Mr. SWEENEY. I was trying to draw a distinction between whether it was scientifically feasible on paper as contrasted with the problems of actual development of prototype development.

Mr. DEHAVEN. I did not understand the question, if you were asking a question.

Mr. SWEENEY. That was the sense in which I was asking whether those kinds of inventors could go to the NACA for help.

Mr. DEHAVEN. I believe not.

Mr. SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that finish your testimony, Mr. DeHaven? Mr. DEHAVEN. Could I add just three words or more, after that last answer?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DEHAVEN. It may exist as a possibility, but it does not work out that the NACA will grant much in the way of funds to projects outside NACA. That is all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, even though they do not grant funds, will they review one of the so-called dreams that you mentioned? Will they review it and pass on it, give their opinion as to whether it is feasible or not feasible, without getting into the field of funds or investments?

Mr. DEHAVEN. I do not think I could answer for NACA policy, Senator, on that. I think it would be quite an easy thing to determine. The CHAIRMAN. You think we should ask them instead of you? Mr. DEHAVEN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Beck, you have an additional statement to make?

Mr. BECK. In the past, many private organizations and individuals with ideas regarding light aircraft design and development which later proved to have real merit have not been albe to win the attention or assistance of the NACA because of the preoccupation of this agency with the research programs and ideas of people and organizations already prominent in aviation.

The CHAIRMAN. Our last and final witness will be Charles A. Parker. STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. PARKER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL AVIATION TRADES ASSOCIATION

Mr. PARKER. My name is Charles A. Parker, presently serving as executive director of the National Aviation Trades Association, composed of 33 State chapters with approximately 2,000 members who are fixed-base operators throughout the country.

This association unfortunately has not established their position relative to S. 2984, but I would like to report the general feeling for the need for improved aircraft in the personal plane category.

I am particularly aware of this need after having been engaged in aircraft sales for nearly 10 years.

Design development has been much like the dog chasing its tail, and it has not, as production figures will show, succeeded in getting on to its own feet by its own devices.

Now, this industry provides a backlog of national defense through its pool or air know-how and facilities through its encouragement of air participation by the public, by providing jobs for thousands of

specialists, and also by maintaining going airports which are part of our national airport system, to the tune of 50 to 75 percent in some States.

This backlog is being lost. Companies, employees, and facilities are steadily on the decline.

Now may be the time, therefore, to do something radical to break the stalemate by opening the way for what we need above all, namely, improved design and development in the personal-type aircraft.

This, as it can be seen, not only is of value to the industry, as generally outlined, and to the national economy, but also of direct value to the military.

In the capacity of an aircraft distributor before and since the war, I have pleaded with manufacturers for development to answer the shortcomings I have found in the products, and which my prospects have readily detected.

The manufacturers' answer has invariably been that due to prohibitive costs of change and development they were reluctant to gamble on change, particularly radical change, or they were simply unable to put up the necessary development funds.

As a result, little change and little improvement has taken place. Those who now are attempting to bring out a more suitable product plus many who have tried, have gone through large sums of money, perhaps all their funds, to complete the required preliminary design and testing, and many a fine idea has hence utterly failed or even now is staggering at a time when we are desperately in need of development. It was my hope, that as the GI flight-training activities receded that aircraft embodying real development and of such appeal would be available to pick up the slack and take us off on a new and sound economic tack.

Such has not been the case. Note, for example, that only about 150 personal-type aircraft were built in January of this year.

Here in 1950 I ask, where are the folding wings to reduce hangar costs? Where is the dual power unit driving one propeller for greater safety, or the light twin-engined development? Where is there one new amphibian for the operator to market offering real and proven usefulness? Where is there an airplane at a price with a really practicable change of pace from its needed 30 miles and hour or less to say, approximately 150 miles an hour? Or finally, where is there just one approved rotable type airplane?

Well, gentlemen, there are none. The prospects, with the industry left to its own devices, are slim, and this phase of the aviation industry continues to decline, lose its valuable people and facilities and pool of aviation know-how.

We are at the point where something is needed to break the vicious. circle. I am in favor of S. 2984 if this bill will help the fellow with a partially developed or nearly fully developed idea to get over the critical hump and into production.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

That finishes us up for this morning. We will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p. m., an adjournment was taken, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Friday, May 12, 1950.)

PROTOTYPE AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENTS

FRIDAY, MAY 12, 1950

UNITED STATES SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OF THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,

Washington, D. C. The subcommittee met pursuant to adjournment at 10 a. m., in the committeeroom, United States Capitol Building, Senator Homer E. Capehart presiding.

Present: Senator Capehart.

Senator CAPEHART. The committee will come to order. I believe our first witness is Mr. James G. Ray, speaking for the feeder airlines. You may proceed in your own way and take as much time as you care to.

STATEMENT OF JAMES G. RAY, AIRLINE CONSULTANT

Mr. RAY. My services are retained by a number of the local service airlines for work of a technical and operational nature. Because of this relationship I know of the great need for a modern aircraft with which to bring the benefits of air service to the smaller more isolated cities and towns.

I am heartily in favor of Senate bill 3504. Its aim is certainly in the right direction. However, there is a serious question as to whether the proposed remedy goes far enough in the case of the feeder prototype. It is this aspect of S. 3504 I would like to bring to the attention. of your committee.

The domestic certificated airlines flew 367,653,925 miles during Of this number, 160,813,043 miles were flown with DC-3 aircraft. Thus, 43.74 percent of the total miles were flown with a prewar aircraft, originally designed in the early thirties and now obsolete.

The DC-3 is obsolete because of the great progress that has been made in the art of designing and building aircraft in the last decade. An aircraft can be built now to carry the same load and operate for considerably less cost per mile.

This greater efficiency is gained in two ways. Structurally, the aircraft can be built lighter for a given pay load. With less structural weight, less power is required, which means less engine weight and less weight for fuel. Aerodynamically, the aircraft can be built to slip through the air with less resistance. This increase in speed automatically lowers operating cost per mile. Under the Civil Aeronautics Act the air carrier's mail pay as set by the Civil Aeronautics Board is based on its actual operating costs.

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Thus the higher cost of operating DC-3 aircraft is passed on to the Federal Government in mail pay. On the volume of DC-3 flying done last year a decrease of 1 cent per mile in operating cost amounts to $1,608,130 per year.

It is difficult to predict accurately the exact improvement in operating costs that can be accomplished with a newly designed DC-3 replacement. Exhibit A, attached hereto, shows a probable decrease of 11 cents per mile. This would mean that nearly 18,000,000 dollars in direct operating expense were wasted last year because the airlines were flying an obsolete aircraft.

Direct expense is not the only saving that can be realized from a new design. The DC-3 has been notoriously poor for loading and balance. An aircraft with its fuselage near the ground and with accessible convenient loading doors could lower ground costs an additional 1 or 2 cents per mile.

In addition, it is reasonable to expect that a new aircraft will have more sales appeal and in itself will attract more customers. Also, the faster schedules and better service that can be provided would result in more patronage and higher load factors. These factors, added to the 18,000,000 dollars in direct flying costs, brought the amount of mail pay for the operation of this obsolete airplane to well above 20,000,000 dollars last year.

These data in exhibit A are taken from design and performance information released by the Boeing and the Douglas aircraft companies. The DC-3 information is read from performance curves appearing in a brochure published by the Douglas Co. on August 1, 1947, a copy of which will be submitted to your committee.

Most of the aircraft manufacturers have at one time or another projected designs for a DC-3 replacement aircraft. In the latter part of 1946 the Boeing Co. designed an aircraft known as the Boeing 417. This aircraft was designed to carry almost exactly the same pay load as the DC-3. Also, it would operate from as small fields and in general would have made a very satisfactory DC-3 replacement. Early in 1947 a brochure of the 417 was released by the Boeing Co. which predicted performance and operating cost in considerable detail. For these reasons this design has been selected for comparison with the DC-3 to show what can be expected by applying the advancements in the art of aircraft design made since the DC-3 was first built. The data in exhibit A were taken from this brochure, a copy of which also will be submitted.

The items of comparison shown in exhibit A have been selected to highlight the basic design improvements. It will be seen that the gross landing weight is some 4,700 pounds less on the 417 which show the economies that can be made in aircraft structures.

Also, the power required is only two-thirds of the DC-3's power, yet the 417 flies faster, carrying approximately the same pay load from the same size airports. This shows the progress that has been made in aerodynamics. It should be realized that the 417 was never built and that the performances shown are only predictions.

However, performance predictions are usually quite accurate, this accuracy being a part of the progress that has been made in the art of aircraft design. Also, it should be remembered that the 417 design itself is nearly 4 years old and I have no doubt a better one can be made today because of additional progress in the last 4 years.

You may well ask why the 417 or some similar aircraft has never been built. I certainly do not know the answer. Some influencing factors are fairly obvious. The short term of the feeder certificates, the difficulties experienced by the smaller carriers in obtaining equity financing, the abundance of war surplus DC-3's and the interest of the larger carriers in larger aircraft might be cited.

Whatever the reason, the fact remains that the DC-3 replacement has not been built. I have contacted six of the largest aircraft manufacturers in the last several months and as far as I can determine there is no such design presently being considered.

In other words, there is no plug in sight for this rat hole down which between 20 and 30 million dollars of mail pay ran last year. The question is whether S. 3504 offers sufficient inducement to get a DC-3 replacement quickly or should stronger measures be taken.

I have no desire to see the Federal Government do anything that can be done by private enterprise. Personally I would rather see this aircraft developed as a private business venture. But after 6 years of effort on the part of the local service air carriers there still is no suitable replacement aircraft in sight. So the Federal Government is faced with the question of whether it will continue to pay this costly obsolescence bill. Its alternative is to invest a much lesser amount in the design of a prototype DC-3 replacement aircraft now.

The actual amount of this investment, that is, the cost of designing and building the replacement aircraft, is difficult to predict. None of the six leading aircraft manufacturers I have talked to had made any recent studies and consequently did not have a developed figure for this cost. However, I got estimates from most of them covering development, design and manufacture up to flight testing. All of these estimates ran between five and eight million dollars.

I would like to emphasize that these estimates cannot be considered official estimates of these companies. To make such an estimate the company would have to be given a definite specification and a considerable amount of study and investigation would be necessary. The estimates I obtained were not of this caliber but instead were more or less free "guestimates" of the company representatives to whom I talked.

Also, I have consulted the CAA on this matter of probable prototype cost. The CAA, of course, is not in the business of designing aircraft or of estimating the cost of such designs. But certain people in the CAA work closely with the aircraft manufacturing industry and are very informed on the present status of the art. I have been able to obtain personal estimates from Mr. George Haldeman, Chief of the Aircraft Division, and Mr. Ray Maloy, Chief of the Engineering Flight Test Branch of the CAA. These men agree that the above estimates are reasonable.

After a general study of this problem during the last several months, it is my belief that the amount of money required will be around 7 to 71⁄2 million dollars. This is less than one-third the amount of money the Federal Government is spending now each year because a suitable DC-3 replacement aircraft has not been developed.

It would seem to me that the most qualified agency of the Government to superintend the expenditure of this money would be the CAA. If the money were made available to them, probably their first move should be to make a study of the requirements of the various carriers