ascertaining the existence of competition and to authorizing the carrier to meet it without any authority to do more than exercise its general powers concerning the reasonableness of rates at all points. But this proposition is directly in conflict with the statute as we have construed it and with the plain purpose and intent manifested by its enactment. To uphold the proposition it would be necessary to say that the powers which were essential to the vivification and beneficial realization of the authority transferred had evaporated in the process of transfer and hence that the power perished as the result of the act by which it was conferred. As the prime

ary of Trunk Line Freight Association territory; thence follows the Ohio River to Huntington, W. Va.

Zone No. 4 embraces all territory in the United States east of Line No. 3 and north of the south boundary of Transcontinental Group C. Zone No. 5 embraces all territory south and east of Transcontinental Group C

It is further ordered, (1) That those portions of the above-numbered applications that request authority to maintain higher commodity rates from points in Zone No. 1 to intermediate points than to Pacific coast terminals be, and the same are hereby, denied, effective November 15, 1911; (2) that petitioners herein be, and they are hereby, authorized to establish and maintain, effective November 15, 1911, commodity rates from all points in zones numbered 2, 3, and 4, as above defined, to points intermediate to Pacific coast terminals that are higher to intermediate points than to Pacific coast terminals; provided, that the rates to intermediate points from points in zones numbered 2, 3, and 4 shall not exceed the rates on the same commodities from the same points of origin to the Pacific coast terminals by more than 7 per cent from points in Zone No. 2, 15 per cent from points in Zone No. 3, and 25 per cent from points in Zone No. 4.

The commission does not hereby approve any rates that may be established under this authority, all such rates being subject to complaint, investigation, and correction if they conflict with any other provisions of the act.

By the commission: [SEAL]

JUDSON C. CLEMENTS,
Chairman.

object of the transfer was to vest the Commission within the scope of the discretion imposed and subject in the nature of things to the limitations arising from the character of the duty exacted and flowing from the other provisions of the act with authority to consider competitive conditions and their relation to persons and places, necessarily there went with the power the right to do that by which alone it could be exerted, and therefore a consideration of the one and the other and the establishment of the basis by percentages was within the power granted. As will be seen by the order and as we have already said for the purpose of the percentages established zones of influence were adopted and the percentages fixed as to such zones varied or fluctuated upon the basis of the influence of the competition in the designated areas. As we have pointed out though somewhat modified the zones as thus selected by the Commission were in substance the same as those previously fixed by the carriers as the basis of the rate-making which was included in the tariffs which were under investigation and therefore we may put that subject out of view. Indeed, except as to questions of power there is no contention in the argument as to the inequality of the zones or percentages or as to any undue preference or discrimination resulting from the action taken. But be this as it may, in view of the findings of the Commission as to the system of rates prevailing in the tariffs which were before it, of the inequalities and burdens engendered by such system, of the possible aggrandizement unnaturally beyond the limits produced by competition in favor of the competitive points and against other points by the tariff in question, facts which we accept and which indeed are unchallenged, we see no ground for saying that the order was not sustained by the facts upon which it was based or that it exceeded the powers which the statute conferred or transcended the limits of the sound legal discretion which it lodged in

the Commission when acting upon the subject before it.

It results that the Commerce Court in enjoining the order of the Commission was wrong and its decree to that end must therefore be reversed and the case be remanded to the proper District Court with directions to dismiss the bill for want of equity.

Reversed.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, ET AL., v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ET AL., v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COMMERCE COURT.

Nos. 137, 163. Argued October 18, 21, 22, 1912.—Decided June 22, 1914. Decided on authority of preceding case.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Attorney General Wickersham and Mr. Assistant to the Attorney General Fowler, with whom Mr. Blackburn Esterline, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, was on the brief, for the United States.

Mr. P. J. Farrell for the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. Charles Donnelly, Mr. F. W. M. Cutcheon and Mr. F. C. Dillard for appellees.

Mr. Rush C. Butler, Mr. William E. Lamb, Mr. Stephen A. Foster and Mr. Cornelius Lynde filed a reply brief on behalf of the Chicago Association of Commerce.

Mr. Joseph N. Teal for Portland Chamber of Commerce.

Mr. J. B. Campbell for the City of Spokane.

Mr. William A. Glasgow, Jr., for Giroux Consolidated Mines Co.

By leave of court, Mr. Alfred P. Thom filed a brief in behalf of certain interested parties.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The eleven carriers who are appellees on this record filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission applications to be relieved from the long and short-haul clause of §4 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended by the act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 547. After full hearing the Commission entered an order granting in certain respects the relief prayed but establishing a proportionate relation to be maintained between the lower rate for the longer haul and the higher rate for the shorter haul upon the basis of percentages which were fixed with reference to defined zones. The carriers refused to obey the order and filed their bill in the Commerce Court to enjoin its enforcement. An interlocutory injunction was ordered. The defendants moved to dismiss and on the overruling of the motions appealed from the interlocutory order, that case being No. 137. Subsequently upon the election of the defendants not to plead further, a final decree was entered and appealed from, that appeal being No. 163.

.

These cases are governed by the opinion in Nos. 136

and 162 just decided. They were tried in the court below with the other cases, were decided by the same opinion, and, although different localities are involved, the questions presented are identical, and for the reasons given in the other cases, Nos. 136 and 162, the decree must be reversed and remanded to the proper District Court with directions to dismiss the bill for want of equity.

Reversed.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ON THE RELATION OF DUNNE, GOVERNOR, AND LUCEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. ECONOMY LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

No. 179. Argued April 29, 30, 1914.—Decided June 22, 1914.

The provisions in the Ordinance for Government of the Northwest Territory and subsequent acts of Congress to the effect that navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence rivers shall be common highways and forever free to the inhabitants of that Territory and of the United States do not determine navigability of any of the streams but only define rights dependent upon the existence of navigability.

There is no Federal right involved in the obstruction, or use by private owners, of a non-navigable stream wholly within a State.

The question of navigability of a river wholly within a State is purely one of fact, and where the state court has decided that such a river is non-navigable there is no right left to review.

A State has no Federal rights which it may exert for itself or on behalf of its citizens or of all the citizens of the United States in regard to a river wholly within its boundaries which the highest court of the State has declared to be non-navigable; nor are any such rights created by acts of Congress merely authorizing surveys for and estiVOL. CCXXXIV-32