takes relations with China. If they conclude that we do not take them seriously, they clearly do have the option of considering new policies-in ways that I will discuss in a moment.

To make one further comment on the Taiwan problem, I would like to emphasize that the long run future of the island will not be immediately solved by any proposed U.S. policy. There simply is no immediate solution. Shifting American ties from Taiwan to Peking will not determine whether Taiwan will eventually be reassociated with China or will try over time to establish some sort of autonomous or even independent status. The island's future will take years-perhaps decades-to decide, and the ultimate outcome will depend essentially on long term trends within both China and Taiwan, rather than on what the United States does or does not do. In the end, only the Chinese themselves (including the Taiwanese) can determine whether or not there will be some new basis for peaceful accommodation or coexistence between the two regimes.

It is equally clear that shifting formal U.S. relations from Taipei to Peking will not produce the millenium in U.S.-China relations. Because of the profound differences between our two societies, consolidating and expanding our relationship will be slow and difficult, even under the best of circumstances. Nevertheless, full normalization of relations is a prerequisite for any attempt to build a significant and lasting reationship.

Some opponents of normalization argue that little in the way of immediate concrete benefits can be expected from upgrading our Peking ties, and that therefore there are no compelling reasons to move now. They point out, correctly, that changing the title of our mission in Peking from liaison office to embassy has little significance, in and of itself. They also point out, probably correctly, that trade, exchanges, and other contacts are likely to increase only gradually, and in the immediate future will probably be of only minor importance to the United States-although they could be increasingly significant over time.

But to judge the potential benefits of normalizing relations with China-and the potential costs of not doing so simply in terms of the immediate short-run payoff in trade and exchanges is to miss the point. The central point is that our ability or failure to establish and maintain a visible relationship with the People's Republic of China could have a tremendous impact on broad U.S. interests, both regionally and globally, over the long run, and full normalization of relations is clearly a prerequisite for establishing a viable relationship.

Although China is still a relatively poor nation, and is not yet close to achieving superpower status in military terms, it has emerged in recent years as an important major power capable of exerting a very significant influence beyond its borders, not only in East Asia but on the world stage. The fact that it is the most populous nation on earth is important, and, despite its low per capita income, its economy is one of the world's largest in absolute terms. Militarily, even though it is still reatively weak compared to the United States and Soviet Union, its armed forces rank third in the world and far overshadow those of any other nation in Asia other than the superpowers. Its possession of nuclear weapons and missiles compel other powers to take its position in the global strategic equation very seriously. Politically, it is an extremely dynamic nation, and its leaders' views have a significant impact, globally, especially in the so-called Third World with which China now associates many of its interests.

The policies that China pursues in the future will have a major impact on the prospects for international peace and stability, and its policies will obviously be greatly influenced by the policies other powers pursue toward it.

Looking to the future, if non-proliferation and other arms control measures are to be successful, it will be essential to draw China into them at some point. Efforts to work toward greater stability in key conflict areas-especially Asian areas such as Korea and Southeast Asia-will simply not succeed over the long run unless China, together with the other major powers, is willing to participate in them, or at least accept them. China could have a very great impact for better or worse in the years ahead on "North-South" relations, between the developed and developing nations. Its policies will also become increasingly important over time in relation to a wide range of global issues concerning the oceans, food, energy, and so on.

More important, China's future policies will unquestionably have a large impact on the global as well as regional political and military balance, and will be a crucial determinant of the prospects for peace and stability-in East Asia in particular. A basic aim of U.S. policy in Asia in the period ahead should

be, while maintaining a close alliance with Japan, to work toward a sustainable equilibrium among all the major powers, one that will reduce the dangers of major conflict and ultimately, hopefully, enhance the prospects for international cooperation. In my opinion, maintaining a reasonable relationship with China will be one essential prerequisite to achieving such an equilibrium.

Americans unfortunately tend to have very short historical memories, but we should not forget that for more than two decades, when we and the Chinese were locked in hostile confrontation, the United States was involved in one conflict and crisis after another in East Asia. This was in part due to the fact that both the United States and China misinterpreted and exaggerated the threats each posed to the other's interest. But it was in part because our respective policies, based on mutual fear and hostility, did in fact work at cross purposes throughout the region. As a result, the United States fought two costly wars, in Korea and Vietnam, twice mobilized forces for possible conflicts over the offshore islands, maintained large numbers of servicemen in constant readiness in East Asia, spent large sums to build up local armed forces and alliances, and worried intensely about the dangers of externally-supported subversion threatening to friends and allies. Differences on how to deal with China also created serious strains in our relations with Japan and other allies.

Even the limited improvement of U.S.-China relations that has occurred since 1972 has changed the situation in some very fundamental respects. Instead of attacking the U.S.-Japan alliance, the Chinese now endorse it, and they no longer attempt to exacerbate strains in Japanese-American relations. In Korea, while giving strong political support to Pyongyang, they stress the need for peaceful reunification and appear to be imposing restraints on Kim Il-sung. In Southeast Asia, instead of urging other countries to expel "U.S. imperialism," they now make it clear that they believe it is desirable for the United States to play an important role and maintain a continuing military presence in the region. Al-` though they have not renounced revolutionary aims, recently they have clearly subordinated them. Even in the Taiwan Strait area, while asserting their "right" to use force to "liberate" Taiwan, they have not, in fact, made serious threats or tried to exert military pressures, even on the offshore islands, in recent years, and in fact they have not yet begun to build up the kind of amphibious forces that they would need to consider actual attack. If changes such as these had not occurred, tensions in East Asia would have been much higher than they actually have been during the last few years, and the United States could not have reduced its military forces in the area without seriously destabilizing results.

Globally, the Sino-Soviet split and U.S.-China opening, combined, have had consequences of equal or greater importance. The military-political balance on the Eurasian continent is very different today from what it once was, and the Soviet Union is now compelled to divide its attention, and its forces, between Europe and Asia-a fact which clearly imposes certain important new constraints on Moscow. Moreover, in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, China today tilts toward the United States even though it continues to criticize both superpowers. Although opinions can differ on how much difference this makes in situations where China's direct influence is limited, there is little doubt that the problems facing the United States would be made difficult in many Third World areas if China used its political influence to attack all American policies instead of quietly endorsing some of them, and the problems of defense in Europe would clearly be more serious if the Soviet Union could concentrate its attention there.

The present parallelism of many American and Chinese interests and policies obviously derives fundamentally from the Sino-Soviet conflict, and from the fact that, even though U.S. and Chinese policies toward the Soviet Union differ in important respects, both countries desire to counterbalance and restrain Moscow. Because of this, and because China's post-Mao leaders have so far continued Mao's anti-Soviet policy without significant change, some Americans argue that there is little danger that China might reassess its policies toward the two superpowers, whatever the United States decides to do or not do to consolidate U.S.-China ties.

In my opinion, this is a very questionable and potentially dangerous assumption. I believe that China's leaders could well decide to reassess their basic foreign policy strategy (1) if they were to conclude that the United States is unable or unwilling to resist Soviet expansionism effectively and therefore is too weak a reed to rely on, or (2) if they were to decide that the United States

placed such little importance on its relations with Peking that it is unwilling to face up to the difficult choices required to deal with the normalization issue and the Taiwan problem, which Peking regards as crucially important in symbolic terms.

If the Chinese were to reassess their basic foreign policy strategy, what new policies might they consider, especially in relation to the two superpowers? There is very little possibility, I should emphasize at the start, that Peking will decide to try to restore a close Sino-Soviet alliance under any foreseeable circumstances. Chinese leaders are likely to believe, for many years to come, that the Russians pose a potential if not an actual threat to China's security. They will probably work hard to build up China's own defense capability to strengthen their hand in dealing with the Soviet Union-and the United States as well.

Yet it is quite possible that China's leaders could decide to pursue a more independent and flexible policy of maneuver between the two superpowers, using its relations with each to press for concessions from the other. They could, in short, try to move toward a policy of greater equidistance in relations with Washington and Moscow. If they were to do this, they would probably probe, cautiously, the possibilities of defusing the Soviet threat and reducing SinoSoviet tensions through a policy of limited détente involving certain two-way compromises. There is no guarantee, of course, that Moscow on its part would show enough flexibility to make limited Sino-Soviet détente possible, but it is certainly conceivable that it could.

In regard to the United States, there is little danger that the Chinese will soon choose to return to a policy of open, hostile confrontation. Yet it is quite possible that, if U.S.-China relations are not normalized, they could decide to harden their policy toward Taiwan and try to exert greater pressure on the United States to alter its policies.

Any sign of trends in these directions would doubtless make it more difficult for the United States to move to complete the normalization process, and if such trends went very far, U.S.-China relations might enter a new period of stalemate and then gradual deterioration.

The immediate effects of this would not necessarily be very dramatic, but over time the consequences could be very serious in relation to U.S. interests. If the present parallelism in American and Chinese interests were to be eroded, at a minimum the prospects of working toward greater international cooperation, involving both Washington and Peking, to try to increase stability in conflict areas in Asia, such as Korea and Southeast Asia, and to deal with the major problems involved in arms control and other global issues, would decline.

If one takes a "worst case" view, U.S.-China relations over time could gradually become increasingly antagonistic again. If so, Peking might again adopt a hostile attitude toward the U.S.-Japan alliance, thereby creating new strains in relations between Washington and Tokyo. It might adopt a less cautious policy toward Korea, which would increase anxieties and uncertainties there. It could again try to encourage Southeast Asian nations-through new pressures or inducementsto reduce their U.S. ties. It could begin seriously to build up its invasion capabilities opposite Taiwan and consider exerting new pressures there. It could also give increased emphasis to its moral support for revolutionaries throughout Asia and perhaps increase material aid in some cases. Globally, it could qualify, or abandon, its pro-U.S. tilt and multiply its attacks on U.S. policies. At worst, the net result might be to lock the United States and China once again into a tense conflictual relationship that could persist for years, with destabilizing effects not only regionally but globally.

In outlining these "worst case" possibilities, I am not predicting that they are all probable in the event that we are not able to consolidate U.S.-China ties, but I would argue that they are definitely possible. Simply recognizing them as possibilities should highlight the stake that the United States now has in consolidating and improving relations with China. The opponents of normalization emphasize the risks that may be involved in downgrading our ties with Taiwan. Any honest observer must agree that there may be some risks in doing this; there are no risk-free policy options in regard to China. But I would put much more emphasis on the risks of not upgrading ties with Peking, which I believe to be much greater.

To sum up, let me say the following. I strongly believe: (1) that improvement in U.S.-China relations will make a significant positive contribution to Washington's effort to work toward a more stable international equilibrium, regionally

and globally; (2) that any deterioration of the U.S.-China relations will multiply the problems facing U.S. policymakers, will have significantly adverse effects on' U.S. interests, and will tend to be internationally destabilizing; (3) that moving promptly to transfer formal recognition from Taiwan to Peking is required to consolidate a significant and lasting relationship with China; and (4) that prolonged postponement of full normalization of relations with Peking involves risks-outweighing those of downgrading our ties with Taiwan-that we should definitely avoid.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much, Mr. Barnett.

We normally hear the panel out before we go to our members up here for questions. Since we are so used to speaking and unused to listening, we have changed the procedure here, so we would like to hear from you folks first before we get to questions.

Mr. Whiting, will you proceed, please.

STATEMENT OF ALLEN S. WHITING, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, CENTER FOR CHINESE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

BIOGRAPHY

Allen S. Whiting is a professor of political science and an associate of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan. He headed the Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East in the State Department, 1962-1966, and was deputy consul general in Hong Kong, 1966-1968. He resided on Taiwan in 1953-1954 and in 1974-1975 and has travelled widely in the Soviet Union, China, Japan and Southeast Asia. He has written or co-authored five books, including "China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision To Enter the Korean War" (Stanford University Press, 1968) and "The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina" (University of Michigan Press, 1975).

Mr. WHITING. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee: I have already distributed a prepared statement to you and I associate myself with the remarks of Dr. Barnett. Therefore, in my oral comments, I would like to amplify on one portion of my statement, namely reference to the cliche concerning Chinese patience.

There is no denying the ability of the Chinese to exercise patience in the face of obstructions and provocations. They do have a different sense of time from Americans. Their cultural memory draws on two millenniums of written history, philosophy, and literature; whereas we think in years, they think in centuries.

This patience exemplifies Peking's handling of the Taiwan question to date. Just as the People's Liberation Army was about to invade the island and complete the civil war in 1950, the United States suddenly arbitrarily intervened and saved the Chinese Nationalists from final defeat. No Chinese Communists were fighting in Korea. Peking had not provided the tanks and artillery for Pyongyang's attack.

Moreover, the Chinese civil war, which began decades earlier, in 1927, had climaxed with 4 years of fighting wherein Chiang Kaishek's troops had been driven from the entire mainland between 1945 and 1949. Yet, when President Truman announced the interposition of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait on June 27, 1950, Peking immediately suspended all military operations against Taiwan.

Some observers, including myself, thought in terms of another cliche-saving face. We did not believe that the civil war had stopped for long. We were wrong. Millions marched in mass rallies, vowing to liberate Taiwan, but the regime never backed its words with action.

Eventually a new image emerged. Instead of seeing the Chinese as aggressive, expansive, and fanatical, Americans came to view them as cautious, patient, and pragmatic.

Despite dozens of fruitless Sino-American ambassadorial talks and hundreds of formal protests from Peking against "intrusions into Chinese air and sea space by U.S. planes and ships," no military threat to Taiwan itself has ever arisen in nearly 30 years.

Even the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, within 3 and 12 miles respectively of the mainland, have had no pressure from the People's Liberation Army since 1960.

AN EMOTIONAL ISSUE

But while the Chinese Communists have proven to be both patient and prudent, they are also capable of anger and determination. It is difficult for Americans to realize the sense of rage derived from nationalism and humiliation. We felt it at Pearl Harbor. Some feel it with the Panama Canal. Yet as a people, nothing in our experience remotely approximates the "century of shame and humiliation" which all Chinese Nationalists and Communists recall when they relive the era beginning with the Opium War and ending with World War II. On this point, both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek agreed, as evidenced by their many speeches and articles.

Frustration and anger breed more than political rhetoric, however. We should recall the Red Guard rampages against foreigners in Peking only 10 years ago. We should also recall the sacking of the U.S. Embassy and library and the burning of the American flag in Taipei, on Taiwan, 20 years ago.

Fueling the Sino-Soviet dispute is fury and resentment over Khrushchev's betrayal of an alliance by his sudden withdrawal of all Soviet technicians and blueprints in 1960, leaving behind dozens of factories half finished at a time of severe economic disorder. This changed the dispute from ideological polemics of two Communist leaders into a national confrontation that involved the Chinese people at the riceroots level. We have not yet felt the full potential of the fury and frustration that underlies the Taiwan issue.

China's confrontation with the Soviet Union inhibits official expression on this matter; however it has begun to surface. Recently I was struck by the identical matter with which two Chinese of unique political acumen but from widely different contexts addressed the question of Taiwan. One is an emminent political scientist, a resident in the United States since 1949; the other an experienced, scholar diplomatic resident in Peking from 1964 to 1976. Both in separate conversations used the same term "explosive" to describe the eventual Chinese reaction should the United States not redefine its relations with Peking and Taipei. Both believe it imperative to remove the formal American political and military involvement from the Chinese civil war before policymakers in Peking conclude that no alternative to the status quo is possible except by the use of force.

Since neither individual is prone to hyperbole, the word "explosive" at first seemed misplaced. If Peking has waited 30 years after Truman's edict and 6 years after President Nixon's pledge to normalize relations, will it not wait longer?