Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Lundine, we are delighted to have you with us. We will put your full statement in the record, and you may proceed. STATEMENT OF HON. STAN LUNDINE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK Mr. LUNDINE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, a few years ago, as you know, motivated by a rather parochial concern of having the only commercial reprocessing facility in the United States at West Valley, N.Y., I began to get a little interested in nuclear waste policy. I will not go into any detail of the West Valley legislation, but in the course of pursuing that it occurred to me that there was a polarization with respect to nuclear energy which was spilling over into an area of nuclear wastes that we ought to be able to solve, and that really there is a compelling national need for a comprehensive nuclear waste management policy. And just as we were able to even the poles, the industry and the environmental communities, to support that legislation, so too should we be able to develop a comprehensive approach to nuclear waste management that for once and for all gets the United States on the track of dealing with this, perhaps our most serious environmental problem. I commend you for your longstanding interest. I know I have worked with you on the Science Committee in addressing this problem and I hope that this committee will be able to report out nuclear waste legislation. I would like to make a few comments about my views on the various controversial aspects of this legislation, and I will try not to be redundant from testimony already received. First of all, our foremost priority must be development of a permanent licensed repository, and I think we should always keep that in mind even in addressing some of these other issues. I introduced legislation calling for the development of a mission plan to carry out the goals and integrate the timetables in this process. I think that it is important that we acknowledge that we need, a definite mission plan to accomplish in developing this permanent repository-to isolate these wastes from the biosphere. Second, I believe a consensus or conflict resolution mechanism must be available to the individual States in their disputes with the Federal Government over the selection of sites for permanent repositories. I do not favor a State veto, for the very simple reason that you will never get a repository. Likewise, I frankly think that those who advocate that both Houses of Congress and the President must overrule State vetoes are inviting a cumbersome process where you will never get a repository. And there is a constitutional problem with a single-house veto. Therefore, only as an option I commend to your review a suggestion I put forward to have a mediation and arbitration board with representatives from the States, representatives from Congress, representatives from the industry, and the environmental community on it to make those decisions. I am not sure that my suggestion is perfect, but I think that it might be a mediation and arbi tration capability which might allow us to solve the problems and still give the States their due recognition. And I am certainly not one who would want to abridge that right. Third, with respect to defense nuclear wastes, I see no justifiable reason to treat them separately. As you already pointed out, technically there is no reason to do so. However, as you have just discussed with the distinguished Senator from South Carolina, there are political problems. I would offer this suggestion: Possibly including a provision which would exempt defense nuclear waste from this bill for a limited period of time, say 2 years. Under such a provision, if the Armed Services Committees want to legislate separately, it gives them a period of time to do that, and if they want to integrate it into the same repository or take some other action they would have time to do that. But it also recognizes in this legislation what the chairman has so cogently pointed out, that ultimately both defense and civilian waste should be dealt with and should be treated in a safe manner, consistent with the highest standards of protecting public health and safety. Fourth, on the question of interim storage, I think that we must first recognize that to the extent that Federal support for interim storage is increased, progress on permanent disposal is likely to decrease. And so it seems to me that we should not have any interim storage unless it is necessary. Personally, I urge you to outright reject the idea of monitored retrievable storage, and I will not say any more about that unless you are interested. The utilities have the capacity. I really do not think, either, that there is a need for an AFR. I think that the utilities have the capacity to deal with their interim spent fuel storage problem and that there is no need to mandate in this legislation the development of federally mandated away-fromreactor storage facilities. The issue of interim storage is principally that of determining who will have the management responsibility for the storage of utilities' spent fuel. The technology for storing spent fuel is well known. The safety record of the utilities is excellent. And I would point out, new dry storage technologies have been developed and promise to make significant contributions to the utility capability to meet interim storage needs. The necessary regulations for licensing these technologies have been put into place by the NRC. I would like to also point out that TVA and Florida Power & Light are conducting a licensed demonstration of dry-cask storage at their reactor site. So I really believe that dry storage offers a more economical solution to this problem, that it does not require transportation to and away from reactor sites. I would point out to the subcommittee that in the entire experience we have had in this area, the estimated time when reactors will begin to experience shortfall in their own storage capacity has constantly been pushed back. So I urge you not to rush forward with AFR's that may or may not be necessary with this new technology. However, I understand that some maintain that we should have a last resort, an insurance policy, if you will, as a sort of standby in the event that it is needed so that the Federal Government will not force a reactor to shut down because of a lack of spent fuel storage capacity. I agree with that. No one wants a reactor, I do not think, to shut down for that reason, or, I do not think it is reasonable to ask that it be shut down for that reason. Therefore, in terms of this insurance policy, I would suggest three criteria that should be attached to any AFR authorization, and I would insist that we try to get the maximum agreement between the industry, the environmentalists, and come to an informal understanding that we are going to stick to this position in the conference with the Senate, given the fact that, as the Senator from South Carolina has testified, it was a very close vote over there. The three criteria I would suggest are: First, that it be limited to 1,700 metric tons, as approved by the House Interior Committee; Second, that it be subject to a finding by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that all other options have been exhausted for utility storage; Third, that it be limited to existing civilian research facilities that are owned by the Federal Government on the date of the enactment of this act. That means, I think, that we are very carefully defining that an AFR is only a standby, but that we are assuring the industry no reactor will in fact be shut down for those reasons. And I think under those circumstances the emergency nature of any shutdown threat could be properly dealt with. Finally, with respect to interim storage, I think we should streamline the licensing process for interim storage of spent fuel. And it seems to me the procedures adopted by the Interior Committee in H.R. 3089 streamline this approach and strike a balance. [Testimony resumes on p. 388.] [The prepared statement of Mr. Lundine follows:] Statement of Congressman Stan Lundine Before Subcommittee on Energy, Conservation and Power June 10, 1982 Motivated by the desire to resolve a serious nuclear waste management problem in my Congressional district at West Valley, New York, six years ago I set out as a member of this legislative body in search of a comprehensive national policy on nuclear waste management as a framework for resolving my parochial concerns, What I found instead was confusion in our federal agencies and in the Congress, and apprehension at the state and local level regarding the direction of our national effort. There was a great deal of controversy regarding what the appropriate direction of a national program might be, and a lack of commitment on the part of all government officials to make the tough choices needed in order to launch an effective national program. Since that time, Congress in its infinite wisdom provided me support in my quest to launch an effort to help deal with my parochial problem of the disposition of 600,000 gallons of high level liquid nuclear waste at West Valley. This was a significant step forward in our commitment to a broader solution to all of our nuclear waste problem. While as Congress directed, work has begun at West Valley, the solidification of these nuclear wastes will be preceding in a dangerous policy vacuum unless we can also put in place a national commitment, and define a policy, for implementation of a comprehensive and permanent disposal system for our nuclear wastes. The high level liquid wastes which we will solidify at West Valley and from the defense program, and the commercial spent fuel currently being stored at sites around the country must find their way into a permanent repository that will isolate them from the biosphere for their hazardous lifetime. Until we have accomplished this goal, as a nation we cannot claim to have solved our nuclear waste problem. As such, it is important that Congress enact a comprehensive nuclear waste policy 2 If our national effort is to be credible to the American people, and if it is to be fair to all interests so as not to require anyone to bear an unequal share of this burden, there must be a consensus on several points. First, our foremost priority must be the development of a permanent licensed repository system for the disposal of solidified commercial and defense wastes and spent nuclear fuel. Accordingly, everything possible must be done to insure that our national resources are not sidetracked and applied to the development of interim storage options as a substitute for permanent disposal. We must also proceed with the implementation of a sound technical plan and institutional strategy for the development of a repository system licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that has continuity over the years. To address this point, I included in legislation- I intorduced earlier this Congress, H.R. 1993, a call for the development of a mission plan to carry out the goals and integrate the timetables of this bill. Such a plan would make sure that we do not experience substantial delays in the program because of poor program planning, or lack of continuity in program planning efforts across changes in political Administrations. A modified version of this concept was adopted by the Science |