Co., 1 I. C. C. Rep. 600, 685. An examination of that report, however, discloses that the railway had in effect a published rate on crossties eo nomine and the complaint was that it was unreasonable because it was higher than the rate on lumber. The ruling of the Commission was not that the lumber rate included a rate on ties, but that the rate on ties was unreasonable as compared with the lumber rate and should be reduced.

(c) Because the Railway Company by loading and carrying the three cars of ties under the 24-cent rate had itself recognized the applicability of the lumber rate to crossties and was concluded thereby. But without stopping to consider the tendency of the proof establishing the want of foundation for the proposition we think it is wanting in merit for this obvious reason: If, as we have seen, the question of whether crossties were embraced in the filed tariff concerning lumber was involved in such conflict and doubt as to require the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the situation was such that the Railway Company could not do by indirection that which the statute permitted it to do only by compliance with the law, that is, filing its tariffs in the regular way. Nothing could better serve to demonstrate this self-evident truth than by recurring to the fact that at the very inception of the controversy the request made by the Railway Company to the Interstate Commerce Commission to be allowed to immediately put in the rate on crossties was refused by that body.

(d) Because the Railway Company did not refuse to transport the ties in good faith and insisted upon the absence of a scheduled rate simply as a pretext and device for preventing the shipment of the ties and their delivery in performance of the contract with the Union Pacific Railway, and with the ulterior and wrongful motive of keeping the ties on its line so as to be able to purchase them itself from the Tie Company. But without pausing

to do more than direct attention to the fact that this proposition is necessarily disposed of by what we have said, that is, by the lawfulness, in view of the state of the existing and filed tariff, of the refusal until the Commission had acted, we think all the contentions under this last head are completely answered by the statement that the suit was based upon the unlawfulness of the action of the Railway Company in refusing to carry the ties in view of the filed tariffs, and therefore the contentions are not open for our consideration.

It results that error was committed by the court in declining to sustain the motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and therefore it is our duty to reverse.

MR. JUSTICE PITNEY dissents.

Reversed.

NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v.

HEAD.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

No. 254. Argued March 10, 1914.-Decided June 8, 1914.

There is a clear distinction between questions concerning the operation and effect of the law of a State within its borders and upon the conduct of persons within its jurisdiction, and questions concerning the right of the State to extend its authority beyond its borders with the same effect; and a decision upon the former does not constitute a ground for refusing to entertain a writ of error to review the judgment of the state court involving the latter.

A State may not extend the operation of its statutes beyond its borders into the jurisdiction of other States, so as to destroy and impair the

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

234 U. S.

right of persons not its citizens to make a contract not operative within its jurisdiction and lawful in the State where made. Under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution the courts of one State are not bound to declare a contract, which was made in another State and modified a former contract, illegal because it would be illegal under the law of the State where the original contract was made and of which neither of the parties is a resident or citizen.

The power that a State has to license a foreign insurance company to do business within its borders and to regulate such business does not extend to regulating the business of such corporation outside of its borders and which would otherwise be beyond its authority. The Constitution and its limitations are the safeguards of all the States preventing any and all of them under the guise of license or otherwise from exercising powers not possessed.

A statute of Missouri regulating loans on policies of life insurance by the company issuing the policy, held not to operate to affect a modifying contract made in another State subsequent to the loan by the insured and the company neither of whom was a resident or citizen of Missouri.

141 Missouri, 403, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the state court and also the power of a State to regulate the business beyond its borders of a foreign corporation licensed to do business therein, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. James H. McIntosh, with whom Mr. Gardiner Lathrop, Mr. Cyrus Crane, Mr. O. W. Pratt and Mr. S. W. Moore were on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

The original contract of insurance was entered into between non-residents of Missouri, who agreed that it should be controlled by the laws of New York. This was a valid provision and cannot be annulled by the courts of Missouri. Smith v. Mutual Benefit L. I. Co., 173 Missouri, 329; Burridge v. New York Life Ins. Co., 211 Missouri, 158; Gibson v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 77 Fed. Rep. 561; London Assurance v. Companhia de Moagens, 167 U. S. 149;

234 U. S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

Kroegher v. Calivada Colonization Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 641, 652; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dingley, 100 Fed. Rep. 408.

The cases relied on by defendant in error which dealt with contracts of residents or citizens of Missouri, such as Cravens v. Insurance Co., 148 Missouri, 583, 593; Price v. Insurance Co., 48 Mo. App. 281; Horton v. Insurance Co., 151 Missouri, 604, 612; Burridge v. Insurance Co., 211 Missouri, 162; Smith v. Mutual Ins. Co., 173 Missouri, 329; Whitfield v. Insurance Co., 205 U. S. 489; Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Clements, 140 U. S. 226; Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 77 Fed. Rep. 94, are distinguishable.

The policy loan agreement was not a Missouri contract. It was signed and delivered outside the State of Missouri by parties who were non-residents of that State and cannot be controlled or governed by the Missouri nonforfeiture laws.

The original contract could be lawfully amended or changed by the loan agreement. 1 Cooley's Briefs Insurance, 900; S. S. White Co. v. Delaware Ins. Co., 105 Fed. Rep. 642; Leonard v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 65 Connecticut, 529; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 22 Ind. App. 333; Kattelman v. Fire Assn., 79 Mo. App. 447.

The right of plaintiff in error to make contracts is protected by § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and to attempt to deprive it of this right raises a constitutional question and gives this court jurisdiction. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 52; Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Missouri, 421, 458; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 722; Union Bank v. Commissioners, 90 Fed. Rep. 7; Olcutt v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 677, 690; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 294; Keller v. Insurance Co., 58 Mo. App. 557; Whitfield v. Insurance Co., 205 U. S. 480; Greenhood on Public Policy, 2.

Mr. Buckner F. Deatherage, with whom Mr. Goodwin Creason, Mr. James S. Botsford, Mr. W. P. Borland and

Argument for Defendant in Error.

234 U.S.

Mr. James A. Reed were on the brief, for defendant in

error:

The defendant, although a foreign corporation created and existing under the laws of New York, came into Missouri under its license and permission and made the contracts of insurance sued upon in these actions, in the State of Missouri, with the same force and effect and subject to the insurance laws of Missouri the same as if it had been and were a corporation created under the laws of Missouri instead of the laws of New York, and for the purposes of this case defendant must be taken to be the same in all respects as a Missouri corporation.

The contracts in these cases having been entered into in Missouri, have the same legal effect and force as if the insured had lived in Missouri, in which State he was born, instead of living in New Mexico, at the time of making these contracts. The people of all the States and Territories of the United States have the right to buy and sell real estate in Missouri, own property therein and enter into contracts therein, the same as citizens and residents of Missouri. See § 748, Statutes Missouri, regarding aliens, 1 Rev. Stat. Missouri of 1909, p. 355.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment plaintiffs were guaranteed the same right as if they had lived in Missouri. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369; R. W. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 209; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377; Frazer v. McConway Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 257; Templar v. Bankers Board Ex., 131 Michigan, 254; Steed v. Hamey, 18 Utah, 367; Pearson v. Portland, 69 Maine, 278.

The question of the situs of contracts in cases where the question of their validity depends upon the laws of the State where they are made does not depend upon the residence of the parties. Napier v. Bunkers Ins. Co., 100 N. Y. Supp. 1072.

The policy was issued upon the life of a man residing, at the date of the issuing thereof, in the city of Chicago