Nashville, &c., Rwy. Co. v. MacNiel (Circuit Court, Mid. Dist. Tenn. Decided August 19, 1897, 82 Fed. Rep. 65, 87).

Here the court issued an injunction to restrain the sale of centennial tickets to the Nashville Exposition in violation of the rules under which they were issued by the railroads, upon the ground that such issue was an interference with the lawful business of the railroads, and that the protection of that business was a proper subject for the granting of an injunction. To the suggestion that this was a novel proposition the court replied that that was of no consequence, that equity jurisdiction was flexible and was to be exercised whenever in the judgment of the court it was necessary, either from private or public considerations, saying:

"The court may properly take into account the public bearing of these actions, and whether the result will affect the public favorably or injuriously.”

To the suggestion that public interests could not be protected or taken into account in proceeding by private persons, the court said that the railway companies in effect represented the public, and continuing enlarged upon the benefit of the exposition to the public, saying:

"There is good ground, therefore, for the apprehension that it is now a vital question whether the exposition shall be the success hoped for, or whether it shall go down in defeat, with state pride humiliated simply in order that the particular practice complained of may continue. I refer to these public considerations because, as before stated, they are matters which justify appeal to the discretion of the court in determining what action shall be taken. Are the great public purposes of this exposition to be thus put in the balances and weighed against this particular branch of the ticket scalpers' trade ?”

The court further said that persons not parties to that suit would be amenable to the injunction if they obtained knowledge of it.

Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v.

Boyle,

Atty. Gen., et al. (Circuit Court, District of Kansas, decided September 27, 1897), 82 Fed. Rep. 705.

Here the federal court entertained a suit by a New York life insurance company against the attorney-general and superintendent of insurance of the state of Kansas to enjoin them from interfering with the business of the insurance company in that state by refusing to issue to it a certificate to do business therein, and to require the insurance commissioner to issue a certificate authorizing such business, and the court held that as the insurance commissioner was by the terms of the state statute plainly required to issue a certificate to the life insurance company, and as his refusal to do so was an injury to the business of the company, the federal court had power to issue the injunction asked in order to prevent irreparable injury to the business of the company, and issued a perpetual injunction against the superintendent of insurance

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restraining him from in any manner interfering with the company or its agents in the transaction of the insurance business in the state of Kansas, and commanding him to issue a license to the company as required by the laws of the state of Kansas, and restraining all others that might act or be called upon to act by the superintendent of insurance from interfering with said company in the transaction of business in Kansas,"

and also enjoined the attorney-general of the state "from bringing suits in behalf of the state upon the request of the insurance commissioner against the company or its agents for transacting its business in Kansas."

Swaine et al. v. Blakemore et al. (Circuit Court, city of St. Louis), decided November 2, 1897.

This was a suit between laborers. The plaintiffs, six in number, alleged that they were officers of the Local Union, No. 4, of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America; that the defendants were members of the Carpenters' District Council of St. Louis and vicinity of the

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America; and that the defendants had for the purpose of depriving the plaintiffs and their associates of the means of earning a livelihood in their calling, sought to secure the discharge of the plaintiffs and their associates from their employment, by representing to their employers that the plaintiffs were nonunion men, demanding their immediate discharge and threatening that if they were not discharged they, the defendants, would not allow any union men to work upon the job on which the plaintiffs were employed, and would boycott the employer and the work in which he was engaged. They alleged that in consequence of this conduct of the defendants a number of the plaintiffs had been discharged by their employers, and had been refused employment elsewhere solely on account of this conduct of the defendants. Wherefore they said that they were deprived of the means of earning a livelihood, and would suffer irreparable damage if the conduct of the defendants was not restrained by injunction.

The court held that the plaintiffs had a right to an opportunity to earn a livelihood by labor in their "chosen avocation"; that this right was property, and that the conduct of the defendants in preventing the exercise of that right to secure employment and labor was an irreparable injury to the freedom and rights of the plaintiffs, for which there was no adequate remedy at law. The bill was verified upon information and belief, an ex-parte injunction was issued upon it restraining the defendants by name

"and all persons acting in concert with them, or under their direction, orders, or control, from interfering with plaintiffs and their associates (naming them), or any one of them, in the peaceable pursuit of their avocation, and from interfering with or boycotting any employer for whom said plaintiffs, or their associates, or either of them may be working."

A demurrer to the bill was overruled, and upon subsequent information for contempt in violating the injunction, four of

the defendants were adjudged guilty of contempt and each fined $10 and costs.

Hopkins et al. v. Oxley Stave Co. (U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit), decided November 8, 1897. 83 Fed. Rep. 912.

This was an appeal from an order by the Circuit Court for the District of Kansas granting a preliminary injunction. It appeared that the Oxley Company manufactured barrels and casks at Kansas City, and had in use certain machines which lessened the cost of making the same. The defendants, not employés of the company but officers and members of trades unions, notified the company to discontinue the use of these machines, and to compel the company to do so, notified it that the members of all labor organizations throughout the country would be induced not to purchase any commodity which might be packed in the machine-hooped barrels or casks. The court enjoined the defendants against this threatened boycott and

"from in any way menacing, hindering, or obstructing the company by interfering with its business, or its customers and thus excluding it from the full enjoyment of such patronage or business as it might enjoy or possess independent of such interference."

From this injunction order an appeal was taken, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the order in an opinion delivered by Thayer, Circuit Judge, in which Sanborn, Circuit Judge, concurred. Caldwell, Circuit Judge, the other member of the court, dissented. The reason given by the majority of the court was that the defendants had combined to prescribe the manner in which the company should manufacture barrels and casks, and to enforce obedience to their orders by a species of intimidation which was "no less harmful than actual violence, and which usually ends in violence;" saying

"The fact cannot be overlooked that another object of the conspiracy was to deprive the public at large of the benefits. to be derived from a labor-saving machine, which seems to have been one of great utility. If a combination to that end is pronounced lawful, it follows that combinations may be organized for preventing the use of harvesters, threshers, steam looms and printing presses, type-setting machines, sewing machines, and a thousand other inventions which have added immeasurably to the productive power of human labor and the comfort and welfare of mankind."

Caldwell, C. J., was of the opinion that the court ought not to interfere in such cases, saying

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"All capital seeks to increase its power by combination, and to that end assumes the form of corporations and trusts. Many of these combinations are on a gigantic scale. They are the employers of the great mass of laborThe manager is tempted to reduce wages to increase dividends, and the laborers resist reduction and

ers.

demand living wages. Sometimes the struggle reaches
the point of open rupture. When it does the only weapon
of defence the laborer can appeal to is the strike, or the
boycott, or both. These weapons they have an undoubted
right to use so long as they use them in a peaceable and
orderly manner. This is the only lawful limitation upon
their use.
That limitation is fundamental and must be ob-
served. It was observed in the case at bar to its fullest
extent."

The opinion of Caldwell should be widely read. It is learned, accurate, and convincing.

In commenting upon this decision of the majority, a newspaper of the East said:

"Such decisions as this are responsible for the outcry that is going up all over the country that the writ of injunction is rapidly becoming an actual instrument of oppression."