least a semblance of a democratic process, while they do not have it on the mainland.

If they were to permit travel from the mainland, the island of Taiwan wouldn't be big enough for all of the people who would want to leave and go to Taiwan.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. That is possible. It is true that you have to face that. I think in 1999, the Chinese have to make a decision. Do they terminate the lease on the new territories at Hong Kong? They may or may not decide that the commercial value of Kowloon is more important than takeover.

They might decide that the commercial value would warrant a degree of autonomy but left alone, without any intermediate negotiations, be it with the United States or with Taiwan, they will ultimately achieve their objective.

It is without saying, I am not saying it is something the American people are advocating or are happy with, but I am saying that is what will happen.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I intended to ask one further question, if I may. It may have been answered, and if it has, I will withdraw the question.

At the present time, our Government proclaims one man, one vote for other areas of this world. Particularly South Africa comes to mind and maybe Zimbabwe. Was the question asked whether the Taiwanese people should have a right to choose and vote as to what should be their future fate? Did our witness testify to that point?

Mr. WOLFF. It just goes to show how well I am learning from the chairman of the full committee because I have asked that question already.

Chairman ZABLOCKI. Very well, I will read the answer.

PEKING'S GAME

Mr. WOLFF. I have just one final question. Bob Scalapino, when he was here, argued, and I am summarizing, that "Soviet-American relations are, and for the foreseeable future, will continue to be of greater importance to the United States than Sino-American relations."

Mr. Scalapino cautioned that a policy of alining with China would ultimately result in a deterioration of Soviet-American relations and a destabilization of conditions in Asia. He said:

The United States must make the critical distinction between playing Peking's game of allowing ourselves to be drawn into a confrontation with Russia and maintaining an economic and political military posture which assures all states of our capacities regarding those communities and policies which we believe to be in our interest.

Mr. SCOTT. That is easy for me to answer. I do not think the United States should play the game of either China or the Soviet Union. I do not think we should play the game of the Soviet Union by lessening our interests or concern as to what is going in the People's Republic of China or vice versa.

It is natural that the Soviet Union looks at us with alarm if they think we have ongoing communication with the People's Republic of China. The People's Republic of China in turn tells us to beware of the Polar Bear or his embrace will stifle us.

We do not have to take either side. We are the United States. In my judgment, our foreign policy should be geared to the advancement of the interests of the United States, its people, and its obligations to the world community, but in no way to tilt toward either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China.

Mr. WOLFF. Senator, I just want to refresh your memory on the question of the War Powers Act. I know you were very active on that. Chairman Zablocki was the principal sponsor of that.

Mr. SCOTT. You may have in mind the number of days.

Mr. WOLFF. No; not the number of days, but the fact that there was a part of the act, if I recall it correctly, that says, "Nothing in this act shall affect treaties in force." Therefore, I do believe that has some relationship to what we were talking about.

Mr. Scort. I think that it does. It does say that it does not in any sense affect the abrogation by the United States under any treaty arrangement, but I'm going further than that. I'm saying, regardless of that, our Congress obivously intended at the time they passed the War Powers Act, not to get into another situation like Vietnam.

Therefore, I think any declaration by the United States of a unilateral nature should willingly provide that it should be with the consent of the Congress. I am adding something there that is in the spirit of the act but certainly not in the letter.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much, Senator Scott. We have kept Senator Roth.

Mr. SCOTT. My apologies. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFF. We are delighted to have you both here today. Are there any further questions? Mr. Burke?

Mr. BURKE. I think maybe we have had Senator Scott long enough, and perhaps we should talk to Senator Roth. I do have some questions, but I will get the opportunity perhaps of asking some of them when we see each other again, Senator.

Mr. SCOTT. All right. I thank you.

Mr. WOLFF. Senator Roth, would you please proceed. Again, our apologies for keeping you so long.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE

Senator ROTH. That is perfectly understandable. As a matter of fact, I had to get back to the Finance Committee to offer a couple of amendments only to have them turned down. I would like to say it is a pleasure to be here again.

I would like to say to our chairman, Mr. Zablocki, there is no one for whom I have greater respect in the area of foreign affairs, and to the committee as a whole, that I do believe the future of our relationship. with China and Taiwan is an important foreign policy issue, and I think your subcommittee, Mr. Wolff, is making an important contribution to public understanding of the issues by holding these hearings. Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much.

Senator ROTH. As a Senator who has long been interested in East Asia, I have many friends on both sides of the normalization question, and I have listened to their views. I have listened to the views of

officials in Japan, the People's Republic of China, the ASEAN countries during visits to those countries this year.

It is my judgment that the United States has a very important national interest in developing a sound, cooperative relationship with the People's Republic of China.

I also believe, however, that we should not accede to Peking's demands for normalization based upon the withdrawal of the few remaining American troops on Taiwan, the abandonment of the mutual security treaty with Taiwan, and the severance of diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government.

This is a position that commands the kind of domestic support our foreign policy should have and which makes sense in terms of the three major international contexts within which the normalization question should be evaluated-those three include the context of our general policies and interests in East Asia, the context of the triangular relationship between the world's three superpowers, and the context of the specific policies we wish to pursue toward the two Chinas themselves. Let me turn first to our overall posture in East Asia. It is a truism to say that the heart and centerpiece of our Asian policy remains our economic, political, and security ties with the region's most dynamic country-Japan.

JAPAN

Without doubt, Japan is the Asian nation that most closely shares our economic and political values. It is by far the second largest economy in the free world and the world's third largest democracy.

The close ties we have had over the past three decades have been enormously important for East Asian peace and stability while a less close relationship or a Japan which moved in very different directions in its defense and foreign policies could be a very severe blow for peace in that region.

The strength of our links to Japan and that nation's trust in the United States will determine Japan's future course, and, in the larger sense, Asia's destiny.

The underpinnings of our relationship with Japan, as many Japanese have told me, depends on much more than our bilateral ties. How Japan ultimately views the value of its links with us depends on our total contribution to stability in East Asia and the fidelity with which we honor our commitments there.

This, I believe, is also true of the way the other two largest countries in East Asia-China and Indonesia-view the value of their American ties.

To the Japanese and many other Asians, our commitment to Taiwan is an important part of our presence. There is no doubt that after the collapse of South Vietnam, there were many doubts in Asia about our ability and willingness to continue to maintain a strong security presence.

Our image was not helped by this year's proposed ground troop withdrawals in South Korea. Should we renounce a commitment that we have entered into with Taiwan, a small country, not because of any perfidy by that small country, but only because the very nation we intended to protect that country against demands it, then, it seems to

me, our credibility as an ally will be severely questioned indeed, especially in Asia but elsewhere as well.

This is a very important cost of renouncing the treaty because the United States is not so powerful that we can maintain the kind of world most compatible with our security interests and political values without friends and allies. As members of this subcommittee know, our credibility is now being questioned by some in Japan and other friends around the world.

SINO-SOVIET RIFT

Let me now turn to the United States-Soviet Union-China triangle. There is no question but that the Sino-Soviet rift has been very beneficial to the United States. It is in our interest to use Sino-Soviet competition to try to improve our relations on a sound basis with both sides, and this was quite successfully done in the early 1970's.

At the same time, to tilt too far toward one of the large communist powers jeopardizes our ability to try to develop a sound relationship with the other. We want to benefit from, but not be a participant in the bitter struggle between China and the Soviet Union.

For this reason, it is essential to remember that while China and the United States have a common interest in opposing Soviet expansion or hegemony, our interests are not identical. The Chinese, for reasons of their own, would like to see a very hostile American-Soviet relationship. In contrast, we want to develop practical means of dealing with the arms race and reducing the threat of war.

Some advocates of normalization argue that this course will permit the United States to develop closer cooperation with China that will be useful in dealing with the Soviet Union. Exactly what this cooperation might consist of, and exactly why it cannot proceed in the absence of normalization is never very clear.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the Sino-Soviet conflict is so fundamental and the present Chinese fear of the Soviet Union is so deep, that the Chinese will, at least at this stage of development, welcome any cooperative action they find in their interest regardless of the Taiwan question. The Soviet threat is today by far the more important

to them.

I would also suggest that if the United States accedes to Chinese demands on Taiwan and abandons its longstanding commitments to that country's defense, it would surely make the Chinese wonder how staunch a partner we would be in standing up to the threat of Soviet hegemony.

I believe that there are means of improving our cooperation with Peking short of normalization of relations on the terms the Chinese demand. For example, we might consider a broader sharing of intelligence information respecting Soviet deployments along the Chinese border.

Finally, I want to look at the specific China-Taiwan relationship. I think that there is no American advocate of normalization who wants Taiwan to be seized or undermined by the Peking regime.

Most point to the military difficulty, if not impossibility, of China taking Taiwan by force in the near future. Even if that is true, nor

malization could lead to a weakening of Taiwan over time, through means that would be available to the Peking Government.

Based on what I have heard the Chinese leaders say, I do not regard normalization as the end of Chinese demands on the United States so far as Taiwan is concerned. I would predict that the Chinese would try to play Japan against the United States in a ratchet process to gradually weaken Taiwan.

The Kissinger and Nixon visits to Peking in 1971 and 1972 were used by the Chinese to put pressure on the Japanese to normalize their relations with China, and thus going a step farther than the United States by diplomatically breaking with Taiwan.

JAPAN FORMULA

Now the "Japan formula" is being suggested for the United States. If we agree, what is the likelihood that China will then go back to Japan to seek some further concession from them, perhaps in the trade area where they have not been very successful to date?

A major problem in our relations with China, of course, is the lack of any real communication. In the absence of this kind of dialog, it is very easy for us to speculate on all kinds of complex arrangements under which Taiwan's autonomy might be respected or to suggest various complicated formulas under which we could agree to China's terms, but still unilaterally reaffirm our commitment to defend Taiwan against an attack.

If we find that we have subsequent differences of interpretation with the Panamanians on treaties that have taken 13 years to negotiate, imagine the problems we would run into with the Chinese.

Moreover, a unilateral statement on our part would be regarded as meaningless without some kind of congressional resolution of support. This would raise important external and internal problems.

Externally, it would call a great deal of attention to the Taiwan issue, and probably provoke Chinese statements that they cannot accept such a declaration and that it constitutes interference in their internal affairs.

Domestically, it could subvert the treatymaking process, under which a commitment requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate, or raise the shades of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

I think it is far wiser to assume that China would not recognize any such elaborate formula. In the Wall Street Journal, last week, it was reported, and I think some reference was made to that a while ago, that Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan said that China could not even tolerate the United States supplying replacement arms for Taiwan's American-made weapons after normalization.

I think this should help lay to rest any speculation about China's ultimate aims and also about what kind of continuing security relationship between Taiwan and the United States and Peking regime might tolerate after normalization.

In other words, normalization is not the end of the Taiwan problem in United States-China relations. It would only be the beginning of new problems.