and pacific, to explain that he was compelled to extend the dominion of England by the need of counteracting the design of France, and that he had insisted on reducing the armies of the native princes in order to preserve them against a nation who 'considered all the thrones of the world as the sport and prey of their boundless ambition and insatiable rapine'' But Mysore, Hyderabad, and Oudh had now been placed beyond danger of the French contagion; and Lord Wellesley was able to record that 'the only native powers of importance now remaining in India independent of British protection are the confederate Maratha States.' It could only be through a perverse contrariety of spirit that, notwithstanding his solemn warnings against the machinations of France, the European power which the Marathas persisted in regarding with uneasiness was England. Their restless character, the advantages presented by their local position to the future intrigues of France, and the number of French officers in the service of Sindia, convinced the Governor-General that it was a matter of indispensable precaution to acquire an ascendancy in the councils of the Maratha Empire, and to frame a system of political connexion that should preserve a powerful barrier against them. This barrier had now been erected by the subsidiary treaties with the Mahomedan States; and as the three leading Maratha chiefs-Sindia, Holkar, and the Rája of Nágpore-were contending among themselves in arms for supremacy, the time was opportune for interposing with an offer of protection to the nominal chief of their confederacy at Poona, where the government was threatened by three predatory armies, subsisting at

See his letter (1799) to Tippu Sultan, who may possibly have thought that this description did not apply exclusively to the French.

large on the country. combined to upset the Peshwa they might seize command of the whole Maratha Empire; and, what was still more important, their next step would probably be a combination against the English.

If the chiefs of these armies

The Peshwa, Báji Rao, had hitherto evaded all overtures from the English for a subsidiary treaty; but there was bitter feud between him and Holkar, whose brother he had cruelly executed, and who was now marching upon his capital. When Sindia came to the Peshwa's assistance, there was a great battle, in which Holkar was nearly defeated, until he charged the enemy at the head of his cavalry with such desperate energy that the allied army was driven off the field with the loss of all their guns and baggage. The Peshwa fled to a fortress, whence he despatched a messenger to solicit help from the English; and soon afterward he took refuge in Bassein, close to Bombay, where he signed a treaty of general defensive alliance with the British government, under which he ceded districts yielding a revenue equivalent to the cost of a strong subsidiary force, to be permanently stationed within his territory, and all the Peshwa's foreign relations were to be subordinated to the policy of England.

The treaty of Bassein1 also accomplished another leading object of Lord Wellesley's policy, for by admitting the British government to mediate in all the exorbitant claims that the Marathas were pressing against the Nizám, it placed the Hyderabad State definitely under the protection of the English, to whom in future all such demands were to be referred. No time was lost in acting upon this important engagement. The Peshwa was escorted back to Poona by a British force 1 December, 1802.

under General Arthur Wellesley; and it was signified to the contending Maratha chiefs that their central government had been taken under British protection. This masterful proceeding alarmed even Lord Castlereagh, who wrote to the Governor-General some remonstrances against a step which 'tended to involve us in the endless and complicated distractions of the turbulent Maratha Empire.' He replied that the influence of the French in the Maratha camp was still to be feared, an argument that prevailed easily over an English ministry who were just bracing up the national strength, after a short breathing time, for a second and still closer wrestle with Buonaparte.

Lord Wellesley's political system was now reaching its climax. His subsidiary troops were encamped at the capitals of the four great Indian powers which had been our political rivals, at Mysore, Hyderabad, Lucknow, and Poona; all disputes among these States were to be submitted to his arbitration, and the interference of all other European nations was to be rigidly excluded. Upon these pillars he was building up firmly the inevitable preponderance of a steady, civilized, orderly administration over the jarring, incoherent rulerships by which it was surrounded. But it was not to be expected that the Treaty of Bassein would be otherwise than unpalatable to the Maratha chiefs, who saw that a blow had been struck at the root of their confederacy, and that the establishment of paramount British influence at Poona not only checkmated their movement against the capital, but was a sure step toward the subversion of their own independence. The maintenance of the head of the Maratha empire in a condition of dependent relation to the British government would naturally, in the course of time, tend to reduce the other Maratha

powers into a similar condition of subordination, which was precisely what they feared and were determined to resist. They withheld acknowledgment of the treaty, questioned the Peshwa's right to conclude it without their consent, suspended their internal feuds, and seemed inclined to combine against the common danger.

The Maratha chief of Nágpore (commonly called the Rája of Berar), who had great influence over all the other leaders, succeeded in organizing a league against the British; but Holkar, although he agreed to a truce with Sindia, refused to join, and the Guikwar of Baroda kept apart. Sindia, however, effected his junction with the Nágpore Rája, when both chiefs evaded the demand of the British envoy for a direct explanation of their intentions, and marched up to the frontier of Hyderabad. It was in the interest of the Marathas to gain time, for they hoped that Holkar might be persuaded to enter the league; it was for the same reason important to the British that the two chiefs should be forced to decide speedily between peace or war. The GovernorGeneral was now again in his element, for in Europe a renewal of the French war was evidently at hand; the English ministers had warned him that a French squadron was preparing at Brest for the East Indies, they had authorized him to retain possession of the French settlements that were to be restored under the Amiens Treaty, and they had desired him to keep his forces on a war-footing. At the same time, some observations, which appeared to the Governor-General particularly inopportune, were conveyed to him upon the increase of his military expenditure and the diversion. of funds on which the Company relied for their trade.

Lord Wellesley, who had offered to resign, requested the ministers to 'consider the alarm and anger of the

Court of Directors on this latter subject with the indulgence which true wisdom extends to the infirmities of prejudice, ignorance, and passion'; while he prepared with alacrity to attack the Maratha confederates simultaneously in various quarters, and to open the impending war on the largest possible scale. The rupture with France intensified, as usual, his sense of the emergent necessity of bringing all the military powers of India under our supreme control. For although there was little real danger, as Arthur Wellesley pointed out, of the French being able to join forces with the Marathas -since their troops, even if they could land, would be destitute of equipments, and would be cut off from their base of supply-yet undoubtedly a great European war must always add risks to our position in India. Lord Wellesley also saw clearly enough that the security of the dominion that he was establishing on land depended essentially upon our maintaining a commanding superiority at sea. He urged upon the ministry at home that so long as the Cape of Good Hope and the Mauritius were in French hands (for the Dutch were entirely under French influence) the coasts of India could be molested, or our enemies inland might be encouraged by expectations of aid from France. He spared, in short, no pains or preparations that might enable him so to use this opportunity of renewed hostilities in Asia and Europe as to accomplish 'the complete consolidation of the British Empire in India and the future tranquillity of Hindusthan.' Whatever may be thought of the methods occasionally used by Lord Wellesley to compass these ends, it is impossible to withhold our admiration from a conception so large, from so clear and far-ranging a survey of the political

horizon.