places and carry on his business, but the defendants had patrolled the streets in front of his premises continuously, and blocked up the doorway and entrance of his premises, used indecent language to those who had taken the places made vacant by the defendants in his employment, had interfered with and intimidated persons who desired to visit the plaintiff's premises to be employed, and for the purpose of trading, and had threatened persons whom he had employed to take the places of the defendants with bodily harm if they continued in his employment, and had caused new men so employed to leave his employment; that they had notified the insurance companies that his property was in danger and had attempted to procure the companies to cancel the insurance on his property; that they had followed the plaintiff's delivery team in various places and cities, and had been to his customers and threatened to injure them in their business if they continued to trade with him.

At the preliminary hearing a temporary injunction was issued restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's business by patrolling the sidewalk or street in front of his premises for the purpose of preventing any one in his employment or desirous of entering the same, from entering his employment or continuing in it; and also from obstructing or interfering with any person entering or leaving the plaintiff's premises, or intimidating by threats, or otherwise, any persons who might be in the employment of the plaintiff, or desiring to enter it, from so doing.

Upon the final hearing it was found that the defendants had conspired to prevent the plaintiff from getting workmen, and thereby carrying on his business unless he would adopt a schedule of prices satisfactory to them, and for no other purpose, and that the means adopted were, first, persuasion and social pressure, which affected the plaintiff disadvantageously. The court ruled that the employment of these means for the purpose of compelling the plaintiff to accede to the schedule of prices was lawful.

But the court found that as a further means the defendants had conveyed threats of personal injury or unlawful harm to persons seeking employment or employed, and ruled that this was unlawful and should be enjoined. As to the patrol in front of the plaintiff's premises, the court found that it consisted of two men changed every hour, and continued from half past six in the morning until half past five in the afternoon, on a busy Boston street, but ruled that this patrol, so far as it was confined to persuasion and giving notice of the strike was not unlawful, and limited the injunction accordingly.

The court also found some evidence of persuasion to break existing contracts, and declared that this was an unlawful interference with the rights of the employer and the employed, and when instituted for the purpose of interfering with the plaintiff's business became a private nui

sance.

As to the claim that the defendants' acts were justifiable, because they were only to secure better wages for themselves by compelling the plaintiff to accept their schedule. of wages, the court said this motive or purpose did not justify maintaining the patrol, and was not within allowable competition.

As to the suggestion that the defendants' acts might subject them to an indictment the court said this would not prevent the issue of an injunction, citing among other cases the Debs case, 158 U. S., and the Ann Arbor cases, 54 Fed. Rep.

The court also held that this interference was not justifiable, although it was with persons who were under no existing contract with the plaintiff; that such conduct was unlawful in any event, and the injunction should not be limited so as to relate only to persons who were bound by existing contracts, citing among other cases Flood v. Jackson, 11 T. L. R. 276.1

1 Since reversed in the House of Lords. See The Times, L. R. Vol. 14, p. 125.

Field, C. J., delivered an opinion discussing the matter of issuing injunctions in cases of this kind and criticising the decisions in Sherry v. Perkins and Spinning Company v. Riley.

He also said that he was not convinced that to persuade one person not to enter the employment of another by telling the truth to him about such other person and his business, was actionable at common law, whatever the motive might be. He said in the present case

"If the establishment of a patrol is using intimidation or force within the meaning of our statutes, it is illegal and criminal; if it does not amount to intimidation, or force, but is carried to such a degree as to interfere with the use by the plaintiff of his property, it may be illegal and actionable, but something more is necessary to justify issuing an injunction; if it is in violation of any ordinance of the city regulating the use of streets, there may be a prosecution for that, and the police can enforce the ordinance; but if it is merely a peaceful mode of finding out the persons who intend to go to the plaintiff's premises to apply for work, and of informing them of the actual facts of the case in order to induce them not to enter into the plaintiff's employment, in the absence of any statute relating to the subject I doubt if it is illegal, and I see no ground for issuing an injunction against it."

Holmes, J., who issued the preliminary injunction, and heard the case, also delivered an opinion dissenting from the propositions stated by the majority of the court, and saying that a patrol of two men did not necessarily carry with it a threat of bodily harm, and that if it did, the modified injunction made upon the final hearing covered it. He also said that

"the policy of allowing free competition justifies the intentional
inflicting of temporal damage, including the damage of inter-
ference with a man's business, by some means, when the
damage is done not for its own sake, but as an instrumentality
in reaching the end of victory in the battle of trade. .
The only debatable ground is the nature of the means by

which such damage may be inflicted. We all agree that it cannot be done by force or threats of force. We all agree, I presume, that it may be done by persuasion to leave a rival's shop and come to the defendant's. It may be done by the withdrawal, or threat to withdraw, such advantages from third persons who have a right to deal or not to deal with the plaintiff, as a means of inducing them not to deal with him either as customers or servants."

He said that in Sherry v. Perkins it appeared that the threats and intimidation there enjoined were of personal violence and intimidation by causing fear of personal violence. As to the general question of the propriety of dealing with this kind of case by injunction the court said nothing, as the defendants had no objection to the final decree. Curran v. Galen, N. Y. Court of Appeals, 152 N. Y. 33; 46 N. E. Rep. 297 (March 2, 1897).

Here a labor union and a brewers' association made a contract that all laborers in the companies belonging to the association should belong to the union, and no employé should work for a company more than four weeks without becoming a member of the union. Curran worked for a company more than four weeks and refused to join the union. The union then requested the company to discharge him and it did so. Curran then sued the members of the union who thus procured his discharge, for conspiracy to injure him. They replied that they requested Curran's discharge "solely in pursuance of the agreement, and without intent or purpose to injure the plaintiff in any way."

Upon demurrer the court at the trial term held the demurrer not good. Upon appeal the general term held it good1 and upon appeal to the court of appeals the demurrer was sustained upon the ground that the contract was against public policy and void. The Court said,

"Public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom in the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling, and

129 N. Y. Sup Ct. 116.

if the purpose of an organization or combination of workmen be to hamper or to restrict that freedom, and through contracts or arrangements with employers, to coerce other workmen to become members of the organization and to come under its rules and conditions under the penalty of the loss of their positions and of deprivation of employment, then that purpose seems clearly unlawful and militates against the spirit of our government and the nature of our institutions. The contract is, in effect, a threat to keep persons from working at the particular trade and procure their dismissal from employment. While it may be true, as argued, that the contract was entered into, on the part of the Ale Brewers' Association with the object of avoiding disputes and conflicts with the workingmen's organization, that feature and such an intention cannot aid the defense, nor legalize a plan of compelling workmen not in affiliation with the organization to join it, at the peril of being deprived of their employment and of means of making a livelihood."

I have stated this case as showing an interesting phase of labor controversy though the question of the exercise of equity power to enjoin did not arise in it.

Consolidated Steel, &c., Co. v. Murray, Circuit Court N. D. Ohio, (May 8, 1897) 80 Fed. Rep. 811.

This was a suit by a corporation manufacturing wire and nails to restrain employés who had struck for higher wages, and thus forced the company's works to be closed, from interfering with other persons who desired to work when the works were reopened.

It appeared that the defendants had resorted to threats, intimidation, and violence for this purpose, and Sage, D. J., held that an injunction should be issued to restrain them, citing specially the Massachusetts cases of Sherry v. Perkins and Vegelahn v. Guntner, and saying that while the defendants might

"peaceably and quietly persuade complainant's employés to quit work, persuasion with the hooting of a mob and deeds of violence as auxiliaries is not peaceable persuasion."