too, and in the broader sense that they apply to a good many nations, including the Chinese, because I would differ somewhat with Mr. Barnett on this point.

I think while it is quite true Peking would be overjoyed to see us "abandon" Taiwan, I think if it were done in such a fashion as to indicate a part of a broader withdrawal and an uncertainty about commitment

Mr. BEILENSON. But it is not, is it? Why should anyone infer that? Mr. SCALAPINO. It would depend on the way it was done. But if it were, I say in my opinion, in the longer term, Peking would be asking again the questions it is asking now; namely, are we really credible as a countervailing force?

One thing Teng Hsiao-ping reportedly said the other day which has not been reported here is, he made some comment to the effect that Secretary Vance had assured him that our military forces were stronger than those of the Soviets, but we don't believe it.

Now, this concern with our capacity to be a countervailing force is, I think, uppermost in the Chinese mind at the moment, more important than Taiwan.

Mr. BEILENSON. What makes you think he was telling the truth that he did, in fact, not believe it?

Mr. SCALAPINO. Whether he was telling the truth or not, the press in China has consistently emphasized this point. It has again and again come back to the dangers of appeasement, the risks of Munich, et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. BEILENSON. We are enormously appreciative to all four of you gentlemen for having given us this much of your time and for coming down to Washington. We have already taken almost 3 hours of your time, but if you have a few more minutes, I think one or two of our staff people might have a few questions to ask, now.

Mr. PRZYSTUP. Following that line, given the current anti-Soviet orientation of the PRC foreign policy, what benefit would they gain from calling our bluff should we normalize and in normalizing issue a statement with reference to the peaceful settlement of the question? Mr. SCALAPINO. I don't think that initially they would "call our bluff." It strikes me that what we are doing here, however, is risking a down the road situation in which we would clearly have no legal defense for giving military assistance to Taiwan. Under those circumstances, I would feel that the possibility of the Taiwan issue becoming an internal issue in China used on occasion in factional struggles would become greater, because in my opinion, the authorities in Peking would then be forced to develop a new Taiwan policy.

They would not have the excuse of an American defense commitment then. There would have to be new measures. They could not go on with precisely the old formula. Then the issue of why are you allowing the United States to give military support to a province which they have accepted legally as a province, I should think would be a very telling political point.

Mr. BARNETT. But you are assuming we will be more explicit on the exact present legal status of Taiwan than is the case.

Mr. SCALAPINO. If we accept the PRC formula, I think we are

being quite explicit, because there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.

Mr. WHITING. The Japanese simply took note of the Chinese position.

Mr. BEILENSON. They said they respected it.

Mr. BARNETT. They respected it; yes. I think you have a "straw man" here. I don't think it will be necessary to be that explicit.

Mr. SCALAPINO. I think Peking will interpret this precisely as they are interpreting now the Shanghai Communique as an acceptance of a one-China position with Taiwan part of China. That is the way they are interpreting the Shanghai Communique today.

Mr. BEILENSON. Anyone else?

Mr. HOLSTINE. This question may be directed to anyone who would like to speak to it.

Aren't the true global implications of normalized relations with China dependent upon the formula we work out, and the manner in which we retain our connections with Taiwan, which everyone, I think, agrees we must at least initially, and the second part, which may be a little more speculative is: Isn't it in Peking's interest to reach a modus vivendi with us which would not undercut our position in Asia, but would rather accommodate our presence in Taiwan, Japan, and even Korea?

That is rather a self-concluding question, but isn't this really the key point? Can we retain our position in Asia after we have this worked out?

Mr. BARNETT. I think the answer to your question is yes. But perhaps that doesn't answer your specific questions. I think Peking is asking us to change the legal basis of our relations with Peking and Taiwan.

Mr. HOLSTINE. Would they be satisfied with a formal and not a substantive change?

Mr. BARNETT. Yes; that is clear, as far as the economic relationship is concerned. They have made that clear. It is also clear that we can have a nonofficial political relationship. It remains to be seen whether they will accept what I think should be the minimum requirement in the security area, from the U.S. point of view, which is a statement on our part about our position, plus our making it clear that Taiwan will have access to what it needs for its defense. But I think they will accept it.

Mr. BEILENSON. Again, our warmest thanks to all of you gentlemen for having come down here and shared your expertise with us. We appreciate it very much.

We have apparently one more question over here.

Mr. NELSON. Professor Thayer, is there a genuine Asian perception of the American problem on normalization with the PRC? Particularly on the Taiwan question? Professor Whiting mentioned that it was his feeling that the Japanese in fact do not want us to pursue the Japanese formula, and you gave us a country-by-country case. But do they see this as a peculiar vestige of the cold war?

Mr. THAYER. No.

Mr. NELSON. The Asian nations you refer to, do they understand the domestic problems we have and do they think they are valid? Could you discuss that for us?

Mr. THAYER. Now, in my talks with the various leaders and people in the various Asian countries, I think they have quite a sophisticated understanding of what is going on here. I don't see any misunderstandings of what the process is. But one of the principal things we have seen—and we haven't talked about it very much today-is they see this also as a small country/big country argument, and they are a little disturbed by seeing two big countries get together and going after a small country, a small country being Taiwan, and that is one of the major things in the relationship that seems to bother them. Many Asians see Taiwan as an outstanding example of American success in helping a new nation build. They ask why the United States is willing to discard this success, which shows the benefits of alliance with the United States for the sake of friendship with the Mainland, which represents a system totally at odds with the United States. It doesn't seem to bother the Japanese so much.

Japan has a specific fear. Its scholars see America's action in East Asia over the past century as an emotional, random, walk. At one time, the United States sympathizes with China. At another time, the United States sympathizes with Japan. They have not been able to develop a logical theory to explain these changes in U.S. sentiment. They ask: Is the United States starting one of its historic sweeps away from Japan and back toward China?

There is a lot in this problem. Another one is the statement you get from some people that the Chinese are dealing with symbols. Normalization, that is, when you get done with normalizing, you will not have a very different situation, realistically, than we have right now. We are dealing with symbols, really, and what we are saying to China is we want to be friends with you, we want to try to establish a closer relationship with you. We recognize, for one reason or another, and the reasons change, that in the future we will have to do business with you. We would like to do it as pleasantly as we possibly can. The Japanese and others say, OK, we understand that, there is no question on that. But there are many ways you can hand symbols back and forth, one to another. The symbols chosen don't have to be Taiwan.

Many Asians see the present impetus to resolve the Taiwan question as coming more from the Americans than from the Chinese. They see the principal Chinese concerns as the construction of China and the containment of the Soviet Union, not the return of Taiwan. They ask: Why does the United States try to resolve differences before exploring fully points in common with China? Why doesn't the United States first talk about national construction? Why rush on Taiwan? Mr. BEILENSON. One does not get that from Premier Teng's statement after Secretary Vance left.

Mr. THAYER. Doesn't get what?

Mr. BEILENSON. That is all they were talking about, isn't it, or were they talking about something else?

Mr. WHITING. May I address that point?
Mr. BEILENSON. Please.

CHINESE PATIENCE

Mr. WHITING. There were many other issues talked about, but the reference that Vice Premier Teng was alleged to have made to the effect that Chinese patience is not inexhaustible is an explicit point that was featured in an American-Chinese newspaper which is very favorable to the Peking line. It was the main headline covering the story, "Chinese Patience Is Not Inexhaustible." If you look at the Chinese press, the attention in Taiwan in the domestic media, not for foreign consumption, has been much more sharply featured than in previous years. I do not think that the Chinese see this as hurrying, the issue has been on the agenda since the Nixon visit, for 6 years. It is not as though we are suddenly popping the question.

Mr. BARNETT. I would like to read one short quote, to counter the idea that you can rank the Chinese concerns, that the Soviet threat is overriding and that the Taiwan problem is way down on their agenda. They are both there, and both important. This quote is from the Ta Kung Pao, which is the leading Communist paper in Hong Kong, and it states what I think the Chinese probably feel, and hint at in statements like that of Teng Hsiao-p'ing:

U.S. officials still say there is no time limit on the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, in other words, there is still no definite time limit on the U.S. withdrawal. However, China holds that there must be a definite time limit, and it will not permit the situation to continue indefinitely.

Now, one can dig up many, many statements, on the public record, some of which state that they are patient, in a certain sense. I think the Chinese are patient in regard to actual reunification of Taiwan, because they know the objective conditions make this impossible in the short run. I do not believe they are patient about what we have been talking about today. This does not provide a simple answer, however, to the question about how they are going to balance this problem, which is a real one from their point of view, against the problem of dealing with the Soviets.

But I would reject the assumption that the Chinese are, and will remain, patient about our transferring formal relations from Taiwan to Peking.

Mr. BEILENSON. Thank you all very much. We are adjourned until 1:00 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene on Wednesday, September 21, 1977, at 1:00 p.m.]

NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

Legislative and Legal Problems

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1977

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 1:15 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Helen S. Meyner presiding.

Mrs. MEYNER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Perhaps I should explain that the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Congressman Wolff from New York, has asked me to take over in his absence. He has been appointed to the United Nations as the representative from Congress for this session of the General Assembly.

Mr. Wolff has prepared some remarks to open this hearing which I will now read:

OPENING STATEMENT OF SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, HON. LESTER L. WOLFF AS READ BY MRS. MEYNER

I would like to welcome everyone to the second in the seven-hearing series on the practical implications of normalization with the People's Republic of China being held by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Yesterday afternoon we began the first hearing, entitled "Global Implications of Normalization," and while we intended to spend time discussing the broad questions that title implies, a significant portion of the hearing revolved around the question of Taiwan.

I mention this because I suspect that much as we might wish to dwell upon more esoteric aspects of the normalization question, the Taiwan issue will refuse to go away-that is, until all parties to the question work out some modus vivendi.

Our Government is committed to a policy of normalization, but we as yet have developed no publicly articulated policy of how or when to do so.

Today's hearing, on the legislative and legal aspects of normalization, will, perhaps more than any other hearing in the series, probe new ground. Certainly insofar as the House is concerned, no indepth examination of the possible effects on our laws and agreements has been undertaken from the standpoint of the working premise that normalization is the intended policy of the U.S. Government.

As an example, at last count, we had some 59 treaties and agree