that he had helped to kill one of Aqajarorssuaq's kinsmen. Aqajarorssuaq observes: "Truly, if I still held by our old customs I should now get up and cut you into little bits. As it is, I thank you for that you came, since I have now learned how my kinsman came by his end. You need fear no harm from me." He makes peace, too, with another mortal enemy-both now carry snuff boxes: "Let us be friends, and cease to follow the custom of our fathers."

The triumph of the new spirit is here complete. In the older stories, we are again and again reminded of the need for observing closely the ancient customs of the race. Vengeance was no less a sacred duty according to the old convention. But Aqajarorssuaq, as his argument in the story plainly shows, acts not only by a higher ethical code; he follows as well a sounder practical one. It is not only "wrong" to kill a man; it is silly. And the time and energy spent in chasing or evading him might have been spent in hunting more seal-in modern terms, the cost of armaments would be better spent on old-age pensions. Aqajarorssuaq stands for the emancipation of the race, not only from the spiritual tyranny of black paganism, but also from the economic burden of a wasteful superstition.

W. W. WORSTER

A GREAT NAVAL ADMINISTRATOR

Private Papers of George, second Earl Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1794-1801. Vols. I. and II. 1913-1914. Edited by Sir JULIAN CORBETT. Vols. III, and IV. Edited by Rear-Admiral H. W.RICHMOND. Navy Record Society.

HANKS are due to the Navy Record Society for these four

THANKS

very important volumes of naval history which it has given to the public, and thanks are also due to the fifth Earl Spencer for his action in placing a great collection of family papers at the disposal of the Society. The task of editing was first entrusted to Sir Julian Corbett, who was responsible for the two volumes issued in 1913 and 1914. Then came the gap of ten years when the war and the Admiralty of the day thrust those of the past out of our thoughts. Sir Julian died at the work of writing his account of the "World War." His place was taken by RearAdmiral Richmond, a most competent successor. These two editors have presented us with a full survey of a great naval administration lasting from 1794 to 1801-that is to say during seven of the most important and fruitful years in the whole life of our country, and of "The Service." They have been economical, without being at all niggardly, with their introductions and notes. Of these we will say no more since our concern is with the documents.

Considerations, not only of space, prevent discussion of the battles fought between 1794 and 1801, for they play but a small part in the whole body of documents, and moreover they are abundantly well known already. These Spencer papers are so well worth study because they help to explain why our squadrons could be promptly and vigorously handled. It was because behind the ships at sea there was an administration which made it possible for them and their crews to be good.

The man who chiefly deserved the thanks of his country for helping the British Fleet to be what it was on the day of Trafalgar was the second Earl Spencer. He did not do the work alone. No institution was ever made by one man alone. The makers of the fleet of 1805 go far back into history. The immediate founders and framers were those admirals and captains of the

later years of the War of the Austrian Succession who thought out "the good old discipline of the Western Squadron." The innate faith of the best Englishmen that the doing of good work is the virtue of a man, and the combination of that independence of character whereby a man is nerved to insist on being free to do what is best, with the whole-hearted belief in the necessity and the nobility of a freely-given obedience, these between them make true discipline; and these were the inspiring forces," the deliveries of the nation's self which have no name.' They gave the rulers the means to work with. Yet, if the race projecting itself on the sea was the causa causans, there had been times when administrative folly, corruption and the rage of faction, had spread evils in the British Fleet, and it was vitally important to clear them away.

Lord Spencer was equally well qualified by birth and character to forward the good work. He was born to take it for granted that he was to serve the State. By character he was fitted to be one of those aristocratic leaders who, however little radicals may be inclined to allow the truth, did so much to give us a cleanhanded public service. He was no more a genius than was his son, Lord Althorp, "that most honest, frank, true and stouthearted of all God's creatures," whose personal influence in the House of Commons carried the Reform Bill. He was just a representative Englishman of the governing class, of sound sense and kindly nature, who came over to Pitt in January, 1794, with the Duke of Portland and other Whigs. In the presence of the threatening anarchy on the other side of the Channel, “so disgusting to humanity, so full of horror," he decided that he must support the ministers of the Crown. And so thought the vast majority of his countrymen. It was in the nature of things that he should become a minister.

In a happy hour he was chosen to replace a predecessor who was Pitt's own brother, the "late" Earl of Chatham-that goodlooking, socially amiable gentleman, who had all the brains required to make a valuable public servant, but was unhappily possessed by a demon of sloth. Pitt had made him First Lord of the Admiralty, presumably because he was his brother and, let us trust, in the hope that he would reform. What he did is lucidly explained by Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, afterwards Lord Barham, who was commissioned to nurse him.

In a

memorandum to Spencer he says that Chatham did not come regularly to the office, and when he did come he came late. He never sent for official papers till after mid-day, and thereby stopped all business. The clerks followed his example. "When I first came to the Admiralty Board, I found no regular time fixed for beginning business nor any plan formed for carrying it into execution; the office extremely defective in attendance, and no dependence whatever on anything being carried into execution." When the Abbot dices what is to be expected of the lay brothers? And this had been the slovenly condition of the office from 1788 to 1794, when Pitt hardened his heart and sent his brother to dawdle elsewhere.

The first measure to be taken was to fix a proper routine, to make it a rule that the clerks must be in attendance at 10.30 a.m., and were not to leave while the Admiralty Board was sitting. Nor were they to receive any more visitors. Among the abuses which Middleton found in abundance, one seemingly was that the gentlemen of the office turned it into a club. There were plenty of other abuses calling for the attention of a strong Board. And this slack Admiralty was supposed to supervise the Navy Board which managed the Civil Government of the Navy, i.e., the dockyards, the building, buying and fitting out generally. The Civil Government was reeking with abuses as the Commissioners of Naval Inquiry were to demonstrate before many years were over in four volumes folio of reports. So one body of idlers was set to keep another body of pilferers on the narrow path of good morals and, of course, the one hand did not wash the other. Better order was imposed at the Admiralty, but whether Middleton succeeded in bringing about all the reforms he wished for is another question. Here is a passage in his memorandum which opens a view into an old world where those who had friends at court might live happily.

It has been customary for the First Lords to recommend certain officers of their own nomination to flag officers who are going abroad who are to be the first promoted. The consequence of this has led to much expense by improper purchases of vessels, which must be explained verbally, and a winking at the breach of Public Order.

As this may not explain itself, it is well to add that admirals who had to find vacancies for these befriended young men would buy in prizes or other craft and commission them as tenders

"hush, hush" vessels of a kind. It must be confessed that Spencer was not always above recommending personal friends. In October, 1795, he particularly points out several of his own. friends to Admiral Christian who was about to sail to the West Indies, and quite candidly says that one of them-who, to be sure, was a promising officer-was a "near relative of Lady Spencer's." But has there ever been, will there ever be, a First Lord or other ministerial person, even of the Labour Party, who never took or will take "care of Dowb?" Enough if the grossly incompetent are not promoted merely for being nearly related to Lady Spencer, and the exceptionally able are brought forward, though they have no connection with her Ladyship's family. Lord Spencer came well up to that standard. If he did consent to the too early promotion of Nelson's son-in-law Nisbet, a scandalous piece of favouritism, and of relatives of St. Vincent's, he was urged by those heroes in the first flush of their glories to job for them.

There were sufficient reasons why Lord Spencer should try to do little more in the way of reform than establish a good routine of business at the Admiralty, and prepare the way for a thorough overhaul of the dockyards. Included in Lord Spencer's private papers is a mass of correspondence with General Bentham, who was appointed Inspector-General of Naval Works, but while recording the existence of this correspondence the editors say that to make a selection would be of little value and that publication of the whole correspondence would swell their book to enormous proportions. We suggest that the Navy Record Society might do worse than issue these documents as a whole.

From the outset of his accession to office Lord Spencer's time was fully occupied in seeking remedies for the internal disorders in the Fleet; in promoting coalitions with foreign Powers, or in meeting the troubles produced by their breakdown; in preparing and directing expeditions; in making ready to meet invasions of Ireland, and proposed hostile landings in Great Britain.

One of his first acts was to decide that Lord Hood, who was First Sea Lord and Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, must be laid on the shelf. Lord Hood had come home on leave after the disastrous venture at Toulon, and the occupation of Corsica, from which so much was hoped and so little was gained. What happened when he did come home? These papers throw