between the reasonable charges to be shown in its schedules and the free passes which it may issue only to those specified in the act. To most of those enumerated the free pass obviously would be gratuitous in the strictest sense, and when all that may receive them are grouped in a single exception we think it plain that the statute contemplates the pass as gratuitous in the same sense to all. It follows, or rather is saying the same thing in other words, that even on the improbable speculation that the possibility of getting an occasional free pass entered into the motives of the employé in working for the road, the law did not contemplate his work as a conventional inducement for the pass but on the contrary contemplated the pass as being what it called itself, free.

As the pass was free under the statute, there is no question of the validity of its stipulations. This was conceded by the Court of Appeals, as we have stated, and is established by the decisions of this court. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Adams, 192 U. S. 440. Boering v. Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co., 193 U. S. 442.

Judgment reversed.

By agreement of parties the judgment in No. 752 was to follow the foregoing. Therefore in No. 752 also the judgment is reversed.

234 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER COMPANY OF AMERICA v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
KENTUCKY.

No. 297. Argued April 24, 1914.-Decided June 22, 1914.

It is essential to the rendition of a personal judgment against a corporation that it be doing business within the State; but each case must depend upon its own facts to show that this essential requirement of jurisdiction exists.

The presence of a corporation within a State necessary to the service of process is shown when it appears that the corporation is there carrying on business in such sense as to manifest its presence within the State, although the business may be entirely interstate in its char

acter.

The fact that the business carried on by a corporation is entirely interstate in its character does not render the corporation immune from the ordinary process of the courts of the State.

147 Kentucky, 655, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the validity and sufficiency of service of process upon a foreign corporation and the determination of whether such corporation was doing business within the State, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Alexander Pope Humphrey and Mr. Edgar A. Bancroft, with whom Mr. Victor A. Remy was on the brief, for plaintiff in error in this case and in No. 298.1

For cases involving questions of service of process upon foreign corporations as controlled by the Constitution of the United States, see Ky. Stats., § 571 (1909); Commonwealth v. Hogan & Co., 25 Ky. L. R. 41; Commonwealth v. Eclipse Hay Press Co., 31 Ky. L. R. 824; Three States

1 See p. 590, post.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

234 U.S.

Buggy Co. v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. L. R. 385; Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518; Conley v. Mathieson, 190 U. S. 406; Caledonian Co. v. Baker, 196 U. S. 432; Remington v. Cent. Pac. R. Co., 198 U. S. 95; Kendall v. Am. Loom Co., 198 U. S. 477; Peterson v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 364; Green v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530; Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437; Saxony Mills v. Wagner, 94 Mississippi, 233; Fawkes v. Am. Motor Co., 176 Fed. Rep. 1010.

At the time of the attempted service the defendant was doing nothing but an interstate commerce business with the people of Kentucky. Commonwealth v. Chattanooga Co., 126 Kentucky, 636; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 621.

The carrying on of interstate commerce by the defendant with persons residing in this State does not constitute a doing of business in Kentucky. Cases supra, and Havens v. Diamond, 93 Ill. App. 557.

Merely soliciting orders is not doing business in a State. Cases supra, and Green v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530; North Wisconsin Cattle Co. v. Oregon Short Line, 105 Minnesota, 198; Earle v. Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co., 127 Fed. Rep. 235, 240; Fairbank v. Cincinnati &c. Ry. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 420, 423; Grace v. Martin Brick Co., 174 Fed. Rep. 131, 132; Kentucky Civil Code of Practice, § 51, subd. 3 and 6.

To hold that defendant can be prosecuted in these cases would violate the commerce clause of the Constitution. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 27; Hadley-Dean Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 Fed. Rep. 242, 244; Albertype Co. v. Gust-Feist Co., 102 Texas, 219; Eclipse Paint Co. v. New Process Roofing Co., 55 Tex. Civ. App. 553; Moroney Co. v. Goodwin Pottery Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 120 S. W. Rep. 1088, 1091.

The fact that the Harvester Company formerly carried on business in Kentucky does not alter the situation.

234 U.S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 226.

Under the construction given the Kentucky Process Statute by the Court of Appeals a person or corporation doing exclusively an interstate commerce business must submit to the jurisdiction of Kentucky courts.

The submission to the state courts, which is requisite to render foreign corporations subject to suit, cannot be compelled or implied where such corporation does only an interstate commercè business.

The cases relied upon by the Commonwealth do not support its contentions.

Mr. Charles Carroll, with whom Mr. James Garnett, Attorney General of the State of Kentucky, Mr. Frank E. Daugherty, Mr. J. R. Mallory, Mr. J. C. Dedman, Mr. C. R. Hill and Mr. C. D. Florence were on the brief, for defendant in error in this case and in No. 298:1

Plaintiff in error cannot raise the question in this court that the proceedings against it in these cases were a denial to it of due process of law. Section 157, Crim. Code, Kentucky; Commonwealth v. Cheek, 1 Duval, 26; Commonwealth v. Neat, 89 Kentucky, 242; Payne v. Commonwealth, 16 Ky. L. R. 839; Sharp v. Commonwealth, 16 Ky. L. R. 840; York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15-20; Cosmopolitan Mining Co. v. Walsh, 193 U. S. 469.

The process in this case was served upon the proper person and the judgment rendered thereon was valid and binding. St. Louis S. W, R. R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 227.

As to effect of the instructions to agents from the plaintiff in error, see Good Roads Co. v. Commonwealth, 146 Kentucky, 690; Boyd Commission Co. v. Coates, 24 Ky. L. R. 730; Nelson Morris v. Rehkopf, 25 Ky. L. R. 352; Green v.

1 See p. 590, post.

Opinion of the Court.

234 U.S.

Chicago &c. R. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530; Denver &c. R. R. Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. Rep. 938; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; Delamater v. South Dakota, 125 U. S. 93; 19 Cyc. 1347-1348.

To hold that plaintiff in error was properly served with process and the judgment rendered against it valid will not violate the commerce clause of the Constitution. International Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth, 147 Kentucky, 657.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

This case presents the question of the sufficiency of the service of process on an alleged agent of the International Harvester Company in a criminal proceeding in Breckenridge County, Kentucky, in the court of which county an indictment had been returned against the Harvester Company for alleged violation of the anti-trust laws of the State of Kentucky. The Harvester Company appeared and moved to quash the return, substantially upon the ground that service had not been made upon an authorized agent of the company and that the company was not doing business within the State of Kentucky, and it set up that any action under the attempted service would violate the due process and commerce clauses of the Federal Constitution. The only question involved, says the Court of Appeals, and we find none other in the record, is whether there was such service of process as would sustain the judgment. The court overruled the motion, and, the case being called for trial and the Harvester Company failing to appear or plead, judgment by default for $500 penalty was entered against it, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky (147 Kentucky, 655).

It appeared that prior to October 28, 1911, before this indictment was returned, the Harvester Company had