We should welcome such unilateral statements. But it is neither necessary nor useful to try to extract an explicit reununciation of force from Peking. To do so would directly challenge China's insistence, as a matter of principle, that the Taiwan question is an internal Chinese matter. Even if obtained, any assurance would be so general as to be virtually meaningless. Let us focus instead on the realities that will deter military attack on Taiwan. -- Finally, if Taiwan chooses eventually to establish peaceful contacts with China, including expansion of its trading relationship, we should welcome this as a first step in the peaceful resolution of differences among the Chinese themselves. I am convinced an approach along these lines makes it possible for Taiwan's prosperity and security to be maintained, while we normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. This approach would take account of the interests and concerns of the Chinese, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese, in turn, should be expected to be sensí tive to our interests and concerns. For China, this surely means flexibility in the implementation of what it asserts are the necessary principles of normalization, once these are accepted by the United States: a flexibility that will lead it not to oppose reasonable steps by the United States to provide for a prosperous and peaceful Taiwan. For Taiwan, this surely means recognition that the substance is far more important than the form of its relationship with us. -- In the final analysis, the Taiwan issue is one for the Chinese themselves to resolve over time. The United States has, and should have, no other fundamental interest than that this resolution be a peaceful one. We lack and do not aspire to the power to impose an American solution on Taiwan. The reality is and should remain that we look forward to and encourage a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue; we oppose any forcible attack on Taiwan. We do not contest the claim both in Peking and in Taipei that Taiwan is part of China, even if the US itself takes no stand, at present on the legal status of Taiwan. We cannot be indifferent to how the Taiwan problem is ultimately solved, because any military solution would harm the people of the island and could have seriously destabilizing effects in the region. The official and the legal relationships can and should be adjusted to these realities. The Feasibility of Normalization Therefore, normalization of relations with China is both right and in our national interest. And it is feasible to do it now --- to establish a new, normal and enduring relationship. There is no better opportunity, since the original China opening in 1972, for us to fully normalize relations with China. This Administration is still young enough to make a commitment that it can carry out, and it can build upon as a legacy for its successors. If we manage to do so, this will enable us to engage Mao's successors in a fruitful relationship that should enhance our security and that of our allies in Asia. -- In Peking, Mao's so-called "revolutionary" line calling for unremitting opposition to Soviet power and improving ties with the United States still continues to characterize Chinese foreign policy. But it would be foolhardy for us to assume that this cannot change in the future. The Chinese have a right to expect us to move forward. with normalization when five years have passed since the Shanghai Communique. If we do not move forward now, our relations with China may well deteriorate, confronting us with a new and difficult situation. Too many times has delay undone the plans of Presidents to establish a new relationship with China. Let us not permit inertia once again to dictate our China policy or an absence of one. -- This is the best time to normalize relations not only for the United States and China, but for Taiwan as well. Obviously Taiwan would prefer that we maintain official relations with it. But its present strength and prosperity, Taiwan's present governance by an effective Premier, and the political detente which we can consolidate with China these all argue for developing substitute, unofficial ties between our country and the island now. If there is further delay, the circumstances of normalizataon which our interests clearly demand at some point could well become less favorable. -- There are significant dangers in a failure to normalize relations with China. And these dangers are likely to increase over time. The longer US-China relations remain at a standstill, as they have over the past four years, the more likely will Peking be to question the value of the US connection. Internal critics will argue that China compromised itself by permitting Liaison Offices to be established and maintained while Taiwan still enjoyed diplomatic representation and expanded consular ties with the United States. From no other country has China accepted such a half-way house and we cannot assume that it will continue to do so indefinitely. -- The internal debate could also highlight the Soviet military threat and perceived Western shortcomings in containing it. Chinese frustration with the US over Taiwan might evenutally overcome Mao's strong anti-Soviet legacy and lead over time to a limited detente between China and the USSR.. -- The results of any realignment, even a gradual one of limited proportions, could be far-reaching. We could forfeit a historic opportunity to establish a new relationship with China. China might become more inclined to emphasize forceful rather than peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Conceivably the Soviets could become even less accommodating than now in Europe and also in arms control negotiations. We should bear in mind that over forty Soviet army divisions are stationed in the Far East. They could be used elsewhere. Tensions would surely rise, and the risk of conflict could increase All countries would ultimately be the losers, including China and the USSR. We should not expect normalizataon to result in instant agreement on the issues dividing us from China. In this, as in relations between China and Taiwan, the resolution of differences will be a slow process. But normalization will remove a key obstacle to a significant and enduring relationship between the United States and China. Clearly, the pace and the scope of US/China relations after normalization will depend on a large number of factors, internal and external, only some of which will be under our control at any one time. For the forseeable future, our world role including our relationships with our allies, our readiness to balance Soviet military power, and our negotiating role in such troubled areas as the Middle East and southern Africa will be a major Chinese concern, and a basic consideration both in how seriously they take our actions and how closely they are willing to work with us. But, over time, a normal and enduring US/China relationship will obviously enhance a parallelism in pursuit of many of our respective interests. In normalizing relations, we should consult closely with our friends and allies --- particularly those most directly affected. We must consult closely with Japan, our major ally in the region. For the first time in this century, the United States can develop strong and constructive ties with both Japan and China. And we can and should assure South Korea and our other allies that our security commitments in the region remain unaltered. When Secretary Vance goes to Peking, he should be able to act upon the following agenda for US-China relations: First, set an early date for complete withdrawal of our few remaining military forces (less than 1400 men) from Taiwan. There is no military need for them to remain, and there is benefit in their leaving by a specific date. Second, begin the negotiating process required to achieve full normalization of US/China relations, as soon as possible, preferably no later than 1978. This will make it possible for all concerned China, Taiwan and the United States to undertake a smooth transition to normalization. Third, pending complete normalization, negotiate a final settlement of the question of US financial claims against China and Chinese assets that have been frozen in the US since 1949. This action will help to augment our economic ties, and it could be symbolically important in making progress toward normalization itself. Fourth. increase both government-to-government and people-to-people contacts and exchanges; prepare the way for reunification of families; and expand US/China trade opportunities in both the agricultural and industrial fields. We must be prepared for progress to be gradual, but any forward movement will help to consolidate our new bilateral relationship, without undermining our economic and other non-governmental ties with Taiwan. Fifth, develop with Congress the political and legal steps required for continuing ties with Taiwan on an unofficial basis. As a member of the Senate, I pledge my full support as we adjust US statutes to permit maintenance of the full range of unofficial ties with Taiwan. When the United States Congress returns from its August recess, I intend to introduce a resolution in support of normalization under these conditions. More generally, we should look forward to expanding discussions with the People's Reublic on the full range of strategic, political and economic issues, at the regional and global levels. One of the most important of these for China and the United States is movement toward a peaceful settlement in Korea. Over time, we should find ways to further the North/South economic dialogue as it relates to basic human needs, and to engage in effective arms control and disarmament. That is for the future. For the present, I am convinced of the importance of our overcoming the legacy of the Cold War and establishing a normal, enduring relationship of significance between the United States and the People's Republic of China. We should move forthrightly to fulfill the vision of the Shanghai Communique, to establish relations which befit the central importance of our two countries in the world arena. APPENDIX 6 ADDRESS BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER At OCCIDENTAL COLLEGE ON JUNE 11, 1977, ON "NORMALIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS" I want to talk to you today about one of the foreign policy issues presently at the center of my desk: the normalization of U.S. relations with other governments. It is an issue that arises in a variety of current and important situations but, before getting down to cases, I think it is important to understand why it is generally in the interest of the United States to exchange diplomats with other governments and, where possible, to exchange ideas, goods, and people as well. The world looks a great deal different today than it did just a few years ago when you began your college education. The absence of major armed conflict lends the world a deceptive air of tranquillity. In fact, societies are in various stages of rapid-sometimes violent-change. The industrial world was rudely reminded of its vulnerability by the oil embargo that occurred less than four years ago. Since then inflation, recession, slow growth, and mounting debt have aggravated political uncertainties all across the globe. In the developing world, exploding populations are exerting unprecedented pressure for change. Communist societies face similar problems. They, too, have found that there are no ready answers to the problems of allocating resources while avoiding inflation and restraining consumption. At a time when individual societies are increasingly under strain, the bipolarism of a few years ago has given way to a diversity of power. Even the most powerful nations are profoundly affected by the decisions of others. Medium-sized powers have proliferated, and we now have a more sophisticated understanding of the limits to our own power and that of the Soviets. We find our political, economic, and security interests are interlocked and interwoven with those of all other nations. We live, in sum, in an interdependent world. And in one way or another, we find our fate and our futures tied increasingly to those of other peoples. If we cannot communicate easily with them, we cannot effectively promote our own interests or build new bonds of common interest. This brings me to my central point: We believe that diplomatic relations help us to discharge our basic duty to protect the interests of our government and our citizens. By keeping open a channel of communication with other countries, we best serve our long-range objective of encouraging the growth of democratic institutions. We do not look at the normalization of relations as an end in itself. Rather, diplomatic relations, once established and maintained, enable us to communicate with other governments directly, to state cur views and listen to theirs, to avoid misunderstandings and to exert influence. In short, they help us to accomplish more than we can without them. Let me put the American attitude toward diplomatic relations in a historical perspective. HISTORY OF RECOGNITION In 1792 the French king was replaced by a popular government. The U.S. envoy in Paris wrote to Thomas Jefferson, our first Secretary of State, to ask how to behave with the new government. He received a straightforward answer: It accords with our principles to acknowledge any government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation substantially declared. With such a government every kind of business may be done. Jefferson's answer was interpreted over time to mean that the United States would generally deal with the government effectively in power. This became the policy of our government until late in the 19th century. But in the 20th century our practice became less certain and exceptions were introduced. Woodrow Wilson introduced a substantial exception by insisting that the United States should not have normal diplomatic relations with governments that |