into New York and New Jersey, and invested on the best landed security at that rate. We have personal knowledge of this being actually done; and, in the report of the committee of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, it is stated to be a thing of frequent occurrence. It is certainly the result naturally to be expected.

Now, suppose the legal interest in Pennsylvania were enhanced to seven per cent., thereby equalizing it with the legal rate of New York and New Jersey, it is perfectly clear that the drain from this state would be removed, and this species of capital invested within our own limits; if the legal rate in Pennsylvania were increased to eight per cent., the current would then take a turn, and the money in the hands of conscientious capitalists, in all those states where the legal rate is less than eight per cent., would flow in upon us. Carry the matter still farther, and abolish all restrictions upon the rate of interest; and it is obvious, that the money in all those states where usury laws are in existence, would direct its course towards Pennsylvania, until we should be flooded with funds from all quarters, seeking a profitable investment. This cur. rent would continue to flow, until the supply of money exceeded the demand for it, at certain rates of interest.

Now, what would be the effect of all this upon the rates of interest? Clearly to reduce these rates: 1st, by making money more abundant in the market; 2d, by removing the risk which always attends a violation of the law; 3d, by obviating the necessity of negotiating usurious loans through the medium of a third person, and thereby saving brokerage commissions.

We hold these three reasons to be good and sufficient. The only means by which a rush of specie into Pennsylvania (supposing the act of 1723 were repealed), from the other states of the union, could be prevented, would be by the repeal of the usury laws of those states; these laws being all thus repealed, the states (setting aside their difference of enterprise and commercial character), would stand upon an equal footing. But this is a thing which cannot be apprehended-at least for many years, and perhaps never; for the strong prejudices against usury, which exist through the country, and particularly in those parts of it which are rather agricultural than commercial, would render the accomplishment of such an object (if at all possible) a work of much time and labour. In regard to our pecuniary relations with foreign countries, we will take occasion to observe, that the general repeal of usury laws throughout the Union would avail more than any other measure, towards counterbalancing the disadvantages under which we labour, from the great disproportion existing between our exports and imports. It would greatly contribute to this result

by encouraging the introduction of foreign capital; which, of itself, would in a great measure compensate for the vast amounts of specie annually exported from this country for the payment of foreign debts. It must be perfectly apparent to every one, that a foreign capitalist will not send his money a distance of three thousand miles, for the purpose of illegal "shaving." This is an operation often attended with considerable hazard; and very little money is employed in this way, unless under the immediate management or superintendence of the lender-the calculation of the credit of the borrower, and the risk attending the violation of law, is with difficulty confided to the agency of a third person. But take away the legal prohibition, and the objections of foreigners to sending their capital would be removed, because they could then make a profitable investment upon substantial landed security. In the case of shaving, by means of an agent, the possible infidelity of that agent in performing the duties of his trust, would be a matter for serious consideration. In the case of investment upon ground rent, or bond and mortgage, no such consideration could arise.

2. We have said that the effect of the usury laws is to enhance the rate of interest, by increasing the risk to the lender -the lender must, therefore, insure himself against the operation of that law, by a charge of additional interest; this would be the case under any circumstances; but the law is doubly operative in producing this effect, inasmuch as it drives out competition; for there are many individuals who could not be induced, by the most exorbitant interest, to hazard the violation of law. Independently of the hazard, and the moral consideration, there is even to the present day a certain degree of disrepute attendant upon the character of the usurer, which also exercises a great restraining influence.

So many capitalists being thus prevented from bringing their money into the market, it follows as a consequence that those who are not driven out, having less competition to encounter, have less to restrain them from increasing the rates of interest. We believe that a confederation among money lenders to enhance interest beyond the actual market rate, is exceedingly difficult, and perhaps not possible; but if it be possible, it is clear that it would be rendered so, by diminishing the number of operative capitalists; for the fewer their number, the more easily can they act in concert. There needs no laboured demonstration to prove this. No necessity, however, would exist for this concert of action; for by driving competition from the market, the supply of money would be so far reduced below the demand, as to enable lenders to require from borrowers a sufficiently exorbitant interest,

3. A repeal of these laws would have a tendency to abolish brokerage commissions upon illegal negotiations. It is well known that, under the existing order of things, very few negotiations, for the loan of money at illegal interest, are made without the agency of a broker. The broker, of course, receives a regular compensation for effecting the transaction, which is generally one quarter of one per cent. upon the gross amount of the loan, and this commission is always paid by the borrower. A is in want of a loan of eight thousand dollars for two months; he employs B, a broker, to procure him the money, which he accordingly does, from C, a capitalist. C's charge for interest is one and a half per cent. a month, amounting in all to $240-B's charge for commissions is one quarter per cent. upon the whole sum, amounting to $20. Thus we see, that A is obliged to pay $260 for the use of $8000 for two months. It is self evident, if the object of the parties to a contract of this nature, in employing the broker, be the evasion of the penalty attached to a breach of the usury laws, that the repeal of those laws would altogether abolish such an agency for such a purpose, and the borrower and lender would then negotiate with each other in propriis personis; so that, in the case we have supposed, A would have only $240 to pay for his loan, instead of $260.

We know it is adversely asserted, that the repeal of the law would not remove the necessity of a broker's agency; and this is strenuously insisted upon, on the ground that brokers are continually employed in the purchase and sale of real estate, and the stocks of incorporated companies. But the circumstances, under which the different agencies are conducted, destroy the analogy. In the first place, there is no regular place of resort, where buyers and sellers of real estate can meet for the purpose of conducting their negotiations. If a man wishes to buy a house, he never thinks of going to the Exchange to effect his object, (unless in pursuance of a sheriff's advertisement,) because it is not customary for holders thus to offer their property at private sale. A broker's office takes the place of an Exchange, and a register is there kept of much of the real estate in the market. This is the usual way in which holders advertise for sale. Purchasers, however, in addition to these, are actuated by other motives. Houses are not sold at a regu lar market rate, as money is,--their prices do not so much

So in the case of loans upon real security,-agents are in general employed to effect them. Such transactions require much investigation, both as respects the value of the property and the validity of the title. Formal papers are also essential. Securities of this description are very different from commercial papers, and may well demand for their negotiation an intermediate person.

depend upon the demand and supply, but are influenced more by the character of the seller, and the fancy of the buyer. A great deal of bargaining, therefore, is sometimes required in making a purchase; and thus a broker is employed by the purchaser, in consequence of his superior knowledge of the value of real estate, and skill in conducting such a negotiation. So also in the purchase of bank and other stocks, a skilful broker, by a species of finesse, may often operate several per cent. more advantageously at the stock and exchange board, than the actual purchaser could do for himself in the street. The commissions paid to the agents in both these cases, are therefore well applied, and are perhaps often the means of saving a hundred times the amount to the principals.

Now, the lending and borrowing of money upon a promissory note is so simple a transaction, that no skill whatever is necessary to effect it. The first thing to be ascertained, is the current value of money in the market; than which, as we have said, nothing is more easy, for it is a matter of notoriety to every one who resorts to the Exchange; this being ascertained, the borrower walks up to one of the numerous capitalists who throng the place "where merchants most do congregate," hands him the business or accommodation paper (as the case may be) which he wants discounted, gets the money at the rate agreed on between the parties, and the affair is settled. It is no argument on the other side, to say, that brokerage is so trifling as not to be worthy of consideration in this discussion. Reflect, for a moment, upon the vast sums that are loaned in this market by private capitalists,-they annually amount to millions of dollars, and the broker pockets his quarter per cent. commission upon every dollar of it. It matters not whether the loan be long or short-for a month or for a year-the commission is still the same.

We assert, then, that the act of 1723 is not only totally inefficacious, but actually promotes that which it is intended to prevent upon this ground alone it should be immediately repealed. We believe that we have already demonstrated this to be the effect of the law, and it will not be necessary to pursue this point further. But it is argued by the advocates of limited rates, that the inefficiency of a law, provided that law be aimed at the prevention of crime, is not a good reason for its repeal. We have already shown that, according to the Bible itself, usury is not a crime; but, independently of that, we take leave to enquire, why should our statute book be lumbered with an accumulation of laws which never have effected any useful purpose? "If the law does no good," we are answered, "neither does it do any harm, and therefore we would have it remain.” Even upon this supposition we would advocate a repeal; but

we say that the act of 1723 does work an infinite deal of harm, and we trust we have made this apparent.

If the law attaching the penalty of death to the crime of murder were inoperative to such an extent as in no degree to prevent the commission of murder, we would rescind it; because we think that an inoperative law is worse than no law at all. This, however, is a matter concerning which different opinions may be entertained, but if this law against murder were not only ineffectual in preventing, but actually tended to produce murders, we are unable to see how a difference of opinion could exist on the subject.

It is sufficiently obvious, from what we have seen, that the present law against usury is worse than inefficient. It is equally clear that the ingenuity of man could not devise a law which would be an efficient substitute. In a community which is in its character so essentially commercial, if it were possible to frame an effective law, it would not for a moment be tolerated; and we do believe that it is nothing but the total incompetency of the act of 1723, which prevents the people from raising an united voice against it.

There is one thing which cannot but strike every reflecting person in regard to this act; we mean, the corrupting influence which it exercises upon the morals of the people. The second section runs thus:

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"If any person or persons whatsoever do or shall receive or take more than six pounds per cent. per annum, on any such bond or contract as aforesaid, upon conviction thereof, the person or persons so offending shall forfeit the money and other things lent, one half thereof to the governor, for the support of the government, and the other half to the person who shall sue for the same, by action of debt, bill, plaint or information, in any court of record within this province, wherein no essoin, protection or wager of law, or any more than one imparlance, shall be allowed."

Now can any man read this most iniquitous statute and fail to see that it holds out a reward to the blackest treachery and ingratitude? We have no reference now to those common informers, who, for the sake of pecuniary gain, make it a business to prosecute for every breach of law to which a money penalty is attached. Such characters, we all agree, are despicable enough. But when a party to a solemn contract, entered into for the purposes of mutual benefit, is enabled, nay, encouraged, by the law to avoid that contract by the deliberate violation of his manly honour, we earnestly protest against the longer continuance of such a blot upon the pages of our statute book.

The common informer may seek to justify his business by the benefit resulting to society from the punishment of crime.