to restrain a conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce between the city of St. Louis and points in other states. In granting the injunction, the judge said that "The unusual character of the bill filed by the government matter. A demurrer to the bill was subsequently overruled by Phillips, D. J., (64 Fed. Rep. 27). This injunction was issued ex-parte against 132 defendants named in the original bill, and afterwards against about 250 more added as defendants. It enjoined the defendants "and all persons acting in concert under their direction and control," and provided that it should be binding on the named defendants after personal service upon them, but it also provided that the injunction "shall be binding upon said defendants, whose names are not stated, but who are within the terms of this order from and after the service of such writ upon them respectively by the reading of the same to them, or by the delivery of a copy thereof to them." Thomas v. Cincinnati, etc. Railway Company (Circuit Court, S. D. Ohio, July 13, 1894), 62 Fed. Rep. 803. This was a petition by receiver of defendant railway against one Phelan, a member of the American Railway Union, to punish him for contempt in interfering with the operation of the railroad by the receiver, and for an injunction. Taft, Circuit Judge, found as a fact that Phelan had conspired with the other officers of the union, to call out the receiver's employés, for the purpose of stopping the business of the railroad and held that this was an unlawful interference with the operation of the road, and a contempt of the court. He also said: "More than this, this combination is in the teeth of the act of July 2, 1890," citing the decision of Judge Billings in 54 Fed. Rep. 994, and other similar decisions, and saying that although a different view had been taken by Putnam, J.,1 he was unable to agree with that view. He therefore sentenced Phelan to six months' imprisonment in the county jail. China Company v. Brown et al. (October 9, 1894), 164 Penn. 449. The plaintiff was a manufacturing corporation, and ordered one department of its works to be closed, whereupon their employés in other departments, being members of a local union, quit work, and refused to permit others to work for the plaintiff. The bill alleged this, and also showed that the defendants had endeavored to prevent others from working for the plaintiff by gathering in crowds about the plaintiff's place of business, and at the boarding places of the workmen, by following the workmen to and from their work, stopping them on the highways, interfering with them in their work, and holding them up to ridicule and contempt of outsiders. An injunction was 1United States v. Patterson (Circuit Court, Mass. D., February 28, 1893), 55 Fed. Rep. 605, 641. Here Putnam, J., held that the statute of 1890 did not authorize the court to restrain an attempt to drive competitors out of the field by violence, annoyance, intimidation, or otherwise, saying that if it did the inevitable result would be "That the federal courts will be compelled to apply this statute to all attempts to restrain commerce among the states, or commerce with foreign nations, by strikes or boycotts, and by every method of interference by way of violence or intimidation. It is not to be presumed that Congress intended thus to extend the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States without very clear language. Such language I do not find in the statute." ordered, restraining the defendants, twenty-seven in number, by name, from these acts. Barr et al. v. Essex Trade Council, the Typographic Union, No. 103 of Newark, et al. (October, 1894), 53 N. J. Eq., 101, 136. This is one of the best-considered cases on this subject. The plaintiffs were the proprietors of a daily newspaper in Newark, N. J. The defendants were incorporated and voluntary associations of workmen. The plaintiffs introduced a new method of making up their paper for publication by the use of what was called "plate matter." The defendant unions, the individual members of which it was shown represented a purchasing power of $400,000 a week, thereupon issued circulars calling upon the public to "boycott" the Newark Times, "cease buying it, cease handling it, cease advertising in it." By this and similar means they induced persons to refuse to buy the plaintiffs' paper, or to advertise in it, and injured and were continuing to injure the plaintiffs' business. The court said that "a man's business is property," and quoted from 16 Wallace 116, that “a calling when chosen is a man's property and right"; said that the plaintiffs' business of publishing his paper, with the incidents of its circulation and advertising, was as much their property as the types and presses upon which the paper was printed, and therefore the conduct of the defendants was an injury to the plaintiffs' property. It also held that the conduct of the defendants, although not actuated by personal malice against the plaintiffs, or by any desire permanently to injure their business, was malicious because the inevitable consequence of it was to injure the plaintiffs' business (citing 23 Fed. Rep. 750). Also that this conduct was an attempt to intimidate and force the plaintiffs by fear of injury to their business as property to submit to the defendants' demands as to how they should conduct their business, and was therefore an attempt to intimidate and coerce. The court then made an elaborate review of the authorities, citing especially Casey v. Typographic Union, 45 Fed. Rep. 135, Cœur d'Alene Mining Company v. Miners' Union, 51 Fed. Rep. 260, Blindell v. Hagan, 54 Fed. Rep. 40, Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, and in conclusion held that as the conduct of the defendants was a continuing injury to the private property of the plaintiffs in their business, it must be enjoined, and issued an injunction restraining the defendants "from distributing or circulating any circulars, printed resolutions, bulletins, or other publications containing appeals or threats against the Newark Times, or the complainants, its publishers, with the design and tending to interfere with their business in publishing said paper, and from making any threats or using any intimidation to the dealers or advertisers in such newspapers tending to cause them to withdraw their business from such newspaper." Elder et al. v. Whitesides et al. (Circuit Court, E. D. Louisiana, March 22, 1895), 72 Fed. Rep. 724. Here citizens of England, owners of steamships between Liverpool and Gretna, Louisiana, filed a bill alleging that the defendants had combined and conspired to prevent the loading or unloading of the plaintiffs' steamships except by such labor as might be acceptable to the defendants, and had thereby absolutely prevented the plaintiffs from loading or unloading their steamships at that port by other than the defendants and their confederates. The plaintiffs filed affidavits showing the combination and conspiracy. The defendants filed their affidavits denying that they had interfered with the plaintiffs, or prevented the loading of their vessels, or caused damage to the plaintiffs. There was no allegation or proof of any overt act committed by the defendants. Parlange, D. J., found that the combination and conspiracy existed, and upon the authority of the opinion in Arthur v. Oakes, held that the defendants should be enjoined, and issued an injunction accordingly. United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724 (Circuit Court, N. D. Ill., December 14, 1894). July 2, 1894, the United States filed a bill in the Circuit Court, under the "Anti-trust Act" of 1890, against Eugene V. Debs and others, and the American Railway Union, alleging that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy to interfere with and prevent the transportation of the mails and interstate commerce upon all the railroads doing business in the city of Chicago, twenty-three in number. An ex-parte injunction was issued on the same day, whereby "the defendants and all persons combining and conspiring with them, and all persons whomsoever" were enjoined from in any manner interfering with the business of these railroads as carriers of interstate passengers and freight, and also among other things "from compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce by threats, intimidation, persuasion, force, or violence, any of the employés of any of said railroads to fail or refuse to perform any of their duties as such employés in connection with the interstate business or commerce of said railroads, or the carriage of the United States mail." July 17th, informations were filed against the defendants, charging that they had violated this injunction. August 1st, and 2nd, information of the same character was filed against one James Hogan and others, who were not parties to the bill. All these persons appeared and filed full and unequivocal answers denying that they had violated the injunction. They also demurred to the bill, and claimed that the court had no jurisdiction. Woods, Circuit Judge, found that the defendants had interfered with and interrupted interstate commerce and the carriage of the mails, and that this constituted a public nuisance, and held that a court of equity had jurisdiction upon bill or information by the attorney-general on behalf of the state to enjoin such a nuisance. The defendants claimed 4 |