the separation from the British empire, the people of America preferred the establishment of themselves into thirteen separate sovereignties, instead of incorporating themselves into one. To these they look up for the security of their lives, liberties, and properties; to these they must look up. The federal government they formed to defend the whole against foreign nations in time of war, and to ' defend the lesser states against the ambition of the larger. They are afraid of granting power unnecessarily, lest they should defeat the original end of the Union; lest the powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular states which the Union was meant to support, and expose the lesser to being swallowed up by the larger. He conceived, also, that the people of the states, having already vested their powers in their respective legislatures, could not resume them without a dissolution of their governments. He was against conventions in the states was not against assisting states against rebellious subjects thought the federal plan of Mr. Patterson did not require coercion more than the national one, as the latter must depend for the deficiency of its revenues on requisitions and quotas and that a national judiciary, extended into the states, would be ineffectual, and would be viewed with a jealousy inconsistent with its usefulness.122

Mr. SHERMAN seconded and supported Mr. Lansing's motion. He admitted two branches to be necessary in the state legislatures, but saw no necessity in a confederacy of states. The examples were all of a single council. Congress carried us through the war, and perhaps as well as any government could have done. The complaints at present are, not that the views of Congress are unwise or unfaithful, but that their powers are insufficient for the execution of their views. The national debt, and the want of power somewhere to draw forth the national resources, are the great matters that press. All the states were sensible of the defect of power in Congress. He thought much might be said in apology for the failure of the state legislatures to comply with the Confederation. They were afraid of leaning too hard on the people by accumulating taxes; no constitutional rule had been, or could be observed in the quotas; the accounts also were unsettled, and every state supposed itself in advance rather than in arrears. For want of a general system, taxes to a due amount had not been drawn from trade, which was the most convenient resource. As almost all the states had agreed to the recommendation of Congress on the subject of an impost, it appeared clearly that they were willing to trust Congress with power to draw a revenue from trade. There is no weight, therefore, in the argument drawn from a distrust of Congress; for money matters being the most important of all, if the people will trust them with power as to them, they will trust them with any other necessary powers. Congress, indeed, by the Confederation, have in fact the right of saying how much the people shall pay, and to what purpose it shall be applied; and this right was granted to them in the expectation that it would

in all cases have its effect. If another branch were to be added to Congress, to be chosen by the people, it would serve to embarrass. The people would not much interest themselves in the elections; a few designing men in the large districts would carry their points; and the people would have no more confidence in their new representatives than in Congress. He saw no reason why the state legislatures should be unfriendly, as had been suggested, to Congress. If they appoint Congress, and approve of their measures, they would be rather favorable and partial to them. The disparity of the states in point of size, he perceived, was the main difficulty. But the large states had not yet suffered from the equality of votes enjoyed by the smaller ones. In all great and general points, the interests of all the states were the same. The state of Virginia, notwithstanding the equality of votes, ratified the Confederation without even proposing any alteration. Massachusetts also ratified without any material difficulty, &c. In none of the ratifications is the want of two branches noticed or complained of. To consolidate the states, as some had proposed, would dissolve our treaties with foreign nations, which had been formed with us, as confederated states. He did not, however, suppose that the creation of two branches in the legislature would have such an effect. If the difficulty on the subject of representation cannot be otherwise got over, he would agree to have two branches, and a proportional representation in one of them, provided each state had an equal voice in the other. This was necessary, to secure the rights of the lesser states, otherwise three or four of the large states would rule the others as they please. Each state, like each individual, had its peculiar habits, usages, and manners, which constituted its happiness. It would not, therefore, give to others a power over this happiness, any more than an individual would do, when he could avoid it.123

Mr. WILSON urged the necessity of two branches; observed, that if a proper model was not to be found in other confederacies, it was not to be wondered at. The number of them was small, and the duration of some, at least, short. The Amphictyonic and Achæan were formed in the infancy of political science, and appear, by their history and fate, to have contained radical defects. The Swiss and Belgic confederacies were held together, not by any vital principle of energy, but by the incumbent pressure of formidable neighboring nations. The German owed its continuance to the influence of the House of Austria. He appealed to our own experience for the defects of our confederacy. He had been six years, of the twelve since the commencement of the revolution, a member of Congress, and had felt all its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others, whether, on many important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by the small members of the Union. The success of the revolution was owing to other causes than the constitution of Congress. In many instances it went on even against the difficulties arising from Congress themselves. He admitted that the large states

did accede, as had been stated, to the Confederation in its present form; but it was the effect of necessity, not of choice. There are other instances of their yielding, from the same motive, to the unreasonable measures of the small states. The situation of things is now a little altered. He insisted that a jealousy would exist between the state legislatures and the general legislature, observing, that the members of the former would have views and feelings very distinct, in this respect, from their constituents. A private citizen of a state is indifferent whether power be exercised by the general or state legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his happiness. His representative has an interest in its being exercised by the body to which he belongs. He will therefore view the national legislature with the eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Congress to the people at large had always been better received, and produced greater effect, than those made to the legislatures. 124

On the question for postponing, in order to take up Mr. Lansing's proposition, "to vest the powers of legislation in Congress,"

Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, ay, 4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 6. Maryland, divided.

On motion of the deputies from Delaware, the question on the second resolution in the report from the Committee of the Whole was postponed till to-morrow. Adjourned.

THURSDAY, June 21.

In Convention. Mr. Jonathan Dayton, from New Jersey, took his

seat.

The second resolution in the report from the Committee of the Whole being under consideration,

Dr. JOHNSON. On a comparison of the two plans which had been proposed from Virginia and New Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity which characterized the latter was its being calculated to preserve the individuality of the states. The plan from Virginia did not profess to destroy this individuality altogether, but was charged with such a tendency. One gentleman alone, (Col. Hamilton,) in his animadversions on the plan of New Jersey, boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of the state governments. Mr. Wilson and the gentleman from Virginia, who also were adversaries of the plan of New Jersey, held a different language. They wished to leave the states in possession of a considerable, though a subordinate, jurisdiction. They had not yet, however, shown how this could consist with, or be secured against, the general sovereignty and jurisdiction which they proposed to give to the national government. If this could be shown, in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the New Jersey propositions that the individuality of the states would not be endangered, many of their objections would, no doubt, be removed. If this could not be shown, their objections would have their full force. He wished it, therefore, to be well considered,

whether, in case the states, as was proposed, should retain some portion of sovereignty at least, this portion could be preserved, without allowing them to participate effectually in the general government — without giving them each a distinct and equal vote for the purpose of defending themselves in the general councils.

Mr. WILSON'S respect for Dr. Johnson, added to the importance of the subject, led him to attempt, unprepared as he was, to solve the difficulty which had been started. It was asked, how the general government and individuality of the particular states could be reconciled to each other, and how the latter could be secured against the former? Might it not, on the other side, be asked, how the former was to be secured against the latter? It was generally admitted, that a jealousy and rivalship would be felt between the general and particular governments. As the plan now stood, though indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of the general government (the Senate, or second branch) was to be appointed by the state legislatures. The state legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the general government, would have an opportunity of defending their rights. Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to the general government of defending itself, by having an appointment of some one constituent branch of the state governments? If a security be necessary on one side, it would seem reasonable to demand it on the other. But, taking the matter in a more general view, he saw no danger to the states from the general government. In case a combination should be made by the large ones, it would produce a general alarm among the rest, and the project would be frustrated. But there was no temptation to such a project. The states having in general a similar interest, in case of any propositions in the national legislature to encroach on the state legislatures, he conceived a general alarm would take place in the national legislature itself; that it would communicate itself to the state legislatures; and would finally spread among the people at large. The general government will be as ready to preserve the rights of the states, as the latter are to preserve the rights of individuals, all the members of the former having a common interest, as representatives of all the people of the latter, to leave the state governments in possession of what the people wish them to retain. He could not discover, therefore, any danger whatever on the side from which it was apprehended. On the contrary, he conceived that, in spite of every precaution, the general government would be in perpetual danger of encroachments from the state governments.125

Mr. MADISON was of opinion, in the first place, that there was less danger of encroachment from the general government than from the state governments; and, in the second place, that the mischiefs from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the latter.

1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the greater tendency, in such systems, to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobe

dience of the members than usurpations of the federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this tendency. But it will be said, that the proposed change in the principles and form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the general government will have real and greater powers, and will be derived, in one branch at least, from the people, not from the governments of the states. To give full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the general legislature, and the states reduced to corporations dependent on the general legislature, -why should it follow that the general government would take from the states any branch of their power, as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desirable to the people? In some of the states, particularly in Connecticut, all the townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction: have the representatives of the people of the townships in the legislature of the state ever endeavored to despoil the townships of any part of their local authority? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people, they are attached to it; and their representatives, chosen by and amenable to them, naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a general government to state governments is parallel.

2. Guards were more necessary against encroachments of the state governments on the general government, than of the latter on the former. The great objection made against an abolition of the state governments was, that the general government could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not against the probable abuse of the general power, but against the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable, it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the convenience of the general government itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate governments. Were it practicable for the general government to extend its care to every requisite object without the coöperation of the state governments, the people would not be less free, as members of one great republic, than as members of thirteen small ones. A citizen of Delaware was not more free than a citizen of Virginia ; nor would either be more free than a citizen of America. Supposing, therefore, a tendency in the general government to absorb the state governments, no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the state governments towards an independence on the general government, and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them must have suggested to the states the experiment we are now making to prevent the calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous task.