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"took the conservative side and waited until the appearance of the troops on Sunday morning, July 8, which had a quieting effect. And in the meantime indictments had been returned by the grand jury."

Continuing he said:

"The action of the grand jury has had a wonderfully happy effect and things are proceeding now according to the regular course of law."1

The appendix to the attorney-general's report for 1896, from which these facts are mainly obtained, contains the telegraphic and other correspondence between the department of justice and others with regard to the labor disturbances of 1894, and was printed in response to a concurrent resolution of congress, passed in January, 1897. It contains the most, and probably the only, reliable information as to what did in fact suppress the riots and remove the obstruction to interstate commerce and the transmission of the mails.

An examination of it demonstrates beyond all question that it was not the arrest of Debs and a few of his confederates for contempt of court that suppressed these extensive riots and restored peace in Chicago and other places. It was not the injunction of the federal courts that put down the riots and removed obstructions to commerce and the transmission of the mails, but indictment by grand juries, arrest upon criminal process, and especially the presence of federal and state troops to the number of more than ten thousand, and the proclamation of the president proclaiming martial law in Chicago, that quelled the riots and removed the obstructions to interstate commerce and the transmission of the mails.

It is true that the federal troops went only in answer to a request from the United States district attorney and the federal courts ostensibly to aid the marshals in enforcing the

1Appendix Rep. Atty. Gen'l, 1896, p. 196.

injunctions of the courts. But the effect would have been precisely the same if they had been sent without that request, as they lawfully might and ought to have been. The president, as the Supreme Court held in the Debs case, had unquestioned authority to send the entire federal army to Chicago, or elsewhere, to suppress any combination, disorder, or riot, which interfered with interstate commerce and the transmission of the mails, without request from any district attorney or federal judge; and if he had done so the effect upon the rioters would have been precisely the same that it was when the troops were sent in answer to such request.

It was not the power of the federal courts to imprison for sixty or ninety days for violation of its injunction that removed these obstructions to commerce: It was the power of the executive to use military force even to the destruction of life, which accomplished the result. So far as the courts were concerned, the only result was that their processes were jeered at, their "omnibus injunctions" treated as mere judicial riot acts and disregarded, and the courts made the subject of criticism by many of the best and most lawabiding citizens.

The conduct of the courts in the cases which I have stated, and especially their conduct in Northern Pacific, Ann Arbor, and Chicago cases, caused discussion and criticism which has weakened the confidence of the people not only in the federal but in the state courts. It has also caused most ill-advised and mischievous legislative action.

On the first day of the next session of congress a bill was introduced in the senate providing:

"That in any case where a writ of injunction issues from
a court of the United States, or a judge thereof, to enjoin
the commission of an act which is, at common law or by
statute, a criminal offense, and where, afterwards, in such
case, it is charged that the party or parties defendant has
or have committed, or have attempted to commit, or have

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aided and abetted or encouraged or instigated other persons, or has or have conspired with other persons or has or have conspired with other persons to commit such act or offense, and where the said party or parties defendant is or are brought before said court or judge to answer the charge in proceedings for contempt, and where the charge is denied by the defendant or defendants, on request, a jury, shall be called to determine the fact."

"1

Other bills of a similar nature were afterwards introduced. See especially Senate Bill 418, entitled "A bill concerning the trial and punishment of contempts of the United States Courts."

These were referred to the Judiciary Committee, consisting of Senators George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, chairman, and Henry M. Teller, of Colorado; Orville H. Platt, of Connecticut; John H. Mitchell, of Oregon; Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota; Clarence D. Clark, of Wyoming; John M. Thurston, of Nebraska; James L. Pugh, of Alabama; James Z. George, of Mississippi; William F. Vilas, of Wisconsin; David B. Hill, of New York; William Lindsey, of Kentucky; and John W. Daniel, of Virginia.

The senate also adopted a resolution :

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"That the Judiciary Committee is hereby directed to investigate the law upon the whole subject of contempts of court,' as enforced by the federal courts, and to report to the senate whether any additional legislation is necessary for the protection of the rights of citizens; and if so, to report such legislation."

April 30th, 1896, this committee unanimously reported the following bill:

"A BILL in relation to contempts of court."

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: Contempts of court are divided into two classes, direct

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1 First session 54th Congress, Senate Bill, 237.

and indirect, and shall be proceeded against only as hereinafter prescribed.

"SEC. 2. That contempts committed during the sitting of the court, or of a judge at chambers, in its or his presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, are direct contempts. All others are indirect contempts.

"SEC. 3. That a direct contempt may be punished summarily without written accusation against the person arraigned, but if the court shall adjudge him guilty thereof a judgment shall be entered of record in which shall be specified the conduct constituting such contempt, with a statement of whatever defense or extenuation the accused offered thereto and the sentence of the court thereon. "SEC. 4. That upon the return of an officer on process or an affidavit duly filed, showing any person guilty of indirect contempt, a writ of attachment or other lawful process may issue, and such persons be arrested and brought before the court; and thereupon a written accusation, setting forth succinctly and clearly the facts alleged to constitute such contempt, shall be filed and the accused required to answer the same, by an order which shall fix the time therefor, and also the time and place for hearing the matter; and the court may, on proper showing, extend the time so as to give the accused a reasonable opportunity to purge himself of such contempt. After the answer of the accused, or if he refuse or fail to answer, the court may proceed at the time so fixed to hear and determine such accusation upon such testimony as shall be produced. If the accused answer, the trial shall proceed upon testimony produced as in criminal cases, and the accused shall be entitled to be confronted with the witnesses against him; but such trial shall be by the court, or, in its discretion, upon application of the accused, a trial by jury may be had as in any criminal case. If the accused be found guilty, judgment shall be entered accordingly, prescribing the punishment. "SEC. 5. That the testimony taken on the trial of any accusation of indirect contempt may be preserved by bill of exceptions, and any judgment of conviction therefor

may be reviewed upon direct appeal to or by writ of error from the supreme court, and affirmed, reversed, or modified, as justice may require. Upon allowance of an appeal or writ of error execution of the judgment shall be stayed, upon the giving of such bond as may be required by the court or a judge thereof, or by any justice of the supreme court.

"SEC. 6. That the provisions of this act shall apply to all proceedings for contempt in all courts of the United States except the supreme court; but this act shall not affect any proceedings for contempt pending at the time of the passage thereof."

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June 10th, 1896, the senate amended the bill so as to provide that in any case of indirect contempt the person charged should have an absolute right of trial by jury, and then passed the bill as thus amended without a dissenting vote. The only opposition to this was by that sound and conservative lawyer, Mr. Platt, of Connecticut, but even he admitted that "there should be some bill relating to the regulations of proceedings in contempt cases passed," and "not objecting to the principle which is contended for in the bill," only claimed that it made "no distinction between contempts, which are merely the disobedience by a witness or a juror of the command of a court, and the contempt which is the disobedience of such orders as were issued in the Ricks2 and Debs cases."

For these reasons, and because the subject was most important, and the bill "revolutionized the entire practice in equity proceedings," he only asked that it be postponed for a more full consideration than it was then possible to have in the closing hours of the session.

But the senate refused even this, and so far as it could by its action made this most mischievous bill the law of the United States

1 Senate Bill, No. 2984.

2 Obviously meaning by Judge Ricks in the Ann Arbor cases.

3 Cong. Rec., June 10, 1896, pp. 6998, 7008.

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