of the Bengal esta blishment have received an addition to their emoluments.

78. On reverting to our orders transmitted to India on the subject of the off-reckonings of the army, we do not find that any such principle of equalization was alluded to, or in our contemplation.

79. The only object of the formation of a general fund for the off-reckonings of the Indian army which was then stated, was to provide a fund for the retired list of general officers, whose pensions, like all other military pensions, were made equal, whether those officers belonged to the establishments of Bengal, Madras or Bombay. The offreckoning fund is indeed in its nature and effects a pension fund, and has therefore very naturally been regulated upon the same principles of equality as are all pens on esta blishments.

In point of fact, however, the Madras officers suffered scarcely any diminution of advantages by that arrangement, the amount of their off-reckonings having been nearly an average of the off-reckonings of Bengal and Bombay.

Each Share.

£1952

1,294 1,458

952 1,458

2,410

1,205

80. This, therefore, is no fair subject of complaint by the officers on the Madras establishment, even had the formation of a general fund been made, as it was not upon a principle of equalizing the allowances to the officers of the three establishments; besides which the officers affected by this arrangement are and most commonly will be resident in Europe, and cannot therefore be found among those who have signed the meinorial.

81. It is impossible for us on such an occasion as the present to quit this subject without repeating our strongest disapprobation of a practice thus again revived by the officers of our army, of combining and forming associations for the purpose of addressing government on any imaginary or real grievance which they may suppose themselves to suffer. The evils of such a practice were cearly pointed out, and the practice itself absolutely forbidden in our military general letter of the

VOL. 11.

20th April, 1803, the 4th and 5th paragraphs of which we shall quote; and we repeat out most positive directions that the strictest atten tion and obedience be paid to them.

4.- We cannot omit taking this opportunity to express, in the most pointed terms, the disapprobation with which we have seen the general associations of officers of different tanks formed for these and similar purposes, associa tionscompletely subversive of that system of military correctness and subordination which it must be your and our duty in future more strictly to enforce, since any relaxation in a point of such essential consequence would infallibly be attended with the most fatal disor ders, as repeated experie ce has too often proved when such practices have been permitted to prevail.

5.It will at all times be our inclination to attend to the comforts and to the interesis of every part of our army, when made known to us through the proper channel of communication.But we at the same time must transmit to you our most positive injunctions to adopt the strongest measures which circumstances may require, to discountenance associations of the descriptions to which we have above referred, if a sense of propriety should not render such interference unnecessary.

While we deem it necessary to repeat, that combinations of this nature are in themselves subversive of the principles of discipline and good order, and calculated to afford an example highly dangerous to the interests of the state, although they may bear only the appear. ance of legitimate appeal to superior authority, for the redress of supposed grievances, we think it due to the officers of our army at large to state, at the same time, that we are disposed to ascribe improper views exclusively to the projectors of such combinations, and to those who have actively exerted themselves in pro moting them. Such officers as may have acceded to the project are not probably aware of the true nature and tendency of the combination which they have contributed to form, and are deceived by the plausible pretext of a constitutional appeal to the authority of govern

ment.

82.-But the case will be verydifferent, if after having been again apprised by the government of the dangerous tendency of the practices, to which in the first instance they may have incautiously lent themselves, after the pains which had been taken to shew the unreasonableness of their complaints, and the utter impossibility of compliance, they should persevere in urging requests, improper in themselves, and rendered sull more so by the manner in which they are brought forward.

83. We are too sensible of the high military spirit which has at all times distinguished our officers in the field to suppose it possible, that after these repeated warnings they can so far forget the sentiments with which that spirit ought to inspire them, as o expose themselves to the imputation of lookg more to the pecuniary emoluments of their

11

profession than to the honour derived from an exemplary discharge of their duties both in war and peace. This distinction is not to be obtained solely by gallantry in the field, but by a strict observance of all the duties of the military character; and of those there is none more important and essential than the inculcation, by their own conduct and example, of principles of subordination to the superior authority, which can alone ensure the obedience of their inferiors in the service, and render an army useful to the state, or safe even to those who command it.

84.-When we look back to the general character of the officers in our service, we are persuaded that reflection has long since convinced those who have been concerned in the transactions animadverted upon in this letter, of their misconduct, and of our substantial regard to their real interests, of which the various beneficial regulations adopted by us in the course of late years afford the most unequivocal proofs. We shall only further add, that at a time when the exigencies of the state subject every individual in the united kingdom to great deprivations, we confidently expect the same cheerful acquiescence in our officers in India, whether civil or military, which so conspicuously mark the good sense, zeal, and loyalty of his majesty's subject at home.

85.-We now revert to the more immediate consideration of the conduct of our late commander-in-chief. The last act of lieutenant general Macdowall which we are called upon to notice, is his address to the army upon the occasion of his quitting the command, and embarking for Europe, which though not transmitted by you has appeared through so many channels, public and private, that we cannot doubt its authenticity.

86.--It is with extreme surprise and concern that we found such sentiments and expressions as the following in an address from a commander-in-chief to the troops under him:

"The circumstances of his appointment (to the command of the army at Fort St. George) were (he says) so humiliating and unpropitious, that he declined addressing the army upon his first assuming the command of it, in the anxious hope that the court of directors might on further deliberation be induced to restore him to his right, by altering the new and extraordinary forms of government, and have enabled him to exercise the functions of his station as the representative of the army with honour to the service and credit to himself."

87.-On the evident impropriety of a commander of our forces claiming as a right that situation in the councils of our government, which our discretion is free to grant or withhold, we have already remarked..

88.-The authority of the governing pow er can never be liable to be arraigned by those whom it employs for the limitations it may think fit to impose on their authority.

89.-Reprehensible and unmilitary as it is in a commander-in-chief to censure and stigmatize the conduct of his superiors in the public orderly books of the army, the desig

nation of representative" of the army," by which lieutenant-general Macdowall has on this occasion chosen to describe himself, is it possible still more reprehensible, and has an obvious tendency to excite dissatisfaction and discontent in the army against our government, by leading them to consider themselves as injured and humiliated by us in the person of their representative

90. There is no sense in which this term could be understood in which it could be applied with propriety to the situation of commander-in-chief, and there are senses in which it might bear, by no forced construction, which are so highly improper, and imply doctrines so directly subversive of the whole frame of our government, that we are unwilling to suppose that either lieutenant-general Macdowall, or the officers in whose memorial it appears, could have been aware of them.

91. The term "representative of the army," is altogether novel and extraordinary. It might be understood to imply that the military class were by a representative to have a share in the legislation, and all the political and financial measures of the government. The admission of the term, though applied in a sense much more limited, would, according to its use in our language, soon give it that import.

92.-But supposing it only to be intended to mean that the army should have their commander in council, in order to take care of their inrerests and represent their wants, claims, and services, this would in the first place imply that the civil members of government would not be sufficiently attentive to the fair claims of the army, which is contrary to all past experience, even when no military officer had a seat in the council; and would require for the military body a privilege in the formation of the government, which no other class has, or, according to the constitution of our government, can have.

93.-The term "representative of the army," would further imply, that the commander of the army is responsible to it for his acts; that he is in fact delegated by it; and that it is not, as a British army, according to the laws and constitution of Great Britain is, an instrument in the hands of the executive government, but is competent, through its representative the commanderin-chief, to judge and control the public acts

and councils.

94. Lieutenant-general Macdowall has not (as already observed) thought fit to record or transmit to us any vindication of his conduct in proceedings which imperiously demand our most prompt and decisive animadversion, neither have we any reason to suppose from, the tenor of his correspodence with the governor in council that it is the intention of lieutenant-general Macdowall further to submit his conduct to our judg

ment and decision.

95. We are of opinion, however, that the official documents and letters from lieutenant