Can't have escheat proved. aples 21 yrs.

6079. The escheator receives a fee of fifteen per cent. of all moneys paid into the State Treasury after an adjudication of escheat, a decree of sale and a distribution to creditors of the decedent: Act of 1911. Any party interested may within three years from the adjudication, or within three years after attaining age if he was a minor or three years after the removal of disability of that sort, "traverse the finding" and if successful secure, less expenses, the money paid into the State Treasury. In such event the "informer" must refund his "reward". No escheat proceedings can be instituted after twenty-one years from the death of a man who was supposed to have died without heirs, etc. Property held in trust may escheat upon the death, without heirs, etc., of the beneficiary: Act of 1911.

TITLE BY OCCUPANCY

SECTION 311. Blackstone, page 258, says that this right arises when an estate is granted to A. to hold for the life of B.-an_estate per autre vie-and A. dies before B., after which time the man who first entered was given the estate until B.'s death "by right of occupancy". If the estate was granted to A. and his heirs for the life of B., A.'s heir would be "special occupant" if A. died before B. The Act of 1834, Purd., 1091 and the Act of 1917, Sec. 11, g, P. L., 471, provide that "unless such an estate (per autre vie) have been limited to the decedent and his heirs" the remainder of the term between A.'s death and B.'s "shall go to the executors or administrators, be included in the inventory and be subject to distribution in like manner as leases for terms of years.

SECTION 312. A man may have title by "Settlement” which is

#

adv. poss.

Theoretically

somewhat similar. Blackstone's definition of occupancy is "the tak occupancy

|| ing possession of those things which before belonged to nobody." The formal method of acquiring title from the Penns or from the Commonwealth was by warrant, survey and patent, already referred to, but many titles are by settlement and improvement "with the manifest intention of making the land a place of abode and the means of supporting a family." (Act of 1786, Purd., under "Land Office," page 2214). In Northwestern Pennsylvania, even titles by warrant were to be valid only when the warrantee actually lived upon the land for five years unless prevented by the enemies of the United States: Act of 1792,

Purd., 2225; Attorney General vs. Grantees, 4 Dallas, 237. The Acts found in Purdon under "Land Office" show the preference to "settlers" and many titles are held by no higher right. See Sec. 40, supra. SECTION 313. Somewhat in the nature of title of occupancy is title by accretion.

Blackstone (Vol. 2, page 262), says that the gradual building up of land bordering on a stream by washing up of sand and earth will increase the land of the riparian owner, but if the alluvion be sudden and considerable it belongs to the King.

SECTION 314. In Pennsylvania land bounded by a non-navigable stream extends to the middle of it: Coovert vs. O'Conner, 8 Watts, 470; Sec. 412, post. The rule is different as to navigable streams for there the ownership extends to high water mark absolutely and to low water mark subject to the easement of passage in the public and of mooring boats, rafts, etc.; Stover vs. Jack, 60 Pa., 339 Fulmer vs. Williams, 122 Pa., 191. A riparian owner's right to use and divert the water is discussed in Scranton Co. vs. R. R., 240 Pa., 604, Read the case of Wheatley vs. Bough, 25 Pa., 528, as to subterranean percolations, springs, etc.

SECTION 315. High and low water marks were established by a Commission acting under authority of a Pennsylvania Act of 1858 along the Ohio, etc., rivers near Pittsburgh, but these were changed by action of the Secretary of War acting under authority of Acts of Congress of 1899, 1890, ete The Federal Government claims the right. いたっ te regulate commerce on such waters and the Supreme Court has ratified the establishment of "harbor lines" by the Secretary of War, although such action may affect riparian property rights: Philadelphia Company vs. Stimson, 223 U. S., 605; Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. vs. Garrison, 237 U. S., 251.

SECTION 316. The riparian owner on navigable or non-navigable streams is entitled to the accretion but the owner upon a navigable stream is not entitled to an island formed by accretion: Wainright vs. McCullough, 63 Pa., 66. The Commonwealth claims title to the islands and beds of navigable streams and will issue warrants and pat ents with special formalities: Purd., under "Land Office", page 2233; Act of 1913, P. L., 665. See Allegheny vs. Nelson, 25 Pa., 332, and

reparian

vuences

along the Allegly rive own to high wales mark abs.

Allegheny vs. Moorhead, 80 Pa., 118, as to "Kilbuck Island" and "Nelson Island" opposite the "Point"-this is now "Exposition Park.

SECTION 317. Navigable streams in England were those in which the tide ebbed and flowed. Here the characterization of a stream depends upon the fact of navigability or non-navigability: Carson vs. Blazer, 2 Binney, 476. In many cases, however, the Legislature has arbitrarily declared the existence of a "fact" by declaring that a stream is navigable. See many such statutes in Price's Index to Local Laws. Chartiers Creek was not deep enough to float large boats upon but it was deemed wise to declare it navigable for a certain distance so that logs might be floated unimpeded by weirs or dams. Later the Act declaring it navigable was repealed, perhaps because there was no longer occasion to float logs

•hered.

1)

TITLE BY PRESCRIPTION AND TITLE BY ADVERSE

POSSESSION

SECTION 318. Title by prescription exists "when a man can show no other title to what he claims, than that he, and those under whom he claims, have immemorially used to enjoy it." 2 Blackstone, 263.

SECTION 319. Prescription applies to incorporeal hereditaments prescription presupposes a grant or presumes a grant, from lapse of time. (An interest in land cannot be prescribed for, although there may be a presumption that a man has received a grant or deed for the 1eal estate he occupies or claims after a lapse of time. It is not proper to say that he claims by prescription-the grant is presumed but it is a grant or conveyance of an estate in land and not a mere incorporeal hereditament: Dougherty vs. Welshaus, 233 Pa., 121.)

The acquisition of title to lands by long continued adverse possession depends upon the Statute of Limitations: Sec. 336, post.

SECTION 320. The distinction between "prescription" and "adverse possession" is actual. At common law prescription could relate only to those things which lie in grant," that is a deed for the conveyance of an incorporeal hereditament. Corporeal hereditaments "lie in livery" and the Statute of Limitations applies to "manors, lands, tenements and hereditaments," not to incorporeal hereditaments. Length of time may constitute an absolute bar by the operation of the Statute of Limitations, while prescription is based upon a presump

def: