am thinking of one particular leader, Chiang Ching-kuo, who spent 12 years in Russia and knows the leaders quite well, they would be very, very reluctant to depend on the Soviet Union unless they were totally desperate, and despaired of any continuing connection with the United States. Only in those circumstances would they seriously consider developing a relationship with the Russians in its place, because they would fear that the Russians would be prepared very ruthlessly and callously to drop them at any point when they saw it to their advantage to do so. They simply don't trust them.

BLOCKADE

Mr. SOLARZ. Now, in the unlikely event, following normalization and the issuance of a statement by the President and maybe by the Congress that we have a commitment to the preservation of peace in the Western Pacific, at some point the People's Republic of China decided in fact to use force to solve the problem, either through the establishment of a blockade or through the launching of an invasion, maybe after they built up an amphibious capacity, at that point if and when Taiwan asks for our assistance, do you think we should be prepared to come to their aid? And if so, what form of assistance do you think would be appropriate to provide, simply naval support, air support, logistical assistance? Should we use troops if they are requested? How would you feel about that?

Or would you think that if the People's Republic of China decided to use force, this is essentially a Chinese problem and absent the obligation of a treaty, we should wish them well but not do anything to get involved ourselves?

Mr. TERRILL. We would have to be very careful about such a request, because, frankly, we don't know what the reaction of people in Taiwan would be to hostilities between the mainland and Taiwan. As we know, there is a division there between the native Taiwanese and those from the mainland, and there hasn't been any opportunity for referendums on questions that would indicate to us what their response would be. Frankly, I think a blockade is the easiest possible case, because there are international waters between Taiwan and the mainland. The United States would have a right to be operating there.

Stopping a blockade is a relatively clinical operation; it wouldn't involve us in being an army of occupation. Moreover, as Mr. Clough said earlier in the day, the blockade would be the most morally bankrupt action that Peking could take, because they would be bringing themselves up against all those nations that recognize them but go on trading with Taipei. It would be a formula for marshaling the maximum possible opposition to the PRC. I think we could conceivably intervene against a blockade.

Mr. SOLARZ. Do you have any views?

STRATEGIC SITUATIONS

Mr. ZAGORIA. Well, I agree with everything that has just been said. I would just add that the question of whether we should intervene if China were to use force against Taiwan would seem to be dependent upon the overall strategic situation at the time. If at one extreme one were to imagine a renewal of a Sino-Soviet alliance, and the Chinese

encouraging wars of national liberation, and encouraging revolutionary powers all over the world, undermining American influence throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as they once were doing, that would be one set of circumstances.

If, on the other hand, the present strategic situation obtains, in which China has in effect become a quasi-ally of the United States in many areas of the world against the expansion of Russian influence, that is another strategic situation. Frankly, so long as this strategic situation obtains, I find it inconceivable to imagine the Chinese using force against Taiwan.

Mr. SOLARZ. But if the present situation continued to exist, and somehow your analysis turned out to be mistaken--you may well be right— but you may not necessarily be infallible.

Mr. ZAGORIA. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. People have made mistakes in the past, and miscalculations, I think, particularly when it comes to making judgments about the intention of other countries whose cultures we imperfectly understand, whose internal dynamics we only distantly appreciate. We ought to have a measure of humility in making those judgments? Mr. ZAGORIA. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. If it turns out you are wrong, I gather we still ought to stay out of it?

Mr. ZAGORIA. NO; I am simply saying I am not predicting whether they will or will not do anything; I am simply saying what we do first of all will depend on an assessment of the international environment. Mr. SOLARZ. Yes; I am saying, assuming that we do.

Mr. ZAGORIA. Assuming that we assess the international environment, let's say that it is the same as it is now.

Mr. SOLARZ. Right.

Mr. ZAGORIA. And China attacks Taiwan, I would certainly favor giving air and naval support, to prevent a blockade, to keep, to preserve the integrity of the island; yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Clough.

Mr. CLOUGH. I think your assumption about a war suddenly starting

Mr. SOLARZ. It is a hypothesis.

JAPAN

Mr. CLOUGH. It is a hypothesis that needs to be taken back a ways, because I cannot conceive of such an attack happening without a lot of advance intelligence and indication of what the PRC was about; and in this period of apparent preparation for an attack, threats to Taiwan and so on, I think our most important effort ought to be in consultation with our ally, Japan.

Japan is a country that would be most immediately affected by a PRC attack against Taiwan. I think it would totally change the attitude of the Japanese people who now regard the PRC as a relatively peaceloving country, not any particular threat to Japan. I think their view would change radically if they saw these preparations going forward in a very convincing way for an attack on Taiwan, and I think the United States and Japan should consult very seriously about how they should meet this threat; and it ought to be done, in

my opinion, in cooperation, perhaps first by supplying things that the forces in Taiwan needed, but ultimately perhaps if necessary by an actual intervention.

Mr. BARNETT. You offer a scenario that I cannot grasp as real. As I think about it, it seems to me that there is a difference between participation in a military skirmish that may on the Chinese side be a tentative testing of Taiwan's capability-and an engagement that we would characterize as a resumption of some real heat in the civil war— an engagement in which the Chinese commitment were so serious that any involvement on the part of the United States or anyone else in support of Taiwan would make us in effect the adversary of China itself, engaged in a war that could be very prolonged and very costly from which it might be extremely difficult to disengage.

I don't think that the character of the military engagement can be foreseeable in advance. I could see us being involved marginally in a skirmish. But a war against PRC would be something that the American people should be loath to undertake. And I suggest that no one, in fact, can tell in the initial stages of a skirmish what it is going to become.

The Korean war would suggest that initially we thought we were associated with South Korea in an engagement only between Koreans; then with the Chinese involvement it became a different war. Your scenario is impossible, I think, for us to talk about.

Mr. SOLARZ. I want to thank the Chairwoman very much.

Mrs. MEYNER. No, no; I just want to say that we could close the formal part of the hearing, but if you would like to continue to question, if it is all right with our witnesses, feel free to do that.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think they have suffered long enough, Mrs. Meyner. I just wanted to thank you for indulging my interest, even though I am not a member of the committee, and to say to the members of the panel it was really most illuminating. I like to be the devil's advocate from time to time, and I thought some of the exchanges we had were really quite helpful. Thank you.

Mrs. MEYNER. Yes. I just want to formally thank Professor Terrill and you, Mr. Clough, and Professor Zagoria, and Mr. Barnett, for your patience and for really one of the best hearings that I have attended in my stay here in Congress. Thank you so much.

[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The Issue of Taiwan

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washingon, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2:30 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Anthony C. Beilenson presiding.

Mr. BEILENSON. We will proceed.

I am sorry I had to leave just as you gentlemen were about to start, but we had to answer a rollcall vote. There will probably be a few more this afternoon-hopefully not too many.

Mr. Wolff has prepared some remarks to open this hearing which I will now read:

STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, HON. LESTER L. WOLFF, AS READ BY MR. BEILENSON

This is the fourth in our seven-hearing series on the practical implications of the U.S. Government's announced intention of normalizing relations, if possible, with the People's Republic of China. Today's hearing is on the implications for Taiwan of the desire of the U.S. Government to recognize Peking as the Government of China. It follows hearings in which our previous witnesses have mostly agreed that the U.S. Government should accept normalization with the PRC only after receiving varying but specific degrees of assurances regarding the future of Taiwan.

Various formulations have been advanced for achieving this goal while at the same time moving to protect, insofar as it is within our power and interest to do so, the future economic and social well-being of the people of Taiwan.

Varying degrees of concern have also been raised about just what our power and interest is regarding Taiwan, and how Taiwan and our interests fit into the Asian and global pictures.

All witnesses to date have agreed that the decision on whether or not to normalize is primarily a political one; that while some 60 treaties and agreements exist between the Republic of China and the United States, the political determination to derecognize Taiwan takes precedence over the legal ties-more particularly the debate over the Shanghai Communique and the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The Shanghai Communique has been described by some witnesses as a beautifully and perhaps deliberately phrased example of diplomatic ambiguity, but some observers, including the chairman of this

subcommittee, feel that the ambiguity may well be the result of differences in translation and that the United States may have agreed in the Chinese version to a status for Taiwan which is not so clearly stated in the English version.

Of perhaps greater immediate importance is the status of the Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in 1954, which binds the United States and the Republic of China to each other's defense-subject, of course, to the constitutional procedures of both nations.

Some of the witnesses to date have felt the defense treaty would automatically lapse upon recognition of Peking by the United States. Others have stated that the treaty will remain in force until and unless it is specifically disavowed by the United States, and that the 12-month cancellation clause would be the minimum the treaty would remain binding in law.

Finally, the chairman of this subcommittee and others have raised the issue of what the role of the people of Taiwan should or could be in the normalization process. That this is a matter of extreme complexity and sensitivity the chairman is well aware. But the rights of self-determination are cherished, traditional rights prompted by the American people, and its application to the situation of Taiwan cannot be cavalierly brushed aside.

Following those remarks, and on behalf of Mr. Wolff, who is presently attending the U.N. session at the request of President Carter, I would like to welcome to today's hearing our panel of distinguished Asian scholars. We don't have any particular order in which you gentlemen have to proceed. Mr. Cline has asked to go first.

Mr. CLINE. I am giving a lecture at Georgetown University at 4 o'clock.

Mr. BEILENSON. You can practice on us.

Mr. CLINE. I asked permission to leave as soon as I presented my statement.

Mr. BEILENSON. That is quite all right.

AND

STATEMENT OF RAY S. CLINE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

BIOGRAPHY

Ray S. Cline joined Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies in 1973 as Executive Director of Studies. In the thirty years of his distinguished government career in intelligence and research, Dr, Cline has held the positions of Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency and of Director of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State. Dr. Cline is a graduate of Harvard, where he also acquired his Master's Degree and his doctorate in the History of International Relations. He was a Prize Fellow at Balliol College, Oxford University.

In his current work at CSIS, Dr. Cline is engaged in research and writing on strategic intelligence, on the world balance of power, and on U.S. decision-making in international affairs.

Dr. Cline is the author of a book on military planning in World War II entitled, "Washington Command Post," 1951, and a book entitled "World Power Assessment."